Disinfo Decoded Archives - Countering WMD Disinformation

Roadmap of a Radiological/Nuclear Disinformation Campaign

Erik — Sun, 08 Mar 2026 17:43:06 +0000

Roadmap of a radiological/nuclear disinformation campaign

Discrediting Opponents

Framing Ukraine, the United States, and the broader “West” as dangerous, destructive, and operating outside of legal or moral bounds

What does this commonly used tactic look like in official documents and statements?

Note Verbale #2513, submitted by the Russian Federation to the IAEA (2023)

Right of Reply by the Russian Federation 2 August 2022, NPT Review Conference

Framing Russia as a Responsible International Actor

Framing Russia as a champion of nonproliferation and a guarantor of nuclear energy and security

What does this commonly used tactic look like in official documents and statements?

Statement by Russia at the 69 Session of the IAEA General th Conference (2025)

Note Verbale #2513, submitted by the Russian Federation to the IAEA (2023)

Fear Mongering

Stoking fears of a nuclear or radiological catastrophe by referencing historical disasters or alleging plans for radiological or nuclear “provocations”

What does this commonly used tactic look like in official documents and statements?

Note Verbale #3127, submitted by the Russian Federation to the IAEA (2022)

Note Verbale #3974, submitted by the Russian Federation to the IAEA (2022)

Provision of “Evidence”

Providing photos or diagrams as “evidence” of Ukraine’s alleged illegal or reckless actions near/against nuclear power plants

What does this commonly used tactic look like in official documents and statements?

Note Verbale #3323, submitted by the Russian Federation to the IAEA (2022)

Note Verbale (unnumbered) submitted by the Russian Federation to the IAEA (2025)

Claims of Victimization

Framing Russia as a victim of Western or Ukrainian hatred and aggression, often as a way to justify military action or nuclear policies

What does this commonly used tactic look like in official documents and statements?

Statement by the Russian Federation at 78th Session of UNGA 1st Committee (2023)

Note Verbale #2513, submitted by the Russian Federation to the IAEA (2023)

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Roadmap of a BWC Disinformation Campaign

Erik — Fri, 14 Nov 2025 21:29:05 +0000

Roadmap of a bwc disinformation campaign

Misuse of Scientific and Technical Information

Presenting inaccurate, irrelevant, or misconstrued scientific or technical information to substantiate false claims

What does this commonly used tactic look like in BWC statements and documents?

Statement by the Russian Federation at the 9th Review Conference (2022)

Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation at 2023 Working Group Meeting

Provision of “Evidence”:

Using reports, government agreements, project documents, and patent applications to generate “evidence” of nefarious activity

What does this commonly used tactic look like in BWC statements and documents?

Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation at 2024 Meeting of States Parties

Presentation submitted by the Russian Federation at 2022 Formal Consultative Meeting

Appeal to Emotions:

Using emotionally manipulative language or content to elicit feelings of outrage, fear, disgust, and/or anger

What does this commonly used tactic look like in BWC statements and documents?

Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation at 2023 Working Group Meeting

Note Verbale submitted by the Russian Federation to BWC States Parties in 2024

Citing “Authoritative” Sources:

Referencing, quoting, or misquoting/misrepresenting sources with apparent authority or expertise to enhance the perceived credibility of false claims

What does this commonly used tactic look like in BWC statements and documents?

Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation at 2023 Meeting of States Parties

Note Verbale submitted by the Russian Federation to BWC States Parties in 2024

Claims of Secrecy or Neglect:

Claiming that certain states are not adequately transparent about their biological activities and/or not responsive to questions about those activities

What does this commonly used tactic look like in BWC statements and documents?

Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation at 2024 Meeting of States Parties

Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation at 2023 Working Group Meeting

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Roadmap of a CWC Disinformation Campaign

Erik — Fri, 14 Nov 2025 21:16:14 +0000

Roadmap of a cwc disinformation campaign

Provision of “Evidence”:

Providing or referencing misleading or deliberately misinterpreted video footage, photos, or laboratory findings as “evidence” of nefarious activity

What does this commonly used tactic look like in documents submitted to the OPCW?

Note Verbale #68 (Annex 1), submitted by the Russian Federation to the OPCW (2024)

Note Verbale #39, submitted by the Russian Federation to the OPCW (2024)

Appeal to Emotions:

Using emotionally manipulative language or content to elicit feelings of outrage, fear, anger, and/or sympathy

What does this commonly used tactic look like in documents submitted to the OPCW?

Note Verbale #38, submitted by the Russian Federation to the OPCW (2023)

Note Verbale #44, submitted by the Russian Federationto the OPCW (2021)

Discrediting Inspection and Assistance Mechanisms:

Disputing or questioning the validity of inspection and assistance mechanisms, including OPCW-led technical assistance visits and fact-finding missions

What does this commonly used tactic look like in documents submitted to the OPCW?

Note Verbale #15, submitted by the Russian Federation to the OPCW (2025)

Note Verbale #759, submitted by the Russian Federation to the OPCW (2019)

Fake Mirroring:

Accusing another state of what you yourself have been accused of (and have likely done/are doing)

What does this commonly used tactic look like in documents submitted to the OPCW?

Note Verbale #38, submitted by the Russian Federation to the OPCW (2023)

Aide Memoire submitted by the Russian Federation to the OPCW (2018)

Flooding the Zone:

Flooding the information environment with numerous, repetitive allegations, often using a standard template

What does this commonly used tactic look like in documents submitted to the OPCW?

Note Verbale #68 (Annex 2), submitted by the Russian Federation to the OPCW (2024)

Note Verbale #68 (Annex 1), submitted by the Russian Federation to the OPCW (2024)

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Methodology

Erik — Mon, 20 Oct 2025 14:00:00 +0000

Methodology

Chemical Weapons Allegations Timeline Methodology

This timeline outlines major chemical weapons (CW) disinformation narratives as well as key events and developments that were incorporated into or distorted by malign state disinformation campaigns.

The methodology employed for compiling the policy timeline on CW allegations was
designed to be as detailed and impartial as possible, whilst acknowledging the limitations in available data and sources.

The analysis does not exhaustively cover every relevant document or statement but focuses on key sources that were most relevant and available within the specified timeframe.

