Delegates Archives - Countering WMD Disinformation

UNGA First Committee Primer 2026

Erik — Sun, 11 Oct 2026 16:06:47 +0000

Countering Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear (CBRN) Disinformation

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee

BRIEFING NOTE | October 2026

Disinformation* by State-sponsored and State-adjacent actors has been observed across multilateral fora and will likely feature at the 81st session of the UNGA First Committee. For further information: www.GPWMDCounterDisinfo.com.

WHY IS DISINFORMATION A RISK AT THE UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE?

CBRN disinformation refers to deliberately false or manipulated information concerning CBRN equipment, technologies or materials. In the First Committee, statements, rights of reply and official documents can be used to place unfounded allegations into the UN record, consuming negotiating time and recasting political disagreement as contested questions of fact that the Committee has no mandate to verify. Member States are also targeted directly, through misrepresented verification findings or fabricated allegations about their civilian and scientific activities. Such claims erode confidence in the UN system and in international verification bodies, fuel friction among Member States and disrupt negotiations. Understanding recurring narratives and tactics equips delegations to pre-emptively debunk falsehoods, alert others to emerging patterns and build State and institutional resilience.

WHAT DISINFORMATION NARRATIVES COULD BE ENCOUNTERED AT THE FIRST COMMITTEE?

UNDERMINING TRUST

Discredited Verification

Narratives portraying the hedged language of verification bodies, their evidentiary limits or extended investigation timelines as evidence of bias, incompetence or concealment.

Misframed Mandate Limits

Narratives portraying mandate limits, including the inability to attribute responsibility, as bias, inaction or proof of institutional weakness.

Pre-emptive Discrediting

Narratives discrediting fact-checkers, local media and inspection findings in advance, so that refutation is received as confirmation.

MANUFACTURING SUSPICION

Distorted Treaty Obligations

Narratives distorting NPT, CWC and BWC obligations. Framing commitments as impositions, or a state accused of violations presenting itself as the treaty's defender.

Fabricated Complicity

Narratives portraying national governments as secretly hosting or enabling weapons activity for foreign powers, presenting them as subordinate rather than sovereign.

False Allegations of Imminent Use

Narratives alleging that a State is preparing to use a CBRN weapon or stage a provocation, pre-loading justification before any event occurs.

Misleading Impact Data

Narratives inflating or downplaying the health and environmental effects of an incident, facility or activity, with false or no measurements to support the claim or with measurements taken out of context.

Mispresented Civilian Research

Narratives recasting purely civilian research, laboratories, funders and collaborations as having a military purpose.

WHERE MIGHT CBRN DISINFORMATION FEATURE AT THE FIRST COMMITTEE?

Each setting below carries a different risk for disinformation spread: the formal record lends more authority to claims, but when encountered in semi-formal and informal settings, disinformation is less likely to be scrutinised or verified in real time and can spread more rapidly.

Statements & Rights of Reply

Disinformation enters the official record and can afterwards be cited as having been raised at the UN.

Official Documents

Notes verbales and working papers enter circulation as official UN documents, becoming permanently citable regardless of evidence.

Side Events & Expert Panels

Expert framing may lend credibility to selective or poorly sourced technical claims.

Corridors & Informal Contact

Claims and materials passed on in consultations and corridor conversation propagate without an identifiable source.

Reports from the Press

A claim may be reported within minutes of being made, and downstream outlets often drop the attribution.

Digital Media

Clips and quotes are stripped of context and circulate with the visual authority of the UN chamber.

VERIFICATION CHALLENGES

HOW SHOULD YOU RESPOND TO DISINFORMATION AT THE FIRST COMMITTEE?

1. Prepare

Know the recurring narratives before the session opens, so recognition does not depend on verification you may not have time to complete.

2. Spot & Check

Watch for potentially false narratives and verify with trusted experts and sources. Escalate through internal channels to capital and delegation leadership.

3. Select Response

Assess whether the narrative is strategically significant and spreading widely enough to warrant a response, and in which setting. Engagement could amplify the falsehood.

4. Coordinate

If deemed significant, coordinate with capital, with relevant stakeholders, and with trusted third parties including experts and organisations, to keep messaging consistent.

5. Debunk

Correct the false claim with factual language, clarify the relevant mandate and evidentiary limits, and support individuals or institutions that are personally targeted.

* Definitively identifying disinformation can be challenging, as intent and attribution are often unclear. For brevity, this note adopts a broad definition of “disinformation” that includes other information operations, as they mislead the audience and shape perception and behaviour.

→ CBRN Disinformation in Diplomatic Communications

→ Disinfo Tactic Bingo

→ Best practices for Countering Radiological and Nuclear Disinfo

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Best Practice Highlight: Pre-Informing and Pre-Bunking

Erik — Mon, 05 Oct 2026 23:52:19 +0000

Best Practice Highlight: Pre-Informing and Pre-Bunking

Case Study of Successful Counter-Disinformation Practice in Preparation of CTBTO Integrated Field Exercise 2026

BRIEFING NOTE | October 2026

Public communication on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) On-Site Inspection (OSI) Integrated Field Exercise 2026 (IFE26) demonstrates how pre-informing and pre-bunking can mitigate chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) misinformation and disinformation.^*

IFE26 replicates an actual OSI, deploying international surrogate inspectors, protective equipment and specialised instruments. Given limited public familiarity with nuclear verification, these elements may be interpreted as indications that Namibia is under formal investigation or that a nuclear incident has occurred. Such narratives could generate public concern, undermine trust in the exercise and its organisers, and distract from IFE26’s purpose of strengthening nuclear-test verification. The CTBTO and Namibian authorities therefore proactively informed the public about the exercise and clarified its technical and institutional nature.

Open-source research conducted through September 2026 identified no evidence of a coordinated or sustained misinformation or disinformation campaign targeting IFE26.^† The absence of a prominent false narrative may illustrate the value of pre-informing and pre-bunking, offering an example for other organisations planning CBRN-related activities.

DEFINITION OF PRE-INFORMING AND PRE-BUNKING¹^,²

Pre-informing is the practice of providing clear information about an event which may or may not happen as soon as there are warning signs. By providing easily digestible factsheets explaining key terms, facts and skills in interpreting scientific literature, the public can more easily engage with official and scientific literature, enabling people to identify potential disinformation and misinformation.

Pre-bunking refers to the act of addressing or refuting potential false or misleading rumors before an individual is exposed. This involves educating people about common tactics of deception or manipulation, encouraging critical thinking, and engaging target
audiences.

BACKGROUND TO IFE26 ³^,⁴^,⁵^,⁶

WHAT

IFEs are complex CTBTO exercises that test nearly all OSI elements, in an integrated manner, including field operations, inspection techniques, data management and logistics. Previous IFEs were held in Kazakhstan (2008) and Jordan (2014).

