Disinformation Trends

MONITORING SNAPSHOT 4

29 October – 11 November 2024

SUMMARY

DFRLab conducts a bimonthly analysis of monitoring periods from a search query including Ukrainian, Russian and English languages to identify when spikes of CBRN disinformation narratives are spreading. This report (October 29 – November 11) saw a wave of claims by Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that Ukraine is planning to seize Russian nuclear facilities; allegations of Ukraine’s dirty bomb development capacity; unfounded statement of Ukrainian forces using gas against Russian forces; as well as re-emergence of the bioweapon labs narrative.

Chemical

CHEMICAL DISINFORMATION:

 

Allegations about Ukraine’s use of chemical weapons and suspicious recruitment messages seeking chemists on temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

Biological

BIOLOGICAL DISINFORMATION:

 

Re-emergence of claims of the presence of US-funded biolabs in Ukraine.

Chemical

RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR DISINFORMATION:

 

Unfounded claims of Ukraine’s plans to take over nuclear power plants (NPPs) and continued allegations about “dirty bomb” development.

EXAMPLES OF DISINFORMATION NARRATIVE TRENDS

Chemical Disinformation

  • False claims about Ukrainian forces using poisonous gas against Russian soldiers (link).
  • Alleged recruitment of chemists in Donetsk with unusual high salary offers through anonymous accounts within local advertising channels.

Sources: Telegram; Twitter/X

Biological Disinformation

  • Unfounded claims on the possibility of Ukraine using the Marburg Fever pathogen as a bioweapon against Russian soldiers, compounded with allegations of Ukraine preparing for new provocations.
  • Allegations of the development and use of Covid-19 vaccines as bioweapons.

Sources: Telegram; Twitter/X

 

Radiological and Nuclear Disinformation

  • Multiple Russian MOD claims about Ukraine planning to seize Russian nuclear facilities (Kursk, Kalinin, Leningrad NPPs) (link).
  • Allegations of Ukrainian attempts to attack Zaporizhzhia NPP using HIMARS and drones (link).
  • Claims about Ukrainian “nuclear blackmail” tactics (link).
  • Assertions about Ukrainian saboteurs targeting Russian nuclear facilities (link).
  • Repeated allegations about Ukraine’s capability to create a dirty bomb from spent nuclear fuel.
  • Claims by Russian official Igor Kirillov, Chief of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troops of the Russian Armed Forces, about Ukraine’s dirty bomb development capacity (link).
  • Suggestions that Ukraine’s alleged dirty bomb development explains their requests to strike deeper into Russia with Western equipment.

Sources: Telegram; Twitter/X

IDENTIFYING DISINFORMATION TRENDS

The Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) is committed to strengthening WMD disarmament and nonproliferation efforts. Disinformation campaigns significantly undermine cooperative threat reduction efforts. The GP Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative aims to track ongoing narratives, understand their impacts and counter state-sponsored or state-adjacent disinformation across Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats.

 

Narrative Trend Monitoring: As part of the GP efforts to identify, understand, and mitigate hostile CBRN disinformation, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) conducts a bimonthly search query of state-sponsored or state-adjacent disinformation narratives. This real-time detection allows the initiative to swiftly recognize, isolate and respond to disinformation narratives and networks as they occur.

 

Methodology: This snapshot report is created from a search query that includes content in Ukrainian, Russian, and English languages, providing an extended search base and corpus of analysis and scale. The focus of the query is centered around CBRN–related messages about the Russian War on Ukraine on social media platforms and online news websites. The report provides examples of notable messages that are likely to include disinformation or key discussions that might be used in mis/disinformation in the future.

 

Disclaimer: Links are provided for published news sources of official state accounts; links to private accounts are excluded for privacy preservation reasons.