SCOPE AND SEARCH PARAMETERS

To construct the timeline, we systematically searched official documents, statements and reports available from national and international governmental archives and websites The primary focus was on countries that have been central to CW-related claims – either as originators or target’s of disinformation- namely China, Russia, Syria, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The following search terms were commonly used in the research process:

“Alexei Navalny”
“chem”
“chemical weapons”
“chemical weapons + Syria”
“chemical weapons + Ukraine”
“Salisbury”
“Skripal”

SOURCE BREAKDOWN

Our dataset focused on:

1. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

China, Russia, Syria, Ukraine, United Kingdom and the United States

Available statements from China, Russia, Syria, UK and the US spanning the fourteen-year timeframe 2011 to 2025 were accessed. 2011 was chosen as a start date as it coincided with the onset of the Syrian civil war, which represented the first widespread and systematic use of chemical weapons in recent decades. Materials assessed included national statements and official records from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), including documents from the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. These statements were examined for any references to chemical weapons allegations, especially those pertaining to Navalny, Skripal/Salisbury, Syria, US or Ukraine.

2. Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

Although the BWC primarily addresses biological weapons, selected documents from the 2011–2025 period were reviewed for references to chemical weapons within broader discussions of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

3. UNGA First Committee

Statements and reports from the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)’s First Committee (2011-2025) were analysed. Special attention was paid to allegations and discussions related to chemical warfare, particularly those involving Russia, Syria, the United States, and Ukraine. The same key terms were used in the search.

4. UN Security Council Documents

Relevant documentation submitted by China, Russia, Syria, Ukraine, UK, the US, and others was reviewed for CW-related content, including JIM (Joint Investigative Mechanism) and FFM (Fact Finding Mission) reports. These documents were scrutinised for references to chemical weapons allegations in the 2011-2025 timeframe.

5. OSCE (Operation for Security and Co-operation in Europe)

Documentation from 2016 onwards were reviewed. The search terms “chem” and “chemical weapons” were used to identify relevant statements and documentation.

6. Government websites

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA): The Russian MFA’s official website (in English) was searched between 2011-2025 for mentions of “Alexei Navalny”, “chem”, “chemical weapons”, “Salisbury”, “Skripal” focusing on statements and documents that included references to Syria, Alexei Navalny, Salisbury and Ukraine.
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD): Similarly, the Russian MoD website (in English) was searched for relevant content between 2011-2025, for mentions of “Alexei Navalny”, “chem”, “chemical weapons”, “Salisbury”, “Skripal” focusing on statements and documents that included references to Syria, Alexei Navalny, Salisbury and Ukraine.
Condition (10)(C) Reports: Annual reports required by the US Senate’s Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Reports from 2014 to 2025 were analysed for reference to chemical weapons incidents, allegations, and compliance assessments. This period was selected because reports from these years are publicly available online in their entirety, allowing for consistent review.
Annual Threat Assessments (2015-2025): Sections on Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) were reviewed in the 2015-2025 timeframe, with emphasis on – China and Russia.
Worldwide Threat Assessments (2015-2018, 2021,2024,2025): Available reports in the 2015-2025 timeframe were reviewed; emphasis was placed on the sections directly relating to Russia.
US Embassy and Treasury Department Websites: Information related to US sanctions imposed on Russia concerning chemical weapons were reviewed.

7. Government and Media Reports

White House Statements (2011-2025): Official White House communications, including press releases and statements were reviewed for references to chemical weapons use or accusations, with a particular focus on Syria, Russia, Salisbury and the Navalny poisoning case.
UK Parliament (2018-2025): Hansard records and official statements were analysed focusing on government responses to the Skripal and Navalny poisonings.
BBC Panorama & BBC Arabic (2011-2025): Investigative documentaries and reports were reviewed to identify chemical weapons attacks by location and year. Emphasis was placed on verifying the number and nature of attacks reported annually, particularly in Syria.
Arms Control Association (2011-2025): The Association’s public timeline and analysis of chemical weapons use especially in Syria were used to corroborate dates, identify key events and contextualise state and non-state actors alleged use of chemical agents.

8. Russian Media

RT and TASS (in English): These outlets were selected due to their status as two of the most widely accessed and influential Russian state media organisations. Their coverage provides official perspectives and narratives commonly disseminated by the Russian state. Searches were conducted using keywords; “Alexei Navalny”, “chem”, “chemical weapons”, “Salisbury”, “Skripal”. Statements alleging chemical weapons use by actors such as the White Helmets were also reviewed.
Russian Newspapers: Articles mentioning Alexei Navalny were included for additional context. This was not a comprehensive or systematic review of all Russian media coverage but rather a targeted selection of materials considered useful for understanding specific incidents and narratives.

DATA SYNTHESIS AND TIMELINE CREATION

The documents were analysed and the information synthesised in a chronological order of key events and allegations. This approach allowed mapping of the progression of CW allegations from early references in the Syrian conflict in the 2010s to more recent developments involving Russia and Ukraine.

The following steps were taken during the synthesis:

Documenting the date of each relevant statement or report.
Categorising each piece of information according to its source (e.g., Russia, Ukraine, United States) and the forum or platform in which it appeared (e.g., national statements to the OPCW, UN Security Council debates, government press releases), as well as its content (e.g., allegations, official denials, statements of support).
Cross-referencing sources to ensure consistency and to understand the context in which the allegations were made.

LIMITATIONS AND EXCLUSIONS

While the goal was to be as comprehensive as possible, there were limitations. For example, patent databases were not included in this research due to the challenges of assessing the potential threat level of the technologies described.

Biological Weapons Allegations Timeline Methodology

This timeline outlines the major biological disinformation narratives as well as the key events and developments that were incorporated into or distorted by malign state disinformation campaigns.

The methodology employed for compiling the policy timeline on biological weapons (BW) allegation was designed to be as detailed and impartial as possible whilst acknowledging the limitations in available data and sources.

The analysis does not exhaustively cover every possible document or statement but focuses on key sources that were most relevant and available within the specified timeframe.

SCOPE AND SEARCH PARAMETERS

To construct the timeline, we systematically searched official documents, statements, and reports available from national and international governmental archives and websites. The primary focus was on countries central to BW-related claims — either as originators or targets of disinformation — namely China, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States.

