Tactic Spotlights Archives - Countering WMD Disinformation

Weaponization of Nuclear Power Plants

Erik — Sat, 16 Aug 2025 14:03:29 +0000

UNDERSTANDING DISINFORMATION IN UKRAINE

WEAPONIZATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

BACKGROUND

Disinformation targeting nuclear power plants (NPPs) has historically been employed by both state and non-state actors to erode public trust in governments and nuclear energy.¹ Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, physical incidents at NPPs (shelling, power loss and drone attacks) have become frequent (see timeline), fuelling these disinformation narratives while obscuring culpability and manipulating public opinion.

While ZNPP has been central to ongoing radiological and nuclear disinformation, ChNPP and KNPP have also featured in the information operation. References to ChNPP often tap into historical radiological anxieties,³ while military activities near KNPP are used to depict Ukraine as a threat to Russian nuclear security.⁴ Each site plays a distinct role: ZNPP as an occupied and compromised site, ChNPP as a symbol of past catastrophe, and KNPP as a vehicle for cross-border escalation narratives.

VERIFICATION CHALLENGES

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has recorded multiple safety incidents at ZNPP, including drone strikes, off-site power losses, shelling, gunfire and cooling water shortages.⁵ Attribution for many incidents remains disputed with both sides denying responsibility and accusing the other of staging attacks.⁶ These narratives amount to disinformation when they involve deliberately false claims, but broader attempts to deflect blame and influence international perception are often better understood as components of wider information operations. Rotation of IAEA staff to ZNPP has been often delayed due to military activity.⁷ These delays complicate timely verification of nuclear materials and risk safe operations.⁸Despite ongoing military activities and incidents at ZNPP and the connected disinformation narratives, the IAEA has confirmed that there is no immediate risk of a radiological leak, with radiation levels remaining within normal parameters.⁹

STRATEGIC AIMS

Disinformation campaigns around NPPs, particularly ZNPP, appear to reflect a deliberate effort to exploit nuclear infrastructure for the following military, political, and psychological advantage:

Justifying Military Presence:¹⁰ By framing control of ZNPP as a measure of nuclear risk management, occupation shifts from a violation of sovereignty to a promotion of nuclear safety.
Delegitimising Ukraine’s Reputation:¹¹ Narratives that cast Ukraine as incapable or reckless with nuclear infrastructure erode international confidence in its governance. ¹²
Blurring Global Norms: Undermining of long-standing norms that civilian nuclear facilities should be excluded from military operations, a principle aimed at preserving their safety during conflict.

TACTIC COMPARISON

Despite differences in the narratives surrounding the ZNPP, ChNPP, and KNPP, consistent disinformation tactics are evident across all three cases. The most prominent techniques include:

Unsubstantiated Attribution

Attributing harm or negligence to deliberate adversary actions without substantiated evidence, to shape international perception.

Manipulating Content

Using altered imagery, selectively framed data, or misleading video to fabricate or distort evidence in support of false narratives.

Emotional Triggers¹³

Amplifying anxiety through alarmist rhetoric or exaggerated consequences to provoke panic and erode public trust in official information.

Firehose of Falsehoods¹⁴

Disseminating large volumes of misleading or contradictory information across multiple channels to confuse audiences and crowd out accurate reporting.

The presence of these disinformation tactics across three diverse examples suggests they constitute a blueprint likely to be reused in future conflicts involving NPPs. Developing a nuanced understanding of this disinformation toolkit is essential for building resilience and ensuring effective crisis response.

CONCLUSION

Disinformation during conflict can threaten nuclear safety by distorting threats, provoking risky actions, and delaying response. It disrupts the ability of institutions like the IAEA to operate effectively and reveals gaps in global mechanisms meant to protect nuclear sites during conflict. ZNPP specifically demonstrates how these dynamics heighten the risk of escalation.

These NPP crises not only challenge Ukraine’s legitimacy but expose vulnerabilities in global nuclear governance frameworks.¹⁵With disinformation increasing confusion and mistrust around nuclear facilities under occupation and within active war zones, institutions must adapt by strengthening safety measures, assessing protocols and implementing crisis communication strategies.

TIMELINE

24 February 2022

Russia launches full-scale invasion, occupies ChNPP.

4 March 2022

RRussia occupies ZNPP.

31 March 2022

Russian forces withdraw from ChNPP.

5 August 2022

Initial reports of shelling damage to infrastructure at ZNPP.

25 August 2022

First loss of off-site power at ZNPP. (Off-site power is lost nine times between Aug 2022 and Jul 2025).

23 November 2022

Nationwide blackout affects all Ukrainian NPPs.

6 June 2023

Kakhovka Dam collapses, impacting ZNPP’s cooling water reserves.

3 October 2023

Reports of drone attacks near KNPP.

11 August 2024

Fire damages ZNPP cooling tower after a drone attack.

14 February 2025

Drone strike hits ChNPP’s New Safe Confinement dome.

August 2025

→ Global Partnership Tactic Spotlights

REFERENCES

Helen Davidson, “State-backed Disinformation Fueling Anger in China Over Fukushima Water,” The Guardian, September 4, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/sep/04/state-backed-disinformation-fuelling-anger-in-china-over-fukushima-wastewater-japan.
Laurence Peter, ‘Ukraine War: Chernobyl Scarred by Russian Troops’ Damage and Looting’, BBC, 3 June 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61685643; Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Reference to Past Crises’, GP Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative, October 2024, https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/reference-to-past-crises/; Sergey Radchenko, ‘Fearing Russia’s Futures’, Engelsberg Ideas (blog), 23 February 2024, https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/fearing-russias-futures/.
‘Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Reference to Past Crises’, GP Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative, October 2024, https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/reference-to-past-crises/; Sergey Radchenko, ‘Fearing Russia’s Futures’, Engelsberg Ideas (blog), 23 February 2024, https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/fearing-russias-futures/.
Reuters, ‘Russia Intercepts Drone near Kursk, No Damage to Nuclear Plant, Governor Says’, Reuters, 3 October 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-intercepts-drone-near-kursk-no-damage-nuclear-plant-governor-says-2024-10-03/; Darya Dolzikova, ‘Kursk Nuclear Power Plant: The Newest Target for Russian Disinformation’, RUSI, 28 March 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/kursk-nuclear-power-plant-newest-target-russian-disinformation.
International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘Timeline of the IAEA’s Response Activities to the Situation in Ukraine’, accessed 17 February 2025, https://www.iaea.org/interactive/timeline/169792.
‘Ukraine, Russia Blame Each Other for Shelling of Nuclear Plant’. Reuters, 11 August 2022, sec. Europe. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-energoatom-says-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-shelled-again-2022-08-11/; ‘Drone Strikes Chornobyl Nuclear Plant in Ukraine, Russia Says Not to Blame’. Al Jazeera, 14 February 2025. International Atomic Energy Agency.
International Atomic Energy Agency. ‘Update 274 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine’. IAEA, 12 February 2025. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-274-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.
‘IAEA Postpones Mission Rotation to Nuclear Plant Due to Lack of Russian Guarantees, Kyiv Says’. 5 February 2025, sec. Europe. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/iaea-postpones-rotation-mission-zaporizhzhia-plant-due-lack-security-guarantees-2025-02-05/.
International Atomic Energy Agency. ‘Update 295 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine’. IAEA, 5 June 2025. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-295-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.
‘Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Framing Russia as a Savior’, GP Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative, January 2025, https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/tactic-spotlight-russia-as-savior/; Iuliia Hoban and Alex Rister, ‘Nuclear Anxiety as an Instrument of War: The Use of News Media to Shape and Respond to the Disinformation Campaign Surrounding the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant’, Media, War & Conflict, 12 June 2024, 17506352241256575, https://doi.org/10.1177/17506352241256575.
‘Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Portraying States and Organizations as Puppets’, GP Countering WMD Disinformation, January 2025, https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/tactic-spotlight-portraying-states-and-organizations-as-puppets/.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ‘Statement by the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cluster I: Nuclear Disarmament), Geneva, 25 July, 2024’.
American Nuclear Society. ‘American and European Nuclear Societies Issue Joint Statement Denouncing Attacks on Ukraine’s Nuclear Facilities and Misinformation’, 6 April 2022. https://www.ans.org/news/article-3823/american-and-european-nuclear-societies-issue-joint-statement/; Mark Wolverton. ‘Radiation Risks Are Real. But No Cause for Radiophobia.’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 16 September 2019. https://thebulletin.org/2019/09/radiation-risks-are-real-but-no-cause-for-radiophobia/.
Miriam Matthews, ‘The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model’, RAND, July 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html
Scott Roecker, ‘Nuclear Power Plants Under Attack: The Legacy of Zaporizhzhia’, Arms Control Association, April 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-04/features/nuclear-power-plants-under-attack-legacy-zaporizhzhia#bio.

