Biological Weapons Archives - Countering WMD Disinformation

Russia’s January 2025 Note Verbale Debunked

Erik — Wed, 20 May 2026 02:17:30 +0000

COUNTERING Biological WEAPONS DISINFORMATION

RUSSIA’S JANUARY 2025 NOTE VERBALE DEBUNKED

Policy Brief | March 2025

Background

In January 2025, Russia circulated a note verbale to the BWC Implementation Support Unit with the request it be shared with all States Parties to the BWC. This document highlighted a briefing given by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev, Deputy Head of the Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense Forces of the Russian Federation on 24 December 2024. Similar to past efforts by Russia, this note verbale focused on falsely accusing the United States of leading illicit biological activities in violation to the BWC. However, while this note included many features, disinformation narratives, and tactics observed in the past in communications issued by Russia, this note featured a new region, Africa, as its target. While Russian accusations may be old news to many who have had to manage and endure the “firehose of falsehoods” in the past, this shift of focus may engage new audiences who are less familiar with these narratives and tactics. In this policy brief we highlight these commonly used approaches found in the latest note verbale from Russia so that readers can better understand the manipulative approaches underlying such notes.

DISINFORMATION TACTICS

The note verbale shared by Russia contains several of the common narratives they have built their disinformation campaigns around and have regularly used for years. Outlined below are the excerpts from the Note Verbale that reflect these narratives.

“Suspicious Outbreaks”

One common narrative to be aware of is fear mongering about “suspicious outbreaks.” Generally, this narrative implies that naturally occurring outbreaks are the result of US biological weapon experimentation. Often this narrative will provide descriptions of potential “clues” to alleged nefarious activity in an effort to discredit the opponent. In this narrative, the occurrence of outbreaks of disease are used to insinuate nefarious activity and the existence of work to combat disease is used as “evidence” that something suspicious is occurring.

Example 1: “First, concerns are voiced about regular outbreaks of, for example, anthrax and tularemia in one region, or foot-and-mouth disease and plague in another one. Such alarms are raised usually at the meetings of US ambassadors with representatives of local health ministries.” (Page 1, Briefing by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev)
Example 2: “There is a clear trend: pathogens that fall within the Pentagon’s area of interest subsequently become pandemic, with US pharmaceutical companies becoming beneficiaries.” (Page 5, Briefing by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev)

Human Experimentation

Another common narrative is the claim that western countries (often the US) are conducting biological experiments on human research subjects. Allegations of ethical violations (lack of informed consent, exploitation of individuals in fragile settings) evoke strong emotions in readers, including disgust and/or outage. This approach often encourages readers to make a mental shortcut that combines an accusation in a different setting and the same accusation being made closer to home.

Example: “American-funded biological projects in Nigeria are aimed at combating HIV. As volunteers, Nigerian citizens take part in the clinical evaluation of antiviral drugs from the Pentagon-affiliated company Gilead. I would like to remind you that this pharmaceutical company also tested its drugs on Ukrainian citizens.” (Page 4, Briefing by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev)

Fulfillment of “Western” goals around WMD use

Another common disinformation narrative focuses on the idea that US oversees biological activities are being disguised as peaceful or protective but are, instead, designed to serve “Western” geopolitical/military goals that may harm other nations. This type of narrative exploits divisions amongst communities that were already distrustful of certain countries such as the US.

Example 1: “It is designed to obtain pathogens in endemic areas and natural foci, control and manage the biological situation in order to serve US interests.” (Page 1, Briefing by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev)
Example 2: “The online media outlet Geopolitics has published an article about the joint efforts of DTRA and the US non-profit organization RTI International to monitor infectious diseases in Africa, which, according to the publication, is a component of the Pentagon’s broader ‘biological espionage’; initiative.” (Page 7, Briefing by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev)

COMMON TACTICS AND MOTIVES

In addition to recycled disinformation narratives, Russia also employed recycled tactics to spread disinformation through this communication, with the common motive of discrediting its opponents and strengthening its global standing. Outlined below are the excerpts from the Note Verbale that highlight the common tactics and motives Russia regularly uses.

“Western” colonialism

This tactic leverages distrust from historical exploitation to suggest that the US furthers its interests while harming locals. It implies that US overseas biological activity is part of a neocolonial agenda. At the same time, Russia uses these messages to position itself as a friend and partner working to support states in Africa.

Example 1: “Now the focus of interest has shifted to Africa. The United States Administration views the region as an infinite natural reservoir of dangerous infectious agents and as a testing ground for experimental medical products.” (Page 1, Briefing by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev)
Example 2: “As a result, participating states involved in this system lose their national sovereignty in the field of biological safety and security and become fully dependent on the United States.” (Page 2, Briefing by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev)

Discrediting opponents

This tactic often lists military organizations, U.S. government organizations (such as the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Department of Defense), government contractors (e.g., CH2M Hill, Metabiota), and people who have worked in the region, and reframes their work in nefarious terms. By listing a large volume of organizations and associations (some trusted and some not) and, at the same time, implying their work is linked to suspicious activity, this approach diminishes each organization’s individual credibility, even if they are a part of approved and well-known global health programs that provide large amounts of local aid.

Risk increasing language

Disinformation usually uses risk increasing language, such as suggesting that common people may not even know they were exposed to biological agents, to increase attention and perception of risk. This includes listing many bio/military programs and implying they have a dual use intent. In this way, this language links the mere existence of a biological program or lab with its potential for causing widespread harm, which evokes a foreboding feeling of risk in the reader, a feeling of immanent harm, and/or that risks are not being honestly communicated to the people who would suffer them.

Disregard for rules, laws, norms

Another tactic aims to diminish the credibility of the “Western” nations by claiming that the US or allies are casually breaking rules, laws, or norms. At the same time, Russia seeks to create a contrast and establishes itself as a rule-follower in many diplomatic spaces and uses rule-breaking as a reason to admonish others.

Example: “While the stated goals are to monitor infectious diseases and assist developing countries, in practice we see a buildup of US biological military capabilities, which circumvents the BWC commitments.” (Page 5, Briefing by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev)

Current Realities

Example: “While the stated goals are to monitor infectious diseases and assist developing countries, in practice we see a buildup of US biological military capabilities, which circumvents the BWC commitments.” (Page 5, Briefing by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev)

The post Russia’s January 2025 Note Verbale Debunked appeared first on Countering WMD Disinformation.

