IAEA General Conference 2026 Archives - Countering WMD Disinformation https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/tag/iaea-gc-2026/ Countering CBRN Disinformation Tue, 06 Oct 2026 01:10:43 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=7.1.4 https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/cropped-KCL1115_GPWMD_Logo_RGB-AW-32x32.png IAEA General Conference 2026 Archives - Countering WMD Disinformation https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/tag/iaea-gc-2026/ 32 32 239085621 Best Practice Highlight: Pre-Informing and Pre-Bunking https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/best-practice-highlight-pre-informing-and-pre-bunking/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=best-practice-highlight-pre-informing-and-pre-bunking Mon, 05 Oct 2026 23:52:19 +0000 https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/?page_id=6892 Best Practice Highlight: Pre-Informing and Pre-Bunking Case Study of Successful Counter-Disinformation Practice in Preparation of CTBTO Integrated Field Exercise 2026 […]

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Best Practice Highlight: Pre-Informing and Pre-Bunking

Case Study of Successful Counter-Disinformation Practice in Preparation of CTBTO Integrated Field Exercise 2026

BRIEFING NOTE | October 2026

Public communication on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) On-Site Inspection (OSI) Integrated Field Exercise 2026 (IFE26) demonstrates how pre-informing and pre-bunking can mitigate chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) misinformation and disinformation.*

 

IFE26 replicates an actual OSI, deploying international surrogate inspectors, protective equipment and specialised instruments. Given limited public familiarity with nuclear verification, these elements may be interpreted as indications that Namibia is under formal investigation or that a nuclear incident has occurred. Such narratives could generate public concern, undermine trust in the exercise and its organisers, and distract from IFE26’s purpose of strengthening nuclear-test verification. The CTBTO and Namibian authorities therefore proactively informed the public about the exercise and clarified its technical and institutional nature.

 

Open-source research conducted through September 2026 identified no evidence of a coordinated or sustained misinformation or disinformation campaign targeting IFE26.† The absence of a prominent false narrative may illustrate the value of pre-informing and pre-bunking, offering an example for other organisations planning CBRN-related activities.

DEFINITION OF PRE-INFORMING AND PRE-BUNKING1, 2

Pre-informing is the practice of providing clear information about an event which may or may not happen as soon as there are warning signs. By providing easily digestible factsheets explaining key terms, facts and skills in interpreting scientific literature, the public can more easily engage with official and scientific literature, enabling people to identify potential disinformation and misinformation.

Pre-bunking refers to the act of addressing or refuting potential false or misleading rumors before an individual is exposed. This involves educating people about common tactics of deception or manipulation, encouraging critical thinking, and engaging target
audiences.

BACKGROUND TO IFE26 3, 4, 5, 6

WHAT
IFEs are complex CTBTO exercises that test nearly all OSI elements, in an integrated manner, including field operations, inspection techniques, data management and logistics. Previous IFEs were held in Kazakhstan (2008) and Jordan (2014).
WHEN
10 October – 20 November 2026
WHERE
Namibia’s Erongo Region, with Swakopmund and Walvis Bay serving logistical and operational roles
SCALE
Around 250 experts and about 150 tonnes of equipment
WHY
To assess how the CTBTO would conduct an OSI if a suspected nuclear test explosion had to be investigated under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

WHAT IS BEING COMMUNICATED THROUGH PRE-INFORMING AND PRE-BUNKING?