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Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Use of Misleading “Evidence”

Erik — Thu, 24 Jul 2025 14:52:48 +0000

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

USE OF MISLEADING “EVIDENCE”

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) seeks to understand and counter Russian state-sponsored or state-adjacent disinformation across Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats, in support of GP Member efforts. As part of this effort, the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (JHCHS) systematically analyzed over 300 news media items from the EUvsDisinfo Database to identify common narratives, tactics, and themes associated with pro-Kremlin CBRN disinformation.

Tactic Spotlight: One commonly used tactic consists of referencing, describing, or alluding to “evidence” that purportedly confirms Russia’s false claims about CBRN weapons/threats. Such evidence may include agreements, documents, reports, and other “materials.” In some cases, these materials are legitimate but are deliberately misinterpreted or taken out of context. In other cases, these materials are partially or fully fabricated. This tactic is designed to legitimize Russia’s claims, driving audiences towards false conclusions that Russia desires.

OVERVIEW

EXAMPLES

Use of misleading “evidence”: Biological weapons

News media items containing disinformation about biological weapons frequently alleged that there were “materials” to supposedly substantiate Russia’s claims about U.S. overseas biological weapons development. Some referenced specific documents or claimed that evidence existed and was incontrovertible—even if it didn’t exist or was strategically manipulated—to bolster perceived credibility of false claims. Claims in which this misleading tactic was used include:

Claims that Russia had uncovered documents and other “materials” (e.g., laboratory reports, “eyewitness” testimony) during its invasion of Ukraine that proved biological weapons development was taking place in Ukrainian laboratories.
References to—and mischaracterizations of—specific documents or agreements outlining U.S. cooperative biological activities in the post-Soviet space.
References to U.S. patents for devices or products that could purportedly be used to disseminate biological weapons.

Example: “Igor Giorgadze, a former Georgian state security minister, has claimed that the US-funded medical facility, known as the Richard G. Lugar Center for Public Health Research, in Georgia could be a cover for a bioweapons laboratory… Having allegedly obtained some 100,000 pages of secret docs, Giorgadze said he would consistently make them publicly available. For instance, he has already revealed a US Patent for the development of a remotely controlled ‘device for the aerial release of mosquitoes.” (Sputnik International, 2018)

Use of misleading “evidence”: Radiological and nuclear weapons

Pro-Kremlin news media outlets often referred to data, information, instructions, and other forms of “evidence” to substantiate false claims about Ukraine and the West’s engagement in suspicious activities related to radiological and nuclear weapons. These narratives cause confusion and stoke public fears of radiological and nuclear disasters by claiming that evidence of WMD development and radiation spread was concealed or ignored. This tactic was featured in the following radiological and nuclear weapons-related disinformation narratives:

Claims that Russia obtained information outlining Ukraine’s plans to create a dirty-bomb for a nuclear “provocation” with support from the West.
References to—and mischaracterizations of—video evidence of explosions allegedly exhibiting the characteristics of an atomic bomb.
Claims that the European detector system was tampered with to conceal evidence of an alleged radioactive cloud moving towards Poland.

Example: “Recently, several web media outlets provided videos of an enormous explosion in the town of Khmelnitski, located to the West of Kiev, and about 200 km from the border with Poland. There were two major explosions which produced a massive roiling swirling fireball which, like an atomic bomb, developed upwards and formed a mushroom cloud, which was black.” (Sputnik International, 2023)

Use of misleading “evidence”: Chemical Weapons

False claims about chemical weapons alleged that materials such as internal government documents, scientific reports, and videos provided evidence that Ukraine and the “West” were engaging in suspicious activities related to the purchase or use of chemical weapons. This included claims that the “West” concealed or disregarded evidence Russia had presented to defend itself against allegations of criminal activity. Unsubstantiated evidence is often used to conceal and divert attention from Russia’s own violations. This tactic was featured in the following chemical weapons-related disinformation narratives:

Claims that the OPCW concealed findings around the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, setting up a planned provocation” to discredit Russia and disregarding Russia’s evidence alleging that Navalny died of natural causes.
Claims of evidence showing that Ukraine agreed to let companies dump hazardous waste and pollute Ukrainian land.
Claims alleging delivery of chemical weapons to Ukraine and supposed plans to use them and blame Russia for it.

Example: “[Maria Zakharova] believes that after their call, Berlin will stop hiding ‘secret materials’ from the international community and erasing formulas detected substances from reports … The Russian Foreign Ministry stated that the West and the OPCW, by not providing the Russian Federation with information about the substance with which [Alexei] Navalny was
allegedly poisoned, are concealing key ‘evidence.’” (RIA Novosti, 2021)

IMPLICATIONS

Referencing or discussing “evidence” (even if such evidence is fabricated or taken out of context) is a tactic used to signal to Russia’s target audiences that its claims are factual or legitimate. These types of signals, which are often referred to as heuristic cues, are problematic because they may discourage individuals from thinking critically about Russia’s claims, leading them instead to rely on a more intuitive and biased form of information processing.¹ The Russian government (along with its proxy outlets) uses these cues deliberately to increase the chances that its falsehoods are believed. Russia also uses this tactic to erode the credibility of the agencies and institutions named in its evidential “materials,” making it difficult for them to respond effectively to Russia’s allegations and potentially undermining their ability to implement global threat reduction activities. This tactic is often used in conjunction with another similar, commonly used tactic: Using “Authoritative” Sources.

ACTIONS

Communicators can respond to this tactic by exposing the ways in which Russia misrepresented or misinterpreted specific documents and other materials. The correct interpretation of these materials should be emphasized, as individuals may need to fill a cognitive gap^2-4 about why such materials (including patent applications) exist or what they really mean. In addition, pre-emptive or anticipatory approaches should also be considered. Raising awareness of this tactic, for example, may help protect Russia’s target audiences from being manipulated by its use in future disinformation campaigns. In addition, those responsible for drafting documents on activities that are commonly targeted by Russian disinformation campaigns (e.g., cooperative threat reduction activities) may want to think pre-emptively about how to draft language in a way that would be difficult for a foreign government to misinterpret or misrepresent.

July 2025

REFERENCES

Peng W, Lim S, Meng J. Persuasive strategies in online health misinformation: a systematic review. Information, Communication & Society. 2023;26(11):2131-2148. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2022.2085615
Cook J. How to Effectively Debunk Myths About Aging and Other Misconceptions. Public Policy & Aging Report. 2017;27(1):13-17. doi:10.1093/ppar/prw034
Johnson HM, Seifert CM. Sources of the continued influence effect: When misinformation in memory affects later inferences. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 1994;20(6):1420-1436. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.20.6.1420
Ecker UKH. Why rebuttals may not work: the psychology of misinformation*. Media Asia. 2017;44(2):79-87. doi:10.1080/01296612.2017.138414

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Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Master Narratives

Erik — Thu, 24 Jul 2025 14:30:25 +0000

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

MASTER NARRATIVES

Master narratives: Analysis of news media items in the sample revealed three master narratives – higher-level narratives that are used to shape world views in ways that benefit the Kremlin. Russia uses these narratives to contextualize its lower-level narratives and specific false claims, enhancing the overall effectiveness of its disinformation campaigns. Given the important role that master narratives play in disinformation campaigns, policy makers should incorporate an understanding of them into counter-disinformation materials, including debunking and prebunking materials, thereby ensuring greater resilience to Russian information manipulation.

OVERVIEW

MASTER NARRATIVES

What are master narratives?

Master narratives can be thought of as the higher-level stories that give meaning to lower-level narratives and specific false claims.^{1, 2} The Russian government and its associated proxy outlets use master narratives to contextualize their false claims, ensuring that they a) resonate with target audiences and b) are interpreted in ways that furthers the Kremlin’s interests. Russia’s master narratives, in other words, reflect the ways in which the Kremlin wants its target audiences to perceive the world around them.

