Russia's Dirty Bomb Disinformation in Ukraine

KEY POINTS

Disinformation narrative: Moscow’s false claim that Ukraine was planning to detonate a dirty bomb on its own territory and blame Russia gained mainstream media attention following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This rhetoric began generating substantial alarm several months later in October 2022, when Western officials (Europe, the US and allied countries) believed it might serve as cover for a false-flag operation or pretext for tactical nuclear weapons use.

 

Response: The initial response from Ukraine and its allies to Russia’s dirty bomb narrative relied primarily on fact-checking to refute and debunk claims about dirty bomb manufacturing in Ukraine. After it became apparent that these claims could be used as a pretext to escalation, backchannel diplomacy and threats of retaliation were also employed to dissuade Russian escalatory action.

 

Implications: Moscow’s dirty bomb narrative underscores how false narratives can manipulate public opinion and obscure intentions. Moving forward, combating such disinformation, especially in fast-evolving crises, may need to rely more heavily on advanced technologies like AI-driven analytics and real-time verification to rapidly counter false narratives.

WHAT IS A DIRTY BOMB?

A dirty bomb (i.e. radiological dispersal device) uses conventional explosives to spread radioactive material – causing contamination, damage and possibly significant disruption.

 

Unlike nuclear weapons, which require highly enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium, the materials used in dirty bombs do not need to be specially developed for weapons use and could potentially be gathered from research, industrial, energy and medical sources. Their relatively small size allows these devices to be positioned by foot or transported by vehicle, making them more accessible to malign non-state actors.1 Dirty bombs have never been successfully used,2 however:

 

  • Their detonation would be millions of times less powerful than a nuclear weapon explosion as it does not create a nuclear fission chain reaction.3
  • The area contaminated would be dependent on the explosive yield and amount of radioactive material released – but would likely extend only a few hundred metres.
  • Radiation released would likely be insufficient to immediately cause mass fatalities, but victims could be harmed over time by the exposure to radioactive material.

The psychological effects of the detonation and subsequent decontamination efforts have led these devices to be characterised as “weapons of mass disruption” rather than “weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).”4

DISINFO

Since at least 2015, Russian actors have propagated the dirty bomb narrative to advance domestic and geopolitical interests – as part of its broader disinformation campaigns. Moscow employs a variety of tactics when spreading these narratives, such as amplifying existing societal divisions and disseminating multiple narratives concurrently to cultivate confusion and public apathy.5 These operations span all chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) domains and have found greater success in the Global South compared with Western audiences.6

OBJECTIVES

Russia’s dirty bomb narrative (see timeline) peaked sharply in intensity and outreach in October 2022, causing Western officials to became concerned that the sudden increase in messaging might serve as cover for a false-flag operation or pretext for tactical nuclear weapons use.8

At the time, Moscow was experiencing significant battlefield setbacks and Western intelligence agencies had intercepted communications from senior Russian military leaders discussing the circumstances in which Moscow might use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine.9 Considering these broader developments, Moscow was plausibly attempting to achieve one, or a combination, of the following objectives:

 

  • Prepare the information space for potential nuclear weapons use.
  • Influence the behaviour of Ukraine and its Western allies.
  • Express genuine concern about Ukraine’s intentions, due to inaccurate intelligence gathering.
  • Bolster domestic support for its ongoing mobilisation efforts.

RESPONSE

As Russia’s dirty bomb narrative and resulting public concern peaked, the West implemented several tactics to mitigate Moscow’s information operations.