WHEN

10 October – 20 November 2026

WHERE

Namibia’s Erongo Region, with Swakopmund and Walvis Bay serving logistical and operational roles

SCALE

Around 250 experts and about 150 tonnes of equipment

WHY

To assess how the CTBTO would conduct an OSI if a suspected nuclear test explosion had to be investigated under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

WHAT IS BEING COMMUNICATED THROUGH PRE-INFORMING AND PRE-BUNKING?

PRE-INFORMING
PURPOSE	EXAMPLE
Explains the basic facts before the exercise begins	What IFE26 is, where it is, when it happens, who will participate⁴^,⁷
Explains why the exercise is important	Officials from the CTBTO clarify that IFE26 tests CTBTO’s ability to investigate a suspected nuclear test explosion and improve OSI readiness, for when the Treaty enters into force, as well as to reduce the risk of misinterpretation regarding the purpose of this exercise⁴^,⁷
Explains why Namibia was selected	Namibia’s CTBT commitment, International Monitoring System (IMS) facilities, Erongo geology, infrastructure and national interest, such as reputation and revenue⁸^,⁹^,¹⁰
Prepares residents for unusual sights	Foreign equipment, white protective clothing, tents, fieldwork and security convoys¹¹

PRE-BUNKING
PURPOSE	EXAMPLE
Anticipates likely false interpretations	Clarifies that IFE26 involves no nuclear materials, no explosions, no radiation, no hazardous materials, no harm to people or the environment⁹^,¹²
Prevents misunderstanding of sovereignty or inspection status	Namibia is hosting the exercise, not being inspected¹¹

HOW ARE PRE-INFORMING AND PRE-BUNKING BEING DISSEMINATED?

	DISSEMINATION CHANNEL	ACTIVITY	FUNCTION
CTBTO	Social media	Official CTBTO and Secretary General Dr. Floyd’s account have shared posts and videos showing IFE26 preparations⁴^,⁶	Builds baseline understanding of what IFE26 is and why it is being conducted
	Local media engagement	Practical workshop with Namibian journalists ahead of the exercise¹¹	Helps media report IFE26 accurately and avoid mistaken framing
	Official conference	CTBTO staff delivered a presentation on IFE26 and OSI capabilities at the CTBT: Science and Technology Conference 2025¹³	Provides technical information for the expert audience
NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT/ MINISTRY OF MINES AND ENERGY (MME)	Social media	Reposts CTBTO material and shares national updates on IFE26 preparations⁷^,¹²	Localises CTBTO messaging and reinforces ministry official explanations for Namibian audiences
NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT/ MINISTRY OF MINES AND ENERGY (MME)	Offline outreach	Public information sessions with local communities in areas involved in the exercise¹⁴	Brings information directly to affected communities and pre-empts concerns about radiation, explosions, nuclear materials, and environmental harm
MAINSTREAM/ LOCAL MEDIA	Print and online reporting	Afrikaans, English and German language coverage explaining IFE26³^,¹¹^,¹⁵	Translates official information into public-facing news coverage

LOCAL SENSITIVITY TO NUCLEAR- AND RADIATION-RELATED ACTIVITIES ¹⁶^,¹⁷

A 2024 local precedent may explain the early investment in pre-informing and pre-bunking around IFE26. In 2024, a private Namibian company planned a radioactive source storage and handling facility for offshore oil exploration equipment in Swakopmund. Residents raised health and environmental concerns. Misinformation claimed that a hazardous radioactive facility already operated in the area, prompting the government to publicly debunk these claims.

This case suggests local sensitivity to narratives involving radioactive or nuclear-related activity, and a corresponding vulnerability to misinformation. If similar narratives take hold around IFE26, public concern could harden into resistance, making the exercise harder to roll out smoothly and weakening trust in both local authorities and the CTBTO. The IFE26 pre-informing and pre-bunking efforts likely sought to pre-empt a similar dynamic.

Conclusion

IFE26 was announced well in advance, with repeated informational messaging since. Publicly available information does not indicate significant local opposition. Given the exercise’s technical complexity and the local precedent, pre-informing and pre-bunking have likely been critical in preventing opposition and any false narratives from forming. These efforts do not guarantee that disinformation will not emerge, but they narrow the information gaps in which misleading narratives take hold and strengthen public resilience if any narratives emerge.

^* CBRN disinformation is the deliberate creation and spread of false or misleading information about CBRN materials, technologies, capabilities or activities, including both peaceful and military applications. Definitively identifying disinformation can be challenging, as intent and attribution are often unclear. For brevity, this note adopts a broad definition of “disinformation” that includes other information operations, such as misinformation, as they mislead the audience and shape perception and behaviour.

^† Research was primarily conducted in English, German, Afrikaans and Oshikwanyama/Oshindonga, with targeted searches in Otjiherero, Khoekhoegowab, Rukwangali and Silozi.

→ RN Disinformation in Diplomatic Communications

→ Example Tactics and Narratives

→ Best Practices for Countering Radiological and Nuclear Disinfo

REFERENCES

¹ ‘Mitigating Disinformation – Countering WMD Disinformation’. Accessed 8 September 2026. https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/mitigating-disinformation/.

² Nagar, Aishwarya, Vanessa Grégoire, Annie Sundelson, Emily O’Donnell-Pazderka, Amelia M. Jamison, and Tara Kirk Sell. ‘Practical Playbook for Addressing Health Rumors’. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, 2024 (updated May 2025). Accessed 23 September 2026. https://centerforhealthsecurity.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/2025-05-CDC-practical-playbook-v3.pdf.

³ Bowe, Rudi. ‘Namibia to Host Historic Global Nuclear Monitoring Exercise | Namib Times Newspaper’. Accessed 8 September 2026. https://www.namibtimes.net/namibia-to-host-historic-global-nuclear-monitoring-exercise/.

⁴ ‘Integrated Field Exercise 2026 (IFE26) | CTBTO’. Accessed 8 September 2026. https://www.ctbto.org/IFE26.

⁵ ‘Namibia to Host Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation’s Field Exercise | Namibia Economist’. Accessed 8 September 2026. https://economist.com.na/namibia-to-host-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-organisations-field-exercise/.

⁶ ‘Namibia to Host CTBTO’s Integrated Field Exercise in 2026 | CTBTO’. Accessed 8 September 2026. https://www.ctbto.org/resources/for-the-media/press-releases/namibia-host-ctbtos-integrated-field-exercise-2026.

⁷ Ministry of Industries, Mines and Energy (MIME). ‘CTBTO IFE26 Exercise in Namibia with International Partners’. LinkedIn, 7 August 2026. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/ministry-of-industries-mines-and-energy_mime-ife26-namibia-activity-7491375009450364929-EGrM.