How do master narratives fit into the broader CBRN disinformation space?

The relationship between master narratives and the other components of a CBRN disinformation campaign can be described as circular and mutually reinforcing. Master narratives give meaning and context to the lower-level components of a disinformation campaign, but those components are also chosen strategically to evoke and lend support to Russia’s master narratives. This relationship is depicted in the figure below.

EXAMPLES

Master Narrative: West Versus the Rest

This master narrative constructed an ongoing, existential conflict between the collective “West” and the rest of the world. Within this master narrative, the West’s purported pursuit (or use) of CBRN weapons was framed as a manifestation of its aggressive, neocolonial agenda, one that was aimed at exploiting and exerting control over non-Western countries, including Russia and Ukraine. In addition, this master narrative framed multilateral nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms as instruments of Western oppression, allowing Western nations to evade punishment for breaches of international law or falsely accuse others (particularly Russia) of WMD use.

Examples of claims that evoked this master narrative included:

Claims that the United States places biolaboratories in foreign countries to exert control over disease outbreaks, allowing it to “create” epidemics and facilitate subsequent dependence on U.S./Western-produced diagnostics or therapeutics (tactic: discredit opponents).
Claims that “Western” countries refused to cooperate following the poisoning of Aleskey Navalny and that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is no longer an impartial or independent organization given the results of its investigation (narratives: assassination attempts, international structures ineffective).
Claims that the “accumulation” of cruise missiles in NATO countries is not a defensive measure but one designed to facilitate aggression against non-NATO countries (tactics: discredit opponents, claims of victimization).

Example: “In conditions of elusive hegemony, the global West, represented by the United States, does not disdain any means to maintain its leadership. Washington relies on destructive methods aimed at weakening those who do not want to put up with American dictates. Placing biological laboratories in foreign countries is part of the U.S. strategy.” (Baltnews, 2022)

Master Narrative: Russia as a Responsible International Actor and the Guarantor of a Multipolar World Order

In this master narrative, Russia was framed as a responsible and even beneficent global actor, one that was committed to establishing a safer, more balanced (as opposed to Western-dominated) world order. Within this narrative, attention was drawn to Russia’s efforts to “protect” vulnerable communities (particularly those in Ukraine) from the proliferation or use of CBRN weapons. Russia’s apparent efforts to strengthen nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms were also emphasized, along with its efforts to hold the “West” accountable for its alleged violations of such mechanisms.

Examples of claims that evoked this master narrative included:

Claims that Russia invaded Ukraine to stop or otherwise prevent Ukrainians from being experimented on in U.S.-funded biological weapons laboratories (narrative: human experimentation; tactic: framing Russia as a savior).
Claims that Russia is carefully documenting and submitting “evidence” to the OPCW of the United States’ and Ukraine’s alleged use of chemical weapons to hold them accountable for their alleged “war crimes” (narrative: allegations of CW use; tactic: use of misleading “evidence”).
Claims that Russia’s deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory was a reasonable and commensurate response to the West’s “aggressive” nuclear policy, one that would ensure a more balanced and secure world (tactic: framing Russia as a savior, claims of victimization).

Example: “The deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of the Republic of Belarus is an adequate and restrained response of the Union State to the aggressive policy of the West. … Belarus and Russia are changing the rules in favor of a multipolar world order, equal and indivisible security for the vast majority—89 percent of humanity, which does not belong to NATO countries.” (Sputnik Armenia, 2023)

Master Narrative: Question More

This master narrative, which derives its name from slogan of the Russian state-sponsored news outlet RT, was designed to evoke suspicion and doubt among Russia’s target audiences, leading them to question the activities and statements of the United States, Ukraine, and other Western or Western-aligned countries. Within this master narrative, “clues” and various forms of “evidence” were provided to indicate to readers that the United States and/or Ukraine were lying about their CBRN-related activities or were attempting to obfuscate their true intentions regarding their pursuit of WMD. Examples of claims that evoked this master narrative included:

Claims that there are “suspicious” disease outbreaks occurring near U.S.-funded biolaboratories, casting doubt on the U.S. government’s assertions that such laboratories are engaged in peaceful activities (narrative: suspicious disease outbreaks).
Claims that the British government made up a fake general to blame for the Salisbury poisonings to cover up the nefarious activities taking place at Porton Down (narrative: assassination attempts).
Claims that while Western audiences have been led to believe that Russia poses a nuclear threat, Ukraine’s nuclear facilities, associated infrastructure, and expertise indicate that the threat actually emanates from Ukraine (narrative: Ukraine’s nuclear capabilities or intentions).

Example: “Тhe UK prosecutor’s office has brought charges against a third participant in the Skripal poisoning. This is a certain Sergei Fedotov, although in reality, he is not Fedotov at all. … In fact, the Skripal story raises questions not for the Russian authorities, but for the British ones. It all looks as if the father and daughter first became victims of some leak or some experiment on people by specialists from Porton Down.” (Ria Novosti, 2021)

IMPLICATIONS

Because they provide meaning and context to lower-level narratives and specific false claims, master narratives are an important part of successful disinformation campaigns.2 Russian CBRN-related disinformation campaigns consist of numerous, sometimes disparate subjects, targets, lower-level narratives, and deceptive tactics. Russia’s master narratives provide the higher-level context necessary to make sense of each of these elements, allowing obscure, disconnected, or even nonsensical claims to resonate with its target audiences. In addition to facilitating the processing of (and belief in) specific falsehoods, Russia’s master narratives also promote world views in which the West is seen as destructive, dangerous, and deceitful and Russia is seen as responsible and trustworthy—world views, in other words, that benefit the Kremlin and its foreign policy objectives.

ACTIONS

To facilitate greater resilience to information manipulation, policy makers and communicators should raise awareness of the master narratives of disinformation campaigns. In fact, master narratives can be incorporated into both debunking (retroactive refutation of false claims) and prebunking (proactive refutation of anticipated false claims) efforts. When debunking the claim that Russia invaded Ukraine to protect Ukrainians from being experimented on in U.S.-funded laboratories, for example, communicators could also call into question the broader notion that Russia is a responsible international actor by emphasizing that its actions in Ukraine were unprovoked and illegal. It may also be possible to refute this master narrative pre-emptively by raising awareness of its possible use in future disinformation campaigns and by promoting alternative (and more accurate) narratives about Russia and the West.³

July 2025

REFERENCES

Russell D. Master Narrative. In: Ryan M, ed. The Encyclopedia of Literary and Cultural Theory. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd; 2010. doi:10.1002/9781444337839.wbelctv2m003
Levinger M. Master Narratives of Disinformation Campaigns. Journal of International Affairs. 2018;71(1.5):125-134.
Rebegea C. “Question More” – But Not Too Much. Mapping Russia’s Malign Master Narratives in Central and Eastern Europe. In: Sultănescu D, ed. Challenges in Strategic Communication and Fighting Propaganda in Eastern Europe: Solutions for a Future Common Project. Vol 142. NATO Science for Peace and Security Series. IOS Press; 2019:75-83. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-943-0-75

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Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Disregard for Rules, Laws, and Norms

Erik — Fri, 06 Jun 2025 18:54:55 +0000

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

DISREGARD FOR RULES, LAWS, AND NORMS

Tactic Spotlight: One commonly used tactic is falsely alleging that a country or entity is disregarding or breaking rules, laws and norms. This tactic represents Russia’s attempt to discredit its opponents by claiming that they are hypocritical rule-breakers, often accusing them of breaking or planning to break the same rules they accuse Russia of flouting. Such allegations cause reputational damage, distract audiences from Russia’s own rule-breaking, and may undermine the international normative and legal framework by creating the impression that existing laws and norms are being violated with impunity.

OVERVIEW

EXAMPLES

Disregard for rules, laws, and norms: Biological weapons

News media items containing disinformation about biological weapons frequently referenced the United States’ overseas biological activities, often claiming that such activities were not peaceful in nature and were therefore a violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC or BTWC). Many items also alleged that the United States was conducting such activities in violation of national legislation and without regard for ethical or moral norms. News items in which this tactic was employed included the following false claims:

Claims that the US is circumventing or failing to comply with both U.S. national legislation and the BWC by conducting prohibited biological activities in overseas (as opposed to domestic) laboratories.
Claims that the US is conducting biological experiments on individuals living in the post-Soviet space, often without their consent or knowledge, thereby violating ethical regulations and norms.
Claims that U.S. scientists working in overseas laboratories are granted diplomatic immunity, allowing them to break national laws without facing prosecution.

