Russia's Dirty Bomb Disinformation in Ukraine

KEY POINTS

Disinformation narrative: Moscow’s false claim that Ukraine was planning to detonate a dirty bomb on its own territory and blame Russia gained mainstream media attention following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This rhetoric began generating substantial alarm several months later in October 2022, when Western officials (Europe, the US and allied countries) believed it might serve as cover for a false-flag operation or pretext for tactical nuclear weapons use.

 

Response: The initial response from Ukraine and its allies to Russia’s dirty bomb narrative relied primarily on fact-checking to refute and debunk claims about dirty bomb manufacturing in Ukraine. After it became apparent that these claims could be used as a pretext to escalation, backchannel diplomacy and threats of retaliation were also employed to dissuade Russian escalatory action.

 

Implications: Moscow’s dirty bomb narrative underscores how false narratives can manipulate public opinion and obscure intentions. Moving forward, combating such disinformation, especially in fast-evolving crises, may need to rely more heavily on advanced technologies like AI-driven analytics and real-time verification to rapidly counter false narratives.

WHAT IS A DIRTY BOMB?

A dirty bomb (i.e. radiological dispersal device) uses conventional explosives to spread radioactive material – causing contamination, damage and possibly significant disruption.

 

Unlike nuclear weapons, which require highly enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium, the materials used in dirty bombs do not need to be specially developed for weapons use and could potentially be gathered from research, industrial, energy and medical sources. Their relatively small size allows these devices to be positioned by foot or transported by vehicle, making them more accessible to malign non-state actors.1 Dirty bombs have never been successfully used,2 however:

 

  • Their detonation would be millions of times less powerful than a nuclear weapon explosion as it does not create a nuclear fission chain reaction.3
  • The area contaminated would be dependent on the explosive yield and amount of radioactive material released – but would likely extend only a few hundred metres.
  • Radiation released would likely be insufficient to immediately cause mass fatalities, but victims could be harmed over time by the exposure to radioactive material.

The psychological effects of the detonation and subsequent decontamination efforts have led these devices to be characterised as “weapons of mass disruption” rather than “weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).”4

DISINFO

Since at least 2015, Russian actors have propagated the dirty bomb narrative to advance domestic and geopolitical interests – as part of its broader disinformation campaigns. Moscow employs a variety of tactics when spreading these narratives, such as amplifying existing societal divisions and disseminating multiple narratives concurrently to cultivate confusion and public apathy.5 These operations span all chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) domains and have found greater success in the Global South compared with Western audiences.6

OBJECTIVES

Russia’s dirty bomb narrative (see timeline) peaked sharply in intensity and outreach in October 2022, causing Western officials to became concerned that the sudden increase in messaging might serve as cover for a false-flag operation or pretext for tactical nuclear weapons use.8

At the time, Moscow was experiencing significant battlefield setbacks and Western intelligence agencies had intercepted communications from senior Russian military leaders discussing the circumstances in which Moscow might use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine.9 Considering these broader developments, Moscow was plausibly attempting to achieve one, or a combination, of the following objectives:

 

  • Prepare the information space for potential nuclear weapons use.
  • Influence the behaviour of Ukraine and its Western allies.
  • Express genuine concern about Ukraine’s intentions, due to inaccurate intelligence gathering.
  • Bolster domestic support for its ongoing mobilisation efforts.

RESPONSE

As Russia’s dirty bomb narrative and resulting public concern peaked, the West implemented several tactics to mitigate Moscow’s information operations.