NGO STATEMENT TO BWC MEETING OF STATES PARTIES

Erik — Sun, 10 May 2026 16:56:32 +0000

NGO STATEMENT TO BWC MEETING OF STATES PARTIES

WHILE NGO STATEMENTS WERE NOT DELIVERED DURING THE 2024 BWC MSP, WE HAD PREPARED THE BELOW STATEMENT THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN DELIVERED ON BEHALF OF THE GP COUNTER WMD DISINFORMATION INITIATIVE | DECEMBER 2024

Dear Chairperson, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen

This year, we have seen an increase in malicious disinformation campaigns and information manipulation tactics that negatively impact cooperative threat reduction efforts and that are eroding trust in our international disarmament treaties and their safeguarding institutions, including the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

Disinformation campaigns across the spectrum of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) domains pose a critical threat to international security. Nonproliferation and disarmament activities are particularly vulnerable to these hostile tactics due to their technical complexity and dual-use nature. These disinformation campaigns can undermine trust in the rules-based international system and the multilateral disarmament fora that help to support it, they can jeopardize the hard work of the BWC-ISU and States Parties in upholding the Biological Weapons Convention and can provide opportunities to amplify fear and confusion among the general public. Failing to take decisive action could allow disinformation to weaken critical disarmament agreements, to destabilize multilateral institutions, heighten tensions within the global community, and severely impede peaceful international cooperation and support.

We are pleased to note the priority and commitments that multilateral institutions including the BWC, as well as many States Parties and delegates here today, have placed upon combatting and countering disinformation. The international community has a responsibility to continue to identify and address disinformation campaigns as they are developed and to proactively combat these false narratives. As an exemplar of this effort, the 31 members of the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction launched the Countering WMD Disinformation initiative. Further endorsed by the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, the initiative is a coordinated, multi-institutional and multi-disciplinary effort to understand and counter state-sponsored or state-adjacent disinformation across the CBRN spectrum.

The GP Counter WMD Disinformation initiative, with initial funding from the Government of Canada, brings together four leading organizations to collaboratively develop approaches to counter CBRN disinformation. Activities include developing tailored tools to support such efforts, monitoring and flagging concerning disinformation narratives in real-time, and training diplomats and practitioners to readily identify and anticipate disinformation narratives that could impact global nonproliferation efforts. We encourage all delegations to explore the resources available on our website, GPWMDcounterdisinfo.com, which includes policy briefs, concise reports, case studies and video explainers.

We would like to thank the Italian Government for their leadership during their G7 presidency, the GP members who sit on the steering committee for this initiative, and all GP members for continuing to identify and create provide valuable insights into CBRN disinformation tactics, including analysis of both current and past disinformation campaigns, and present effective strategies to address these growing threats.

We encourage all delegations to engage with this initiative, to help prevent and counter harmful disinformation related to all forms of WMD, to ensure that efforts to enhance Article X cooperation are not undermined, to support the work of the BWC-ISU, and to work towards a safer and more secure world.

We thank you for your kind attention,

The GP Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative

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BWC BRIEFING NOTE | DECEMBER 2025

Erik — Sun, 10 May 2026 16:47:47 +0000

COUNTERING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DISINFORMATION

BWC BRIEFING NOTE | DECEMBER 2025

Disinformation continues to threaten the integrity of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), fomenting mistrust between states parties and undermining the global norm against biological weapons. In recent meetings of the BWC, some states have used disinformation (in the form of false allegations) to further their geopolitical agendas, block proposals for strengthening the Convention, undermine international cooperation and assistance, and further divisions between states parties. The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction’s (GP) Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative seeks to build resilience to these false allegations and safeguard multilateral disarmament treaties.

FALSE ALLEGATIONS

In the context of its invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Federation has continued to falsely claim that Ukraine, with the alleged support of the United States, was developing biological weapons in Ukrainian laboratories. U.S. cooperative threat reduction activities in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states have long been a target of Russian disinformation campaigns. However, these campaigns intensified following the Russian invasion, with Russia calling for a Formal Consultative Meeting in 2022 to discuss its alleged claims about Ukrainian laboratories.

Recently, states outside of the post-Soviet space have also become targets of disinformation campaigns. In January 2025, for example, the Russian Federation submitted a note verbale to BWC states parties false alleging that the US was shifting the focus of its ‘clandestine’ biological activities from Ukraine and Georgia to countries in Africa. Despite the shifting targets of these campaigns, the tactics used to spread disinformation are largely recycled. By understanding, characterizing, and exposing these tactics, it is possible to build resilience to disinformation within the BWC diplomatic community and beyond.

COMMON DISINFORMATION TACTICS TO BE ON THE LOOKOUT FOR

We analyzed official BWC documents to identify recurring disinformation tactics. We identified 5 common tactics across BW-related disinformation campaigns. These are displayed in the figure below.

See full Roadmap of a BWC Disinformation Campaign

TRACKING ALLEGATIONS ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ACTIVITY BUILDS INFORMATION RESILIENCE

See full CBRN Tracker

Allegations of biological weapons activity and illicit biological research frequently surface in discussions among BWC states parties. Our CBRN Disinformation Tracker is an interactive resource that enables users to follow how disinformation can influence multilateral disarmament debates on WMD. It offers a structured and impartial method for documenting claims, helping users to understand the broader dynamics of how false or misleading information on CBRN activities develops over time.

Typical biological disinformation narratives relate to laboratories and pathogen-transfer claims, fabricated disease outbreaks, delegitimization and sovereignty-loss themes, narratives of encirclement, and alleged violations of the BWC. Each entry in the Tracker links to original source material, including official statements and notes verbales, enabling the user to examine the underlying data directly.

The Tracker provides an evidence-based tool that supports users to:

Identify and counter false WMD allegations made under the guise of treaty compliance
Recognise patterns of coordinated disinformation aimed at manipulating international mechanisms
Reinforce the credibility and impartiality of technical bodies
Understand historical context
Strengthen defences against information warfare

The Tracker empowers the disarmament community to better understand how misleading narratives emerge, spread and recur across contexts, and to build greater resilience against disinformation campaigns.

ACTIONS TO COUNTER DISINFORMATION

Raise awareness of the common tactics used in BWC disinformation campaigns. The more the diplomatic community can recognize and identify these tactics, the less impact they will have on BWC proceedings.

Engage when necessary but be conscious of the amount of time spent discussing false allegations. While refuting false allegations can be an effective way to correct misconceptions and restore trust, engaging in extended discussions can take up valuable time and distract from more pressing issues.

Reaffirm the importance of the BWC and the global norm against biological weapons. Disinformation campaigns can erode confidence in the Convention and weaken the global norm against biological weapons. Continued emphasis on the value of the Convention and the strength of the global norm can help offset the negative effects of disinformation.