Example: “The Americans frankly did not bother to comply with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction (BTWC). This was precisely the primitive, but cunning idea: the jurisdiction of the BTWC covers the development of biological weapons on one’s own territory, but not on the territory of other BTWC states parties.” (Sputnik Belarus, 2023)

Disregard for rules, laws, and norms: Chemical weapons

News media items containing disinformation about chemical weapons often constructed hypotheticals, like Ukraine and the US allegedly planning to deploy banned chemical weapons in Ukraine and highlighted how doing so would violate rules. They pointed to supposed double standards or lack of cooperation during investigations, often in situations where these countries had accused Russia of breaking rules. This sought to discredit “Western” countries and paint them as unreliable, untrustworthy, and hypocritical, thus making Russia look like a rule-follower in contrast. This disinformation tactic included the following claims related to chemical weapons:

Alleging that the Ukrainian Armed Forces plan to use prohibited chemical weapons and commit war crimes with U.S. support, thereby violating the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Accusing the US of not fulfilling its obligations to destroy chemical weapons stockpiles.
Claiming that the “West” violated norms by not cooperating with Russia during investigations of the poisonings of Alexei Navalny and Sergei & Yulia Skripal.

Example: “In February, the head of Russia’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Protection Forces, Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, accused Ukrainian forces of using banned chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. He claimed that Washington had been aiding and abetting Kiev in these activities … the two nations had thus violated the OPCW’s charter.” (RT, 2024)

Disregard for rules, laws, and norms: Radiological and nuclear weapons

News media items featuring disinformation about radiological and nuclear weapons often accuse Ukraine and the West of disregarding and manipulating international rules, laws and norms, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to advance their geopolitical interests and support alleged attacks on nuclear power plants (NPPs). These claims discredit Russian opposition by highlighting their supposed political shortcomings and suggesting that they are willing disregard non-proliferation norms and endanger citizens in pursuit of their goals.

This tactic was featured in the following radiological and nuclear weapons-related disinformation narratives:

Claims that Ukraine and its Western allies are portraying Ukraine’s alleged attack on the Zaporizhzhya NPP as lawful and consistent with international norms.
Assertions that the West is complicit in “criminal” behavior by turning a blind eye to Ukraine’s alleged attacks on the Zaporizhzhya NPP.
Accusations that the West uses Russia as a scapegoat to distract from their own diplomatic failures and manipulates international norms and laws to serve its geopolitical agenda.

Example: “’We strongly urge Washington, Brussels and other capitals, primarily European ones, to leave irresponsible games and intrigues around the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant and immediately exert inﬂuence on the Kyiv authorities in order to force them to stop shelling the station and adjacent territories,’ Zakharova emphasized. ‘Further connivance with on the part of the Western curators of Ukraine is simply criminal.’” (TASS, 2022)

IMPLICATIONS

The Russian government’s tendency to accuse its opponents of violating or circumventing rules, laws, and norms can be described as a form of whataboutism. Whataboutism is a fallacious rhetorical technique that is designed to deflect criticism of one’s own wrongdoings by pointing to an opponent’s wrongdoings,^1,2 which, in the context of Russian disinformation, are often falsely alleged. By accusing the United States, Ukraine, and broader “West” of violating international and national laws, Russia seeks to deflect and distract from its own breaches of international law, including its invasion of Ukraine and its recent use of chemical weapons. In addition to discrediting and undermining Russia’s opponents, this tactic may erode confidence in the broader international normative and legal system by framing existing laws and norms—including those designed to protect the global community from weapons of mass destruction—as weak and easy to transgress.

ACTIONS

Policy makers and communicators can respond to this tactic by exposing it for what it is: a fallacious argument designed to divert attention from Russia’s own disregard for rules, laws, and norms.³ In fact, raising awareness of this tactic among both diplomats and the general public may improve their ability to identify when it is being used to deceive or mislead them, promoting cognitive resistance and resilience.⁴ This tactic is often used in conjunction with another commonly used tactic: Distraction and Misdirection. As such, it may be useful to raise awareness about both tactics together. In addition, when responding to this tactic, it may also be beneficial for countries to reaffirm their commitment to abiding by and upholding international laws and norms, including those codified in non-proliferation and disarmament treaties, thereby reinforcing their strength and value.

June 2025

REFERENCES

EUvsDisinfo. National Whataboutism as a State Ideology. February 10, 2021.
Gorenburg D. Strategic Messaging: Propaganda and Disinformation Efforts. In: Herd GP, ed. Russia’s Global Reach: A Security and Statecraft Assessment. George C. Marshall European Center For Security Studies; 2021:127-135.
Pamment J. RESIST 2 Counter-Disinformation Toolkit. Government Communication Service; 2021.
Roozenbeek J, van der Linden S, Goldberg B, Rathje S, Lewandowsky S. Psychological inoculation improves resilience against misinformation on social media. Sci Adv. 2022;8(34). doi:10.1126/sciadv.abo6254

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Developing a Taxonomy

Erik — Sat, 08 Feb 2025 00:11:14 +0000

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

DEVELOPING A TAXONOMY

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) seeks to understand and counter Russian state-sponsored or state-adjacent disinformation across Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats, in support of GP Member efforts. As part of this effort, the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (JHCHS) is developing a taxonomy of Russian state-sponsored/state-adjacent disinformation about CBRN threats.

This taxonomy leverages a systematic and rigorous analysis of over 300 news media items collected from the EUvsDisinfo Database. The taxonomy maps common narratives, tactics, and themes associated with pro-Kremlin CBRN disinformation, highlighting recurring patterns that can then be countered proactively to build resilience. The taxonomy also provides the scientific foundation for subsequent in-depth analyses of specific narratives and themes frequently identified through our mapping process, in the form of Tactic Spotlights.

OVERVIEW

METHODOLOGY

To establish a robust evidence base for this analysis, the research team conducted three dedicated systematic searches for news media items containing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) disinformation: one for biological weapons-specific content, a second for chemical weapons-specific content, and a third for radiological and nuclear weapons-specific content. Searches were conducted on the EUvsDisinfo Database, which is a collection of pro-Kremlin disinformation claims managed by the European External Action Service. Each search was conducted using search terms available on the database website. Searches were conducted between November 2023 and March 2024 and yielded 465 total results in the form of distinct disinformation “claims.” All news media items in which such claims were propagated were reviewed, with exclusion of items based on the following criteria: any language except English, Russian and Ukrainian, video or radio format, not related to the threat category of interest, and non-working links. The final biological weapons-related sample consisted of 199 news media items, while the chemical weapons-related sample and radiological/ nuclear-related sample consisted of 62 and 84 news media items, respectively. All news media items were published between 2017 and 2024.

The research team then developed a preliminary coding framework of disinformation subjects, targets, narratives, and tactics based on existing literature on disinformation, risk perception, and political rhetoric. The coding framework was refined through pilot testing and iterative revision. This framework was adapted to each sample, resulting in three final codebooks (one for each threat category). Each relevant codebook was then used to code the corresponding sample. All news media items were coded independently by two researchers to ensure high levels of reliability. Researchers met to discuss and adjudicate any coding discrepancies through a process of negotiated agreement, ensuring rigorous application of the codebook. The recurring subjects, targets, narratives, and tactics across each threat category were then organized into a disinformation taxonomy. Below is a graphical representation of selected themes from all three samples. Note: the size of the boxes does not correspond to the frequency with which countries, organizations, or themes were discussed in the sample.

TAXONOMY

SELECT TACTIC SPOTLIGHTS

References to past crises

The “references to past crises” tactic links current CBRN threats (real or falsely alleged) with historical disasters or atrocities such as genocide, the Chornobyl disaster, or the Holocaust. It is designed to evoke a strong emotional response among readers and discredit opponents of Russia by accusing them (implicitly or explicitly) of repeating historical injustices or tragedies.

“Authoritative” Sources

The “authoritative” sources tactic is used to provide a false appearance of legitimacy or expert backing. However, these sources may be fake, taken out of context, paid by/part of the originator of the disinformation, or have expertise in a separate area altogether. This tactic makes it difficult to differentiate between legitimate news coverage and disinformation campaigns.

