Countering Radiological & Nuclear Disinformation
General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency
BRIEFING NOTE | September 2026
WHY IS DISINFORMATION A RISK AT THE IAEA GC?
Radiological and nuclear (RN) disinformation refers to deliberately false or manipulated information concerning RN equipment, technologies or materials. Disinformation can target the IAEA by portraying cautious language, extended verification timelines or mandate limitations as bias or failure. It can also target Member States through manipulative representation of IAEA findings and evidence concerning their RN activities. As such, RN disinformation can erode trust in the IAEA’s impartiality and technical authority, fuel diplomatic friction among Member States and disrupt GC negotiations. Understanding common disinformation narratives and tactics can better equip delegations to pre-emptively debunk falsehoods, alert others to recurring patterns and build organisational and state resilience against the harmful effects of RN disinformation.
WHAT NARRATIVES COULD BE ENCOUNTERED AT THE GC?
The following false or misleading narratives are among those most likely to be encountered at the IAEA GC.
Cautious Verification
Narratives portraying the IAEA's cautious language (which reflects uncertainty and evidentiary limits) or extended verification timelines as evidence of bias, incompetence or concealment.
Double Standards
Narratives alleging that the IAEA applies uneven levels of scrutiny across States, portraying it as too lenient towards some and disproportionately scrutinising others.
Mandate Limits
Narratives portraying the IAEA's mandate limitations, including its lack of authority to attribute responsibility for incidents, as bias, inaction or proof of institutional weakness.
Attacks on Facilities
Narratives arguing that striking or taking control of a nuclear facility was necessary for security reasons, irrespective of the legal context, while presenting the attacker as the protector.
New Facilities & Programmes
Narratives declaring a newly announced facility or programme to be certainly weapons-related or certainly not a proliferation concern, without sufficient evidence.
Radiological Impact
Narratives inflating or downplaying the health and environmental effects of an incident, facility or activity, with false or no measurements to support the claim or with measurements taken out of context.
Safeguards Obligations
Narratives distorting obligations, either portraying legally binding safeguards commitments as an unfair imposition or falsely presenting strengthened measures as universally mandatory.
Verification Findings
Narratives declaring that a State certainly has or certainly does not have a weapons programme by interpreting verification findings beyond their evidentiary limits.
WHERE MIGHT RN DISINFORMATION FEATURE AT THE GC?
Each setting below carries a different risk for disinformation spread: the formal record lends more authority to claims, but when encountered in semi-formal and informal settings, disinformation is less likely to be scrutinised or verified in real time and can spread more rapidly.
Plenary & Rights of Reply
Misleading claims may be inserted into official records.
Side Events & Scientific Forum
Expert framing may lend credibility to selective or poorly sourced technical claims.
Exhibition Floor
Printed and displayed material can circulate without independent review.
Corridors & Informal Contact
Claims and materials passed on in conversation propagate without an identifiable source.
Reports from the Press
A false or misleading claim or remark may be reported within minutes, long before it is verified.
Digital Media
Clips and quotes may be stripped of context and amplified far beyond the venue.
HOW SHOULD YOU RESPOND TO DISINFORMATION AT THE GC?
1. Spot & Check
Watch for potentially false narratives and quietly verify with trusted technical experts and sources. Escalate through internal channels to relevant leadership.
2. Select Response
Assess whether the narrative is strategically significant and spreading widely enough to warrant a response (engagement could amplify the falsehood).
3. Coordinate
If deemed significant, coordinate the response with the capital, the IAEA and trusted third parties, including experts and organisations, to keep message consistency.
4. Debunk
Correct the false claim with factual language, clarify the IAEA's mandate and evidentiary limits and support individuals who are personally targeted.
[1] Definitively identifying disinformation can be challenging, as intent and attribution are often unclear. For brevity, this note adopts a broad definition of “disinformation” that includes other information operations, as they mislead the audience and shape perception and behaviour.