Countering Radiological & Nuclear Disinformation

2026 Review Conference of the NPT

BRIEFING NOTE | April 2026

Disinformation* by State-sponsored and State-adjacent actors has been observed in international disarmament forums and will likely feature at the 2026 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This briefing note aims to prepare delegations for disinformation narratives they may encounter. For further information: www.GPWMDCounterDisinfo.com.

WHAT IS RN DISINFORMATION AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?

Radiological and nuclear (RN) disinformation refers to deliberately false or manipulated information concerning radiological or nuclear technologies, materials, weapons or their associated risks and uses. Like other WMD-related disinformation, RN narratives matter because of their negative and disruptive impact in multilateral fora. See examples of the risk below:

Complicate risk communication and response coordination during emergencies.

Put technical facts in question through selective interpretation of data, reducing the impact of impartial assessments.

Create diplomatic friction and misperceptions between Member States, making collective action harder.

Weaken norm coherence and pave the way for norm fragmentation.

Distract resources and delay effective decision-making.

REVCON NARRATIVES

In the context of the 2026 NPT RevCon, such RN disinformation narratives can erode trust in shared facts, increase suspicions and harden negotiating positions. When false claims circulate, they can distort perceptions and narrow the space for compromise across the NPT’s pillars. This can weaken political support for collective measures on nuclear non-proliferation, safety, security and peaceful uses. Delegations should therefore pause to assess whether the claims they encounter are supported by credible evidence. The following false or misleading narratives are among those most likely to be encountered at RevCon:

Inflating or Fabricating Nuclear Threats

False Framing of Nuclear Policy

Narratives recasting doctrinal revisions or nuclear cooperation as offensive escalation or treaty breach – to erode state legitimacy in multilateral fora.

Weapons Acquisition Claims

Narratives alleging that a State is close to acquiring nuclear weapons, or is receiving covert external assistance – to create urgency and legitimise coercive or military action.

Weapons Testing Allegations

Narratives alleging concealed nuclear tests or preparations for testing – to stigmatise an adversary, heighten threat perceptions or normalise reciprocal actions.

Undermining Oversight and Legitimacy

Institutional Bias Allegations

Narratives portraying international bodies as ineffective or biased – to weaken perceptions of their impartiality, technical credibility and oversight functions.

Distorting the Nature or Control of Nuclear Assets

Mischaracterised Infrastructure

Narratives claimed dual-use nuclear infrastructure is purely civilian (or vice versa) – to deligitmise escalation or justify military intervention.

False Facility Security Claims

Narratives presenting an occupier or outside actor as the rightful ‘protector’ of a nuclear facility – to shift blame for attacks, accidents or instability onto others.

Disinformation Tactics

Within RN international forums, including the RevCon, the right of reply is a key vehicle for disinformation. These replies are reactive and not formally recorded, which enables further opportunities for the spread of false or misleading claims. By contrast, pre-prepared national statements often contain less overt disinformation, though they still advance selective or strategically framed narratives.

 

State actors draw on a range of tactics designed to deceive audiences, shape perceptions and legitimise political or military action. See our graphic below for examples of some of the most common disinformation tactics. Recognising and responding to these tactics will better equip RevCon participants to identify, contextualise and mitigate their potential impact.

CURRENT REALITIES

Appeal to Authority
Appeal to Emotions
Claims of Victimisation
Credibility Inflation
Discrediting Opponents
Distraction & Misdirection
Manipulation of Evidence
Entities as Puppets
Recycling Narratives

Want to Learn More?

Understanding theses common disinformation narratives and tactics will better equip delegations to pre-emptively debunk falsehoods, alert others to recurring patterns and build organisational and state resilience against the harmful effects of RN disinformation.

* Definitively identifying disinformation amid broader efforts to influence populations can be challenging as intent and attribution are often unclear. For brevity, this report adopts a broad definition of ‘disinformation’ that includes misinformation and other information operations, as all seek to mislead the public and shape perceptions.

Read More:

→ Best practices for Countering Radiological and Nuclear Disinfo

→ Radiological and Nuclear Disinformation Roadmap

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Policy Briefs

REFERENCES

  1. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). ‘Safeguards Implementation Report 2023’. International Atomic Energy Agency, 7 June 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/06/20240607_sir_2024_part_ab.pdf.

  2. IAEA. ‘Two Years of IAEA Continued Presence at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant’. International Atomic Energy Agency, 3 September 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/two-years-of-iaea-continued-presence-at-the-zaporizhzhaya-nuclear-power-plant.pdf.

  3. ‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on Its 2nd Session: Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’. United Nations, 2 August 2024. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceSecond_session_(2024)/NPT_CONF.2026_PC.II_07_-_07._ADVANCE_UNEDITED_VERSION_Master_1_FINAL_Report__Preparatory_Committee_2nd__session.pdf.

  4. ‘Summary Record (Partial) of the 18th Meeting, Held at the Vienna International Centre, Vienna, on Friday, 11 August 2023: Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1st Session’. United Nations, 7 September 2023. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/239/51/pdf/n2323951.pdf.

  5. United Nations. ‘Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference Ends without Adopting Substantive Outcome Document Due to Opposition by One Member State’, 26 August 2022. https://press.un.org/en/2022/dc3850.doc.htm.

  6. GP WMD Counter Disinfo. ‘Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Portraying States and Organizations as Puppets’. January 2025. https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/tactic-spotlight-portraying-states-and-organizations-as-puppets/.

  7. Predictable patterns in how the human brain functions to simplify information processing, which frequently leads individuals to think about the world in distorted ways, Stephen Eldridge. ‘Cognitive Bias: Description & Examples’. Britannica. Accessed 11 April 2025. https://www.britannica.com/science/cognitive-bias.

  8. Specific cues or narrative elements designed to provoke strong emotional reactions in the audience; Melissa L. Finucane et al., ‘The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits’, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 13, no. 1 (January 2000): 1–17, https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(200001/03)13:1<1::AID-BDM333>3.0.CO;2-S; Cameron Martel, Gordon Pennycook, and David G. Rand, ‘Reliance on Emotion Promotes Belief in Fake News’, Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications 5, no. 1 (7 October 2020): 47,

    https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-020-00252-3.