Distraction and Misdirection

The “distraction and misdirection” tactic points to (real or falsely alleged) CBRN activity and threats, such as weapons use, attacks on facilities, or emerging dangers. It is designed to cause confusion about what may be happening on the ground, justify potential use of weapons, and/or direct attention away from a country’s own CBRN activities or actions.

Portraying States and Entities as Puppets

The “portraying states and entities as puppets” tactic is used to imply that a foreign power exercises control over a country or entity, thereby discrediting it and its supporters. This tactic is often employed alongside false claims of CBRN development or use, including claims that Ukraine’s development or use of such weapons is controlled or directed by the United States and the broader “West.” This tactic also discredits and undermines multilateral institutions such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and United Nations by framing them as puppets of “the West.”

Framing Russia as a Savior

The “framing Russia as a savior” tactic represents Russia’s attempt to commend its own actions, framing them as necessary to ensure global peace and security. By drawing attention to alleged CBRN and other security threats that purportedly require Russian intervention, this tactic is designed to legitimize Russia as a responsible international actor and justify its aggression in Ukraine.

Interested in learning more about these disinformation tactics?

Visit Tactic Spotlights to explore the full tactic spotlights, discover how these tactics are employed within the CBRN information space, and take actionable steps to counter them.

January 2025

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Tactic Spotlight – Portraying states and organizations as puppets

Erik — Sat, 01 Feb 2025 18:15:55 +0000

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

PORTRAYING STATES AND ORGANIZATIONS AS PUPPETS

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) seeks to understand and counter state-sponsored or state-adjacent disinformation across Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats, in support of GP Member efforts. As part of this effort, the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (JHCHS) systematically analyzed over 300 news media items from the EUvsDisinfo Database to identify common narratives, tactics, and themes associated with pro-Kremlin CBRN disinformation.

Tactic Spotlight: One commonly used tactic is portraying states and organizations as puppets. This tactic is used to imply that a foreign power exercises control over a country or organization, thereby discrediting it and its supporters. This tactic is often employed alongside false claims of CBRN development or use, including claims that Ukraine’s development or use of such weapons is controlled or directed by the United States and the broader “West.” This tactic also discredits and undermines multilateral institutions such as the OPCW, IAEA, and UN by framing them as puppets of “the West.”

OVERVIEW

EXAMPLES

Portraying states and organizations as puppets: Biological weapons

In news media items containing disinformation about biological weapons, Ukraine’s sovereignty was repeatedly called into question. In particular, news items claimed that Ukraine was effectively controlled by the United States, which was using the country to further its own geopolitical interests, including the development of biological weapons.

News media items containing disinformation about biological weapons constructed Ukraine as a “puppet state” by claiming that:

Ukraine was merely a testing ground for the United States’ clandestine biological weapons activities.
The Ukrainian government had no control over the functioning of U.S.-funded biological laboratories in its territory.
The 2014 Maidan Revolution, during which former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych was removed from power, was orchestrated by the United States in response to the Ukrainian government’s attempts to close U.S. biolaboratories in Ukraine.

Example: “This is the main reason for the creation of U.S. biolabs in Ukraine, serving as an opportunity to carry out the most dangerous kinds of studies, including studies on human beings, which are prohibited under U.S. laws, but allowed in Ukraine, due to problems in Ukrainian legislation, but to a greater extent, to Ukraine’s foreign control by the United States.’’ (Sputnik International, 2020)

Portraying states and organizations as puppets: Radiological and nuclear weapons

In spreading disinformation about radiological and nuclear weapons, news media outlets asserted that Ukraine, the United Nations, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are puppets controlled by and acting on behalf of “the West”, typically the U.S. and U.K.. This tactic, which effectively framed the war in Ukraine as a proxy war with the West, was used to justify Russia’s actions, such as the deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus, as a defensive and just response to Western aggression.

Radiological and nuclear weapons-related disinformation portrayed states and organizations as puppets in narratives claiming:

The U.S. and U.K. are behind Ukraine’s plans of a nuclear provocation using a dirty bomb.
The U.S. is interested in escalating the war against Russia using nuclear weapons.
Russia is calling on “the West” to stop Kyiv’s shelling of nuclear power plants, but the IAEA, which is under pressure from the West, won’t make definitive statements on where the shelling is coming from.

Example: “Russian President Vladimir Putin commented on the IAEA report on the Zaporozhye NPP published yesterday. In his opinion, the agency wrote it under pressure from the United States and Europe, and therefore did not directly indicate that the shelling was coming from Ukraine.” (Kommersant, 2022)

Portraying states and organizations as puppets: Chemical weapons

News media items containing disinformation about chemical weapons often referred to Ukraine as a “puppet state” of “the West” in an effort to discredit Ukraine’s military response to Russia in the Russo-Ukrainian War and discredit countries that supported Ukraine. When paired with allegations of nefarious activity (e.g., claims that U.S.-made chemical weapons were delivered to Ukraine), this tactic was used to proactively blame “the West” for preparing to use chemical weapons in Ukraine, warn them about pinning the blame for it on Russia, and justify retaliatory actions.

This disinformation tactic also included the following claims related to chemical weapons:

Alleging that the U.S. planned to use chemical weapons against Russia, using Ukraine’s army for cover.
Mocking the Ukrainian army’s losses due to their alleged “Western” puppeteers’ lack of military prowess.
Accusing the media and OPCW for being puppets of “the West” if they blamed Russia for being involved in the deaths of Sergei Skripal, Yulia Skripal, and Alexei Navalny or ignored Russia’s supposed evidence to the contrary.

Example: “Igor Kirillov announced the delivery to Ukraine of several wagons of toxic substances, including the US-made Bi-Z chemical weapon, as well as a large batch of personal protective equipment. Washington’s goal is, under the cover of the puppet Ukrainian army, to use weapons of mass destruction in the special operation zone and shift responsibility for this crime to Russia.’’ (Sputnik Georgia, 2023)

IMPLICATIONS

Framing a country as a “puppet state” uses the metaphor of a puppeteer controlling a puppet to imply that a country that appears to be independent is being manipulated or controlled by a foreign power.1 Russia’s attempts to frame Ukraine as a puppet of “the West” are politically strategic because they undermine Ukraine’s credibility, discredit Ukraine’s supporters, blame “the West” for allegedly waging a proxy war against Russia, and deflect attention away from Russia’s own actions (including its efforts to exert control over Ukraine).2,3 This narrative also justifies Russian intervention in Ukraine as a way to seemingly liberate Ukraine from its puppeteers. Framing multilateral or intergovernmental organizations as puppets similarly discredits their autonomy and undermines their impartiality, trustworthiness, and ability to fulfill their mission of ensuring WMD non-proliferation.

ACTIONS

Encouraging public awareness of this tactic can help promote resilience and resistance to its effects. When communicating about this tactic in the context of Ukraine, it may also be useful to highlight Russia’s own attempts to exert control over Ukraine, including by staging “referendums” in occupied territories. Such an approach could underscore the hypocrisy in Russia’s claims about Ukraine being a puppet of “the West”. It is also vitally important for policy makers and other communicators to stress the autonomy and impartiality of multilateral institutions like the OPCW, IAEA, and UN. In addition, it may be helpful to emphasize that Russia’s attempts to frame such institutions as puppets undermine their credibility and, by extension, pose a threat to international security.

January 2025

REFERENCES

Marek K. Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law. Librairie Droz; 1968.
Bodnar, Joseph , et al. “How Is Russia Covering the Ukraine Crisis?” Alliance for Securing Democracy, 27 Jan. 2022, securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/russia-propaganda-disinformation-ukraine/.
Kremlin Watchers Movement. “Disinformation Trends in September 2023.” Vox Ukraine, 2023, voxukraine.org/en/kremlin-watchers-movement-disinformation-trends-in-september-2023. Accessed 14 Jan. 2025.

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Tactic Spotlight – Russia as savior

Erik — Sat, 01 Feb 2025 17:58:18 +0000

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

FRAMING RUSSIA AS A SAVIOR

Tactic Spotlight: One commonly used tactic is “Framing Russia as a Savior.” This tactic represents Russia’s attempt to commend its own actions, framing them as necessary to ensure global peace and security. By drawing attention to alleged CBRN and other security threats that purportedly require Russian intervention, this tactic is designed to legitimize Russia as a responsible international actor and justify its aggression in Ukraine.