PRE-INFORMING
PURPOSE EXAMPLE
Explains the basic facts before the exercise begins What IFE26 is, where it is, when it happens, who will participate4, 7
Explains why the exercise is important Officials from the CTBTO clarify that IFE26 tests CTBTO’s ability to investigate a suspected nuclear test explosion and improve OSI readiness, for when the Treaty enters into force, as well as to reduce the risk of misinterpretation regarding the purpose of this exercise4, 7
Explains why Namibia was selected Namibia’s CTBT commitment, International Monitoring System (IMS) facilities, Erongo geology, infrastructure and national interest, such as reputation and revenue8, 9, 10
Prepares residents for unusual sights Foreign equipment, white protective clothing, tents, fieldwork and security convoys11
PRE-BUNKING
PURPOSE EXAMPLE
Anticipates likely false interpretations Clarifies that IFE26 involves no nuclear materials, no explosions, no radiation, no hazardous materials, no harm to people or the environment9, 12
Prevents misunderstanding of sovereignty or inspection status Namibia is hosting the exercise, not being inspected11

HOW ARE PRE-INFORMING AND PRE-BUNKING BEING DISSEMINATED?

DISSEMINATION CHANNEL ACTIVITY FUNCTION
CTBTO Social media Official CTBTO and Secretary General Dr. Floyd’s account have shared posts and videos showing IFE26 preparations4, 6 Builds baseline understanding of what IFE26 is and why it is being conducted
Local media engagement Practical workshop with Namibian journalists ahead of the exercise11 Helps media report IFE26 accurately and avoid mistaken framing
Official conference CTBTO staff delivered a presentation on IFE26 and OSI capabilities at the CTBT: Science and Technology Conference 202513 Provides technical information for the expert audience
NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT/ MINISTRY OF MINES AND ENERGY (MME) Social media Reposts CTBTO material and shares national updates on IFE26 preparations7, 12 Localises CTBTO messaging and reinforces ministry official explanations for Namibian audiences
Offline outreach Public information sessions with local communities in areas involved in the exercise14 Brings information directly to affected communities and pre-empts concerns about radiation, explosions, nuclear materials, and environmental harm
MAINSTREAM/ LOCAL MEDIA Print and online reporting Afrikaans, English and German language coverage explaining IFE263, 11, 15 Translates official information into public-facing news coverage

LOCAL SENSITIVITY TO NUCLEAR- AND RADIATION-RELATED ACTIVITIES 16, 17

A 2024 local precedent may explain the early investment in pre-informing and pre-bunking around IFE26. In 2024, a private Namibian company planned a radioactive source storage and handling facility for offshore oil exploration equipment in Swakopmund. Residents raised health and environmental concerns. Misinformation claimed that a hazardous radioactive facility already operated in the area, prompting the government to publicly debunk these claims.

 

This case suggests local sensitivity to narratives involving radioactive or nuclear-related activity, and a corresponding vulnerability to misinformation. If similar narratives take hold around IFE26, public concern could harden into resistance, making the exercise harder to roll out smoothly and weakening trust in both local authorities and the CTBTO. The IFE26 pre-informing and pre-bunking efforts likely sought to pre-empt a similar dynamic.

Conclusion

IFE26 was announced well in advance, with repeated informational messaging since. Publicly available information does not indicate significant local opposition. Given the exercise’s technical complexity and the local precedent, pre-informing and pre-bunking have likely been critical in preventing opposition and any false narratives from forming. These efforts do not guarantee that disinformation will not emerge, but they narrow the information gaps in which misleading narratives take hold and strengthen public resilience if any narratives emerge.

*  CBRN disinformation is the deliberate creation and spread of false or misleading information about CBRN materials, technologies, capabilities or activities, including both peaceful and military applications. Definitively identifying disinformation can be challenging, as intent and attribution are often unclear. For brevity, this note adopts a broad definition of “disinformation” that includes other information operations, such as misinformation, as they mislead the audience and shape perception and behaviour.

†  Research was primarily conducted in English, German, Afrikaans and Oshikwanyama/Oshindonga, with targeted searches in Otjiherero, Khoekhoegowab, Rukwangali and Silozi.

Read More:

→ RN Disinformation in Diplomatic Communications

→ Example Tactics and Narratives

→ Best Practices for Countering Radiological and Nuclear Disinfo

Download PDF
Tactic Spotlights

REFERENCES

1  ‘Mitigating Disinformation – Countering WMD Disinformation’. Accessed 8 September 2026. https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/mitigating-disinformation/.