COUNTERING DISINFORMATION WITH EXAMPLE REFUTATION LANGUAGE

To counter biolab disinformation narratives:

Potential refutation language: “The biological facilities in question are engaged in purely peaceful activities, including biosurveillance and the development of medical countermeasures. The financial and technical assistance provided to these facilities, which is fully and publicly documented, falls squarely under Article X of the Convention and is aimed at reducing biological threats, including the threat posed by biological weapons. These allegations are not only false, but also dangerous, as they undermine international cooperation and assistance and erode confidence in Convention.”

To counter biolab disinformation narratives expanding to Africa and other regions:

Potential refutation language: “The false claims about biological activities in [insert country] are nothing more than a new spin on decades-long disinformation campaigns against peaceful cooperative threat reduction activities. These activities are essential for understanding and mitigating biological threats in the region and attempts to delegitimize them aim to undermine international security and compromise global health security writ large.”

To counter suggestions of secrecy or neglect in reporting ICA

Potential refutation language: “The Russian Federation has continuously sought to undermine international cooperation and assistance under Article X by falsely claiming that states parties are using cooperative threat reduction programs as a cover for offensive activities in violation of the Convention. At the same time, the Russian Federation has also sought to undermine efforts to enhance transparency and build trust by falsely alleging that some states are leaving important details out of their reporting requirements. This is untrue, as states parties regularly report transparently on their ICA activities through working papers, national statements, and publicly available reports, presentations, and brochures. Many of these reports are available on the UNODA website. Members of the G7-led Global Partnership also share details of their biosecurity capacity building efforts through an annual programming annex. We see no need to duplicate reporting on these activities by including them in CBM forms and refuse to further the false narrative that certain states are withholding information.”

The post BWC BRIEFING NOTE | DECEMBER 2025 appeared first on Countering WMD Disinformation.

Roadmap of a BWC Disinformation Campaign

Erik — Fri, 14 Nov 2025 21:29:05 +0000

Roadmap of a bwc disinformation campaign

Misuse of Scientific and Technical Information

Presenting inaccurate, irrelevant, or misconstrued scientific or technical information to substantiate false claims

What does this commonly used tactic look like in BWC statements and documents?

Statement by the Russian Federation at the 9th Review Conference (2022)

Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation at 2023 Working Group Meeting

Provision of “Evidence”:

Using reports, government agreements, project documents, and patent applications to generate “evidence” of nefarious activity

What does this commonly used tactic look like in BWC statements and documents?

Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation at 2024 Meeting of States Parties

Presentation submitted by the Russian Federation at 2022 Formal Consultative Meeting

Appeal to Emotions:

Using emotionally manipulative language or content to elicit feelings of outrage, fear, disgust, and/or anger

What does this commonly used tactic look like in BWC statements and documents?

Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation at 2023 Working Group Meeting

Note Verbale submitted by the Russian Federation to BWC States Parties in 2024

Citing “Authoritative” Sources:

Referencing, quoting, or misquoting/misrepresenting sources with apparent authority or expertise to enhance the perceived credibility of false claims

What does this commonly used tactic look like in BWC statements and documents?

Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation at 2023 Meeting of States Parties

Note Verbale submitted by the Russian Federation to BWC States Parties in 2024

Claims of Secrecy or Neglect:

Claiming that certain states are not adequately transparent about their biological activities and/or not responsive to questions about those activities

What does this commonly used tactic look like in BWC statements and documents?

Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation at 2024 Meeting of States Parties

Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation at 2023 Working Group Meeting

The post Roadmap of a BWC Disinformation Campaign appeared first on Countering WMD Disinformation.

CBRN Disinformation — Views from Experts

Erik — Fri, 14 Nov 2025 16:25:50 +0000

CBRN disinformation

VIEWS FROM EXPERTS

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) seeks to understand and counter state-sponsored or state-adjacent disinformation across Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats. As part of this effort, the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (JHCHS) synthesized expert opinions on high-level global policy approaches the diplomatic community could use to manage and counter CBRN disinformation. JHCHS conducted formal interviews with a broad range of experts and rigorously analyzed their responses to identify themes and recommendations. Findings underscore the urgent need for tailored countermeasures and enhanced collaboration to implement proactive strategies like prebunking and amplifying factual information through trusted voices.

OVERVIEW

METHODOLOGY

We recruited key informants (KIs) with subject matter expertise in disinformation and/or CBRN weapons representing government institutions, United Nations (UN) organizations, academic institutions, non-governmental organizations, and think tanks located in the United Kingdom, United States of America (US), Canada, Ukraine, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Finland, Italy, and Belgium. Those who agreed to participate took part in a 45-minute virtual solo or group interview with JHCHS researchers, including at least one lead interviewer and a note-taker. All participants provided consent and all but two provided full permission to record and transcribe the interview. These two interviews were recorded using only audio recordings or notetaking. All interviews followed a semi-structured interview guide, shared with participants in advance via email.

In total, we conducted 24 interviews with 28 experts, who provided insights into the current state of CBRN disinformation, perceived goals and recommendations to guide future countermeasures. To systematically identify impacts and themes, we developed a qualitative analysis codebook and used it to conduct a thematic analysis of transcripts. To ensure high levels of reliability, all transcripts were reviewed by all members of the research team and were each coded independently by two trained coders, who used a process of negotiated agreement to settle differences.

FINDINGS

Interviews with experts revealed deep concern about the growing impact of disinformation on CBRN threats, particularly during acute crises like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. KIs noted that CBRN-related disinformation targets diverse audiences, ranging from specific geographic communities (domestic Russian populations, communities where biolabs are located, etc.), to government officials, to society at large. KIs also noted that disinformation is spread through various mechanisms, from simple social media posts to official multilateral forums such as meetings of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). KIs described multifaceted goals of disinformation, including eroding the credibility of adversaries, undermining multilateral institutions, and justifying military actions. These narratives often create “infodemic” conditions, leading to confusion, wasted resources, and compromised trust and transparency. To counter this threat, KIs recommended proactive strategies like prebunking and amplifying factual information through trusted voices, alongside strengthening the technical authority of multilateral organizations. These findings underscore the urgent need for tailored countermeasures and enhanced collaboration between governments, experts, and technology platforms to build resilience against this evolving threat.

Experts noted that disinformation tactics and themes often differ between CBRN categories, though the overall purpose of distraction and confusion remains consistent. Themes from this analysis align with tactics characterized in our taxonomy of CBRN disinformation in pro-Kremlin news media; our Tactic Spotlight briefs describe these tactics, as well as the overarching master narratives they employ.

