COUNTERING RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (RN) DISINFORMATION:
AN INTRODUCTORY BEST PRACTICE GUIDE FOR STATE DELEGATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL FORA
RN disinformation is the deliberate spread of false or misleading information aboutnuclear weapons, peaceful nuclear applications or radiological materials. The GP WMD Counter Disinfo Initiative has analysed relevant past disinformation tactics aimed at preparing delegations for disinformation narratives they may encounter.
WHY IT MATTERS
State delegations articulate national positions, engage in dialogue and shape outcomes through norm-setting and decision-making. Their visibility makes them prime targets for reputational attacks, narrative manipulation and emotionally charged RN disinformation, which is increasingly used as a tool of hybrid warfare.1 Such disinformation poses a growing risk not only to the perceived credibility of delegations but also to the coherence of diplomatic processes and broader institutional trust.
HOW IT WORKS
RN disinformation strategically undermines state delegations’ ability to perform core diplomatic functions by seeking to erode their credibility and trustworthiness. Delegations may be portrayed as deceptive or irresponsible (e.g. their state secretly developing or intending to develop nuclear weapons or concealing treaty violations);2 as provoking escalation (e.g. intentionally escalating tensions by attempting to provoke a nuclear war or drag alliances into direct confrontation);3 or acting as proxies for external agendas (e.g. adversaries can use polarising, degrading or vilifying language to present delegations as “puppets of foreign interests”).4 These tactics seek to weaken delegations’ reputations, impede coalition-building and reduce delegations’ influence in negotiations, ultimately disrupting their capacity to shape diplomatic outcomes.
ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN DELEGATIONS’ RESILIENCE AGAINST RN DISINFORMATION
This foundational best practice guidance is informed by interviews, practitioner engagement and a review of relevant policy and academic literature. It brings together sectoral insights from disciplines focusing on information perception and resulting behaviour, as well as analysis of RN disinformation dynamics in international fora, including stakeholder-specific advantages, constraints and identified practitioner needs.
RN DISINFORMATION DECISION TREE: STEP-BY-STEP GUIDANCE
A suspected RN disinformation narrative emerges in a multilateral forum through statements, procedural interventions, agenda items, draft language negotiations, technical questions or requests for clarification. Does the narrative target your delegation directly or indirectly?
Is the narrative spreading beyond fringe sources? Indicators: Cited by media, mentioned by other delegations, referenced in negotiations or draft language or gaining engagement online.
Would a public response amplify the narrative?
- Log the case internally: include narrative summary, sources, screenshots, timeline, actions taken and outcomes.
- Conduct internal debrief: review effectiveness of response, note gaps in response coordination or technical access.
- Update Standard Operating Procedures or decision thresholds.
- Share lessons learned with trusted partners through secure channels.
- Add case to transition brief for future delegation rotations.
REFERENCES
- A set of military, diplomatic, economic and informational actions that are deployed to achieve strategic objectives. See: Yevhen Mahda, Russia’s Hybrid Aggression: Lessons for the World (2018).
- TACC, ‘Путин заявил, что угроза Украины создать собственное ядерное оружие не пустая бравада [Putin says Ukraine’s Threat to Develop its Own Nuclear Weapons Is Not Empty Bravado]’, 21 February 2021, .
- MIKRU, ‘Экс-дипломат объяснил желание Зеленского втянуть НАТО в горячий конфликт с Россией [Former diplomat explains Zelensky’s desire to drag NATO into a heated conflict with Russia]’, 5 August 2024; Delegation of the Russian Federation, ‘Statement by the Representative of the Delegation of the Russian Federation in Exercise of the Right of Reply’, 2 August 2022.
- GP WMD Counter Disinfo, ‘Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Portraying States and Organizations as Puppets’, January 2025.