OVERVIEW

EXAMPLES

Framing Russia as a Savior: Biological weapons

In news media items containing disinformation about biological weapons, Russian efforts to warn the global community about the alleged danger posed by U.S.-funded biological laboratories in Ukraine were emphasized. In addition, Russia was framed as a protector from those very threats.

Several actions taken by Russia to “protect” specific populations or warn the global community were lauded, including:

Russia’s appeal to the UN Security Council to investigate the purportedly nefarious activities of U.S.-funded biological laboratories in Ukraine
Russia’s proposals to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention in the context of U.S.-assisted biological laboratories in Ukraine
Russia’s efforts to “protect” residents of the Donbas region from various threats (including alleged biological weapons threats)

Example: “[The United States] act[s] in exactly the same way in Ukraine, where they provoked a coup d’état, condoned the inculcation of neo-Nazi ideology, turned Ukraine into a testing ground for military-biological experiments, turned a blind eye to the killings of the civilian population of Donbass and prepared for military action against our country. Under these conditions, Russia stood up to protect the population of Donbass and did not allow their aggressive plans to be implemented.” (News.am, 2023).

Framing Russia as a Savior: Chemical weapons

Pro-Kremlin news media items containing disinformation about chemical weapons often praised Russia’s actions in the Russo-Ukrainian war and portrayed Russia as a symbol of justice, righteousness, and freedom. They emphasized this rhetoric through contrasting negative narratives alleging that the U.S., U.K., NATO, OPCW, and others were disregarding nonproliferation norms or engaging in nefarious activities regarding chemical weapons.

Disinformation about chemical weapons framed Russia as a protector and praised their actions, including:

Asserting that Russian military laboratories can identify potential chemical weapons use by “the West” in Ukraine.
Russia asserts leadership in strengthening the Chemical Weapons Convention, despite obstruction from “the West”, as evidenced by their alleged bias in the investigation of Alexei Navalny’s poisoning.

Example: “The Russian Ministry of Defense today officially warned the Western masters of the puppet Ukrainian army about inevitable retaliation for the use of chemical weapons during the special military operation … The analytical capabilities of the chemical laboratories of the Russian Ministry of Defense deployed in the zone of the special military operation make it possible to reliably determine the type of chemical used and the country of origin.” (Sputnik Georgia, 2023)

Framing Russia as a Savior: Radiological and nuclear weapons

Pro-Kremlin news media outlets framed Russia as a morally responsible international actor intent on restoring order to Ukraine and preventing the escalation of a nuclear world war. They emphasized Russia’s military prowess and ability to outsmart Ukraine, U.S. and NATO opposition by foiling their alleged plans to carry out nuclear strikes against Russia. Such false claims reinforce the notion that Russia is a “protector” by exploiting legitimate fears of radiological and nuclear weapons-use and attacks on nuclear power plants.

Disinformation about radiological and nuclear weapons that framed Russia as a savior included claims that:

Russia has never threatened to use nuclear weapons in the Russo-Ukrainian war
Russia invaded Ukraine to protect people from the Kyiv “regime” and confirm Ukraine’s status as a neutral and nuclear-free state
Russia is trying to protect the public from the alleged radiation risks associated with Ukraine’s use of Western-supplied depleted uranium shells

Example: “According to him, Moscow has repeatedly warned about the disastrous consequences of the West supplying Ukraine with shells containing depleted uranium.” (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2023)

IMPLICATIONS

The framing of Russia as a savior is likely designed to legitimize the notion that Russia is a responsible and beneficent international actor, one dedicated to maintaining global peace and security and ensuring a world free from CBRN threats. Moreover, by constructing humanitarian and CBRN threats that allegedly require Russian intervention, this tactic may also be designed to provide a legal and moral justification for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its other aggressive actions. The construction of threats may evoke a fear response in readers, making them more prone to emotional reasoning and therefore more likely to believe Russia’s false claims.1 Finally, by drawing attention to alleged CBRN and other security threats, this tactic may serve as a distraction from Russian atrocities committed in Ukraine.

ACTIONS

Exposing this disinformation tactic may help prevent it from persuading the public that Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine or elsewhere are legally or morally justified. Russia has used a similar framing in the past2 and will likely use it again in future conflicts. As such, it may be beneficial for policy makers and communicators to call attention to the tactic now as a form of pre-emptive refutation. Communicators can also debunk specific claims associated with this tactic, including false claims of CBRN threats. To be maximally effective, debunking efforts should include detailed alternative explanations.3 For example, a debunking message could explain that the biological laboratories in Ukraine are public and animal health facilities that reduce biological threats in the region.

January 2025

REFERENCES

Martel C, Pennycook G, Rand DG. Reliance on emotion promotes belief in fake news. Cogn Res Princ Implic. 2020;5:47. doi: 10.1186/s41235-020-00252-3
Pupcenoks J & Klein GR First Georgia, Then Ukraine: How Russian Propaganda Justifies Invasions. The Journal of Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/online-exclusives/first-georgia-then-ukraine-how-russian-propaganda-justifies-invasions. March 9, 2022. Accessed January 9, 2025.
Lewandowsky S, Cook J, Ecker UKH, Albarracín D, Amazeen MA, Kendeou P, Lombardi D, Newman EJ, Pennycook G, Porter E, Rand DG, Rapp DN, Reifler J, Roozenbeek J, Schmid P, Seifert CM, Sinatra GM, Swire-Thompson B, van der Linden S, Vraga EK, Wood, TJ, Zaragoza MS. The Debunking Handbook 2020. https://sks.to/db2020. 2020. Accessed January 9, 2025. DOI:10.17910/b7.1182

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Strategy and Impacts of CW Disinformation

Erik — Sun, 24 Nov 2024 14:42:28 +0000

Chemical Weapons Disinformation in Ukraine

UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA’S CHEMICAL WEAPONS ALLEGATIONS IN UKRAINE

SELECTED EXAMPLES OF CW ALLEGATIONS AND RELATED DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

STRATEGY AND IMPACTS OF CW DISINFORMATION

BRIEF 3/3 | NOVEMBER 2024

Disinformation plays a crucial role in shaping perceptions, influencing diplomatic outcomes, and diverting attention. Russian allegations against Ukraine concerning the use of chemical weapons (CW) have been a central part of this strategy. These claims are not simply reactive responses to specific events; they are part of a calculated effort to shape conflict narratives to confuse international observers and deflect attention from alleged transgressions of international law.

STRATEGIC AIMS

Deflection of Blame

Russia’s allegations fit into a broader strategy which is seeking to shift the blame for chemical weapons use onto Ukraine. By accusing Ukraine of chemical warfare, Russia attempts to position itself as the victim of a false narrative, claiming to be targeted by unsubstantiated attacks. This tactic serves two purposes: it deflects attention away from Russia’s own violations of international norms, and it undermines the credibility of Ukrainian and international claims. Russian allegations are often directed with little or no evidence, but their repetition contributes to a growing atmosphere of confusion that can hamper efforts to hold Russia accountable for its actions.

Justification for Potential Action

Another strategic aim of these allegations is to set the stage for Russia’s own potential use of chemical weapons. By framing accusations of Ukrainian chemical attacks as a pre-emptive move, Russia can lay the groundwork to justify the use of chemical weapons on the battlefield. This tactic further aligns with concerns expressed by the US, UK, and Ukraine about the possibility of “false flag” operations, in which Russia might stage chemical attacks to falsely implicate Ukraine. These pre-emptive accusations create a framework in which any future Russian use of chemical weapons can be justified as retaliation or as a defensive response to Ukrainian “provocations.”

Discrediting Ukraine and International Allies

By accusing Ukraine of chemical weapon use, Russia seeks to frame Ukraine—and by extension, its allies—as aggressors or violators of international law. These allegations are part of a broader strategy to undermine Ukraine’s legitimacy on the world stage, presenting it as a rogue state that ignores the laws of war and the disarmament treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Furthermore, by focusing on the actions of the US and NATO, Russia attempts to discredit the support Ukraine receives from the West, portraying it as an enabler of Ukrainian violations. By continuously disseminating CW-related disinformation, Russia aims to polarise the geopolitical landscape.

IMPACTS ON CONFLICT DYNAMICS

Complicating Accountability

The stream of unverified claims and manipulated evidence complicates the process of accountability for contraventions of the norms, laws and guidelines under threat during the ongoing conflict. International bodies, such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), can struggle to determine the veracity of claims when accusations are constantly reported. The volume of disinformation makes it challenging for these organisations to distinguish between genuine threats and fabricated claims.