2  Nagar, Aishwarya, Vanessa Grégoire, Annie Sundelson, Emily O’Donnell-Pazderka, Amelia M. Jamison, and Tara Kirk Sell. ‘Practical Playbook for Addressing Health Rumors’. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, 2024 (updated May 2025). Accessed 23 September 2026. https://centerforhealthsecurity.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/2025-05-CDC-practical-playbook-v3.pdf.

3  Bowe, Rudi. ‘Namibia to Host Historic Global Nuclear Monitoring Exercise | Namib Times Newspaper’. Accessed 8 September 2026. https://www.namibtimes.net/namibia-to-host-historic-global-nuclear-monitoring-exercise/.

4  ‘Integrated Field Exercise 2026 (IFE26) | CTBTO’. Accessed 8 September 2026. https://www.ctbto.org/IFE26.

5  ‘Namibia to Host Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation’s Field Exercise | Namibia Economist’. Accessed 8 September 2026. https://economist.com.na/namibia-to-host-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-organisations-field-exercise/.

6  ‘Namibia to Host CTBTO’s Integrated Field Exercise in 2026 | CTBTO’. Accessed 8 September 2026. https://www.ctbto.org/resources/for-the-media/press-releases/namibia-host-ctbtos-integrated-field-exercise-2026.

7  Ministry of Industries, Mines and Energy (MIME). ‘CTBTO IFE26 Exercise in Namibia with International Partners’. LinkedIn, 7 August 2026. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/ministry-of-industries-mines-and-energy_mime-ife26-namibia-activity-7491375009450364929-EGrM.

8  Brandt, Edgar. Namibia to Support Global Nuclear Test Verification Efforts – New Era. 25 November 2025. https://neweralive.na/namibia-to-help-confirm-nuclear-explosions/.

9  ‘Namibia to Host Major Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation Verification Exercise in 2026 – Informanté’. 26 December 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20251226171839/https://informante.web.na/?p=387095.

10  Taapopi, Selma. Namibia to Lead Africa in Major Nuclear Test–Ban Exercise. 2025. 02:56. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FnFc6efwTqU.

11  Graig, Augetto. Namibië Is Gasheer van Kernkragtoetsverbod [Namibia Hosts Nuclear Test-Ban Exercise]. 12 May 2026. https://fliphtml5.com/jxto/Republikein_20260512_Combined-Ly7m/Republikein_20260512/.

12  Ministry of Industries, Mines and Energy (MIME). ‘Namibia Hosts CTBTO Integrated Field Exercise IFE26’. LinkedIn, 10 June 2026. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/ministry-of-industries-mines-and-energy_mime-nuclearnonproliferation-ctbto-activity-7473076955760943105-TNL2.

13  Summers, Simon, and Andrew Bramnik. ‘On-Site Inspection Integrated Field Exercise in 2026 (IFE26)’. 10 September 2025. https://conferences.ctbto.org/event/30/contributions/6081/attachments/2820/5397/P4.5-546_SUMMERS.pdf.

14  Municipality of Walvis Bay. ‘Big Things Are Happening in Erongo!’ 17 June 2026. https://www.facebook.com/municipalityofwalvisbay/posts/-big-things-are-happening-in-erongo-information-sharing-session-did-you-know-nam/1345801214396135/.

15  Graig, Augetto. Erongo Übt Atomtest-Kontrolle [Erongo Practices Nuclear Test Monitoring]. 7 May 2026. https://fliphtml5.com/jxto/Allgemeine_Zeitung_20260507_Combined/Allgemeine_Zeitung_20260507/

16  Rengura, Renate. ‘Swakopmund Officials Debunk Rumors of Radioactive Storage Facility’. 2024. https://nbcnews.na/node/104893.

17  Hartman, Adam. ‘Swakopmund Community Ralliesagainst Plan for Radioactive Material’. The Namibian, 28 February 2024. https://www.namibian.com.na/swakopmund-community-ralliesagainst-plan-for-radioactive-material/.