⁸ Brandt, Edgar. Namibia to Support Global Nuclear Test Verification Efforts – New Era. 25 November 2025. https://neweralive.na/namibia-to-help-confirm-nuclear-explosions/.

⁹ ‘Namibia to Host Major Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation Verification Exercise in 2026 – Informanté’. 26 December 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20251226171839/https://informante.web.na/?p=387095.

¹⁰ Taapopi, Selma. Namibia to Lead Africa in Major Nuclear Test–Ban Exercise. 2025. 02:56. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FnFc6efwTqU.

¹¹ Graig, Augetto. Namibië Is Gasheer van Kernkragtoetsverbod [Namibia Hosts Nuclear Test-Ban Exercise]. 12 May 2026. https://fliphtml5.com/jxto/Republikein_20260512_Combined-Ly7m/Republikein_20260512/.

¹² Ministry of Industries, Mines and Energy (MIME). ‘Namibia Hosts CTBTO Integrated Field Exercise IFE26’. LinkedIn, 10 June 2026. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/ministry-of-industries-mines-and-energy_mime-nuclearnonproliferation-ctbto-activity-7473076955760943105-TNL2.

¹³ Summers, Simon, and Andrew Bramnik. ‘On-Site Inspection Integrated Field Exercise in 2026 (IFE26)’. 10 September 2025. https://conferences.ctbto.org/event/30/contributions/6081/attachments/2820/5397/P4.5-546_SUMMERS.pdf.

¹⁴ Municipality of Walvis Bay. ‘Big Things Are Happening in Erongo!’ 17 June 2026. https://www.facebook.com/municipalityofwalvisbay/posts/-big-things-are-happening-in-erongo-information-sharing-session-did-you-know-nam/1345801214396135/.

¹⁵ Graig, Augetto. Erongo Übt Atomtest-Kontrolle [Erongo Practices Nuclear Test Monitoring]. 7 May 2026. https://fliphtml5.com/jxto/Allgemeine_Zeitung_20260507_Combined/Allgemeine_Zeitung_20260507/

¹⁶ Rengura, Renate. ‘Swakopmund Officials Debunk Rumors of Radioactive Storage Facility’. 2024. https://nbcnews.na/node/104893.

¹⁷ Hartman, Adam. ‘Swakopmund Community Ralliesagainst Plan for Radioactive Material’. The Namibian, 28 February 2024. https://www.namibian.com.na/swakopmund-community-ralliesagainst-plan-for-radioactive-material/.

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Secretariat Briefing Note

Erik — Tue, 22 Sep 2026 12:44:40 +0000

Countering Radiological & Nuclear Disinformation

THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) SECRETARIAT

BRIEFING NOTE | September 2026

Disinformation can undermine trust in the IAEA by attacking its impartiality and technical authority. The GP WMD Counter Disinfo Initiative has developed targeted recommendations on countering disinformation for the IAEA Secretariat.

WHAT IS RN DISINFORMATION?

RN disinformation refers to deliberately false or manipulated information concerning radiological or nuclear technologies, materials and weapons. Its purpose is to influence perceptions and behaviour among target audiences. Unlike misinformation, disinformation is intentionally misleading and may originate from both non-state and state actors for financial or strategic gain.

WHY IT MATTERS

RN disinformation can directly undermine the IAEA’s ability to deliver on its mandate by delegitimising the sources of its authority: technical expertise, impartiality and international credibility. When the IAEA is portrayed as biased or ineffective, trust is eroded, which can lead to reduced political and financial support by Member States. At the organisational level, sustained attacks can lower staff morale and prompt overly cautious communication that can limit the IAEA’s effectiveness. A constrained Secretariat is less able to deter proliferation and ensure nuclear safety, security and peaceful uses of nuclear technologies.

DISINFORMATION SPIRALING IMPACT ON THE IAEA

Trust undermined by disinformation

Political support and funding decline

Core functions harder to fulfill

Legitimacy further questioned

Risks of proliferation increase, peaceful nuclear cooperation becomes difficult

RN DISINFORMATION CREATES THE FOLLOWING RISKS

Complicate risk communication and response coordination during emergencies

Distract resources and delay effective decision-making

Put technical facts in question through selective interpretation of data, reducing the impact of impartial assessments

Create diplomatic friction and misperceptions between Member States, making collective action harder

Weaken norm coherence and pave the way for norm fragmentation

HOW RN DISINFORMATION WORKS

Public perceptions of radiation, shaped by past nuclear incidents, can act as emotional triggers¹ that heighten sensitivity to alarming claims. Response to such triggers is one of many psychological vulnerabilities disinformation can exploit, alongside other cognitive biases,² that reduce critical assessment of information. The technical complexity of nuclear issues creates barriers to understanding and opens space for distortion. Potential manipulation may include reducing allegations to simplified good-versus-evil narratives and linking them to nationality, alliances or ideology. Such linkages trigger biases, encouraging audiences to interpret technical claims through pre-existing views and identities.

HOW RN DISINFORMATION SPREADS

Formal diplomatic channels (plenary statements, notes verbales, etc.)
Informal diplomatic channels (corridor diplomacy, staff conversations, conferences)
Media channels (press briefings, interviews, traditional and social media, etc.)

NARRATIVES THE SECRETARIAT CAN FACE

Impartiality framed as political alignment

Actors exploit: The IAEA's obligation to stay impartial and grounding in verifiable evidence.

Disinformation approach: Reframing neutrality as political alignment with dominant powers or selective blindness to violations.

Mandate constraints framed as inaction

Actors exploit: The IAEA's need to satisfy Member States and inability to attribute blame.

Disinformation approach: Portraying mandate limitations as a decision not to act or institutional weakness.

Cooperation framed as risky or biased

Actors exploit: The IAEA's support for peaceful use of nuclear technology via technical cooperation.

Disinformation approach: Framing assistance as favouritism or enabling military programmes.

Scientific due diligence framed as cover-ups

Actors exploit: The time required for IAEA inspections, verification and technical assessment.

Disinformation approach: Framing slow, deliberate processes as concealment or collusion.

Uncertainty framed as incompetence or concealment

Actors exploit: The Secretariat's cautious, probabilistic language.

Disinformation approach: Reframing scientific uncertainty and evidentiary limits as incompetence or intentional concealment.

Personal backgrounds framed as institutional bias

Actors exploit: National origin, past affiliations or perceived biases of IAEA staff.

Disinformation approach: Alleging personal bias to discredit institutional outputs.