DESCRIBED CBRN DISINFORMATION THEMES AND TACTICS

Disinformation Themes Table

Theme	Description
Distraction & Misdirection	Pointing to (real or falsely alleged) CBRN activity and threats, such as weapons use, attacks on facilities, or emerging dangers. This approach is designed to cause confusion about what may be happening on the ground, justify potential use of weapons, and/or direct attention away from potentially embarrassing events or a country’s own CBRN activities.
Discrediting Opponents	Using disinformation to discredit opponents in the eyes of the international community and/or the disinformation spreader’s domestic population. This includes portraying states and entities (including foreign aid initiatives) as “puppets” of a foreign power.
Use of Misleading “Evidence”	Referencing, describing, or alluding to “evidence” that purportedly confirms false claims about CBRN weapons or threats. Such evidence may include agreements, documents, reports, and other “materials.” In some cases, these materials are legitimate but are deliberately misinterpreted or taken out of context. In other cases, these materials are partially or fully fabricated.
Framing Russia as a Savior	Framing Russian actions as necessary to ensure global peace and security. By drawing attention to alleged CBRN and other security threats that purportedly require Russian intervention, this tactic is designed to legitimize Russia as a responsible international actor and justify its aggression in Ukraine.
Using “Authoritative” Sources	Referencing “authoritative” sources to provide a false appearance of legitimacy or expert backing. These sources may be fake, taken out of context, paid by or part of the originator of the disinformation, or have expertise in a separate area.
References to Past or Present Crises	Linking current CBRN threats (real or falsely alleged) with historical disasters or atrocities such as genocide, the Chernobyl disaster, or the Holocaust to evoke a strong emotional response.
Disregard for Rules & Norms	Falsely alleging that a country or entity is disregarding or breaking rules, laws, and norms to discredit opponents.
Risk Increasing Language	Narratives with risk-increasing language as a psychological tactic to increase fear and/or serve as a threat.
Claims of Victimization	Framing the disinformation spreader as victim of real or perceived wrongdoings to distract from or minimize the harms committed by the supposed “victim.”
Tailoring	Tailoring disinformation to audience preferences for how they receive information or what sources they trust to increase the uptake and effectiveness of disinformation.

AUDIENCES AND MECHANISMS

KIs described a range of potential target audiences for CBRN-related disinformation, listing entities as specific as “communities affected by [past] radiological or nuclear events” and as broad as “society at large”. KIs noted that disinformation is spread across a variety of channels and platforms, including social media, news outlets, press conferences, online forums, schoolbooks, seemingly legitimate convenings where disinformation can be spread strategically, official multilateral fora, bots and troll farms, Artificial Intelligence (AI)-driven channels, and deepfake videos. In some cases, KIs were even more specific, citing networks and media spaces in Ukraine that were allegedly owned by Russian media groups. KIs also highlighted that there was often secondary proliferation of disinformation where existing disinformation was leveraged and further propagated by groups and individuals aligned with those who created the initial false messages. The figure below shows the different types of target audiences.

DISINFORMATION TARGET AUDIENCES IDENTIFIED BY KIs

Disinformation Target Audiences >

Individuals

CBRN experts

The “uninformed” layman

Government leaders

Scientists

Diplomats

Journalists

Russia supporters, Anti-Ukraine, Anti-West

Well-meaning secondary disinformation spreaders

Communities

Communities affected by radiological or nuclear events

Domestic audiences (e.g. Ukraine, Russia, Syria, Iran, US, Canada, Europe)

Conspiracy leaning populations

Ultra nationalistic people and groups

Multi-Country Groups or Regions

States parties to various disarmament agreements

Countries supporting Ukraine

Lower income countries

Global majority countries

Eastern Europe

The “West”

Non-Aligned Movement States

Africa

South America

Latin America

Middle East / North Africa

Indo-Pacific

Broad Categories

Society at large

International community

Governments

States at war

POTENTIAL GOALS AND PURPOSES

KIs shared that CBRN disinformation seemed to work towards potential goals and was spread for specific purposes. These perceived goals and purposes can be categorized across three broad categories: impacts to mental schemas, impacts to systems, and impacts to country-level activities. “Affecting mental schemas” refers to the cognitive and psychological angles of disinformation, such as attempts at targeting emotions and changing people’s opinions. “Affecting systems” encompasses the process of disrupting decision-making, proceedings, and action at the institutional and multilateral levels. It can include attempts to undermine disarmament agreements, while also encompassing efforts to influence entire sectors, such as advancements in technology and communication. “Affecting actions” at the country level includes the influence of inter and intra-country policy and law. These categories are not mutually exclusive; rather, they interact dynamically. For example, efforts to reduce the morale of Ukrainian citizens (affecting mental schemas) can, in turn, undermine the broader effort countering Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (affecting country actions). The figure below shows more examples of perceived goals and impacts across these three categories.

Perceived Purposes & Impacts

Perceived Purposes

Affecting Systems

Escape accountability for nefarious activity
Undermine multilateral institutions & efforts
Justify development and use of WMD capabilities

Affecting Mental Schemas

Exert control or influence over domestic population
Erode the credibility of adversaries and their supporters
Sow confusion and doubt about peaceful activities
Create conditions to incite an infodemic
Increase distrust in domestic population of adversaries

Affecting Country Actions

Influence tactical geopolitical decisions and negotiations
Sabotage opponents’ and adversaries’ alliances

Perceived Impacts

Affecting Systems

Official communication channels become impaired
Distraction
Wasting of time and resources
Movement towards accountability for spreading disinformation

Affecting Mental Schemas

Stokes confusion during infodemics
Plausible deniability
Discourages cooperation between nations
Compromises transparency mechanisms and culture of trust
Organic spread of disinformation narratives by those who believe them

Affecting Country Actions

Incentives to continue disinformation campaigns
Increases WMD posturing and compromises global norms
Influences war, conflict, and geopolitics
Disrupts peaceful uses of CBRN resources

DESCRIBED GOALS AND IMPACTS OF CBRN DISINFORMATION

KIs shared that the goals and impacts of CBRN disinformation campaigns seemed to differ based on the type of threat. For example, participants felt that disinformation on chemical weapons created confusion and muddled the information space, while disinformation on radiological and nuclear weapons evoked a strong sense of fear due to the high-risk perception of nuclear threats. However, several common goals and impacts were identified that spanned all threats, including inviting suspicion of Ukraine’s credibility and undermining global nonproliferation norms. Almost all disinformation claims seemed to target two higher-order goals: improving how the world perceived the disinformation spreader and weakening or undermining the spreader’s opponents. Goals also could be separated by their effect on systems, mental schemas, and country actions. These threat-specific and threat-agnostic goals and impacts are illustrated below:

Disinformation Effects Chart

Strengthen the disinformation spreader’s geopolitical position and weaken their opponents