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]]> 6892 Secretariat Briefing Note https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/secretariat-briefing-note/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=secretariat-briefing-note Tue, 22 Sep 2026 12:44:40 +0000 https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/?page_id=6786 The GP WMD Counter Disinfo Initiative has developed targeted recommendations on countering disinformation for the IAEA Secretariat

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Countering Radiological & Nuclear Disinformation

THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) SECRETARIAT

BRIEFING NOTE | September 2026

Disinformation can undermine trust in the IAEA by attacking its impartiality and technical authority. The GP WMD Counter Disinfo Initiative has developed targeted recommendations on countering disinformation for the IAEA Secretariat.

WHAT IS RN DISINFORMATION?

RN disinformation refers to deliberately false or manipulated information concerning radiological or nuclear technologies, materials and weapons. Its purpose is to influence perceptions and behaviour among target audiences. Unlike misinformation, disinformation is intentionally misleading and may originate from both non-state and state actors for financial or strategic gain.

WHY IT MATTERS

RN disinformation can directly undermine the IAEA’s ability to deliver on its mandate by delegitimising the sources of its authority: technical expertise, impartiality and international credibility. When the IAEA is portrayed as biased or ineffective, trust is eroded, which can lead to reduced political and financial support by Member States. At the organisational level, sustained attacks can lower staff morale and prompt overly cautious communication that can limit the IAEA’s effectiveness. A constrained Secretariat is less able to deter proliferation and ensure nuclear safety, security and peaceful uses of nuclear technologies.

DISINFORMATION SPIRALING IMPACT ON THE IAEA

Trust undermined by disinformation

Political support and funding decline

Core functions harder to fulfill

Legitimacy further questioned

Risks of proliferation increase, peaceful nuclear cooperation becomes difficult

RN DISINFORMATION CREATES THE FOLLOWING RISKS

Complicate risk communication and response coordination during emergencies
Distract resources and delay effective decision-making
Put technical facts in question through selective interpretation of data, reducing the impact of impartial assessments
Create diplomatic friction and misperceptions between Member States, making collective action harder

Weaken norm coherence and pave the way for norm fragmentation

HOW RN DISINFORMATION WORKS

Public perceptions of radiation, shaped by past nuclear incidents, can act as emotional triggers1 that heighten sensitivity to alarming claims. Response to such triggers is one of many psychological vulnerabilities disinformation can exploit, alongside other cognitive biases,2 that reduce critical assessment of information. The technical complexity of nuclear issues creates barriers to understanding and opens space for distortion. Potential manipulation may include reducing allegations to simplified good-versus-evil narratives and linking them to nationality, alliances or ideology. Such linkages trigger biases, encouraging audiences to interpret technical claims through pre-existing views and identities.

HOW RN DISINFORMATION SPREADS

  • Formal diplomatic channels (plenary statements, notes verbales, etc.)
  • Informal diplomatic channels (corridor diplomacy, staff conversations, conferences)
  • Media channels (press briefings, interviews, traditional and social media, etc.)

NARRATIVES THE SECRETARIAT CAN FACE

Impartiality framed as political alignment

Actors exploit: The IAEA's obligation to stay impartial and grounding in verifiable evidence.

Disinformation approach: Reframing neutrality as political alignment with dominant powers or selective blindness to violations.

Mandate constraints framed as inaction

Actors exploit: The IAEA's need to satisfy Member States and inability to attribute blame.

Disinformation approach: Portraying mandate limitations as a decision not to act or institutional weakness.

Cooperation framed as risky or biased

Actors exploit: The IAEA's support for peaceful use of nuclear technology via technical cooperation.

Disinformation approach: Framing assistance as favouritism or enabling military programmes.

Scientific due diligence framed as cover-ups

Actors exploit: The time required for IAEA inspections, verification and technical assessment.

Disinformation approach: Framing slow, deliberate processes as concealment or collusion.