BEST PRACTICE GUIDANCE

Awareness

Integrate RN disinformation into institutional risk and preparedness processes (leadership/management).
Train relevant staff to recognise, escalate and respond to RN disinformation (management/OPIC).
Incorporate lessons from past RN disinformation incidents into guidance and exercises (OPIC/technical departments).
Maintain links with relevant expert, fact-checking and platform networks (OPIC/analysts).

Monitoring

Establish a system for monitoring of RN narratives (leadership/OPIC).
Use digital tools to support detection and analysis (OPIC).
Remain vigilant and report suspected disinformation to an OPIC focal point (all).
Identify narratives targeting IAEA mandate, activities, findings or staff (OPIC).
Escalate significant cases affecting IAEA to the leadership (OPIC).
Track the reach of specific narratives (OPIC).

Assessment

Escalate significant cases to the leadership (OPIC).
Define response thresholds based on reach, potential harm and risks to inadvertently amplify (OPIC/leadership).
Establish and activate a process for assessing significant cases, including through trusted expert networks (OPIC).
Recommend whether to monitor, clarify, correct or escalate (OPIC).

Response

Maintain adaptable pre-approved response language (OPIC/technical departments).
Tailor responses to the audience, platform and level of risk (OPIC).
Use trusted partners or experts where external amplification adds credibility (OPIC/leadership).
Support staff targeted by disinformation or harassment (OPIC/management).
Track response effectiveness and recurring claims (OPIC).

Member States look to the IAEA as the trusted source of impartial information. Disinformation risks must be anticipated to strengthen this role and demonstrate foresight and proactive stances

REFERENCES

Specific cues or narrative elements designed to provoke strong emotional reactions in the audience; Melissa L. Finucane et al., ‘The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits’, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 13, no. 1 (January 2000): 1–17, https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(200001/03)13:1<1::AID-BDM333>3.0.CO;2-S; Cameron Martel, Gordon Pennycook, and David G. Rand, ‘Reliance on Emotion Promotes Belief in Fake News’, Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications 5, no. 1 (7 October 2020): 47, https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-020-00252-3.
Predictable patterns in how the human brain functions to simplify information processing, which frequently leads individuals to think about the world in distorted ways; Stephen Eldridge. ‘Cognitive Bias: Description & Examples’. Britannica. Accessed 11 April 2025. https://www.britannica.com/science/cognitive-bias.

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Countering Radiological and Nuclear Disinformation at the IAEA GC

Erik — Tue, 22 Sep 2026 12:27:27 +0000

Countering Radiological & Nuclear Disinformation

General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency

BRIEFING NOTE | September 2026

Disinformation¹ by State-sponsored and State-adjacent actors has been observed across multilateral nuclear fora and will likely feature at the 70th session of the IAEA General Conference (GC). Further information can be found at www.GPWMDCounterDisinfo.com.

WHY IS DISINFORMATION A RISK AT THE IAEA GC?

Radiological and nuclear (RN) disinformation refers to deliberately false or manipulated information concerning RN equipment, technologies or materials. Disinformation can target the IAEA by portraying cautious language, extended verification timelines or mandate limitations as bias or failure. It can also target Member States through manipulative representation of IAEA findings and evidence concerning their RN activities. As such, RN disinformation can erode trust in the IAEA’s impartiality and technical authority, fuel diplomatic friction among Member States and disrupt GC negotiations. Understanding common disinformation narratives and tactics can better equip delegations to pre-emptively debunk falsehoods, alert others to recurring patterns and build organisational and state resilience against the harmful effects of RN disinformation.

WHAT NARRATIVES COULD BE ENCOUNTERED AT THE GC?

The following false or misleading narratives are among those most likely to be encountered at the IAEA GC.

UNDERMINING AUTHORITY

Cautious Verification

Narratives portraying the IAEA's cautious language (which reflects uncertainty and evidentiary limits) or extended verification timelines as evidence of bias, incompetence or concealment.

Double Standards

Narratives alleging that the IAEA applies uneven levels of scrutiny across States, portraying it as too lenient towards some and disproportionately scrutinising others.

Mandate Limits

Narratives portraying the IAEA's mandate limitations, including its lack of authority to attribute responsibility for incidents, as bias, inaction or proof of institutional weakness.

MISREPRESENTING EVIDENCE

Attacks on Facilities

Narratives arguing that striking or taking control of a nuclear facility was necessary for security reasons, irrespective of the legal context, while presenting the attacker as the protector.

New Facilities & Programmes

Narratives declaring a newly announced facility or programme to be certainly weapons-related or certainly not a proliferation concern, without sufficient evidence.

Radiological Impact

Safeguards Obligations

Narratives distorting obligations, either portraying legally binding safeguards commitments as an unfair imposition or falsely presenting strengthened measures as universally mandatory.

Verification Findings

Narratives declaring that a State certainly has or certainly does not have a weapons programme by interpreting verification findings beyond their evidentiary limits.

WHERE MIGHT RN DISINFORMATION FEATURE AT THE GC?

Plenary & Rights of Reply

Misleading claims may be inserted into official records.

Side Events & Scientific Forum

Expert framing may lend credibility to selective or poorly sourced technical claims.

Exhibition Floor

Printed and displayed material can circulate without independent review.

Corridors & Informal Contact

Claims and materials passed on in conversation propagate without an identifiable source.

Reports from the Press

A false or misleading claim or remark may be reported within minutes, long before it is verified.

Digital Media

Clips and quotes may be stripped of context and amplified far beyond the venue.

HOW SHOULD YOU RESPOND TO DISINFORMATION AT THE GC?

1. Spot & Check

Watch for potentially false narratives and quietly verify with trusted technical experts and sources. Escalate through internal channels to relevant leadership.

2. Select Response

Assess whether the narrative is strategically significant and spreading widely enough to warrant a response (engagement could amplify the falsehood).

3. Coordinate

If deemed significant, coordinate the response with the capital, the IAEA and trusted third parties, including experts and organisations, to keep message consistency.

4. Debunk

Correct the false claim with factual language, clarify the IAEA's mandate and evidentiary limits and support individuals who are personally targeted.

[1] Definitively identifying disinformation can be challenging, as intent and attribution are often unclear. For brevity, this note adopts a broad definition of “disinformation” that includes other information operations, as they mislead the audience and shape perception and behaviour.

WANT TO LEARN MORE?

→ RN Disinformation in Diplomatic Communications

→ Example Tactics and Narratives

→ Best Practices for Countering RN Disinfo

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Tactic Tracker

Erik — Wed, 09 Sep 2026 00:47:31 +0000

Tactic Tracker

Radiological and Nuclear Disinformation

Match all nine narrative examples with the tactic they best represent.

RN Disinformation Tactic Tracker

Tactic categories

Each narrative has one primary match in this exercise.

All nine narratives are correctly matched.