Affecting Systems

Affecting Mental Schemas

Affecting Country Actions

Create infodemic conditions
Influence countries’ allegiances
Influence tactical decisions or negotiations
Undermine global norms and treaties
Undermine multilateral institutions
Sow confusion about peaceful activities
Erode the credibility of Ukraine and its supporters
Exert control and influence over domestic population
Justify developing future defensive and offensive capabilities
Stoke fears about a potential catastrophe
Escape accountability

SHARED GOALS & IMPACTS

Disinformation on Chemical Weapons

Deflect blame for Navalny/Skripal assassination attempts
Distract from Russia’s use of chemical weapons on the battlefield
Undermine OPCW investigations of Russia’s use of chemical weapons
Confuse and muddle the information space

Disinformation on Biological Weapons

Justify invasion of Ukraine
Undermine US cooperative biological activities
Impede progress on the Biological Weapons Convention
Stoke divisions among diplomatic and general audiences

Disinformation on Radiological & Nuclear Weapons

Discourage countries from sending tangible support to Ukraine
Create an immediate fear response
Exaggerate risk and distract from Russia’s poor performance in its invasion of Ukraine
Weaken public trust in and credibility of IAEA & safeguards

CBRN-SPECIFIC GOALS & IMPACTS

NOTE: This is not an exhaustive list and represents only perceived or suspected (not confirmed) goals and impacts.

CBRN disinformation has tangible impacts like eroding public trust in institutions that safeguard against CBRN threats, influencing domestic and international perspectives on the actions of nation states, and overwhelming people with a ‘firehose of falsehoods’ that may keep them from verifying facts. KIs suggested that disinformation impacts diplomatic spaces, weakening the nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament (NACD) architecture over time and often distracting from important international action on other time-sensitive threats.

ADDRESSING DISINFORMATION

The below figure illustrates factors that facilitate disinformation, as well as proposed recommendations to counter CBRN disinformation across multiple levels, based on our discussions with KIs.

CBRN Disinformation Table

Disinformation Facilitators

KI Recommendations to Counter Disinformation

Institutions

Disinformation Facilitators

Lack of time/resources to identify and counter disinformation
Siloed knowledge and countermeasures due to the discrete and distinct ways in which chemical, biological, and/or nuclear threat reduction and policymaking occurs
Weakening of CBRN disarmament structures
Lack of monitoring and regulation on social media
Emerging technology such as AI and novel WMD technologies

Community

Disinformation Facilitators

Past grievances and crises
Geopolitical tensions
Emergencies that increase vulnerability to disinformation

Individual

Disinformation Facilitators

Mistrust in science and institutions
Deception is becoming normalized
WMDs are inherently scary
Lack of knowledge regarding CBRN realities

Information

Disinformation Facilitators

Lack of trusted voices to debunk
Difficulty discerning what is true
Confusion between disinformation, posturing, and propaganda
Classified nature of CBRN information
Complexity of WMD technology

CONCLUSION

This study both corroborates and extends the existing knowledge regarding disinformation, highlighting unique features and challenges in the disarmament context. Findings underscore the need for tailored countermeasures at various levels (institutions, community, individual, and information) that consider the specificities of disarmament fora, the evolving tactics of state actors, and the complex interplay between audiences, information, belief, and behavior. These measures will require a collaborative approach at the bilateral and multilateral levels to combat disinformation campaigns as they arise, improve trust and transparency between nations, and bolster global disarmament norms.

September 2025

The post CBRN Disinformation — Views from Experts appeared first on Countering WMD Disinformation.

Building Resilience to False Narratives

Erik — Thu, 07 Aug 2025 20:21:06 +0000

COUNTERING Biological WEAPONS DISINFORMATION

Building Resilience to False Narratives: A Primer for the BWC Sixth Working Group, August 2025

Current Realities

Erosion of information integrity is a pressing concern in the biological non-proliferation and threat reduction domain. False narratives alleging misuse of biological laboratories in Ukraine and other partner countries around the globe continue to be a key focus.

In the lead up to the August 2025 BWC Working Group session:

The overarching narrative, which falsely frames peaceful biological research and health security initiatives as covert military bioweapons development, remains largely consistent in Ukraine. However, geographical scope is broadening to encompass regions around the world including Africa, the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East.
The expanding narrative reflects regional specificities. For example, disinformation campaigns targeting Southeast Asia have portrayed biological research facilities which receive foreign funding as fronts for biological weapons development. These narratives often exploit regional tensions over complex strategic rivalries and mistrust towards foreign assistance. New proxy channels, including state-affiliated media and political actors, are being employed to propagate the false claims.

The global expansion of narratives related to biological research, medical counter measures and cooperative threat reduction initiatives reflect a more sophisticated and globalised information manipulation strategy that goes beyond the immediate context of Ukraine. The targeted and deliberate spread of mis- and disinformation undermines broader non-proliferation and threat reduction priorities, including efforts within the BWC to strengthen international cooperation and assistance and to agree new measures on scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

Messaging is generally aligned with anti-‘western’ narratives, where ‘western’ refers not to geography but to liberal democratic values such as freedom of speech, political association and the rule of law. These anti-‘western’ narratives often:

Frame the BWC as selectively enforced or manipulated by NATO states.
Portray cooperative bioscience as a neocolonial endeavour.
Exploit themes of national sovereignty and resistance to external influence to stoke distrust of international cooperation and Western involvement.

UPCOMING SIDE EVENTS

Learn more about recent trends and efforts to build resilience against biological disinformation at two upcoming BWC side events and engage with the Global Partnership Initiative:

Monday 11 Aug 2025, GP Counter Disinformation Initiative side event on ‘Building Resilience to Disinformation Narratives and Tactics’ 1315-1445 in room XXV. This side event aims to:

Showcase country perspectives and experiences that highlight the need for resilience-building efforts.
Provide an overview of existing tools and approaches to counter disinformation.
Describe effective approaches to promote resilience to information manipulation.
Raise awareness of how policy makers and the diplomatic community can recognize recurring patterns of disinformation campaigns.
Increase partner capacity to build trust and lessen the impact of information manipulation.

Monday 18 Aug 2025, European Union side event on ‘Safeguarding Information Integrity in the Biological Weapons Convention: 50 Years of Trust, Science and Security’ 13:15-14:45, Room XXV. This side event aims to:

Raise awarenessof how information manipulation affects implementation of the BWC, including trust in Article X cooperation and the S&T review process.
Promote transparency and science-based dialogue as key safeguards of information integrity.
Highlight practical tools and good practices to reinforce cooperation, assistance and communication.
Facilitate engagementbetween diplomats, scientists, and civil society to explore coordinated approaches to maintain trust and prevent harmful narratives.
Contribute to deliberationson topics assigned to the Working Group, in particular international cooperation, transparency, and compliance.