Uncertainty framed as incompetence or concealment

Actors exploit: The Secretariat's cautious, probabilistic language.

Disinformation approach: Reframing scientific uncertainty and evidentiary limits as incompetence or intentional concealment.

Personal backgrounds framed as institutional bias

Actors exploit: National origin, past affiliations or perceived biases of IAEA staff.

Disinformation approach: Alleging personal bias to discredit institutional outputs.

BEST PRACTICE GUIDANCE

Awareness

  • Integrate RN disinformation into institutional risk and preparedness processes (leadership/management).
  • Train relevant staff to recognise, escalate and respond to RN disinformation (management/OPIC).
  • Incorporate lessons from past RN disinformation incidents into guidance and exercises (OPIC/technical departments).
  • Maintain links with relevant expert, fact-checking and platform networks (OPIC/analysts).

Monitoring

  • Establish a system for monitoring of RN narratives (leadership/OPIC).
  • Use digital tools to support detection and analysis (OPIC).
  • Remain vigilant and report suspected disinformation to an OPIC focal point (all).
  • Identify narratives targeting IAEA mandate, activities, findings or staff (OPIC).
  • Escalate significant cases affecting IAEA to the leadership (OPIC).
  • Track the reach of specific narratives (OPIC).

Assessment

  • Escalate significant cases to the leadership (OPIC).
  • Define response thresholds based on reach, potential harm and risks to inadvertently amplify (OPIC/leadership).
  • Establish and activate a process for assessing significant cases, including through trusted expert networks (OPIC).
  • Recommend whether to monitor, clarify, correct or escalate (OPIC).

Response

  • Maintain adaptable pre-approved response language (OPIC/technical departments).
  • Tailor responses to the audience, platform and level of risk (OPIC).
  • Use trusted partners or experts where external amplification adds credibility (OPIC/leadership).
  • Support staff targeted by disinformation or harassment (OPIC/management).
  • Track response effectiveness and recurring claims (OPIC).

Member States look to the IAEA as the trusted source of impartial information. Disinformation risks must be anticipated to strengthen this role and demonstrate foresight and proactive stances

Download PDF
Tactic Spotlights

REFERENCES

  1. Specific cues or narrative elements designed to provoke strong emotional reactions in the audience; Melissa L. Finucane et al., ‘The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits’, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 13, no. 1 (January 2000): 1–17, https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(200001/03)13:1<1::AID-BDM333>3.0.CO;2-S; Cameron Martel, Gordon Pennycook, and David G. Rand, ‘Reliance on Emotion Promotes Belief in Fake News’, Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications 5, no. 1 (7 October 2020): 47, https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-020-00252-3.
  2. Predictable patterns in how the human brain functions to simplify information processing, which frequently leads individuals to think about the world in distorted ways; Stephen Eldridge. ‘Cognitive Bias: Description & Examples’. Britannica. Accessed 11 April 2025. https://www.britannica.com/science/cognitive-bias.

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]]> 6786 Countering Radiological and Nuclear Disinformation at the IAEA GC https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/countering-radiological-and-nuclear-disinformation-at-the-iaea-gc/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=countering-radiological-and-nuclear-disinformation-at-the-iaea-gc Tue, 22 Sep 2026 12:27:27 +0000 https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/?page_id=6767 Disinformation by State-sponsored and State-adjacent actors has been observed across multilateral nuclear fora and will likely feature at the 70th session of the IAEA General Conference

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Countering Radiological & Nuclear Disinformation

General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency

BRIEFING NOTE | September 2026

Disinformation1 by State-sponsored and State-adjacent actors has been observed across multilateral nuclear fora and will likely feature at the 70th session of the IAEA General Conference (GC). Further information can be found at www.GPWMDCounterDisinfo.com.

WHY IS DISINFORMATION A RISK AT THE IAEA GC?