Disclaimer: It can be difficult to definitively determine whether the information you read or hear is disinformation. This game provides a starting point for recognising communication tactics that may be used to construct or reinforce potential chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) disinformation narratives. Many of these tactics can also appear in legitimate communication and should therefore be treated as indicators prompting closer examination of the narrative, rather than as evidence of disinformation on their own. Confirming whether a claim is deceptive often requires further investigation and may not be possible in real time.

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BWC Briefing Note: August 2026

Erik — Tue, 14 Jul 2026 12:03:39 +0000

COUNTERING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DISINFORMATION

BWC Briefing Note | August 2026

Erosion of information integrity is a pressing concern for the BWC. Since 2022, false narratives alleging the misuse of biological laboratories in Ukraine and other partner countries have remained a persistent focus, while their geographic scope has broadened to regions including Africa, the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. These narratives increasingly reflect regional specificities, circulate through proxy channels and multilingual media ecosystems, and frame peaceful bioscience cooperation as politically motivated, neocolonial or selectively enforced.

Left unchallenged, such claims can erode trust between States Parties, weaken confidence in transparency and cooperation measures, and complicate efforts to strengthen the Convention. The Global Partnership’s Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative supports efforts to identify, counter and build resilience against these narratives, helping to protect the integrity of the global norm against biological weapons.

NEW REPORT: THE MATRYOSHKA WAR

Biological disinformation has become part of the geopolitical contestation around global health security, in which laboratories, sample-sharing, genomic surveillance, outbreak response, cooperative threat reduction and technical assistance are reframed as threats. The foundational “biolab” narrative alleges that peaceful biological cooperation conceals covert military activity. Its ambiguity is central to its usefulness: it can be adapted to almost any laboratory, outbreak, foreign partner or biosurveillance programme, allowing very different local cases to be drawn into the same geopolitical storyworld.

The Matryoshka model explains how these narratives travel and gain force. At the multilateral layer, allegations enter formal settings such as the BWC as questions of compliance, transparency or verification, giving them procedural weight. At the state and media layer, technical-sounding claims are produced, translated and circulated through official, state-aligned and proxy channels. At the local layer, these claims connect with existing concerns about sovereignty, equity, foreign influence, military involvement or access to biological resources. Each layer reinforces the others: local anxieties are repackaged as international “evidence”, state actors cite them to validate the broader biolab narrative, and the narrative is then redeployed in new regional contexts. The result is a durable feedback loop that can distort assessments of compliance, weaponise public health cooperation and complicate efforts to sustain trust in the BWC.

NEW DEBUNKING BRIEF: EBOLA DISINFORMATION

As Ebola spreads in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, familiar disinformation narratives have resurfaced, casting doubt on the disease’s origins and suggesting links to biological weapons. These claims are not new; they echo narratives seen during earlier outbreaks, including in West Africa in 2014, because they are familiar, adaptable and easily reactivated during periods of heightened concern. By fuelling fear, suspicion and confusion, they can exploit public attention to advance pre-existing strategic interests. This analysis highlights their reuse to expose recurring tactics and strengthen resilience against them.

Ebola disinformation often amplifies perceived risk by presenting mortality rates without context, exaggerating transmission, or suggesting weaponisation. This can heighten fear and make audiences more receptive to further manipulation, particularly where existing social divisions or institutional mistrust are already present.

Many narratives seek to foster doubt about outbreaks by urging audiences to “question more”, rely on speculative or false data, and adopt conspiratorial interpretations. Even without making explicit allegations, they can shift perceptions of Ebola from a natural outbreak to something potentially deliberate.

Some narratives go further, directly accusing adversaries of creating biological weapons. These claims can erode trust, exploit scepticism toward institutions such as “big pharma”, and draw on themes of colonialism, ethnic tension and past crises. Other narratives position Russia as a responsible global actor by emphasising its vaccines and aid, contrasting this with depictions of US involvement as suspicious, inadequate or neocolonial.

The reuse of disinformation from past Ebola outbreaks is expected and revealing. As the current outbreak continues, similar tactics may reappear, including claims about ethnic weapons, biolabs and conspiracy-framed research. Recognising these patterns can help policymakers, communicators and the public identify and resist manipulation more effectively.

ENGAGE WITH US TO FURTHER YOUR UNDERSTANDING

Maintaining situational awareness of disinformation is now an important part of effective BWC participation. False allegations and politicised narratives often circulate in parallel information spaces before entering formal multilateral settings. Tracking these trends helps States Parties anticipate narrative escalation, distinguish genuine compliance concerns from coordinated disinformation, and avoid reactive dynamics that can further erode trust.

Regular monitoring of biological weapons and global health security disinformation should therefore be treated as a practical risk-reduction measure, supporting evidence-based engagement and protecting the technical integrity of the Convention. States Parties can use the CBRN disinformation tracker, roadmaps, tactic spotlights and other resources to stay informed about emerging CBRN narratives affecting disarmament diplomacy.

RESPONDING TO DISINFORMATION IN THE CONFERENCE ROOM

Possible language to counter biolab disinformation narratives:

The biological facilities in question are engaged in purely peaceful activities, including biosurveillance and the development of medical countermeasures.

The financial and technical assistance provided to these facilities, which is fully and publicly documented, falls squarely under Article X of the Convention and is aimed at reducing biological threats, including the threat posed by biological weapons.

These allegations are not only false, but also dangerous, as they undermine international cooperation and assistance and can erode confidence in Convention.

Possible language to counter biolab disinformation narratives expanding to Africa and other regions:

The false claims about biological activities in [insert country] are nothing more than a new spin on decades-long disinformation campaigns against peaceful cooperative threat reduction activities.

These activities are essential for understanding and mitigating biological threats in the region and attempts to delegitimize them aim to undermine international security and compromise global health security writ large.

Possible language to counter suggestions of secrecy or neglect in reporting ICA:

The Russian Federation has continuously sought to undermine international cooperation and assistance under Article X by falsely claiming that States Parties are using cooperative threat reduction programmes as a cover for offensive activities in violation of the BWC.

At the same time, the Russian Federation has also sought to undermine efforts to enhance transparency and build trust by falsely alleging that some states are leaving important details out of their reporting requirements.

This is untrue, as states parties regularly report transparently on their ICA activities through working papers, national statements and publicly available reports, presentations and brochures. Many of these reports are available on the UNODA website.

Members of the G7-led Global Partnership also share details of their biosecurity capacity-building efforts through an annual programming annexe. We see no need to duplicate reporting on these activities by including them in CBM forms and refuse to further the false narrative that certain states are withholding information.

The post BWC Briefing Note: August 2026 appeared first on Countering WMD Disinformation.

