Countering radiological & nuclear disinformation

Narratives, tactics and motivations

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (PREPCOM) FOR THE 2026 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

BRIEFING NOTE | APRIL 2025

Disinformation* by state-sponsored and state-adjacent actors has been observed in international disarmament forums, including the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Disinformation will likely feature at the 2025 PrepCom. The Global Partnership’s WMD Counter Disinformation Initiative (GP) has analysed past relevant disinformation tactics and identified common narratives and their characteristics. This analysis aims to prepare PrepCom delegations for disinformation narratives they may encounter. Further information can be found on www.GPWMDCounterDisinfo.com.

COMMON FALSE ALLEGATIONS

Within radiological and nuclear international forums, such as the NPT, the most common vehicle Russia uses to disseminate disinformation is the “right of reply” mechanism. In contrast, its “formal statements” within the NPT have largely refrained from employing overt disinformation.9, 10, 15, 17, 18 Russia has frequently spread disinformation regarding the following radiological and nuclear topics:

NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

False claims Ukraine is developing nuclear weapons.

DIRTY BOMB DETONATION

False claims Ukraine is planning to detonate a dirty bomb and blame Russia for the attack.

ESCALATION WITH NATO

False claims Ukraine is intentionally attempting to drag NATO into a nuclear war with Russia.

In addition to the above examples, a central disinformation narrative has involved the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). The IAEA has identified 17 major incidents at the site.5, 6 Based on a review of previous “right of replies”,3 narratives likely to emerge during this 2025 NPT PrepCom include:

  1. Ownership claims: Russia repeatedly asserts itself as the legal owner of ZNPP, framing its military occupation as necessary to protect the facility from Ukraine’s “reckless” attacks.7, 9, 10, 11, 16
  2. Accuse Ukraine of the ZNPP attacks: Russia denies all responsibility and shifts responsibility to Ukraine for shelling the facility and surrounding areas.7, 8, 11, 12, 13
  3. Calling out Western “hypocrisy”: In an effort to undermine Western credibility, Russia argues that Western media reporting and official statements are biased, frequently questioning why Ukraine’s alleged attacks on ZNPP receive less scrutiny than Russia’s occupation of the plant.8, 11

DISINFORMATION TACTICS

State actors have employed a variety of disinformation tactics to mislead audiences, shape perceptions, and justify political or military actions. Such tactics have been observed across the CBRN disarmament spectrum, including in the radiological and nuclear sphere. Recognising and addressing these tactics will help NPT PrepCom participants mitigate their potential impact.

Based on our previous research, we have identified the following tactics which have been used in disinformation campaigns targeting Ukraine:

EXPLOIT DIVISIONS

Amplifies political issues to erode social trust and cohesion.

ABUSE TECHNICAL LANGUAGE

Exploits complex terminology to hinder debunking efforts.2

DISTRACT AND MISDIRECT

Diverts attention from political and military actions.1

APPEAL TO AUTHORITY

Uses official-sounding sources to boost credibility.14, 17

EMOTIONAL TRIGGERS

Incites public fear by exploiting emotive terminology.

FIREHOSE OF FALSEHOODS

Generates parallel narrative to overwhelm the audience.12, 13

To prepare for potential radiological and nuclear disinformation at the upcoming NPT PrepCom, participants can take the following steps:

 

  • Recognise disinformation: Familiarise yourself with common narratives, tactics and motivations behind radiological and nuclear disinformation. The GP Counter WMD Disinfo Initiative has several factsheets of common tactics for diplomats to explore.
  • Promote a fact-based information environment: Discredit false narratives and strengthen technical nuclear understanding by actively sharing credible information, including authoritative sources like the IAEA.
  • Understand past radiological and nuclear disinformation narratives: The GP Counter WMD Disinfo Initiative have published several deep dive reports exploring Russian dirty bomb and Ukraine nuclear weapons disinformation.
  • Stay informed: Follow the GP Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative on social media to stay informed about emerging disinformation trends.

COUNTERING RADIOLOGICAL & NUCLEAR DISINFORMATION

* Definitively identifying disinformation amid broader efforts to influence populations can be challenging as intent and attribution are often unclear. For brevity, this report adopts a broad definition of ‘disinformation’ that includes misinformation and other information operations, as all seek to mislead the public and shape perceptions.