 

  • Fact-checking: Officials, media platforms and research institutes10 redoubled ongoing efforts to debunk Moscow’s dirty bomb narrative, with strategies such as reverse image searching and feasibility analysis by experts. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which undertook verification activities and conducted research within Ukraine, also categorically rejecting Moscow’s claims.11
  • Backchannel diplomacy: This was conducted to encourage Russia’s partners to dissuade Moscow from employing a dirty bomb or nuclear weapon. China’s leader, Xi Jinping, likely warned President Putin against using nuclear weapons. India also issued a public statement condemning nuclear weapon use by any state.12
  • Threats of retaliation: These were privately conveyed to Russia by French, UK and US officials. Western leaders reportedly warned that a tactical nuclear weapons strike would not go unpunished and that they may respond by conventionally striking Russian forces.13

CONCLUSION

Moscow’s dirty bomb narrative highlights how false or misleading information can be used to exploit global radiological and nuclear fears, shape public opinion, obscure intentions and sow confusion.14 Western debunking efforts likely played a role in calming public anxiety and challenging Russia’s accusations. However, combating future disinformation, especially during rapidly evolving crises, may need to increasingly leverage advanced technologies such as AI-driven analytics and real-time data verification to identify and counter misleading narratives before they gain momentum.

TIMELINE

2015-2021

Sporadic appearance of dirty bomb narrative in Russian language media/social media.

January - March 2022

Russian state media reports on alleged Ukrainian dirty bomb manufacturing, possibly to help justify its invasion.

23 October 2022

Surge in Russian state media reporting about a potential dirty bomb ‘provocation’.


Russian defence officials discuss concerns with French, UK and US counterparts.

24 October 2022

France, UK and US leaders reject Russia’s dirty bomb narrative.


US officials express fears that Russia’s claims may be used as a pretext for tactical nuclear weapons use in Ukraine.


Chief of the Russian Armed Forces claims a dirty bomb is nearly complete and that the military is preparing to operate in a radioactive environment.


Russia’s UN ambassador writes to the UN Secretary General stating his concerns about dirty bomb use.

25 October 2022

President Biden warns that tactical nuclear weapons use would be a “serious mistake”.

26 October 2022

Russia’s defence minister contacts Chinese and Indian counterparts to warn them of the dirty bomb threat.


NATO’s secretary general warns of severe consequences in response to nuclear weapons use.


India’s defence minister publicly warns against nuclear weapons use.

27 October 2022

President Putin repeats dirty bomb allegations.


The US defence secretary warns of significant retaliation if Russia uses nuclear weapons.

28 October 2022

Moscow’s dirty bomb warnings abruptly end.

November 2022 - Present

Circulation of dirty bomb narrative returns to baseline frequency.

November 2024

REFERENCES

  1. Peter Brookes, ‘Russia’s Dirty Bomb Claim Is a Dirty Lie’, The Heritage Foundation, 4 November 2022, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/russias-dirty-bomb-claim-dirty-lie.

 

  1. Samuel Meyer, Sarah Bidgood, William C. Potter, Death Dust: The Little-Known Story of U.S. and Soviet Pursuit of Radiological Weapons, International Security, Volume 45, Number 2, Fall 2020, pp. 51-94.

 

  1. Heather Williams Younis Kelsey Hartigan, Lachlan MacKenzie, Reja, ‘Deter and Divide: Russia’s Nuclear Rhetoric & Escalation Risks in Ukraine’, CSIS, accessed 15 October 2024, https://features.csis.org/deter-and-divide-russia-nuclear-rhetoric.

 

Department of Public Health, ‘Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC): Fact Sheet on Dirty Bombs | Mass.Gov’, Massachusetts Government, accessed 15 October 2024, https://www.mass.gov/info-details/nuclear-regulatory-commission-nrc-fact-sheet-on-dirty-bombs.

 

  1. US NRC, Backgrounder on Dirty Bombs’ United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, accessed 23 October 2024, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-dirty-bombs.htm

 

  1. Juan Delcan and Izaguirre Valentina, ‘Russia’s Propaganda Model’, RAND, 16 July 2016, https://www.rand.org/about/nextgen/art-plus-data/juan-delcan-and-valentina-izaguirre/russias-firehose-of-falsehood.html.

 

 

  1. Dominik Presl, ‘Russia Is Winning the Global Information War’, RUSI, 8 November 2024, https://rusi.orghttps://rusi.org.