2026 Review Conference of the NPT

Erik — Mon, 11 May 2026 02:09:55 +0000

Countering Radiological & Nuclear Disinformation

2026 Review Conference of the NPT

BRIEFING NOTE | April 2026

Disinformation* by State-sponsored and State-adjacent actors has been observed in international disarmament forums and will likely feature at the 2026 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This briefing note aims to prepare delegations for disinformation narratives they may encounter. For further information: www.GPWMDCounterDisinfo.com.

WHAT IS RN DISINFORMATION AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?

Radiological and nuclear (RN) disinformation refers to deliberately false or manipulated information concerning radiological or nuclear technologies, materials, weapons or their associated risks and uses. Like other WMD-related disinformation, RN narratives matter because of their negative and disruptive impact in multilateral fora. See examples of the risk below:

Complicate risk communication and response coordination during emergencies.

Put technical facts in question through selective interpretation of data, reducing the impact of impartial assessments.

Create diplomatic friction and misperceptions between Member States, making collective action harder.

Weaken norm coherence and pave the way for norm fragmentation.

Distract resources and delay effective decision-making.

REVCON NARRATIVES

In the context of the 2026 NPT RevCon, such RN disinformation narratives can erode trust in shared facts, increase suspicions and harden negotiating positions. When false claims circulate, they can distort perceptions and narrow the space for compromise across the NPT’s pillars. This can weaken political support for collective measures on nuclear non-proliferation, safety, security and peaceful uses. Delegations should therefore pause to assess whether the claims they encounter are supported by credible evidence. The following false or misleading narratives are among those most likely to be encountered at RevCon:

Inflating or Fabricating Nuclear Threats

False Framing of Nuclear Policy

Narratives recasting doctrinal revisions or nuclear cooperation as offensive escalation or treaty breach – to erode state legitimacy in multilateral fora.

Weapons Acquisition Claims

Narratives alleging that a State is close to acquiring nuclear weapons, or is receiving covert external assistance – to create urgency and legitimise coercive or military action.

Weapons Testing Allegations

Narratives alleging concealed nuclear tests or preparations for testing – to stigmatise an adversary, heighten threat perceptions or normalise reciprocal actions.

Undermining Oversight and Legitimacy

Institutional Bias Allegations

Narratives portraying international bodies as ineffective or biased – to weaken perceptions of their impartiality, technical credibility and oversight functions.

Distorting the Nature or Control of Nuclear Assets

Mischaracterised Infrastructure

Narratives claimed dual-use nuclear infrastructure is purely civilian (or vice versa) – to deligitmise escalation or justify military intervention.

False Facility Security Claims

Narratives presenting an occupier or outside actor as the rightful ‘protector’ of a nuclear facility – to shift blame for attacks, accidents or instability onto others.

Disinformation Tactics

Within RN international forums, including the RevCon, the right of reply is a key vehicle for disinformation. These replies are reactive and not formally recorded, which enables further opportunities for the spread of false or misleading claims. By contrast, pre-prepared national statements often contain less overt disinformation, though they still advance selective or strategically framed narratives.

State actors draw on a range of tactics designed to deceive audiences, shape perceptions and legitimise political or military action. See our graphic below for examples of some of the most common disinformation tactics. Recognising and responding to these tactics will better equip RevCon participants to identify, contextualise and mitigate their potential impact.

CURRENT REALITIES

Appeal to Authority

Appeal to Emotions

Claims of Victimisation

Credibility Inflation

Discrediting Opponents

Distraction & Misdirection

Manipulation of Evidence

Entities as Puppets

Recycling Narratives

Want to Learn More?

Understanding theses common disinformation narratives and tactics will better equip delegations to pre-emptively debunk falsehoods, alert others to recurring patterns and build organisational and state resilience against the harmful effects of RN disinformation.

* Definitively identifying disinformation amid broader efforts to influence populations can be challenging as intent and attribution are often unclear. For brevity, this report adopts a broad definition of ‘disinformation’ that includes misinformation and other information operations, as all seek to mislead the public and shape perceptions.

→ Best practices for Countering Radiological and Nuclear Disinfo

→ Radiological and Nuclear Disinformation Roadmap

REFERENCES

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). ‘Safeguards Implementation Report 2023’. International Atomic Energy Agency, 7 June 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/06/20240607_sir_2024_part_ab.pdf.
IAEA. ‘Two Years of IAEA Continued Presence at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant’. International Atomic Energy Agency, 3 September 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/two-years-of-iaea-continued-presence-at-the-zaporizhzhaya-nuclear-power-plant.pdf.
‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on Its 2nd Session: Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’. United Nations, 2 August 2024. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceSecond_session_(2024)/NPT_CONF.2026_PC.II_07_-_07._ADVANCE_UNEDITED_VERSION_Master_1_FINAL_Report__Preparatory_Committee_2nd__session.pdf.
‘Summary Record (Partial) of the 18th Meeting, Held at the Vienna International Centre, Vienna, on Friday, 11 August 2023: Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1st Session’. United Nations, 7 September 2023. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/239/51/pdf/n2323951.pdf.
United Nations. ‘Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference Ends without Adopting Substantive Outcome Document Due to Opposition by One Member State’, 26 August 2022. https://press.un.org/en/2022/dc3850.doc.htm.
GP WMD Counter Disinfo. ‘Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Portraying States and Organizations as Puppets’. January 2025. https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/tactic-spotlight-portraying-states-and-organizations-as-puppets/.
Predictable patterns in how the human brain functions to simplify information processing, which frequently leads individuals to think about the world in distorted ways, Stephen Eldridge. ‘Cognitive Bias: Description & Examples’. Britannica. Accessed 11 April 2025. https://www.britannica.com/science/cognitive-bias.
Specific cues or narrative elements designed to provoke strong emotional reactions in the audience; Melissa L. Finucane et al., ‘The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits’, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 13, no. 1 (January 2000): 1–17, https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(200001/03)13:1<1::AID-BDM333>3.0.CO;2-S; Cameron Martel, Gordon Pennycook, and David G. Rand, ‘Reliance on Emotion Promotes Belief in Fake News’, Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications 5, no. 1 (7 October 2020): 47,
https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-020-00252-3.

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Statement on Nuclear and Radiological Disinformation 2024

Erik — Sun, 10 May 2026 18:22:16 +0000

Statement on Nuclear and Radiological Disinformation

On behalf of the Global Partnership Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative

2024 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting

Geneva, Switzerland

July 2024

Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am speaking on behalf of the Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative, a project of the 31-member Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership). This initiative is funded by Global Affairs Canada and implemented by The Atlantic Council Digital Forensic Research Lab, The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, King’s College London and Open Nuclear Network. The project is endorsed by the G7-led Global Partership and the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism. [Additional endorsements to be confirmed this week.]