The following search terms in English were commonly used in the research process:

“bio”
“biological military”
“biological weapons”
“Georgia”
“Lugar”
“military biological”
“Ukraine”
“US”

SOURCE BREAKDOWN

Our dataset focused on:

The Biological Weapons Convention

China, Russia, Ukraine and the United States Available statements from Ukraine, Russia, China, and the US spanning the ten-year timeframe 2015-2025. These statements were examined for references to biological weapons allegations or allegations of military biological activity, especially those pertaining to Georgia, Ukraine or the United States. The search terms “bio,” “biological military,” “biological weapons,” “Georgia,” “Lugar,” “military biological,” “Ukraine,” and “US” were used to identify relevant material. The ten-year timeframe was selected because it covers the period when state-sponsored biological weapons allegations and related narratives became increasingly prominent, especially in the context of the Ukraine conflict. The 2015 start date was chosen not due to lack of earlier material (which is available in UNODA’s BWC documentation library), but because this period marks the point at which such allegations became increasingly prominent in official discourse, particularly in relation to the Ukraine conflict.

UNGA’s First Committee Statements and reports from the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee were analysed in the 2015–2025 timeframe. The search terms “bio,” “Ukraine,” “Georgia,” “military biological,” and “Lugar” were used to identify relevant discussions, with special attention to allegations and debates related to nefarious activities and biological warfare, particularly those involving Georgia, Ukraine, and the United States.

UN Security Council Documents Relevant documents submitted by China, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States to the UN Security Council were reviewed in the 2015–2025 timeframe. The search terms “bio,” “Ukraine,” “Georgia,” “military biological,” and “Lugar” were used to identify references to bio-labs, biological warfare allegations, and military biological activity.

OSCE (Operation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Documents were reviewed from 2015 onward. The search terms “bio,” “military biological,” “Georgia” and “Ukraine” were used to identify relevant statements and documentation.

Government websites

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA): The Russian MFA’s official website (in English) was searched between 2015-2025 for mentions of “bio”, “biological weapons”, “military biological activities”, “disease outbreaks”, focusing on statements and documents that included references to Georgia or Ukraine.
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD): Similarly, the Russian MoD website (in English) was searched for relevant content between 2015-2025, for mentions of “bio”, “biological weapons”, “military biological activities”, “disease outbreaks”, focusing on statements and documents that included references to Georgia or
US State Department: Documents related to the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), as well as other relevant materials, were reviewed from 2015-2025.
Arms Control Compliance Reports: All reports in the 2015-2025 timeframe were reviewed; emphasis was placed on documents that addressed the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), particularly concerning China and Russia.
Annual Threat Assessments (2015-2025): Sections on Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) were reviewed in the 2015-2025 timeframe, with emphasis on – China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.
Worldwide Threat Assessments (2015-2018, 2021,2024,2025): Available reports in the 2015-2025 timeframe were reviewed; emphasis was placed on the sections directly relating to Russia.
US Embassy and Treasury Department Websites: Information related to US sanctions imposed on Russia concerning biological weapons or labs were

Russian Media:

RT and TASS (in English): These outlets were selected due to their status as two of the most widely accessed and influential Russian state media organisations. Their coverage provides official perspectives and narratives commonly disseminated by the Russian state. Searches were conducted between 2015 – 2025 using keywords; “bio”, “biological weapons”, “military biological activities”, “disease outbreaks”, “Georgia” “Lugar”, “Ukraine” and “US”. Articles were included if they directly addressed issues related to biological weapons, laboratories, or alleged military biological activities. Duplicate reports and pieces where the keywords appeared only incidentally without substantive discussion were excluded.
Other Russian media (in English): Other relevant media articles were included for additional context. This was not a comprehensive or systematic review of all Russian media coverage but rather a targeted selection of materials considered useful for understanding specific incidents and narratives.

DATA SYNTHESIS AND TIMELINE CREATION

The documents were analysed and the information synthesised in a chronological order of key events and allegations. This approach allowed us to map the progression of BW allegations from first mentions in the mid-2010s to the more recent intensification of these claims.

The following steps were taken during the synthesis:

Documenting the date of each relevant statement or report.
Categorising each piece of information according to its source (e.g., Russia, Ukraine, United States etc.) and its content (e.g., allegations, official denials, statements of support).
Cross-referencing sources to ensure consistency and to understand the context in which the allegations were made.

LIMITATIONS AND EXCLUSIONS

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CBRN Tracker

Erik — Mon, 20 Oct 2025 14:00:00 +0000

CBRN Disinformation Tracker

This is a chronological and interactive resource enabling you to track how disinformation is impacting multilateral disarmament debates on weapons of mass destruction.

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Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Use of Misleading “Evidence”

Erik — Thu, 24 Jul 2025 14:52:48 +0000

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

USE OF MISLEADING “EVIDENCE”

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) seeks to understand and counter Russian state-sponsored or state-adjacent disinformation across Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats, in support of GP Member efforts. As part of this effort, the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (JHCHS) systematically analyzed over 300 news media items from the EUvsDisinfo Database to identify common narratives, tactics, and themes associated with pro-Kremlin CBRN disinformation.

Tactic Spotlight: One commonly used tactic consists of referencing, describing, or alluding to “evidence” that purportedly confirms Russia’s false claims about CBRN weapons/threats. Such evidence may include agreements, documents, reports, and other “materials.” In some cases, these materials are legitimate but are deliberately misinterpreted or taken out of context. In other cases, these materials are partially or fully fabricated. This tactic is designed to legitimize Russia’s claims, driving audiences towards false conclusions that Russia desires.

OVERVIEW

EXAMPLES

Use of misleading “evidence”: Biological weapons

News media items containing disinformation about biological weapons frequently alleged that there were “materials” to supposedly substantiate Russia’s claims about U.S. overseas biological weapons development. Some referenced specific documents or claimed that evidence existed and was incontrovertible—even if it didn’t exist or was strategically manipulated—to bolster perceived credibility of false claims. Claims in which this misleading tactic was used include:

Claims that Russia had uncovered documents and other “materials” (e.g., laboratory reports, “eyewitness” testimony) during its invasion of Ukraine that proved biological weapons development was taking place in Ukrainian laboratories.
References to—and mischaracterizations of—specific documents or agreements outlining U.S. cooperative biological activities in the post-Soviet space.
References to U.S. patents for devices or products that could purportedly be used to disseminate biological weapons.

