UNDERSTANDING DISINFORMATION IN UKRAINE

ALLEGATIONS OF UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR REARMAMENT

Disinformation narrative: Russia deliberately promotes existing misinformation about Ukraine’s potential nuclear rearmament, creating a disinformation narrative that seeks to justify its invasion and deflect attention from its own suspension of non-proliferation initiatives. Ukraine’s contradictory statements inadvertently amplify this disinformation.

 

Implications: This targeted disinformation aims to damage Ukraine’s credibility within the international community and erode Western military support.

 

Recommendations: Ukraine should prioritise consistent and unambiguous messaging around its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); Western media and policymakers should ensure quality reporting to prevent the spread of misinformation; and governmental agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international bodies should proactively debunk false narratives to expose Russia’s tactics and reaffirm global commitments to non-proliferation.

KEY POINTS

BACKGROUND

Discussions about Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament can be traced back to 1991, when it inherited roughly 4,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons that were stationed on its territory.1 Unlike Kazakhstan and Belarus, which also acquired nuclear weapons during the Soviet Union’s collapse but agreed to give them up quickly, Ukraine underwent significant internal debate about whether to retain its stockpile.

 

Kyiv’s eventual decision to relinquish its nuclear weapons was influenced by international political pressure, Moscow’s operational control over the weapons and economic and safety issues.2 Importantly, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum affirmed that Russia, the UK, the US3 would “refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine”.4 In exchange, Kyiv agreed to transfer its nuclear arsenal to Moscow and join the NPT.5 Initially praised for preventing nuclear proliferation, the Memorandum later became a source of grievance after Russia repeatedly violated Ukraine’s sovereignty6 (see timeline).

RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION

Moscow generates disinformation by deliberately amplifying existing misinformation about Ukraine’s indigenous technical capabilities and the amount of time needed to develop a viable nuclear deterrent. This fusion of factual elements with falsehoods makes these information operations especially difficult to counter and refute.7 Moscow’s disinformation campaign highly likely serves several purposes:

 

  • Justification for military aggression: Russia rationalises its invasion by undermining Kyiv’s reputation as a responsible international.8 9
  • Fearmongering: By conflating the unrelated “dirty bomb” (see previous report) and nuclear weapons development narratives, Russia amplifies public fears that supporting Ukraine could lead to nuclear escalation.10 11
  • Distraction from own nuclear activity:12 The nuclear rearmament narrative diverts attention from Russia’s suspension of non-proliferation efforts and its nuclear threats against the West.

UKRAINIAN INTENT

Despite fuelling Russia’s disinformation narratives, Kyiv’s contradictory13 14 statements about nuclear rearmament (see timeline) might aim to achieve any combination of the following objectives:

 

  • Influence Western support: Remind allies that withdrawing or reducing military assistance could destabilise nuclear non-proliferation efforts.
  • Undermine disinformation narratives: Shift the spotlight onto the failures of the Budapest Memorandum and highlight Russia’s responsibility for destabilising non-proliferation norms.
  • Signal genuine intent: Prepare the information space for a future official policy shift from NPT adherence to nuclear rearmament.

FUTURE OUTLOOK

Calls for a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine are growing.15 16 If Kyiv is unable to secure NATO membership or receive bilateral security guarantees from the US as part of a future peace settlement, Ukraine could consider developing nuclear weapons as a deterrent against further Russian aggression.

 

While Ukraine may explore rearmament, successfully rebuilding its nuclear capabilities is highly unlikely due to significant technical and political challenges. Developing a nuclear deterrent would likely take multiple years and require currently absent indigenous capabilities.17 Any covert efforts would almost certainly be exposed, undermining diplomatic support from key allies. Disinformation around the threats posed by nuclear rearmament could also be exploited as pretext for renewed military action.

 

Additionally, aggression against Ukraine has inadvertently highlighted the dangers of nuclear disarmament. Moscow’s actions may embolden nations such as Iran and North Korea to further pursue nuclear deterrence while avoiding denuclearisation talks, damaging non-proliferation efforts.18

CONCLUSION

To counter targeted disinformation narratives:

 

  • Ukrainian officials: should prioritise consistent and unambiguous messaging around Kyiv’s commitment to the NPT to avoid undermining international confidence in non-proliferation frameworks.
  • Western media and policymakers: should deepen their understanding of the technical and legal barriers to Ukraine restoring its nuclear weapon status – to prevent inadvertently spreading disinformation.
  • Governments, NGOs and international bodies: should take a more proactive and responsive role in debunking these narratives.

By exposing disinformation tactics and reinforcing Ukraine’s non-nuclear status, the international community can discredit these narratives while reaffirming global norms against nuclear proliferation.

TIMELINE

1994

Ukraine signs the Budapest Memorandum, giving up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurances. It also joins the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state.

2014

Russia annexes Crimea and supports pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas.


Some Ukrainian politicians begin advocating for nuclear rearmament, although this doesn’t become state policy.

February 2022

President Zelenskyy warns adherence to the Budapest Memorandum is in doubt unless the West assures Ukraine’s security.


President Putin cites Ukraine’s nuclear rhetoric as a justification for Russia’s full-scale invasion.