Today, we would like to address a critical and growing threat that jeopardises global security: the spread of disinformation in the nuclear and radiological security realm, which poses a significant and growing threat to the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to the supporting cooperative threat reduction activities of the Global partnership community. This statement aims to highlight the detrimental effects of such disinformation on the three pillars of the NPT – disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear technology – and suggest ways to address this growing threat.

Disarmament

It is now largely accepted that disarmament, a cornerstone of the NPT, is likely to rely heavily on trust and verification. Disinformation campaigns spreading false information about the intentions and actions of states could erode this trust. For instance, the incident in 2016, when false reports claimed US tactical nuclear weapons were being moved from Turkey to Romania, created panic and confusion. Such disinformation can manipulate public perception and influence policy decisions, hindering disarmament efforts.

Disinformation can also influence countries’ threat perceptions, potentially hindering disarmament efforts or fuelling an arms race. When nations are led to believe in exaggerated threats, they may respond by increasing their own arsenals, thus undermining global disarmament objectives.

Non-proliferation

The objective of non-proliferation is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. However, disinformation can erode trust in international safeguards and verification mechanisms, which are essential for ensuring compliance with non-proliferation obligations.

Unfounded allegations, such as those about plans to explode a “dirty bomb” on Ukrainian soil, exemplify broader disinformation campaigns that may justify military escalations and destabilise regions. These tactics undermine international support for affected nations and destabilise entire regions, hindering peaceful resolution efforts and increasing regional instability. Disinformation campaigns can also falsely accuse states of non-compliance or secret nuclear activities, potentially jeopardising regional and global security.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

The peaceful use of nuclear technology, a vital right under the NPT, is critical for sustainable development and energy security. Disinformation can generate unwarranted fear and opposition to nuclear energy and other beneficial applications, significantly hindering their development and implementation. By misrepresenting the safety and environmental impacts of nuclear technology, disinformation campaigns can distort public perception, causing delays or cancellations of projects that could offer substantial benefits to health, energy and industry.

Moreover, disinformation undermines public confidence in regulatory bodies and international organisations responsible for overseeing nuclear safety and security. When these institutions are portrayed as ineffective or biased, public trust erodes and support for nuclear projects diminishes.

The rapid spread of disinformation is facilitated by social media and AI-generated content, platforms that are particularly vulnerable due to the high volume and speed of information dissemination. This false information can even undermine technical analyses, leading to flawed understandings that affect international treaties and policies.

Call to Action

To address these challenges, we propose a series of steps:

Strengthen International Cooperation: Establish a dedicated task force within the NPT framework to monitor, identify and counter nuclear and radiological disinformation.
Enhance Verification Mechanisms: Improve existing verification and transparency measures to build trust among states.
Promote Public Education: Launch comprehensive educational campaigns to inform the public about the realities of nuclear energy and disarmament. Transparent and fact-based communication can help dispel myths and counteract disinformation.
Leverage Technology: Utilise advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence and big data analytics, to detect and analyse disinformation patterns. By understanding the origins and dissemination channels of disinformation, we can develop targeted strategies to mitigate its impact.
Engage Civil Society and Academia: Engagement by civil society and non-governmental organisations can broaden the scope of efforts to combat disinformation, leveraging diverse perspectives and expertise. Academic and policy research on the impacts of disinformation can provide valuable insights and inform strategies. Investing in research specifically focused on nuclear and radiological disinformation can lead to more effective countermeasures and a deeper understanding of these threats.
Promote Media Literacy: Initiatives to enhance media literacy and public awareness can empower individuals and the general public to recognise and reject false information, thereby reducing the effectiveness of disinformation campaigns.

We are pleased to report that some measures towards addressing this threat have already commenced. The GP Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative is a coordinated and multi-disciplinary effort to mitigate the threat of disinformation across Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) security. This project, which is being delivered in collaboration with the G7’s Rapid Response Mechanism and other counter-disinformation initiatives, aims to provide a solid evidence base to: identify, understand and develop mitigation strategies; raise awareness; and ultimately reduce the impact of hostile CBRN disinformation.

By taking these comprehensive steps, State Parties, international organisations and civil society can protect the treaty’s integrity and ensure global nuclear security. Through coordinated efforts at all levels, we can mitigate the impact of disinformation in the nuclear and radiological security realm and ensure a safer, more secure future for all.

We thank you for your attention.

The GP Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative

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Statement on Nuclear and Radiological Disinformation

Erik — Sun, 10 May 2026 18:09:01 +0000

Statement on Nuclear and Radiological Disinformation

On behalf of the Global Partnership Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative

2025 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting

New York, United States of America

April 2025

Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am speaking on behalf of the Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative, a dedicated effort of the G7-led Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership). This initiative is funded by Global Affairs Canada and implemented by The Atlantic Council Digital Forensic Research Lab, The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, King’s College London and Open Nuclear Network. Our efforts are undertaken on behalf of all 31 Global Partnership members and are coordinated with other counter-disinformation initiatives, including the G7’s Rapid Response Mechanism.

As States gather to reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), we must acknowledge a growing challenge that threatens the treaty’s integrity: the spread of disinformation in the nuclear and radiological realm. Disinformation is increasingly used to manipulate perceptions, distort facts, and undermine trust across the entire WMD spectrum. In the NPT context, disinformation threatens the effective implementation of the treaty’s three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear technologies.

While disinformation in nuclear fora is not new, recent trends suggest a rise in deliberate and sophisticated efforts to mislead the international community. These efforts target verification mechanisms and multilateral forums, fuel distrust among states, and erode public confidence in nuclear governance and non-proliferation efforts. This statement will illustrate how disinformation threatens the NPT’s objectives and propose concrete measures to counter its spread while preserving the integrity of diplomatic discourse.

Disarmament

For disarmament to be effective, states must have assurance that other countries are implementing their commitments in good faith. However, disinformation is increasingly being used to cast doubt on compliance, create false perceptions of treaty violations, and justify arms buildups. Fabricated claims about nuclear intentions or capabilities are used to portray states as non-compliant, while manipulated public narratives can erode support for arms control agreements. Additionally, independent verification bodies are sometimes undermined through allegations of bias or incompetence. If left unchecked, these tactics will further degrade trust, impede diplomatic progress, and increase the risk of arms racing based on exaggerated or false security concerns.

Non-Proliferation

The non-proliferation pillar of the NPT relies on the credibility of its verification mechanisms, yet disinformation poses a growing challenge to its effectiveness. False accusations of states developing nuclear weapons capabilities in violation of their obligations undermine trust in the treaty, while efforts to cast doubt on the neutrality of verification bodies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), further weaken confidence in compliance processes. Additionally, misleading claims are sometimes used to justify unilateral actions under the pretext of preventing proliferation. Past disinformation campaigns have falsely alleged the existence of clandestine nuclear programs or imminent radiological threats, leading to heightened geopolitical tensions and calls for pre-emptive action despite a lack of credible evidence. Such tactics not only destabilize international security but also divert attention from legitimate proliferation concerns that require collective engagement and fact-based diplomacy.