 

  • Fact-checking: Officials, media platforms and research institutes10 redoubled ongoing efforts to debunk Moscow’s dirty bomb narrative, with strategies such as reverse image searching and feasibility analysis by experts. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which undertook verification activities and conducted research within Ukraine, also categorically rejecting Moscow’s claims.11
  • Backchannel diplomacy: This was conducted to encourage Russia’s partners to dissuade Moscow from employing a dirty bomb or nuclear weapon. China’s leader, Xi Jinping, likely warned President Putin against using nuclear weapons. India also issued a public statement condemning nuclear weapon use by any state.12
  • Threats of retaliation: These were privately conveyed to Russia by French, UK and US officials. Western leaders reportedly warned that a tactical nuclear weapons strike would not go unpunished and that they may respond by conventionally striking Russian forces.13

CONCLUSION

Moscow’s dirty bomb narrative highlights how false or misleading information can be used to exploit global radiological and nuclear fears, shape public opinion, obscure intentions and sow confusion.14 Western debunking efforts likely played a role in calming public anxiety and challenging Russia’s accusations. However, combating future disinformation, especially during rapidly evolving crises, may need to increasingly leverage advanced technologies such as AI-driven analytics and real-time data verification to identify and counter misleading narratives before they gain momentum.

TIMELINE

2015-2021

Sporadic appearance of dirty bomb narrative in Russian language media/social media.

January - March 2022

Russian state media reports on alleged Ukrainian dirty bomb manufacturing, possibly to help justify its invasion.

23 October 2022

Surge in Russian state media reporting about a potential dirty bomb ‘provocation’.


Russian defence officials discuss concerns with French, UK and US counterparts.

24 October 2022

France, UK and US leaders reject Russia’s dirty bomb narrative.


US officials express fears that Russia’s claims may be used as a pretext for tactical nuclear weapons use in Ukraine.


Chief of the Russian Armed Forces claims a dirty bomb is nearly complete and that the military is preparing to operate in a radioactive environment.


Russia’s UN ambassador writes to the UN Secretary General stating his concerns about dirty bomb use.

25 October 2022

President Biden warns that tactical nuclear weapons use would be a “serious mistake”.

26 October 2022

Russia’s defence minister contacts Chinese and Indian counterparts to warn them of the dirty bomb threat.


NATO’s secretary general warns of severe consequences in response to nuclear weapons use.


India’s defence minister publicly warns against nuclear weapons use.

27 October 2022

President Putin repeats dirty bomb allegations.


The US defence secretary warns of significant retaliation if Russia uses nuclear weapons.

28 October 2022

Moscow’s dirty bomb warnings abruptly end.

November 2022 - Present

Circulation of dirty bomb narrative returns to baseline frequency.