RECENT HISTORY BACKGROUNDER

Since the onset of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Russia has made a series of false allegations accusing the United States and Ukraine of conducting prohibited activities in US-supported laboratories in Ukraine. These laboratories conduct peaceful biological activities that promote public and animal health and contribute to regional biosafety and biosecurity. US assistance through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program is consistent with BWC Article X, which promotes the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and information for the peaceful use of biology.

In June 2022, Russia submitted a diplomatic note and Aide Memoire containing questions about the Ukrainian laboratories. The Aide Memoire was largely based on misrepresented, illegible and unsubstantiated materials. Despite a US request for clarification, Russia proceeded to call for a Formal Consultative Meeting under BWC Article V, held on 26 August 2022. At the meeting, the United States and Ukraine provided detailed overviews of their cooperative biological work. 42 other States Parties joined them in dismissing Russia’s allegations as unfounded.

Beyond diplomatic channels, Russia has propagated disinformation about biological weapons through state-sponsored media, proxy outlets and social media channels. These platforms often reference Russia’s claims at the BWC to lend credibility and amplify baseless claims to wider audiences.

Russian disinformation campaigns on biological weapons are not new. Since the early 2000s, Russia has repeatedly targeted peaceful threat reduction initiatives, including programming initiatives, including programming delivered through the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, an effort Russia participated in until 2014. For example, Russia has long made unfounded claims about the Richard Lugar Center in Georgia, a facility that contributes to public health efforts, including Georgia’s COVID-19 response. These recent campaigns are consistent with historical Soviet disinformation tactics aimed at undermining international biological cooperation.

False allegations about biological weapons proliferation are designed to create confusion, accuse others of nefarious acts, distract attention from its own activities and further a narrative of grievance. These include:

Accusations that States Parties are using Article X of the BWC as a cover for prohibited activities.
Suggesting that naturally occurring disease outbreaks are the result of biological weapons research.
Claiming that biological facilities are conducting unethical experiments on human research subjects.
Mischaracterising research on natural disease vectors or animal hosts as efforts to spread pathogens deliberately.
The use of Russian-aligned regional media outlets continue to produce multilingual content, primarily available in French, Portuguese, Spanish, Arabic and Chinese.

DISINFORMATION TACTICS

Producers of disinformation often use the following tactics and techniques as part of their malicious efforts:

Discrediting opponents by referencing an opponent’s history of colonialism or imperialism; claiming that opponents show a disregard for international rules, procedures, and norms; manipulative referencing of an opponent’s historical biological weapons development or use; and framing opponents as corrupt or mercenary.
Distortion or creation of false evidence by inflating the importance of unrelated, inconsequential, or misinterpreted pieces of information to imply nefarious activity.
Using sources that appear ‘authoritative’but are misquoted, affiliated with the disinformation purveyor, or lacking in relevance, real credentials or expertise.
Appealing to emotions by exaggerating the risks associated with an opponent’s conduct (whether real or falsely alleged); referencing past crises or atrocities and linking them to current events; describing the victims of alleged unethical medical experimentation

MOTIVATIONS FOR SPREADING DISINFORMATION

Disinformation is regularly used by Russia to obfuscate or justify its own actions and undermine adversaries. Common motivations include:

Misdirection: Disinformation targeting Ukraine is being used to distract from activities within Russia such as significant upgrades to its military biological facility at Sergiev Posad-6.
Confusion: A ‘firehose’ of disinformation is being used to overwhelm the information space, making it difficult for individuals to distinguish between false and accurate information. This creates an environment where malicious activity can remain undetected.
Justification: Russia has repeatedly used false accusations of biological weapons development in Ukraine, often by NATO allies, and the promotion of false narratives regarding broader WMD threats as justification for its illegal war on Ukraine.
Undermining Trust: Disinformation about bioweapons undermines trust in and support for the rules-based international system, including multilateral disarmament fora.

ACTIONS TO COUNTER BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DISINFORMATION

There are several actions diplomats can take to counter disinformation campaigns and to prepare for increased information manipulation during the BWC Sixth Meeting of the Working Group. These actions can help delegations build resilience to BW disinformation campaigns and include:

Learn about common disinformation tactics, narratives and motivations in advance of, and during meetings, such as the BWC Sixth Meeting of the Working Group.
Share accurate and correct information and call out attempts to pollute and sidetrack BWC negotiations.
Follow the GP Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative to learn more about the common tactics, narratives and motivations behind biological weapons disinformation.

Video Primers:

→ What is Bioweapons Disinformation?

→ BWC Cooperation and Assistance at Risk

Other useful resources:

→ Russian Chemical Weapons Disinformation: A Chain of Labs Narrative

→ A History of Bioweapons Disinformation: A Long History of False Claims

→ Allegations Against the US and Ukraine: Missing Evidence and a Reversed Logic

→ Sundelson, Annie E.; Trotochaud, Marc; Huhn, Noelle; and Sell, Tara Kirk. “Russian and U.S. News Media Coverage of Ukrainian Biological Laboratories, February – March 2022.” Journal of Strategic Security 16, no. 4 (2023) : 57-73.

→ The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Confronting False Allegations and Disinformation

The post Building Resilience to False Narratives appeared first on Countering WMD Disinformation.

Biological Weapons Disinformation Primer

Erik — Thu, 05 Dec 2024 23:55:05 +0000

COUNTERING Biological WEAPONS DISINFORMATION

TACTICS, MOTIVATIONS AND REALITIES

BWC FIFTH WORKING GROUP ON THE STRENGTHENING OF THE CONVENTION AND MEETING OF STATES PARTIES BRIEFING NOTE | NOVEMBER 2024

We expect to see continued state-sponsored and state-adjacent biological weapons disinformation in the lead up to and during the Fifth Session of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) on 2-13 December 2024 as well as during the Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention 16-18 December 2024. In anticipation, the Global Partnership’s Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative has analyzed past disinformation campaigns spread by Russia and its allies to highlight their common characteristics.

FALSE ALLEGATIONS

Since the onset of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Russia has made a series of false allegations accusing the United States and Ukraine of conducting prohibited activities in U.S.-assisted laboratories in Ukraine. These laboratories conduct peaceful biological activities that promote public and animal health and contribute to regional biosafety and biosecurity. The assistance provided by the United States through its Cooperative Threat Reduction Program falls under BWC Article X, which requires States Parties to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and information for the peaceful use of biology.

