




Summary

DFRLab conducts a **weekly** review of data based on a search query including **Ukrainian, Russian and English languages** to identify when spikes of CBRN disinformation narratives are spreading on **Telegram, X, and web**. DFRLab tracks both:

- **Chatter** – official statements, transcriptions of official statements provided with no commentary, news items presented in a factual manner
- And **disinformation** – factually untrue statements and messages manipulating facts, presenting a strong emotional case or call to action aimed at changing policy.

This report (**July 8 - July 21, 2025**) reveals:




Nuclear chatter	Nuclear disinformation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ongoing chatter focused on US targeting Iranian nuclear facilities to prevent further nuclear weapon development efforts; • Concerns from the IAEA about the possibility of a nuclear tragedy due to potential ZNPP damage, lending authority to nuclear safety fears. • Discussion about Macron's statement on France's readiness to discuss role of its 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Claims the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) helped cover up an incident at the South Ukrainian NPP allegedly happening in March 2025; • Claims of columns of smoke spotted over Zaporizhzhia NPP and alleged attacks against the plant, though these were eventually debunked with clarification that the plant operates normally;

nuclear weapons in European collective defense;


- Discussion of **Germany's capability to own nuclear weapons** as part of broader European nuclear discussions.

- Ongoing discussion about **Ukraine's capability to develop a "dirty bomb"** maintaining persistent radiological weapon narratives;
- **Speculation about "dirty bomb" development in Georgia** due to remains of enriched uranium in the country, expanding geographical scope of concerns;
- Discussion about possibility of **Russia's use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine** with claims that discussion is spurred by Zelensky's attempt to prepare population for eventual "dirty bomb" provocation;
- **Claims AFU drones were taken down next to Kursk NPP**, suggesting Ukrainian targeting of Russian nuclear facilities;
- **Claims Ukraine is responsible for providing Syria with nuclear material**, expanding Ukraine's alleged nuclear activities beyond domestic concerns.



Biological disinformation


- Ongoing claims of **bioweapon development in biolabs in Ukraine**.



Chemical chatter	Chemical disinformation
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Discussion of Ukraine's claims of chemical weapon use by Russia<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Subsequent discussion of Director Ratcliffe's readiness to provide President Trump with intelligence on these allegations	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Claims from the Russian Department of Defense about alleged use of chemical weapons by Armed Forces of Ukraine generating discussion across social media platforms;<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Claims of existing proof of Ukraine's ability to mass produce chemical weapons, attempting to establish systematic chemical weapons capabilities.

Dominant keywords

During this period we have seen some increase in mentions of chemical weapons and dirty bombs. The nuke keyword remains highly used, consistent with previous monitoring periods.



Prevalence of Keywords in CBRN Disinformation from monitoring period relative to prior periods

(Keywords above the line were mentioned in an above average number of posts, while keywords below the line were discussed less frequently than usual. Note that each keyword accounts for variation in the term. For example, “NPP” captures not only the acronym, but also “nuclear power plant” and “nuclear plant” across all three languages.)

Identifying Disinformation Trends

The Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) is committed to strengthening WMD disarmament and nonproliferation efforts. Disinformation campaigns significantly undermine cooperative threat reduction efforts. The GP Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative aims to track ongoing narratives, understand their impacts and counter state-sponsored or state-adjacent disinformation across Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats.

Narrative Trend Monitoring: As part of the GP efforts to identify, understand, and mitigate hostile CBRN disinformation, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) conducts a bimonthly search query of state-sponsored or state-adjacent disinformation narratives. This real-time detection allows the initiative to swiftly recognize, isolate and respond to disinformation narratives and networks as they occur.

Methodology: This snapshot report is created from tailored search queries that includes content in Ukrainian, Russian, and English languages, providing an extended search base and corpus of analysis and scale. The results of the query are exported and stored in standardized file formats. DFRLab then extracts a standard subset of the results for manual review. This material consists of 1000 top posts from X and Telegram.

The 1000 posts output by the data preparation step are manually reviewed to determine whether they are ‘relevant’ (part of general CBRN discussion/ “chatter”) and ‘in-scope’ (probable mis/disinformation).

Relevance: Relevant posts are either *specifically about CBRN/WMD issues or include substantial discussion of them*, even if the main topic is something else. A post would *not* be relevant if it:

- uses CBRN terms figuratively (ex. “That cold snap totally *nuked* my vegetable garden!”);
- hijacks CBRN hashtags to farm engagement (ex. “GlorpCoin is the hottest new crypto on the market. Buy now!!! #biolab);
- briefly mentions CBRN as a descriptor or aside (ex. A lengthy post that contains the phrase “nuclear weapons state” once and no other mention of CBRN/WMD.);
- is written in a language other than English, Ukrainian, or Russian.

Scope: Posts are in scope if they *discuss CBRN/WMD in an emotionally charged or otherwise sensationalist way meant to provoke a negative audience reaction or political change*. A post may be in scope if it:

- speculates or fearmongers about CBRN development and/or use;
- calls for CBRN proliferation and/or use;
- fearmongers about nuclear escalation;
- uses the possibility of CBRN deployment to call for policy change.

A post is likely *not* in scope if it:

- jokes about CBRN with no clear disinformation motive or call to action;
- presents information or news about CBRN in a neutral, factual tone;
- describes historical facts about WMD development/use without tying them to current events.