READ MORE:

→ GP Tactic Spotlights

→ Allegations of Ukrainian Nuclear Rearmament

→ Allegations of Ukrainian dirty bomb development

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Policy Briefs

REFERENCES

    1. András Rácz. ‘Russia Goes for Annexation and Mobilization | DGAP’. German Council on Foreign Relations, 22 September 2022. https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/russia-goes-annexation-and-mobilization.
    2. Borger, Julian, and Peter Beaumont. ‘Russia Steps up Ukraine “Dirty Bomb” Claim in Letter Delivered to UN’. The Guardian, 25 October 2022, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/25/russia-to-raise-ukraine-dirty-bomb-claim-at-un-security-council.
    3. Delegation of the Russian Federation at the 10th NPT Review Conference. ‘Statement by the Representative of the Delegation of the Russian Federation in Exercise of the Right of Reply’. Reaching Critical Will, 2 August 2022. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2022/statements/2Aug_Russia_RoR.pdf.
    4. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). ‘Safeguards Implementation Report 2023’. International Atomic Energy Agency, 7 June 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/06/20240607_sir_2024_part_ab.pdf.
    5. ‘Timeline of the IAEA’s Response Activities to the Situation in Ukraine’. Accessed 6 March 2025. https://www.iaea.org/interactive/timeline/169792.
    6. ‘Two Years of IAEA Continued Presence at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant’. International Atomic Energy Agency, 3 September 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/two-years-of-iaea-continued-presence-at-the-zaporizhzhaya-nuclear-power-plant.pdf.
    7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on the Kiev Regime’s Recurrent Terrorist Attacks on Energodar – The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation’, 22 June 2024. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1958650/.
    8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s Comment on the UN General Assembly Adopting Ukrainian Draft Resolution “Safety and Security of Nuclear Facilities of Ukraine, Including the Zaporozhskaya Nuclear Power Plant“ – The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation’, 12 July 2024. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1961688/.
    9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cluster 1: Nuclear Disarmament), Vienna, August 3, 2023’, 3 August 2023. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1900234/.
    10. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Statement by the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cluster I: Nuclear Disarmament), Geneva, 25 July, 2024’, 25 July 2024. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1963583/.
    11. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Выступление Управляющего От Российской Федерации, Постоянного Представителя РФ При Международных Организациях в Вене М.И.Ульянова По Пункту 8 Повестки Дня Сессии Совета Управляющих МАГАТЭ, Вена, 6 Марта 2025 Года (Statement by the Governor of the Russian Federation, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna M.I. Ulyanov on Agenda Item 8 of the IAEA Board of Governors, Vienna, March 6, 2025)’. Accessed 7 March 2025. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2001818/.
    12. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna. ‘Russia’s Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s Comment in Connection with the Latest Failure to Rotate IAEA Secretariat Experts at the Zaporozhskaya NPP and Ukraine’s New Provocation against This Plant’, 12 February 2025. https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/russia_s_foreign_ministry_spokeswoman_maria_zakharova_s_comment_in_connection_with_the_latest_failur/.
    13. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna. ‘Statement by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov on the Agenda Item 3 of the Session of the IAEA Board of Governors «Nuclear and Radiation Safety: Nuclear Safety Review 2025»’, 3 March 2025. https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/statement_by_permanent_representative_of_the_russian_federation_to_the_international_organizations_i_03032025/.
    14. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations. ‘Remarks to the Press by First Deputy Permanent Representative Dmitry Polyanskiy Following Security Council’s AOB Discussion of the Possibility of Ukraine Creating a “Dirty Bomb”’, 25 October 2022. https://russiaun.ru/en/news/stakeout_251022#!
    15. ‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on Its 2nd Session: Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’. United Nations, 2 August 2024. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceSecond_session_(2024)/NPT_CONF.2026_PC.II_07_-_07._ADVANCE_UNEDITED_VERSION_Master_1_FINAL_Report__Preparatory_Committee_2nd__session.pdf.
    16. Russian Mission Vienna. ‘Выступление Постоянного Представителя Российской Федерации При Международных Организациях в Вене М.И.Ульянова По Пункту 9 Повестки Дня Сессии Совета Управляющих МАГАТЭ «Ядерная Безопасность, Физическая Ядерная Безопасность и Гарантии На Украине» (Statement by Mikhail Ulyanov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organisations in Vienna, on Agenda Item 9 of the IAEA Board of Governors “Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine”)’. Telegraph, 11 September 2024. https://telegra.ph/Vystuplenie-Postoyannogo-predstavitelya-Rossijskoj-Federacii-pri-mezhdunarodnyh-organizaciyah-v-Vene-MIUlyanova-po-punktu-9-pove-09-11.
    17. ‘Summary Record (Partial) of the 18th Meeting, Held at the Vienna International Centre, Vienna, on Friday, 11 August 2023: Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1st Session’. United Nations, 7 September 2023. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/239/51/pdf/n2323951.pdf.
    18. United Nations. ‘Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference Ends without Adopting Substantive Outcome Document Due to Opposition by One Member State’, 26 August 2022. https://press.un.org/en/2022/dc3850.doc.htm.