Example: “Igor Giorgadze, a former Georgian state security minister, has claimed that the US-funded medical facility, known as the Richard G. Lugar Center for Public Health Research, in Georgia could be a cover for a bioweapons laboratory… Having allegedly obtained some 100,000 pages of secret docs, Giorgadze said he would consistently make them publicly available. For instance, he has already revealed a US Patent for the development of a remotely controlled ‘device for the aerial release of mosquitoes.” (Sputnik International, 2018)

Use of misleading “evidence”: Radiological and nuclear weapons

Pro-Kremlin news media outlets often referred to data, information, instructions, and other forms of “evidence” to substantiate false claims about Ukraine and the West’s engagement in suspicious activities related to radiological and nuclear weapons. These narratives cause confusion and stoke public fears of radiological and nuclear disasters by claiming that evidence of WMD development and radiation spread was concealed or ignored. This tactic was featured in the following radiological and nuclear weapons-related disinformation narratives:

Claims that Russia obtained information outlining Ukraine’s plans to create a dirty-bomb for a nuclear “provocation” with support from the West.
References to—and mischaracterizations of—video evidence of explosions allegedly exhibiting the characteristics of an atomic bomb.
Claims that the European detector system was tampered with to conceal evidence of an alleged radioactive cloud moving towards Poland.

Example: “Recently, several web media outlets provided videos of an enormous explosion in the town of Khmelnitski, located to the West of Kiev, and about 200 km from the border with Poland. There were two major explosions which produced a massive roiling swirling fireball which, like an atomic bomb, developed upwards and formed a mushroom cloud, which was black.” (Sputnik International, 2023)

Use of misleading “evidence”: Chemical Weapons

False claims about chemical weapons alleged that materials such as internal government documents, scientific reports, and videos provided evidence that Ukraine and the “West” were engaging in suspicious activities related to the purchase or use of chemical weapons. This included claims that the “West” concealed or disregarded evidence Russia had presented to defend itself against allegations of criminal activity. Unsubstantiated evidence is often used to conceal and divert attention from Russia’s own violations. This tactic was featured in the following chemical weapons-related disinformation narratives:

Claims that the OPCW concealed findings around the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, setting up a planned provocation” to discredit Russia and disregarding Russia’s evidence alleging that Navalny died of natural causes.
Claims of evidence showing that Ukraine agreed to let companies dump hazardous waste and pollute Ukrainian land.
Claims alleging delivery of chemical weapons to Ukraine and supposed plans to use them and blame Russia for it.

Example: “[Maria Zakharova] believes that after their call, Berlin will stop hiding ‘secret materials’ from the international community and erasing formulas detected substances from reports … The Russian Foreign Ministry stated that the West and the OPCW, by not providing the Russian Federation with information about the substance with which [Alexei] Navalny was
allegedly poisoned, are concealing key ‘evidence.’” (RIA Novosti, 2021)

IMPLICATIONS

Referencing or discussing “evidence” (even if such evidence is fabricated or taken out of context) is a tactic used to signal to Russia’s target audiences that its claims are factual or legitimate. These types of signals, which are often referred to as heuristic cues, are problematic because they may discourage individuals from thinking critically about Russia’s claims, leading them instead to rely on a more intuitive and biased form of information processing.¹ The Russian government (along with its proxy outlets) uses these cues deliberately to increase the chances that its falsehoods are believed. Russia also uses this tactic to erode the credibility of the agencies and institutions named in its evidential “materials,” making it difficult for them to respond effectively to Russia’s allegations and potentially undermining their ability to implement global threat reduction activities. This tactic is often used in conjunction with another similar, commonly used tactic: Using “Authoritative” Sources.

ACTIONS

Communicators can respond to this tactic by exposing the ways in which Russia misrepresented or misinterpreted specific documents and other materials. The correct interpretation of these materials should be emphasized, as individuals may need to fill a cognitive gap^2-4 about why such materials (including patent applications) exist or what they really mean. In addition, pre-emptive or anticipatory approaches should also be considered. Raising awareness of this tactic, for example, may help protect Russia’s target audiences from being manipulated by its use in future disinformation campaigns. In addition, those responsible for drafting documents on activities that are commonly targeted by Russian disinformation campaigns (e.g., cooperative threat reduction activities) may want to think pre-emptively about how to draft language in a way that would be difficult for a foreign government to misinterpret or misrepresent.

July 2025

REFERENCES

Peng W, Lim S, Meng J. Persuasive strategies in online health misinformation: a systematic review. Information, Communication & Society. 2023;26(11):2131-2148. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2022.2085615
Cook J. How to Effectively Debunk Myths About Aging and Other Misconceptions. Public Policy & Aging Report. 2017;27(1):13-17. doi:10.1093/ppar/prw034
Johnson HM, Seifert CM. Sources of the continued influence effect: When misinformation in memory affects later inferences. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 1994;20(6):1420-1436. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.20.6.1420
Ecker UKH. Why rebuttals may not work: the psychology of misinformation*. Media Asia. 2017;44(2):79-87. doi:10.1080/01296612.2017.138414

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Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Master Narratives

Erik — Thu, 24 Jul 2025 14:30:25 +0000

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

MASTER NARRATIVES

Master narratives: Analysis of news media items in the sample revealed three master narratives – higher-level narratives that are used to shape world views in ways that benefit the Kremlin. Russia uses these narratives to contextualize its lower-level narratives and specific false claims, enhancing the overall effectiveness of its disinformation campaigns. Given the important role that master narratives play in disinformation campaigns, policy makers should incorporate an understanding of them into counter-disinformation materials, including debunking and prebunking materials, thereby ensuring greater resilience to Russian information manipulation.

OVERVIEW

MASTER NARRATIVES

What are master narratives?

Master narratives can be thought of as the higher-level stories that give meaning to lower-level narratives and specific false claims.^{1, 2} The Russian government and its associated proxy outlets use master narratives to contextualize their false claims, ensuring that they a) resonate with target audiences and b) are interpreted in ways that furthers the Kremlin’s interests. Russia’s master narratives, in other words, reflect the ways in which the Kremlin wants its target audiences to perceive the world around them.