March 2022

Foreign Minister Lavrov declares Russia will take all necessary measures to prevent Ukraine from regaining nuclear weapons.


Russia’s disinformation shifts focus from nuclear rearmament to the “dirty bomb” narrative.

June 2024

In its annual safeguard report, the IAEA again finds no indication that Ukraine is weaponising its nuclear material for non-peaceful activities.19

October 2024

President Zelenskyy states that Ukraine will either join NATO or obtain nuclear weapons.


Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry reaffirms that Kyiv remains committed to the NPT.

November 2024

Changes in US leadership raise concerns about possible reductions in military aid to Ukraine.


Rearmament concerns are amplified by poor analysis and inaccurate mainstream media reporting which misrepresents officials’ positions and downplays the complexities of nuclear weapon development.20 21


President Putin amplifies this media reporting, reiterating that Russia will not allow Ukraine to develop nuclear weapons.

January 2025

REFERENCES

  1. ‘Nuclear Disarmament Ukraine’, The Nuclear Threat Initiative (blog), 29 October 2024, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/ukraine-nuclear-disarmament/.
  2. Barry R. Schneider, William L. Dowdy, ‘Why Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons: nonproliferation incentives and disincentives’, Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear Threats (journal), 1998.
  3. Alexander Pikayev, ‘POST-SOVIET RUSSIA AND UKRAINE: WHO CAN PUSH THE BUTTON?’, The Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1994, https://web.archive.org/web/20140808054400/http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/pikaye13.pdf.
  4. Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances, 1994 – Council on Foreign Relations’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 December 1994, https://web.archive.org/web/20170312052208/http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/budapest-memorandums-security-assurances-1994/p32484.
  5. ‘Nuclear Disarmament Ukraine’.
  6. Budjeryn, Mariana. ‘“NATO or Nukes”: Why Ukraine’s Nuclear Revival Refuses to Die’. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (blog), 1 November 2024. https://thebulletin.org/2024/11/nato-or-nukes-why-ukraines-nuclear-revival-refuses-to-die/.
  7. ГЛАВКОМ. ‘Володимир Огризко: Україні слід ставити питання про вихід з договору про нерозповсюдження ядерної зброї’, 5 March https://glavcom.ua/publications/124109-volodimir-ogrizko-ukrajini-slid-staviti-pitannja-pro-vihid-z-dogovoru-pro-nerozpovsjudzhennja-jadernoji-zbroji.html.
  8. ‘Vladimir Putin – Speech on the Donbass and the Situation in Ukraine (Transcript-Video)’, accessed 10 December 2024, https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/vladimirputindonbassandukraine.htm.
  9. Sergey Lavrov, ‘Statement by Sergey Lavrov at the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva.’, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 3 January 2022, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1802148/.
  10. ‘Disinfo: Kyiv Passed from Rejecting Nuclear Weapons to Preparing a Dirty Bomb’, EUvsDisinfo, accessed 29 November 2024, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/kyiv-passed-from-rejecting-nuclear-weapons-to-preparing-a-dirty-bomb/.
  11. ‘Russia, without Evidence, Says Ukraine Making Nuclear “Dirty Bomb”’, Reuters, 6 March 2022, sec. Europe, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-without-evidence-says-ukraine-making-nuclear-dirty-bomb-2022-03-06/.
  12. GP Countering WMD Disinformation. ‘Disinfornation Tactic Spotlight: Distraction and Misdirection’. Accessed 24 January 2025. https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/distraction-and-misdirection/.
  13. Budjeryn, ‘NATO or Nukes’.
  14. Tucker, Maxim. ‘Could Zelensky Use Nuclear Bombs? Ukraine’s Options Explained’, 14 November 2024. https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/zelensky-nuclear-weapons-bomb-0ddjrs5hw.
  15. Michael McFaul, ‘How Trump Can End the War in Ukraine: Convince Kyiv to Trade Land for NATO Membership’, 12 December 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-trump-can-end-war-ukraine.
  16. Edward Helmore, ‘Trump’s Ukraine Envoy Pick Proposed Forcing Peace Talks by Withdrawing US Weapons’, The Guardian, 28 November 2024, sec. US news, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/28/trump-keith-kellogg-russia-ukraine.
  17. The G7 Global Partnership Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative. ‘Letter to the Editor: Addressing Misleading Claims on Ukraine’s Nuclear Capabilities.’ November 2024.
  18. William J. Broad, ‘Ukraine Gave Up a Giant Nuclear Arsenal 30 Years Ago. Today There Are Regrets.’, The New York Times, 5 February 2022, sec. Science, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/05/science/ukraine-nuclear-weapons.html.
  19. IAEA, Safeguards Implementation Report 2023”, 07 June 2024, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/06/20240607_sir_2024_part_ab.pdf
  20. Helene Cooper et al., ‘Trump’s Vow to End the War Could Leave Ukraine With Few Options’, The New York Times, 21 November 2024, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/21/us/politics/trump-russia-ukraine-war.html.
  21. Tucker, ‘Could Zelensky Use Nuclear Bombs? Ukraine’s Options Explained’.
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