The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Applications

The right to develop and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is a fundamental principle of the NPT. However, disinformation campaigns seek to delegitimize civilian nuclear programs, sometimes by falsely linking them to weapons development or storage to justify restrictions on technology transfer and international cooperation. Exaggerated claims about safety risks contribute to public opposition to nuclear energy projects, while efforts to undermine trust in nuclear regulators by portraying them as ineffective or politically biased further erode confidence in the sector. These challenges are particularly concerning as the world faces growing energy needs and climate change pressures, both of which require a fact-based discussion on the role of nuclear energy in sustainable development.

Recommendations for Action

Platforms like the GP Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative, together with credible partners from civil society, can provide valuable support to Member States in addressing these challenges. Dedicated counter-disinformation initiatives, independent research institutions, media organizations, and NGOs can provide evidence and materials that fact-check nuclear-related claims, debunk disinformation, and contribute to public awareness efforts. Fostering partnerships between governments, international organizations, and civil society will help build a resilient information environment, protect the treaty’s integrity and ensure global nuclear security. Through coordinated efforts at all levels, we can mitigate the impact of disinformation in the nuclear and radiological security realm and ensure a safer, more secure future for all.

We thank you for your attention.

The GP Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative

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STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL DISINFORMATION TO 2026 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

Erik — Sun, 10 May 2026 17:47:59 +0000

STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL DISINFORMATION

2026 NPT Review Conference | April 2026

Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am speaking on behalf of the Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative of the 31-member Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. This initiative is funded by Canada and Germany and is implemented by The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, King’s College London and Open Nuclear Network.

As States Parties meet over the next month to review the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, we must address a growing challenge affecting multilateral discussions in the nuclear and radiological realm: the amplification and circulation of false or unverified allegations regarding safeguards, compliance or nuclear intent.

Radiological and nuclear issues are technically complex and rely on specialised verification methodologies, established evidentiary standards and clearly defined institutional mandates. When such matters are discussed or claims made without the full context, misunderstandings and opportunities for confusion can arise and positions may harden before clarification or key details are made available.

Unverified, unfounded and false allegations related to compliance, safety or intent can shape diplomatic positions before technical clarification is available. Technical findings may be selectively presented, reframed or simplified, reducing complex issues to binary narratives. This risks distorting discussions and placing delegations – particularly those without specialised technical capacity – in difficult positions, including pressure on neutral or middle-ground states to signal alignment prematurely, narrowing space for balanced engagement and increasing polarisation.

The introduction of serious allegations in multilateral settings carries particular weight. Such claims should be carefully substantiated and, where appropriate, grounded in established reporting mechanisms. Creating space for technical clarification before drawing conclusions can support stability in deliberations.

This challenge cuts across all three pillars of the Treaty.

In the context of non-proliferation, unverified claims regarding safeguards, compliance or intent can undermine confidence in verification processes and distort assessments of risk.

In the context of disarmament, inaccurate or misleading characterisation of capabilities, doctrines or commitments can deepen mistrust and complicate dialogue.

In the context of peaceful uses, misleading narratives about safety, security or intent can undermine cooperation and erode confidence in the benefits of nuclear applications.

To support the integrity of Treaty discussions, key standards should be implemented, including:

All allegations should be grounded in well-documented and verified information.
Technical assessments should be referenced in their full context.
Established clarification mechanisms should be used where uncertainties arise.

Where these standards are not met, caution should be exercised in engaging with or amplifying such claims. Verification through competent international bodies and trusted expert networks, requests for clarification through established Treaty mechanisms and internal coordination before responding should be prioritised. Where appropriate, timely and evidence-based communication should be used to clarify the record and mitigate the spread of misleading narratives.

These principles are not intended to constrain debate. They are intended to protect it. Technical assessment and political deliberation serve complementary roles within the Treaty framework.

The NPT depends on informed engagement, mutual respect and good-faith deliberation. By exercising care in how nuclear and radiological information is presented and interpreted, States Parties can reduce the risk of avoidable polarisation and preserve the integrity of this Review Conference.

We thank you for your attention.

The GP Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative

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Delegates Archives - Countering WMD Disinformation

UNGA First Committee Primer 2026

Countering Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear (CBRN) Disinformation

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee

Discredited Verification

Misframed Mandate Limits

Pre-emptive Discrediting

Distorted Treaty Obligations

Fabricated Complicity

False Allegations of Imminent Use

Misleading Impact Data

Mispresented Civilian Research

Statements & Rights of Reply

Official Documents

Side Events & Expert Panels

Corridors & Informal Contact

Reports from the Press

Digital Media

1. Prepare

2. Spot & Check

3. Select Response

4. Coordinate

5. Debunk

Read More:

Best Practice Highlight: Pre-Informing and Pre-Bunking

Best Practice Highlight: Pre-Informing and Pre-Bunking

Case Study of Successful Counter-Disinformation Practice in Preparation of CTBTO Integrated Field Exercise 2026

Read More:

Secretariat Briefing Note

Countering Radiological & Nuclear Disinformation

THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) SECRETARIAT

Awareness

Monitoring

Assessment

Response

Countering Radiological and Nuclear Disinformation at the IAEA GC

Countering Radiological & Nuclear Disinformation

General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Cautious Verification

Double Standards

Mandate Limits

Attacks on Facilities

New Facilities & Programmes

Radiological Impact

Safeguards Obligations

Verification Findings

Plenary & Rights of Reply

Side Events & Scientific Forum

Exhibition Floor

Corridors & Informal Contact

Reports from the Press

Digital Media

1. Spot & Check

2. Select Response

3. Coordinate

4. Debunk

WANT TO LEARN MORE?

Tactic Tracker

Tactic Tracker

Radiological and Nuclear Disinformation

Match all nine narrative examples with the tactic they best represent.

Tactic categories

BWC Briefing Note: August 2026

COUNTERING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DISINFORMATION

2026 Review Conference of the NPT

Countering Radiological & Nuclear Disinformation

2026 Review Conference of the NPT

False Framing of Nuclear Policy

Weapons Acquisition Claims

Weapons Testing Allegations

Institutional Bias Allegations

Mischaracterised Infrastructure

False Facility Security Claims

Appeal to Authority

Appeal to Emotions

Claims of Victimisation

Credibility Inflation

Discrediting Opponents

Distraction & Misdirection

Manipulation of Evidence