How do master narratives fit into the broader CBRN disinformation space?

The relationship between master narratives and the other components of a CBRN disinformation campaign can be described as circular and mutually reinforcing. Master narratives give meaning and context to the lower-level components of a disinformation campaign, but those components are also chosen strategically to evoke and lend support to Russia’s master narratives. This relationship is depicted in the figure below.

EXAMPLES

Master Narrative: West Versus the Rest

This master narrative constructed an ongoing, existential conflict between the collective “West” and the rest of the world. Within this master narrative, the West’s purported pursuit (or use) of CBRN weapons was framed as a manifestation of its aggressive, neocolonial agenda, one that was aimed at exploiting and exerting control over non-Western countries, including Russia and Ukraine. In addition, this master narrative framed multilateral nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms as instruments of Western oppression, allowing Western nations to evade punishment for breaches of international law or falsely accuse others (particularly Russia) of WMD use.

Examples of claims that evoked this master narrative included:

Claims that the United States places biolaboratories in foreign countries to exert control over disease outbreaks, allowing it to “create” epidemics and facilitate subsequent dependence on U.S./Western-produced diagnostics or therapeutics (tactic: discredit opponents).
Claims that “Western” countries refused to cooperate following the poisoning of Aleskey Navalny and that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is no longer an impartial or independent organization given the results of its investigation (narratives: assassination attempts, international structures ineffective).
Claims that the “accumulation” of cruise missiles in NATO countries is not a defensive measure but one designed to facilitate aggression against non-NATO countries (tactics: discredit opponents, claims of victimization).

Example: “In conditions of elusive hegemony, the global West, represented by the United States, does not disdain any means to maintain its leadership. Washington relies on destructive methods aimed at weakening those who do not want to put up with American dictates. Placing biological laboratories in foreign countries is part of the U.S. strategy.” (Baltnews, 2022)

Master Narrative: Russia as a Responsible International Actor and the Guarantor of a Multipolar World Order

In this master narrative, Russia was framed as a responsible and even beneficent global actor, one that was committed to establishing a safer, more balanced (as opposed to Western-dominated) world order. Within this narrative, attention was drawn to Russia’s efforts to “protect” vulnerable communities (particularly those in Ukraine) from the proliferation or use of CBRN weapons. Russia’s apparent efforts to strengthen nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms were also emphasized, along with its efforts to hold the “West” accountable for its alleged violations of such mechanisms.

Examples of claims that evoked this master narrative included:

Claims that Russia invaded Ukraine to stop or otherwise prevent Ukrainians from being experimented on in U.S.-funded biological weapons laboratories (narrative: human experimentation; tactic: framing Russia as a savior).
Claims that Russia is carefully documenting and submitting “evidence” to the OPCW of the United States’ and Ukraine’s alleged use of chemical weapons to hold them accountable for their alleged “war crimes” (narrative: allegations of CW use; tactic: use of misleading “evidence”).
Claims that Russia’s deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory was a reasonable and commensurate response to the West’s “aggressive” nuclear policy, one that would ensure a more balanced and secure world (tactic: framing Russia as a savior, claims of victimization).

Example: “The deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of the Republic of Belarus is an adequate and restrained response of the Union State to the aggressive policy of the West. … Belarus and Russia are changing the rules in favor of a multipolar world order, equal and indivisible security for the vast majority—89 percent of humanity, which does not belong to NATO countries.” (Sputnik Armenia, 2023)

Master Narrative: Question More

This master narrative, which derives its name from slogan of the Russian state-sponsored news outlet RT, was designed to evoke suspicion and doubt among Russia’s target audiences, leading them to question the activities and statements of the United States, Ukraine, and other Western or Western-aligned countries. Within this master narrative, “clues” and various forms of “evidence” were provided to indicate to readers that the United States and/or Ukraine were lying about their CBRN-related activities or were attempting to obfuscate their true intentions regarding their pursuit of WMD. Examples of claims that evoked this master narrative included:

Claims that there are “suspicious” disease outbreaks occurring near U.S.-funded biolaboratories, casting doubt on the U.S. government’s assertions that such laboratories are engaged in peaceful activities (narrative: suspicious disease outbreaks).
Claims that the British government made up a fake general to blame for the Salisbury poisonings to cover up the nefarious activities taking place at Porton Down (narrative: assassination attempts).
Claims that while Western audiences have been led to believe that Russia poses a nuclear threat, Ukraine’s nuclear facilities, associated infrastructure, and expertise indicate that the threat actually emanates from Ukraine (narrative: Ukraine’s nuclear capabilities or intentions).

Example: “Тhe UK prosecutor’s office has brought charges against a third participant in the Skripal poisoning. This is a certain Sergei Fedotov, although in reality, he is not Fedotov at all. … In fact, the Skripal story raises questions not for the Russian authorities, but for the British ones. It all looks as if the father and daughter first became victims of some leak or some experiment on people by specialists from Porton Down.” (Ria Novosti, 2021)

IMPLICATIONS

Because they provide meaning and context to lower-level narratives and specific false claims, master narratives are an important part of successful disinformation campaigns.2 Russian CBRN-related disinformation campaigns consist of numerous, sometimes disparate subjects, targets, lower-level narratives, and deceptive tactics. Russia’s master narratives provide the higher-level context necessary to make sense of each of these elements, allowing obscure, disconnected, or even nonsensical claims to resonate with its target audiences. In addition to facilitating the processing of (and belief in) specific falsehoods, Russia’s master narratives also promote world views in which the West is seen as destructive, dangerous, and deceitful and Russia is seen as responsible and trustworthy—world views, in other words, that benefit the Kremlin and its foreign policy objectives.