In June 2022, Russia submitted a diplomatic note and Aide Memoire containing questions to the United States and Ukraine regarding the activities of the Ukrainian laboratories. The Aide Memoire consisted primarily of misrepresented documents, some of which were illegible, and unsubstantiated ‘evidence’ of alleged non-compliance. Despite receiving a response from the United States requesting legible copies of the referenced documents, Russia chose to call for a formal consultative meeting under BWC Article V, which opened on 26 August 2022. At the Formal Consultative Meeting, the United States and Ukraine provided detailed descriptions of the peaceful nature of their cooperative biological activities. In addition to the United States and Ukraine, 42 other States Parties present at the Formal Consultative Meeting dismissed Russia’s allegations as unfounded.

In addition to leveling false allegations through diplomatic channels, Russia has also propagated disinformation about biological weapons through state-sponsored news agencies, proxy outlets, and social media channels. These media outlets often reference Russia’s claims made in the context of the BWC and serve as a force multiplier, amplifying Russian falsehoods so they reach audiences outside of the diplomatic arena.

It is important to acknowledge that Russian disinformation campaigns about biological weapons are not new. Since the early 2000s, Russia has continually spread disinformation about peaceful biological threat reduction activities, including those conducted through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program — a program that Russian itself was a participant in and that was established to dismantle the Soviet WMD architecture and re-employ Soviet bioweapons scientists in peaceful public health roles. For example, the Russian Federation has long alleged that the Richard Lugar Center in Georgia, which was built with funds from the Nunn-Lugar Program, is being used to research and develop biological weapons. Like the Ukrainian facilities described above, the Richard Lugar Center is a peaceful public health facility, one that contributed significantly to Georgia’s COVID-19 response. These more recent campaigns are also in line with historical efforts by the Soviet Union to spread disinformation about biological weapons. Russia’s current allegations regarding laboratories in Ukraine are a simply a continuation a decades-long effort to discredit other States Parties by accusing them of non-compliance.

False allegations about biological weapons are designed to create confusion, accuse others of nefarious acts, and further a narrative of grievance. These include:

Accusations that States Parties are using Article X of the BWC as a cover for prohibited activities.
Suggesting that naturally occurring disease outbreaks are the result of biological weapons research.
Claiming that biological facilities are conducting unethical experiments on human research subjects.
Mischaracterizing research on natural disease vectors or animal hosts as efforts to spread pathogens deliberately.

DISINFORMATION TACTICS

Producers of disinformation often use the following tactics and techniques as part of their malicious efforts:

Discrediting opponents by:
- Referencing an opponent’s history of colonialism or imperialism.
- Claiming that opponents show a disregard for international rules, procedures, and norms.
- Manipulative referencing of an opponent’s historical biological weapons development or use.
- Framing opponents as corrupt or mercenary.
Distortion or creation of false evidence by inflating the importance of unrelated, inconsequential, or misinterpreted pieces of information to imply nefarious activity.
Using sources that appear ‘authoritative’ but are misquoted, affiliated with the disinformation purveyor, or lacking in relevance, real credentials or expertise.
Appealing to emotions by:
- Exaggerating the risks associated with an opponent’s conduct (whether real or falsely alleged).
- Referencing past crises or atrocities and linking them to current events.
- Describing the victims of alleged unethical medical experimentation

MOTIVATIONS FOR SPREADING DISINFORMATION

Disinformation is regularly used by Russia to obfuscate or justify its own actions and undermine adversaries. Common motivations include:

Misdirection: Disinformation targeting Ukraine is being used to distract from activities within Russia such as significant upgrades to its military biological facility at Sergiev Posad-6.
Confusion: A ‘firehose’ of disinformation is being used to overwhelm the information space, making it difficult for individuals to distinguish between false and accurate information. This creates an environment where malicious activity can remain undetected.
Justification: Russia has repeatedly used false accusations of biological weapons development in Ukraine, often by NATO allies, and the promotion of false narratives regarding broader WMD threats as justification for its illegal war on Ukraine.
Undermining Trust: Disinformation about bioweapons undermines trust in and support for the rules-based international system, including multilateral disarmament fora.

CURRENT REALITIES

A key component of countering disinformation is understanding the current realities that such malicious campaigns try to mask or disrupt. The reality is:

Biological weapons disinformation campaigns can be used as a distraction from other ongoing events.
The BWC is a vital legally binding multilateral treaty that established the norm against biological weapons and is a key part of the rules-based international system.
There is no credible evidence that Ukraine is in breach of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.
Russia’s current actions are not new, Russia has a long history of employing disinformation campaigns to misdirect and justify its illegal activities in other countries. These same tactics and similar narratives are being reused today.

ACTIONS TO COUNTER CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISINFORMATION

There are several actions that diplomats can take to counter Russia’s disinformation campaigns and to prepare for an increase in disinformation during the BWC Fifth Meeting of the Working Group. These actions will help your delegations build resilience to BW disinformation campaigns and include:

Learn about common disinformation tactics, narratives and motivations in advance of, and during meetings, such as the BWC Fifth Meeting of the Working Group and the Meeting of States Parties.
Share accurate and correct information and call out attempts to pollute and sidetrack BWC negotiations.
Follow the GP Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative to learn more about the common tactics, narratives and motivations behind biological weapons disinformation.

Video Primers:

→ What is Bioweapons Disinformation?

→ BWC Cooperation and Assistance at Risk

Current Focus:

→ Russia’s Upgraded Military Biological Research Facility and the Link to Bioweapons Disinformation in Ukraine

→ Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Distraction and Misdirection

→ Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Using “Authoritative” Sources

→ Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Reference to Past Crises

→ Operation Denver

→ Operation Tarakany

Other useful resources:

→ Russian Chemical Weapons Disinformation: A Chain of Labs Narrative

→ A History of Bioweapons Disinformation: A Long History of False Claims

→ Allegations Against the US and Ukraine: Missing Evidence and a Reversed Logic

→ The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Confronting False Allegations and Disinformation

The post Biological Weapons Disinformation Primer appeared first on Countering WMD Disinformation.

BWC Article X success stories

Erik — Sun, 01 Sep 2024 20:19:21 +0000

BWC Article X success stories

COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE

Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) commits states parties “to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.” The provisions of Article X recognise that in addition to the BWC’s provisions on disarmament, scientific cooperation and development assistance are essential to ensure that biological knowledge, tools and material are shared to promote the security of states parties from infectious disease threats emerging within and outside their territories. There have been multiple Article X success stories, including from Senegal, Laos, Uganda, Ghana and Thailand.

SENEGAL

The establishment in 2018 of a Public Health Emergency Operations Center in Dakar received support from the Global Health Security Agenda, the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the African Union Center for Disease Control, and the World Health Organisation. It now successfully acts as a focal point for disease analytics, diagnostic testing and information sharing across the West African region. The Public Health Emergency Operations Center has been utilised during the COVID-19 pandemic, recent Chikungunya outbreaks and following a mass casualty event involving Senegalese nationals during a Hajj stampede.

