Disinformation Trends
MONITORING SNAPSHOT 23
22 July – 4 August 2025
SUMMARY
DFRLab conducts a weekly of data based on a search query including Ukrainian, Russian and English languages to identify when spikes of in CBRN disinformation narratives are spreading on Telegram, X, and web. DFRLab tracks both:
- Chatter – official statements, transcriptions of official statements provided with no commentary, news items presented in a factual manner
- And disinformation – factually untrue statements and messages manipulating facts, presenting a strong emotional case or call to action aimed at changing policy.
This report reveals:
Nuclear Chatter
- Discussion about President Trump’s decision to deploy two nuclear submarines closer to Russia in response to Dmitriy Medvedev’s online posts threatening nuclear strikes against the US.
- Discussion of President Trump’s statement about US readiness to face nuclear war with Russia in response to Medvedev’s threats.
- Response from Peskov stating American nuclear submarines have been carrying out patrols even before recent US administration statements.
- Discussion about hacking of a French firm leaking material including details of software for nuclear submarines.
- Discussion about agreement between the US and South Korea to jointly move to nuclear disarmament of North Korea.
- News about 8.8 earthquake in Kamchatka, Russia damaging the port housing nuclear submarines, though no submarine damage reported.
- Discussion of US plans to build a nuclear reactor on the moon.
Nuclear disinformation
- Claims about fire around the Zaporizhzhia NPP as a result of Ukrainian shelling.
- Claims IAEA instructors toured a location around Zaporizhzhia NPP targeted by the AFU.
- Claims about alleged AFU drone attacks against the power plant and claims AFU is threatening workers of Zaporizhzhia NPP and their families.
- Claims of attack against Rostov NPP.
- Speculation about transfer of nuclear missiles from the US to the UK and its use as signaling to Russia.
- Claims Russia will immediately use nuclear weapons if Kaliningrad is attacked.
- Claims US nuclear agency was breached in Microsoft Sharepoint attacks.
Unverified BW Allegations
- DPRK claims it will produce more biological weapons if the West produces more nuclear weapons.
Biological disinformation
- Ongoing claims of presence of facilities developing bioweapons in Ukraine.
Chemical chatter and disinformation
- Discussion about SBU evidence of over 10,000 cases of Russia’s chemical weapon use against Ukraine.
Dominant Keywords
During this period we have seen some increase in mentions of chemical weapons and dirty bombs. The nuke keyword remains highly used, consistent with previous monitoring periods.
Prevalence of Keywords in CBRN Disinformation from monitoring period relative to prior periods (Keywords above the line were mentioned in an above average number of posts, while keywords below the line were discussed less frequently than usual. Note that each keyword accounts for variation in the term. For example, “NPP” captures not only the acronym, but also “nuclear power plant” and “nuclear plant” across all three languages.)
IDENTIFYING DISINFORMATION TRENDS
The Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) is committed to strengthening WMD disarmament and nonproliferation efforts. Disinformation campaigns significantly undermine cooperative threat reduction efforts. The GP Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative aims to track ongoing narratives, understand their impacts and counter state-sponsored or state-adjacent disinformation across Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats.
Narrative Trend Monitoring: As part of the GP efforts to identify, understand, and mitigate hostile CBRN disinformation, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) conducts a bimonthly search query of state-sponsored or state-adjacent disinformation narratives. This real-time detection allows the initiative to swiftly recognize, isolate and respond to disinformation narratives and networks as they occur.
Methodology: This snapshot report is created from tailored search queries that includes content in Ukrainian, Russian, and English languages, providing an extended search base and corpus of analysis and scale. The results of the query are exported and stored in standardized file formats. DFRLab then extracts a standard subset of the results for manual review. This material consists of 1000 top posts from X and Telegram.
The 1000 posts output by the data preparation step are manually reviewed to determine whether they are ‘relevant’ (part of general CBRN discussion/ “chatter”) and ‘in-scope’ (probable mis/disinformation).
Relevance: Relevant posts are either specifically about CBRN/WMD issues or include substantial discussion of them, even if the main topic is something else. A post would not be relevant if it:
- uses CBRN terms figuratively (ex. “That cold snap totally nuked my vegetable garden!”);
- hijacks CBRN hashtags to farm engagement (ex. “GlorpCoin is the hottest new crypto on the market. Buy now!!! #biolab);
- briefly mentions CBRN as a descriptor or aside (ex. A lengthy post that contains the phrase “nuclear weapons state” once and no other mention of CBRN/WMD.);
- is written in a language other than English, Ukrainian, or Russian.
Scope: Posts are in scope if they discuss CBRN/WMD in an emotionally charged or otherwise sensationalist way meant to provoke a negative audience reaction or political change. A post may be in scope if it:
- speculates or fearmongers about CBRN development and/or use;
- calls for CBRN proliferation and/or use;
- fearmongers about nuclear escalation;
- uses the possibility of CBRN deployment to call for policy change.
A post is likely not in scope if it:
- jokes about CBRN with no clear disinformation motive or call to action;
- presents information or news about CBRN in a neutral, factual tone;
- describes historical facts about WMD development/use without tying them to current events.