Erosion of Trust in International Monitoring

The effectiveness of international monitoring bodies such as the OPCW has been undermined by the ongoing disinformation campaign. When evidence regarding allegations is inconsistent or unverifiable, international organisations are left with limited options. The repeated lack and volume of clear evidence leads to a situation where organisations tasked with monitoring CW can lose credibility, as they are unable to confirm or refute the claims. This erosion of trust not only hampers the credibility of international monitoring but may also reduce the deterrent these bodies have on states considering the use of CW.

Increased Tensions and Sanctions

The disinformation surrounding the alleged use of chemical weapons has contributed to increased diplomatic tensions. These allegations have sparked a cycle of retaliatory sanctions, as the US, EU, and their allies impose financial and economic penalties on Russian entities in response to accusations of chemical weapons use. The ongoing accusations feed into a broader narrative of escalating tensions, with each new claim prompting further punitive measures and deepening divisions.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

Role of the OPCW and UN

International organisations, particularly the OPCW and the United Nations (UN), face significant challenges responding to chemical weapons allegations due to the lack of verifiable evidence and the complexity of the claims. The OPCW has struggled to verify allegations made by both Russia and Ukraine, as the limited or contradictory information available makes it difficult to establish reliable facts. This challenge is compounded by the high volume of claims, which not only raises concerns about the authenticity of specific reports but also overwhelms the OPCW’s ability to conduct thorough investigations. As a result, the OPCW’s ability to independently verify chemical weapons use has been severely hampered, preventing clear conclusions and effective responses.

In the absence of conclusive proof, these organisations are often forced to issue generic statements or suspend investigations, which further fuels scepticism and disinformation. The competing narratives make it difficult for the international organisations to take decisive action with regards to accountability.

For example, the OPCW’s recent Technical Assistance Visit (TAV) to Ukraine in November 2024, following allegations from Ukraine of toxic chemical use near Illinka, provides a clear instance of these challenges. In response to Ukrains request for a TAV the OPCW team corroborated the chain of custody for samples provided by Ukraine, confirming the presence of the riot control agent CS in both soil and grenade samples. However, the OPCW noted that the use of riot control agents as weapons of war is prohibited under the CWC, which highlights the difficulty of managing competing allegations while ensuring compliance with international norms.

Despite the OPCW’s rigorous methods, including independent analysis by designated laboratories and witness testimonies, such incidents underscore the ongoing challenges of verifying chemical weapons use. These complexities are not limited to the verification of false claims, but also involve the logistical and technical hurdles of gathering consistent, reliable evidence amid ongoing conflict.

Sanctions and Diplomatic Pressure

The United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom have imposed sanctions on Russian entities and individuals associated with the spread of false information or the alleged use of CW. These sanctions are intended to punish Russia and deter further escalation. However, they also serve as a diplomatic tool to signal disapproval of Russia’s actions and to bolster the credibility of Ukraine’s claims. In addition, the international diplomatic pressure on Russia has been amplified by the allegations, which have become a focal point for global debates on the ethics of warfare and the use of CW.

The increasing readiness of States Parties to call out Russian disinformation relating to chemical weapons reflects the growing concern over the implications of Russia’s disinformation campaign, which undermines efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict. As accusations of chemical weapons use continue to surface, international powers are increasingly aligning with Ukraine’s calls for greater international scrutiny and accountability, further isolating Russia from the global community.

CONCLUSION

Russia’s use of disinformation about Ukraine’s chemical weapons is a strategic tool designed to deflect blame, justify potential future actions, and discredit both Ukraine and its supporters. By complicating accountability, eroding trust in international monitoring, and prompting retaliatory sanctions, these allegations are impacting the dynamics of the conflict at the international level. The ongoing responses from international organisations such as the OPCW and the UN, have been limited by the lack of verifiable evidence, highlighting the challenges posed by disinformation amidst ongoing conflict hostilities. The international community’s response, including sanctions and diplomatic pressure, reflects the growing recognition of the dangers posed by Russia’s disinformation campaign, and the need for a unified stance against the use of chemical weapons.

→ Chemical Weapons in Ukraine | Policy Brief 1/3

→ Chemical Weapons in Ukraine | Policy Brief 2/3

→ Chemical Weapons in Ukraine | Policy Brief 3/3

→ What is chemical weapons disinformation?

→ Russia’s July 2024 Note Verbale debunked

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Russia’s Dirty Bomb Disinformation in Ukraine

Erik — Sat, 23 Nov 2024 19:22:20 +0000

Russia's Dirty Bomb Disinformation in Ukraine

KEY POINTS

Disinformation narrative: Moscow’s false claim that Ukraine was planning to detonate a dirty bomb on its own territory and blame Russia gained mainstream media attention following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This rhetoric began generating substantial alarm several months later in October 2022, when Western officials (Europe, the US and allied countries) believed it might serve as cover for a false-flag operation or pretext for tactical nuclear weapons use.

Response: The initial response from Ukraine and its allies to Russia’s dirty bomb narrative relied primarily on fact-checking to refute and debunk claims about dirty bomb manufacturing in Ukraine. After it became apparent that these claims could be used as a pretext to escalation, backchannel diplomacy and threats of retaliation were also employed to dissuade Russian escalatory action.

Implications: Moscow’s dirty bomb narrative underscores how false narratives can manipulate public opinion and obscure intentions. Moving forward, combating such disinformation, especially in fast-evolving crises, may need to rely more heavily on advanced technologies like AI-driven analytics and real-time verification to rapidly counter false narratives.

WHAT IS A DIRTY BOMB?

A dirty bomb (i.e. radiological dispersal device) uses conventional explosives to spread radioactive material – causing contamination, damage and possibly significant disruption.

Unlike nuclear weapons, which require highly enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium, the materials used in dirty bombs do not need to be specially developed for weapons use and could potentially be gathered from research, industrial, energy and medical sources. Their relatively small size allows these devices to be positioned by foot or transported by vehicle, making them more accessible to malign non-state actors.¹ Dirty bombs have never been successfully used,² however:

Their detonation would be millions of times less powerful than a nuclear weapon explosion as it does not create a nuclear fission chain reaction.³
The area contaminated would be dependent on the explosive yield and amount of radioactive material released – but would likely extend only a few hundred metres.
Radiation released would likely be insufficient to immediately cause mass fatalities, but victims could be harmed over time by the exposure to radioactive material.

The psychological effects of the detonation and subsequent decontamination efforts have led these devices to be characterised as “weapons of mass disruption” rather than “weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).”⁴

DISINFO

Since at least 2015, Russian actors have propagated the dirty bomb narrative to advance domestic and geopolitical interests – as part of its broader disinformation campaigns. Moscow employs a variety of tactics when spreading these narratives, such as amplifying existing societal divisions and disseminating multiple narratives concurrently to cultivate confusion and public apathy.⁵ These operations span all chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) domains and have found greater success in the Global South compared with Western audiences.⁶

OBJECTIVES

Russia’s dirty bomb narrative (see timeline) peaked sharply in intensity and outreach in October 2022, causing Western officials to became concerned that the sudden increase in messaging might serve as cover for a false-flag operation or pretext for tactical nuclear weapons use.⁸

At the time, Moscow was experiencing significant battlefield setbacks and Western intelligence agencies had intercepted communications from senior Russian military leaders discussing the circumstances in which Moscow might use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine.⁹ Considering these broader developments, Moscow was plausibly attempting to achieve one, or a combination, of the following objectives:

Prepare the information space for potential nuclear weapons use.
Influence the behaviour of Ukraine and its Western allies.
Express genuine concern about Ukraine’s intentions, due to inaccurate intelligence gathering.
Bolster domestic support for its ongoing mobilisation efforts.

RESPONSE

As Russia’s dirty bomb narrative and resulting public concern peaked, the West implemented several tactics to mitigate Moscow’s information operations.