November 2024

REFERENCES

  1. András Rácz. ‘Russia Goes for Annexation and Mobilization’. German Council on Foreign Relations, 22 September 2022. https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/russia-goes-annexation-and-mobilization.
  2. Borger, Julian, and Peter Beaumont. ‘Russia Steps up Ukraine “Dirty Bomb” Claim in Letter Delivered to UN’. The Guardian, 25 October 2022, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/25/russia-to-raise-ukraine-dirty-bomb-claim-at-un-security-council.
  3. Brookes, Peter. ‘Russia’s Dirty Bomb Claim Is a Dirty Lie’. The Heritage Foundation, 4 November 2022. https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/russias-dirty-bomb-claim-dirty-lie.
  4. Delegation of the European Union to the People’s Republic of China. ‘Disinformation About Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine – Debunking Seven Myths Spread by Russia’. Delegation of the European Union to the People’s Republic of China, 18 March 2022. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/disinformation-about-russias-invasion-ukraine-debunking-seven-myths-spread-russia_en?s=166.
  5. Digital Forensic Research Lab. ‘Russian War Report: Kremlin Recycles Old Narratives to Claim Ukraine Is Constructing Dirty Bombs and Bioweapons’. Atlantic Council, 7 March 2022. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-kremlin-recycles-old-narratives-to-claim-ukraine-is-constructing-dirty-bombs-and-bioweapons/.
  6. Government of Massachusetts. ‘Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC): Fact Sheet on Dirty Bombs’. Government of Massachusetts. Accessed 8 April 2025. https://www.mass.gov/info-details/nuclear-regulatory-commission-nrc-fact-sheet-on-dirty-bombs.
  7. Heather Williams, Kelsey Hartigan, Lachlan MacKenzie, and Reja Younis. ‘Deter and Divide: Russia’s Nuclear Rhetoric & Escalation Risks in Ukraine’. Center for Strategic & International Studies. Accessed 8 April 2025. https://features.csis.org/deter-and-divide-russia-nuclear-rhetoric.
  8. Heather Williams, Kelsey Hartigan, Lachlan MacKenzie, and Reja Younis. ‘Russian Nuclear Calibration in the War in Ukraine’. Center for Strategic & International Studies, 23 February 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-nuclear-calibration-war-ukraine.
  9. Helene Cooper, Julian E. Barnes, and Eric Schmitt. ‘Russian Military Leaders Discussed Use of Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Officials Say’. The New York Times, 2 November 2022, sec. U.S. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/us/politics/russia-ukraine-nuclear-weapons.html.
  10. International Atomic Energy Agency. ‘IAEA Inspectors Complete In-Field Verification Activities at Three Ukraine Locations, No Indications of Undeclared Nuclear Activities and Materials’. Text. IAEA, 3 November 2022. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-inspectors-complete-in-field-verification-activities-at-three-ukraine-locations-no-indications-of-undeclared-nuclear-activities-and-materials.
  11. Katherine Lawlor and Kateryna Stepanenko. ‘Warning Update: Russia May Conduct a Chemical or Radiological False-Flag Attack as a Pretext for Greater Aggression against Ukraine’. Institute for the Study of War, 9 March 2022. http://dev-isw.bivings.com/.
  12. Lachlan MacKenzie. ‘Six Days in October: Russia’s Dirty Bomb Signaling and the Return of Nuclear Crises’, 3 September 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/six-days-october-russias-dirty-bomb-signaling-and-return-nuclear-crises.
  13. Max Seddon. ‘Why Vladimir Putin Toned down His Nuclear Rhetoric’. Financial Times, 1 November 2023, sec. War in Ukraine. https://www.ft.com/content/d98446ac-b56e-4f1d-bfa9-ebaed4e26884.
  14. Meyer, Samuel, Sarah Bidgood, and William C. Potter. ‘Death Dust: The Little-Known Story of U.S. and Soviet Pursuit of Radiological Weapons’. International Security 45, no. 2 (1 October 2020): 51–94. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00391.
  15. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna. ‘Russia’s Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s Comment in Connection with the Latest Failure to Rotate IAEA Secretariat Experts at the Zaporozhskaya NPP and Ukraine’s New Provocation against This Plant’, 12 February 2025.
  16. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna. ‘Statement by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov on the Agenda Item 3 of the Session of the IAEA Board of Governors «Nuclear and Radiation Safety: Nuclear Safety Review 2025»’, 3 March 2025.
  17. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations. ‘Remarks to the Press by First Deputy Permanent Representative Dmitry Polyanskiy Following Security Council’s AOB Discussion of the Possibility of Ukraine Creating a  “Dirty Bomb”’, 25 October 2022. https://russiaun.ru/en/news/stakeout_251022#!
  18. Reuters. ‘Russia, without Evidence, Says Ukraine Making Nuclear “Dirty Bomb”’. Reuters, 6 March 2022, sec. Europe. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-without-evidence-says-ukraine-making-nuclear-dirty-bomb-2022-03-06/.
  19. Russian Federation. ‘Letter Dated 24 October 2022 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council’. United Nations, 24 October 2022. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3995910.
  20. The Guardian. ‘US Dismisses “Transparently False” Russian Claims of Ukraine Plan to Use “Dirty Bomb”’. The Guardian, 24 October 2022, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/24/us-dismisses-transparently-false-russian-claims-of-ukraine-plan-to-use-dirty-bomb.
  21. ‘Summary Record (Partial) of the 18th Meeting, Held at the Vienna International Centre, Vienna, on Friday, 11 August 2023: Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1st Session’. United Nations, 7 September 2023. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/239/51/pdf/n2323951.pdf.
  22. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ‘Backgrounder on Dirty Bombs’. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 2022. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-dirty-bombs.html.
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