 

Michael Kelley, ‘Understanding Russian Disinformation and How the Joint Force Can Address It’, US Army War College – Publications, 29 May 2024, https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/News/Display/Article/3789933/understanding-russian-disinformation-and-how-the-joint-force-can-address-it/

 

How a Powerful Russian Propaganda Machine Chips Away at Western Notions of Truth – Washington Post’, accessed 17 October 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/national-security/russian-propaganda-skripal-salisbury/.

 

  1. ‘Атомная Бомба Для Бедных’, Журнал Международная жизнь, 16 April 2015, https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/12958.

 

Younis, ‘Deter and Divide’.

 

‘Russia, without Evidence, Says Ukraine Making Nuclear “Dirty Bomb”’, Reuters, 6 March 2022, sec. Europe, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-without-evidence-says-ukraine-making-nuclear-dirty-bomb-2022-03-06/.

 

Katherine Lawlor, Kateryna Stepanenko, ‘Warning Update: Russia May Conduct a Chemical or Radiological False-Flag Attack as a Pretext for Greater Aggression against Ukraine’, Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022, 11 November 2024, sec. Europe, https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Radiological%20Chemical%20False%20Flag%20Warning.pdf

 

‘Russian War Report: Kremlin Recycles Old Narratives to Claim Ukraine Is Constructing Dirty Bombs and Bioweapons’, Atlantic Council (blog), 7 March 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-kremlin-recycles-old-narratives-to-claim-ukraine-is-constructing-dirty-bombs-and-bioweapons/.

 

‘Disinformation About Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine – Debunking Seven Myths Spread by Russia | EEAS’, European Union, Delegation of the European Union to the People’s Republic of China, 18 March 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/disinformation-about-russias-invasion-ukraine-debunking-seven-myths-spread-russia_en?s=166.

 

  1. Heather Williams et al., ‘Russian Nuclear Calibration in the War in Ukraine’, 23 February 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-nuclear-calibration-war-ukraine.

 

  1. Helene Cooper, Julian E. Barnes, and Eric Schmitt, ‘Russian Military Leaders Discussed Use of Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Officials Say’, The New York Times, 2 November 2022, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/us/politics/russia-ukraine-nuclear-weapons.html.

 

  1. ‘IAEA Inspectors Complete In-Field Verification Activities at Three Ukraine Locations, No Indications of Undeclared Nuclear Activities and Materials’, Text (IAEA, 3 November 2022), https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-inspectors-complete-in-field-verification-activities-at-three-ukraine-locations-no-indications-of-undeclared-nuclear-activities-and-materials.

 

  1. Staff and agencies, ‘US Dismisses “Transparently False” Russian Claims of Ukraine Plan to Use “Dirty Bomb”’, The Guardian, 24 October 2022, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/24/us-dismisses-transparently-false-russian-claims-of-ukraine-plan-to-use-dirty-bomb.

 

Joscha Weber, ‘Fact Check: Russia’s False Case for a Dirty Bomb in Ukraine – DW – 10/28/2022’, dw.com, accessed 22 October 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/fact-check-russias-false-case-for-a-dirty-bomb-in-ukraine/a-63590306.

 

  1. Younis, ‘Deter and Divide’.

 

  1. Max Seddon, ‘Why Vladimir Putin Toned down His Nuclear Rhetoric’, Financial Times, 1 December 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/d98446ac-b56e-4f1d-bfa9-ebaed4e26884.

Julian Borger, ‘Nuclear Attack in Ukraine Should Spark “Devastating” Nato Response, Says Poland’, The Guardian, 28 September 2022, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/28/ukraine-nato-russia-nuclear-weapons-devastating-poland-foreign-minister.

 

  1. Lachlan MacKenzie, ‘Six Days in October: Russia’s Dirty Bomb Signaling and the Return of Nuclear Crises’, 3 September 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/six-days-october-russias-dirty-bomb-signaling-and-return-nuclear-crises.
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