LAOS

Nearly US $1.9 million in scientific assistance has been provided to Laos to support health security in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. A tabletop exercise in Vientiane in March 2020, sponsored by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency included representatives from across the government of Laos and its public health bodies, as well as local United Nations officials and the World Health Organisation. The exercise built on long-term scientific assistance provided to Laos to support best practices in health security and emergency management.

UGANDA

A partnership between the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the government of Uganda has resulted in a multi-year programme to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity in the country. In the context of regional instability in East Africa, the partnership has developed infrastructure to safeguard dangerous pathogens used for public health research, including physical site protections and workforce training on dual-use research of concern, and it has supported the development of laboratories and Public Health Emergency Operations Centers, including in Uganda.

GHANA

A partnership between Global Affairs Canada, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, and Ghanaian Veterinary professionals successfully established biological containment laboratories in Accra, Pong-Tamale and Takoradi. The state-of-the-art modular laboratories were initially designed to support the detection of anthrax, avian influenza and African swine fever in animal populations, but as the COVID-19 pandemic reached Ghana, they were adapted to also provide frontline diagnostics to local health authorities.

THAILAND

Diagnostic equipment provided by the US Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to the Chulalongkorn University in Thailand facilitated the first diagnosis of a case of SARS-CoV-2 outside of Wuhan, China in January 2020. Early detection and reporting of the international spread of the virus supported early response planning by international health bodies.

KEY MESSAGES

The successes of recent scientific cooperation underscores the crucial role of Article X in global biological security regimes.
Scores of programmes have shown the benefits of effective collaboration to build essential infrastructure, share best practices, and pool expert knowledge across country networks to ensure the international community’s shared protection against infectious disease threats wherever they might emerge.

→ BWC/MSP/2018/WP.9 ‘International Activities of Global Partnership Member Countries related to Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,’ submitted by Canada, Denmark, European Union, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States, 4 Dec 2018.

→ BWC/MSP/2020/MX.1/WP.2 ‘What Constitutes Assistance and Cooperation under Article X?,’ submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 13 August 2021.

→ Revill, J & Maceda, MG ‘Options for Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention,’ UNDIR, Feb 2022.

The post BWC Article X success stories appeared first on Countering WMD Disinformation.

BWC Cooperation and Assistance at Risk

Erik — Fri, 12 Jul 2024 20:25:01 +0000

BWC Cooperation and Assistance at Risk

International partnerships are crucial for strengthening global health security and reducing the impact of infectious diseases. These collaborations form an important pillar of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). However, disinformation is now posing a significant threat to this international cooperation.

A good example is a Canadian-funded project in the Kyrgyz Republic aimed at building a human and animal health laboratory. In 2006, Canada’s Weapons Threat Reduction Program approached the government of the Kyrgyz Republic to enhance biosecurity, biosafety, and biocontainment capabilities. The Canadian government committed $60 million to build a high-containment laboratory that would serve as the central repository for dangerous pathogens, consolidating them from several existing but vulnerable facilities.

Unfortunately, in early 2011, this project became the target of an aggressive, sustained, and unfounded disinformation campaign. The fabricated allegations characterized the lab as a “laboratory of death,” falsely claiming that Canada intended to use it to develop biological weapons. Other false claims suggested that the lab posed a danger to local citizens and that Canada was exploiting the Kyrgyz Republic.

The immediate impact of the disinformation campaign was the termination of the project. Had the lab been completed, it would have provided enormous health security benefits for the Kyrgyz Republic, the surrounding region, and globally. A less visible but significant impact was Canada’s longer-term decision to redirect its biological threat reduction and Article X-related activities from Central Asia to other regions.

Partnerships like those between Canada and the Kyrgyz Republic are dedicated to strengthening public health facilities, biosafety, biosecurity, and disease surveillance for peaceful purposes. They have nothing to do with weapons. The example of the Kyrgyz lab shows the importance of states speaking out and condemning disinformation campaigns that target peaceful cooperation among BWC States Parties.

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Biological Weapons Archives - Countering WMD Disinformation

Russia’s January 2025 Note Verbale Debunked

COUNTERING Biological WEAPONS DISINFORMATION

RUSSIA’S JANUARY 2025 NOTE VERBALE DEBUNKED

READ MORE:

NGO STATEMENT TO BWC MEETING OF STATES PARTIES

NGO STATEMENT TO BWC MEETING OF STATES PARTIES

BWC BRIEFING NOTE | DECEMBER 2025

COUNTERING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DISINFORMATION

Roadmap of a BWC Disinformation Campaign

Roadmap of a bwc disinformation campaign

Misuse of Scientific and Technical Information

Presenting inaccurate, irrelevant, or misconstrued scientific or technical information to substantiate false claims

What does this commonly used tactic look like in BWC statements and documents?

Provision of “Evidence”:

Using reports, government agreements, project documents, and patent applications to generate “evidence” of nefarious activity

What does this commonly used tactic look like in BWC statements and documents?

Appeal to Emotions:

Using emotionally manipulative language or content to elicit feelings of outrage, fear, disgust, and/or anger

What does this commonly used tactic look like in BWC statements and documents?

Citing “Authoritative” Sources:

Referencing, quoting, or misquoting/misrepresenting sources with apparent authority or expertise to enhance the perceived credibility of false claims

What does this commonly used tactic look like in BWC statements and documents?

Claims of Secrecy or Neglect:

Claiming that certain states are not adequately transparent about their biological activities and/or not responsive to questions about those activities

What does this commonly used tactic look like in BWC statements and documents?

CBRN Disinformation — Views from Experts

CBRN disinformation

VIEWS FROM EXPERTS

DISINFORMATION TARGET AUDIENCES IDENTIFIED BY KIs

Individuals

Communities

Multi-Country Groups or Regions

Broad Categories

Perceived Purposes

Affecting Systems

Affecting Mental Schemas

Affecting Country Actions

Perceived Impacts

Affecting Systems

Affecting Mental Schemas

Affecting Country Actions

Affecting Systems

Affecting Mental Schemas

Affecting Country Actions

Disinformation on Chemical Weapons

Disinformation on Biological Weapons

Disinformation on Radiological & Nuclear Weapons

Building Resilience to False Narratives

COUNTERING Biological WEAPONS DISINFORMATION

READ MORE:

Biological Weapons Disinformation Primer

COUNTERING Biological WEAPONS DISINFORMATION

TACTICS, MOTIVATIONS AND REALITIES

READ MORE:

BWC Article X success stories

BWC Article X success stories

COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE

READ MORE:

BWC Cooperation and Assistance at Risk

BWC Cooperation and Assistance at Risk