Radiological and nuclear (RN) disinformation refers to deliberately false or manipulated information concerning RN equipment, technologies or materials. Disinformation can target the IAEA by portraying cautious language, extended verification timelines or mandate limitations as bias or failure. It can also target Member States through manipulative representation of IAEA findings and evidence concerning their RN activities. As such, RN disinformation can erode trust in the IAEA’s impartiality and technical authority, fuel diplomatic friction among Member States and disrupt GC negotiations. Understanding common disinformation narratives and tactics can better equip delegations to pre-emptively debunk falsehoods, alert others to recurring patterns and build organisational and state resilience against the harmful effects of RN disinformation.

WHAT NARRATIVES COULD BE ENCOUNTERED AT THE GC?

The following false or misleading narratives are among those most likely to be encountered at the IAEA GC.

UNDERMINING AUTHORITY

Cautious Verification

Narratives portraying the IAEA's cautious language (which reflects uncertainty and evidentiary limits) or extended verification timelines as evidence of bias, incompetence or concealment.

Double Standards

Narratives alleging that the IAEA applies uneven levels of scrutiny across States, portraying it as too lenient towards some and disproportionately scrutinising others.

Mandate Limits

Narratives portraying the IAEA's mandate limitations, including its lack of authority to attribute responsibility for incidents, as bias, inaction or proof of institutional weakness.

MISREPRESENTING EVIDENCE

Attacks on Facilities

Narratives arguing that striking or taking control of a nuclear facility was necessary for security reasons, irrespective of the legal context, while presenting the attacker as the protector.

New Facilities & Programmes

Narratives declaring a newly announced facility or programme to be certainly weapons-related or certainly not a proliferation concern, without sufficient evidence.

Radiological Impact

Narratives inflating or downplaying the health and environmental effects of an incident, facility or activity, with false or no measurements to support the claim or with measurements taken out of context.

Safeguards Obligations

Narratives distorting obligations, either portraying legally binding safeguards commitments as an unfair imposition or falsely presenting strengthened measures as universally mandatory.

Verification Findings

Narratives declaring that a State certainly has or certainly does not have a weapons programme by interpreting verification findings beyond their evidentiary limits.

WHERE MIGHT RN DISINFORMATION FEATURE AT THE GC?

Each setting below carries a different risk for disinformation spread: the formal record lends more authority to claims, but when encountered in semi-formal and informal settings, disinformation is less likely to be scrutinised or verified in real time and can spread more rapidly.

Plenary & Rights of Reply

Misleading claims may be inserted into official records.

Side Events & Scientific Forum

Expert framing may lend credibility to selective or poorly sourced technical claims.

Exhibition Floor

Printed and displayed material can circulate without independent review.

Corridors & Informal Contact

Claims and materials passed on in conversation propagate without an identifiable source.

Reports from the Press

A false or misleading claim or remark may be reported within minutes, long before it is verified.

Digital Media

Clips and quotes may be stripped of context and amplified far beyond the venue.

HOW SHOULD YOU RESPOND TO DISINFORMATION AT THE GC?

1. Spot & Check

Watch for potentially false narratives and quietly verify with trusted technical experts and sources. Escalate through internal channels to relevant leadership.

2. Select Response

Assess whether the narrative is strategically significant and spreading widely enough to warrant a response (engagement could amplify the falsehood).

3. Coordinate

If deemed significant, coordinate the response with the capital, the IAEA and trusted third parties, including experts and organisations, to keep message consistency.

4. Debunk

Correct the false claim with factual language, clarify the IAEA's mandate and evidentiary limits and support individuals who are personally targeted.

[1] Definitively identifying disinformation can be challenging, as intent and attribution are often unclear. For brevity, this note adopts a broad definition of “disinformation” that includes other information operations, as they mislead the audience and shape perception and behaviour.

WANT TO LEARN MORE?

→ RN Disinformation in Diplomatic Communications

→ Example Tactics and Narratives

→ Best Practices for Countering RN Disinfo
Download PDF
Tactic Spotlights

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