ACTIONS

To facilitate greater resilience to information manipulation, policy makers and communicators should raise awareness of the master narratives of disinformation campaigns. In fact, master narratives can be incorporated into both debunking (retroactive refutation of false claims) and prebunking (proactive refutation of anticipated false claims) efforts. When debunking the claim that Russia invaded Ukraine to protect Ukrainians from being experimented on in U.S.-funded laboratories, for example, communicators could also call into question the broader notion that Russia is a responsible international actor by emphasizing that its actions in Ukraine were unprovoked and illegal. It may also be possible to refute this master narrative pre-emptively by raising awareness of its possible use in future disinformation campaigns and by promoting alternative (and more accurate) narratives about Russia and the West.³

July 2025

REFERENCES

Russell D. Master Narrative. In: Ryan M, ed. The Encyclopedia of Literary and Cultural Theory. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd; 2010. doi:10.1002/9781444337839.wbelctv2m003
Levinger M. Master Narratives of Disinformation Campaigns. Journal of International Affairs. 2018;71(1.5):125-134.
Rebegea C. “Question More” – But Not Too Much. Mapping Russia’s Malign Master Narratives in Central and Eastern Europe. In: Sultănescu D, ed. Challenges in Strategic Communication and Fighting Propaganda in Eastern Europe: Solutions for a Future Common Project. Vol 142. NATO Science for Peace and Security Series. IOS Press; 2019:75-83. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-943-0-75

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Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Disregard for Rules, Laws, and Norms

Erik — Fri, 06 Jun 2025 18:54:55 +0000

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

DISREGARD FOR RULES, LAWS, AND NORMS

Tactic Spotlight: One commonly used tactic is falsely alleging that a country or entity is disregarding or breaking rules, laws and norms. This tactic represents Russia’s attempt to discredit its opponents by claiming that they are hypocritical rule-breakers, often accusing them of breaking or planning to break the same rules they accuse Russia of flouting. Such allegations cause reputational damage, distract audiences from Russia’s own rule-breaking, and may undermine the international normative and legal framework by creating the impression that existing laws and norms are being violated with impunity.

OVERVIEW

EXAMPLES

Disregard for rules, laws, and norms: Biological weapons

News media items containing disinformation about biological weapons frequently referenced the United States’ overseas biological activities, often claiming that such activities were not peaceful in nature and were therefore a violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC or BTWC). Many items also alleged that the United States was conducting such activities in violation of national legislation and without regard for ethical or moral norms. News items in which this tactic was employed included the following false claims:

Claims that the US is circumventing or failing to comply with both U.S. national legislation and the BWC by conducting prohibited biological activities in overseas (as opposed to domestic) laboratories.
Claims that the US is conducting biological experiments on individuals living in the post-Soviet space, often without their consent or knowledge, thereby violating ethical regulations and norms.
Claims that U.S. scientists working in overseas laboratories are granted diplomatic immunity, allowing them to break national laws without facing prosecution.

Example: “The Americans frankly did not bother to comply with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction (BTWC). This was precisely the primitive, but cunning idea: the jurisdiction of the BTWC covers the development of biological weapons on one’s own territory, but not on the territory of other BTWC states parties.” (Sputnik Belarus, 2023)

Disregard for rules, laws, and norms: Chemical weapons

News media items containing disinformation about chemical weapons often constructed hypotheticals, like Ukraine and the US allegedly planning to deploy banned chemical weapons in Ukraine and highlighted how doing so would violate rules. They pointed to supposed double standards or lack of cooperation during investigations, often in situations where these countries had accused Russia of breaking rules. This sought to discredit “Western” countries and paint them as unreliable, untrustworthy, and hypocritical, thus making Russia look like a rule-follower in contrast. This disinformation tactic included the following claims related to chemical weapons:

Alleging that the Ukrainian Armed Forces plan to use prohibited chemical weapons and commit war crimes with U.S. support, thereby violating the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Accusing the US of not fulfilling its obligations to destroy chemical weapons stockpiles.
Claiming that the “West” violated norms by not cooperating with Russia during investigations of the poisonings of Alexei Navalny and Sergei & Yulia Skripal.

Example: “In February, the head of Russia’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Protection Forces, Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, accused Ukrainian forces of using banned chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. He claimed that Washington had been aiding and abetting Kiev in these activities … the two nations had thus violated the OPCW’s charter.” (RT, 2024)

Disregard for rules, laws, and norms: Radiological and nuclear weapons

News media items featuring disinformation about radiological and nuclear weapons often accuse Ukraine and the West of disregarding and manipulating international rules, laws and norms, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to advance their geopolitical interests and support alleged attacks on nuclear power plants (NPPs). These claims discredit Russian opposition by highlighting their supposed political shortcomings and suggesting that they are willing disregard non-proliferation norms and endanger citizens in pursuit of their goals.

This tactic was featured in the following radiological and nuclear weapons-related disinformation narratives:

Claims that Ukraine and its Western allies are portraying Ukraine’s alleged attack on the Zaporizhzhya NPP as lawful and consistent with international norms.
Assertions that the West is complicit in “criminal” behavior by turning a blind eye to Ukraine’s alleged attacks on the Zaporizhzhya NPP.
Accusations that the West uses Russia as a scapegoat to distract from their own diplomatic failures and manipulates international norms and laws to serve its geopolitical agenda.

Example: “’We strongly urge Washington, Brussels and other capitals, primarily European ones, to leave irresponsible games and intrigues around the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant and immediately exert inﬂuence on the Kyiv authorities in order to force them to stop shelling the station and adjacent territories,’ Zakharova emphasized. ‘Further connivance with on the part of the Western curators of Ukraine is simply criminal.’” (TASS, 2022)

IMPLICATIONS

The Russian government’s tendency to accuse its opponents of violating or circumventing rules, laws, and norms can be described as a form of whataboutism. Whataboutism is a fallacious rhetorical technique that is designed to deflect criticism of one’s own wrongdoings by pointing to an opponent’s wrongdoings,^1,2 which, in the context of Russian disinformation, are often falsely alleged. By accusing the United States, Ukraine, and broader “West” of violating international and national laws, Russia seeks to deflect and distract from its own breaches of international law, including its invasion of Ukraine and its recent use of chemical weapons. In addition to discrediting and undermining Russia’s opponents, this tactic may erode confidence in the broader international normative and legal system by framing existing laws and norms—including those designed to protect the global community from weapons of mass destruction—as weak and easy to transgress.

ACTIONS

Policy makers and communicators can respond to this tactic by exposing it for what it is: a fallacious argument designed to divert attention from Russia’s own disregard for rules, laws, and norms.³ In fact, raising awareness of this tactic among both diplomats and the general public may improve their ability to identify when it is being used to deceive or mislead them, promoting cognitive resistance and resilience.⁴ This tactic is often used in conjunction with another commonly used tactic: Distraction and Misdirection. As such, it may be useful to raise awareness about both tactics together. In addition, when responding to this tactic, it may also be beneficial for countries to reaffirm their commitment to abiding by and upholding international laws and norms, including those codified in non-proliferation and disarmament treaties, thereby reinforcing their strength and value.

June 2025

REFERENCES

EUvsDisinfo. National Whataboutism as a State Ideology. February 10, 2021.
Gorenburg D. Strategic Messaging: Propaganda and Disinformation Efforts. In: Herd GP, ed. Russia’s Global Reach: A Security and Statecraft Assessment. George C. Marshall European Center For Security Studies; 2021:127-135.
Pamment J. RESIST 2 Counter-Disinformation Toolkit. Government Communication Service; 2021.
Roozenbeek J, van der Linden S, Goldberg B, Rathje S, Lewandowsky S. Psychological inoculation improves resilience against misinformation on social media. Sci Adv. 2022;8(34). doi:10.1126/sciadv.abo6254

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Developing a Taxonomy

Erik — Sat, 08 Feb 2025 00:11:14 +0000

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

DEVELOPING A TAXONOMY

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) seeks to understand and counter Russian state-sponsored or state-adjacent disinformation across Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats, in support of GP Member efforts. As part of this effort, the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (JHCHS) is developing a taxonomy of Russian state-sponsored/state-adjacent disinformation about CBRN threats.

This taxonomy leverages a systematic and rigorous analysis of over 300 news media items collected from the EUvsDisinfo Database. The taxonomy maps common narratives, tactics, and themes associated with pro-Kremlin CBRN disinformation, highlighting recurring patterns that can then be countered proactively to build resilience. The taxonomy also provides the scientific foundation for subsequent in-depth analyses of specific narratives and themes frequently identified through our mapping process, in the form of Tactic Spotlights.

OVERVIEW

METHODOLOGY

To establish a robust evidence base for this analysis, the research team conducted three dedicated systematic searches for news media items containing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) disinformation: one for biological weapons-specific content, a second for chemical weapons-specific content, and a third for radiological and nuclear weapons-specific content. Searches were conducted on the EUvsDisinfo Database, which is a collection of pro-Kremlin disinformation claims managed by the European External Action Service. Each search was conducted using search terms available on the database website. Searches were conducted between November 2023 and March 2024 and yielded 465 total results in the form of distinct disinformation “claims.” All news media items in which such claims were propagated were reviewed, with exclusion of items based on the following criteria: any language except English, Russian and Ukrainian, video or radio format, not related to the threat category of interest, and non-working links. The final biological weapons-related sample consisted of 199 news media items, while the chemical weapons-related sample and radiological/ nuclear-related sample consisted of 62 and 84 news media items, respectively. All news media items were published between 2017 and 2024.

The research team then developed a preliminary coding framework of disinformation subjects, targets, narratives, and tactics based on existing literature on disinformation, risk perception, and political rhetoric. The coding framework was refined through pilot testing and iterative revision. This framework was adapted to each sample, resulting in three final codebooks (one for each threat category). Each relevant codebook was then used to code the corresponding sample. All news media items were coded independently by two researchers to ensure high levels of reliability. Researchers met to discuss and adjudicate any coding discrepancies through a process of negotiated agreement, ensuring rigorous application of the codebook. The recurring subjects, targets, narratives, and tactics across each threat category were then organized into a disinformation taxonomy. Below is a graphical representation of selected themes from all three samples. Note: the size of the boxes does not correspond to the frequency with which countries, organizations, or themes were discussed in the sample.

TAXONOMY

SELECT TACTIC SPOTLIGHTS

References to past crises

The “references to past crises” tactic links current CBRN threats (real or falsely alleged) with historical disasters or atrocities such as genocide, the Chornobyl disaster, or the Holocaust. It is designed to evoke a strong emotional response among readers and discredit opponents of Russia by accusing them (implicitly or explicitly) of repeating historical injustices or tragedies.

“Authoritative” Sources

The “authoritative” sources tactic is used to provide a false appearance of legitimacy or expert backing. However, these sources may be fake, taken out of context, paid by/part of the originator of the disinformation, or have expertise in a separate area altogether. This tactic makes it difficult to differentiate between legitimate news coverage and disinformation campaigns.

Distraction and Misdirection

The “distraction and misdirection” tactic points to (real or falsely alleged) CBRN activity and threats, such as weapons use, attacks on facilities, or emerging dangers. It is designed to cause confusion about what may be happening on the ground, justify potential use of weapons, and/or direct attention away from a country’s own CBRN activities or actions.

Portraying States and Entities as Puppets

The “portraying states and entities as puppets” tactic is used to imply that a foreign power exercises control over a country or entity, thereby discrediting it and its supporters. This tactic is often employed alongside false claims of CBRN development or use, including claims that Ukraine’s development or use of such weapons is controlled or directed by the United States and the broader “West.” This tactic also discredits and undermines multilateral institutions such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and United Nations by framing them as puppets of “the West.”

Framing Russia as a Savior

The “framing Russia as a savior” tactic represents Russia’s attempt to commend its own actions, framing them as necessary to ensure global peace and security. By drawing attention to alleged CBRN and other security threats that purportedly require Russian intervention, this tactic is designed to legitimize Russia as a responsible international actor and justify its aggression in Ukraine.

Interested in learning more about these disinformation tactics?

Visit Tactic Spotlights to explore the full tactic spotlights, discover how these tactics are employed within the CBRN information space, and take actionable steps to counter them.

January 2025

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Tactic Spotlight – Portraying states and organizations as puppets

Erik — Sat, 01 Feb 2025 18:15:55 +0000

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

PORTRAYING STATES AND ORGANIZATIONS AS PUPPETS

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) seeks to understand and counter state-sponsored or state-adjacent disinformation across Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats, in support of GP Member efforts. As part of this effort, the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (JHCHS) systematically analyzed over 300 news media items from the EUvsDisinfo Database to identify common narratives, tactics, and themes associated with pro-Kremlin CBRN disinformation.

Tactic Spotlight: One commonly used tactic is portraying states and organizations as puppets. This tactic is used to imply that a foreign power exercises control over a country or organization, thereby discrediting it and its supporters. This tactic is often employed alongside false claims of CBRN development or use, including claims that Ukraine’s development or use of such weapons is controlled or directed by the United States and the broader “West.” This tactic also discredits and undermines multilateral institutions such as the OPCW, IAEA, and UN by framing them as puppets of “the West.”

OVERVIEW

EXAMPLES

Portraying states and organizations as puppets: Biological weapons

In news media items containing disinformation about biological weapons, Ukraine’s sovereignty was repeatedly called into question. In particular, news items claimed that Ukraine was effectively controlled by the United States, which was using the country to further its own geopolitical interests, including the development of biological weapons.

News media items containing disinformation about biological weapons constructed Ukraine as a “puppet state” by claiming that:

Ukraine was merely a testing ground for the United States’ clandestine biological weapons activities.
The Ukrainian government had no control over the functioning of U.S.-funded biological laboratories in its territory.
The 2014 Maidan Revolution, during which former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych was removed from power, was orchestrated by the United States in response to the Ukrainian government’s attempts to close U.S. biolaboratories in Ukraine.

Example: “This is the main reason for the creation of U.S. biolabs in Ukraine, serving as an opportunity to carry out the most dangerous kinds of studies, including studies on human beings, which are prohibited under U.S. laws, but allowed in Ukraine, due to problems in Ukrainian legislation, but to a greater extent, to Ukraine’s foreign control by the United States.’’ (Sputnik International, 2020)

Portraying states and organizations as puppets: Radiological and nuclear weapons

In spreading disinformation about radiological and nuclear weapons, news media outlets asserted that Ukraine, the United Nations, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are puppets controlled by and acting on behalf of “the West”, typically the U.S. and U.K.. This tactic, which effectively framed the war in Ukraine as a proxy war with the West, was used to justify Russia’s actions, such as the deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus, as a defensive and just response to Western aggression.

Radiological and nuclear weapons-related disinformation portrayed states and organizations as puppets in narratives claiming:

The U.S. and U.K. are behind Ukraine’s plans of a nuclear provocation using a dirty bomb.
The U.S. is interested in escalating the war against Russia using nuclear weapons.
Russia is calling on “the West” to stop Kyiv’s shelling of nuclear power plants, but the IAEA, which is under pressure from the West, won’t make definitive statements on where the shelling is coming from.

Example: “Russian President Vladimir Putin commented on the IAEA report on the Zaporozhye NPP published yesterday. In his opinion, the agency wrote it under pressure from the United States and Europe, and therefore did not directly indicate that the shelling was coming from Ukraine.” (Kommersant, 2022)

Portraying states and organizations as puppets: Chemical weapons

News media items containing disinformation about chemical weapons often referred to Ukraine as a “puppet state” of “the West” in an effort to discredit Ukraine’s military response to Russia in the Russo-Ukrainian War and discredit countries that supported Ukraine. When paired with allegations of nefarious activity (e.g., claims that U.S.-made chemical weapons were delivered to Ukraine), this tactic was used to proactively blame “the West” for preparing to use chemical weapons in Ukraine, warn them about pinning the blame for it on Russia, and justify retaliatory actions.

This disinformation tactic also included the following claims related to chemical weapons:

Alleging that the U.S. planned to use chemical weapons against Russia, using Ukraine’s army for cover.
Mocking the Ukrainian army’s losses due to their alleged “Western” puppeteers’ lack of military prowess.
Accusing the media and OPCW for being puppets of “the West” if they blamed Russia for being involved in the deaths of Sergei Skripal, Yulia Skripal, and Alexei Navalny or ignored Russia’s supposed evidence to the contrary.

Example: “Igor Kirillov announced the delivery to Ukraine of several wagons of toxic substances, including the US-made Bi-Z chemical weapon, as well as a large batch of personal protective equipment. Washington’s goal is, under the cover of the puppet Ukrainian army, to use weapons of mass destruction in the special operation zone and shift responsibility for this crime to Russia.’’ (Sputnik Georgia, 2023)

IMPLICATIONS

Framing a country as a “puppet state” uses the metaphor of a puppeteer controlling a puppet to imply that a country that appears to be independent is being manipulated or controlled by a foreign power.1 Russia’s attempts to frame Ukraine as a puppet of “the West” are politically strategic because they undermine Ukraine’s credibility, discredit Ukraine’s supporters, blame “the West” for allegedly waging a proxy war against Russia, and deflect attention away from Russia’s own actions (including its efforts to exert control over Ukraine).2,3 This narrative also justifies Russian intervention in Ukraine as a way to seemingly liberate Ukraine from its puppeteers. Framing multilateral or intergovernmental organizations as puppets similarly discredits their autonomy and undermines their impartiality, trustworthiness, and ability to fulfill their mission of ensuring WMD non-proliferation.

ACTIONS

Encouraging public awareness of this tactic can help promote resilience and resistance to its effects. When communicating about this tactic in the context of Ukraine, it may also be useful to highlight Russia’s own attempts to exert control over Ukraine, including by staging “referendums” in occupied territories. Such an approach could underscore the hypocrisy in Russia’s claims about Ukraine being a puppet of “the West”. It is also vitally important for policy makers and other communicators to stress the autonomy and impartiality of multilateral institutions like the OPCW, IAEA, and UN. In addition, it may be helpful to emphasize that Russia’s attempts to frame such institutions as puppets undermine their credibility and, by extension, pose a threat to international security.

January 2025

REFERENCES

Marek K. Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law. Librairie Droz; 1968.
Bodnar, Joseph , et al. “How Is Russia Covering the Ukraine Crisis?” Alliance for Securing Democracy, 27 Jan. 2022, securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/russia-propaganda-disinformation-ukraine/.
Kremlin Watchers Movement. “Disinformation Trends in September 2023.” Vox Ukraine, 2023, voxukraine.org/en/kremlin-watchers-movement-disinformation-trends-in-september-2023. Accessed 14 Jan. 2025.

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