Fact-checking: Officials, media platforms and research institutes¹⁰ redoubled ongoing efforts to debunk Moscow’s dirty bomb narrative, with strategies such as reverse image searching and feasibility analysis by experts. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which undertook verification activities and conducted research within Ukraine, also categorically rejecting Moscow’s claims.¹¹
Backchannel diplomacy: This was conducted to encourage Russia’s partners to dissuade Moscow from employing a dirty bomb or nuclear weapon. China’s leader, Xi Jinping, likely warned President Putin against using nuclear weapons. India also issued a public statement condemning nuclear weapon use by any state.¹²
Threats of retaliation: These were privately conveyed to Russia by French, UK and US officials. Western leaders reportedly warned that a tactical nuclear weapons strike would not go unpunished and that they may respond by conventionally striking Russian forces.¹³

CONCLUSION

Moscow’s dirty bomb narrative highlights how false or misleading information can be used to exploit global radiological and nuclear fears, shape public opinion, obscure intentions and sow confusion.¹⁴ Western debunking efforts likely played a role in calming public anxiety and challenging Russia’s accusations. However, combating future disinformation, especially during rapidly evolving crises, may need to increasingly leverage advanced technologies such as AI-driven analytics and real-time data verification to identify and counter misleading narratives before they gain momentum.

TIMELINE

2015-2021

Sporadic appearance of dirty bomb narrative in Russian language media/social media.

January - March 2022

Russian state media reports on alleged Ukrainian dirty bomb manufacturing, possibly to help justify its invasion.

23 October 2022

Surge in Russian state media reporting about a potential dirty bomb ‘provocation’.

Russian defence officials discuss concerns with French, UK and US counterparts.

24 October 2022

France, UK and US leaders reject Russia’s dirty bomb narrative.

US officials express fears that Russia’s claims may be used as a pretext for tactical nuclear weapons use in Ukraine.

Chief of the Russian Armed Forces claims a dirty bomb is nearly complete and that the military is preparing to operate in a radioactive environment.

Russia’s UN ambassador writes to the UN Secretary General stating his concerns about dirty bomb use.

25 October 2022

President Biden warns that tactical nuclear weapons use would be a “serious mistake”.

26 October 2022

Russia’s defence minister contacts Chinese and Indian counterparts to warn them of the dirty bomb threat.

NATO’s secretary general warns of severe consequences in response to nuclear weapons use.

India’s defence minister publicly warns against nuclear weapons use.

27 October 2022

President Putin repeats dirty bomb allegations.

The US defence secretary warns of significant retaliation if Russia uses nuclear weapons.

28 October 2022

Moscow’s dirty bomb warnings abruptly end.

November 2022 - Present

Circulation of dirty bomb narrative returns to baseline frequency.

November 2024

REFERENCES

András Rácz. ‘Russia Goes for Annexation and Mobilization’. German Council on Foreign Relations, 22 September 2022. https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/russia-goes-annexation-and-mobilization.
Borger, Julian, and Peter Beaumont. ‘Russia Steps up Ukraine “Dirty Bomb” Claim in Letter Delivered to UN’. The Guardian, 25 October 2022, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/25/russia-to-raise-ukraine-dirty-bomb-claim-at-un-security-council.
Brookes, Peter. ‘Russia’s Dirty Bomb Claim Is a Dirty Lie’. The Heritage Foundation, 4 November 2022. https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/russias-dirty-bomb-claim-dirty-lie.
Delegation of the European Union to the People’s Republic of China. ‘Disinformation About Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine – Debunking Seven Myths Spread by Russia’. Delegation of the European Union to the People’s Republic of China, 18 March 2022. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/disinformation-about-russias-invasion-ukraine-debunking-seven-myths-spread-russia_en?s=166.
Digital Forensic Research Lab. ‘Russian War Report: Kremlin Recycles Old Narratives to Claim Ukraine Is Constructing Dirty Bombs and Bioweapons’. Atlantic Council, 7 March 2022. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-kremlin-recycles-old-narratives-to-claim-ukraine-is-constructing-dirty-bombs-and-bioweapons/.
Government of Massachusetts. ‘Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC): Fact Sheet on Dirty Bombs’. Government of Massachusetts. Accessed 8 April 2025. https://www.mass.gov/info-details/nuclear-regulatory-commission-nrc-fact-sheet-on-dirty-bombs.
Heather Williams, Kelsey Hartigan, Lachlan MacKenzie, and Reja Younis. ‘Deter and Divide: Russia’s Nuclear Rhetoric & Escalation Risks in Ukraine’. Center for Strategic & International Studies. Accessed 8 April 2025. https://features.csis.org/deter-and-divide-russia-nuclear-rhetoric.
Heather Williams, Kelsey Hartigan, Lachlan MacKenzie, and Reja Younis. ‘Russian Nuclear Calibration in the War in Ukraine’. Center for Strategic & International Studies, 23 February 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-nuclear-calibration-war-ukraine.
Helene Cooper, Julian E. Barnes, and Eric Schmitt. ‘Russian Military Leaders Discussed Use of Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Officials Say’. The New York Times, 2 November 2022, sec. U.S. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/us/politics/russia-ukraine-nuclear-weapons.html.
International Atomic Energy Agency. ‘IAEA Inspectors Complete In-Field Verification Activities at Three Ukraine Locations, No Indications of Undeclared Nuclear Activities and Materials’. Text. IAEA, 3 November 2022. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-inspectors-complete-in-field-verification-activities-at-three-ukraine-locations-no-indications-of-undeclared-nuclear-activities-and-materials.
Katherine Lawlor and Kateryna Stepanenko. ‘Warning Update: Russia May Conduct a Chemical or Radiological False-Flag Attack as a Pretext for Greater Aggression against Ukraine’. Institute for the Study of War, 9 March 2022. http://dev-isw.bivings.com/.
Lachlan MacKenzie. ‘Six Days in October: Russia’s Dirty Bomb Signaling and the Return of Nuclear Crises’, 3 September 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/six-days-october-russias-dirty-bomb-signaling-and-return-nuclear-crises.
Max Seddon. ‘Why Vladimir Putin Toned down His Nuclear Rhetoric’. Financial Times, 1 November 2023, sec. War in Ukraine. https://www.ft.com/content/d98446ac-b56e-4f1d-bfa9-ebaed4e26884.
Meyer, Samuel, Sarah Bidgood, and William C. Potter. ‘Death Dust: The Little-Known Story of U.S. and Soviet Pursuit of Radiological Weapons’. International Security 45, no. 2 (1 October 2020): 51–94. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00391.
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna. ‘Russia’s Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s Comment in Connection with the Latest Failure to Rotate IAEA Secretariat Experts at the Zaporozhskaya NPP and Ukraine’s New Provocation against This Plant’, 12 February 2025.
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna. ‘Statement by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov on the Agenda Item 3 of the Session of the IAEA Board of Governors «Nuclear and Radiation Safety: Nuclear Safety Review 2025»’, 3 March 2025.
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations. ‘Remarks to the Press by First Deputy Permanent Representative Dmitry Polyanskiy Following Security Council’s AOB Discussion of the Possibility of Ukraine Creating a “Dirty Bomb”’, 25 October 2022. https://russiaun.ru/en/news/stakeout_251022#!
Reuters. ‘Russia, without Evidence, Says Ukraine Making Nuclear “Dirty Bomb”’. Reuters, 6 March 2022, sec. Europe. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-without-evidence-says-ukraine-making-nuclear-dirty-bomb-2022-03-06/.
Russian Federation. ‘Letter Dated 24 October 2022 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council’. United Nations, 24 October 2022. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3995910.
The Guardian. ‘US Dismisses “Transparently False” Russian Claims of Ukraine Plan to Use “Dirty Bomb”’. The Guardian, 24 October 2022, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/24/us-dismisses-transparently-false-russian-claims-of-ukraine-plan-to-use-dirty-bomb.
‘Summary Record (Partial) of the 18th Meeting, Held at the Vienna International Centre, Vienna, on Friday, 11 August 2023: Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1st Session’. United Nations, 7 September 2023. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/239/51/pdf/n2323951.pdf.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ‘Backgrounder on Dirty Bombs’. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 2022. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-dirty-bombs.html.

The post Russia’s Dirty Bomb Disinformation in Ukraine appeared first on Countering WMD Disinformation.

Distraction and Misdirection

Erik — Sat, 23 Nov 2024 18:01:12 +0000

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

DISTRACTION AND MISDIRECTION

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) seeks to understand and counter Russian state-sponsored or state-adjacent disinformation across Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats, in support of GP Member efforts. As part of this effort, the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (JHCHS) analyzed disinformation in news media to identify common narratives, tactics, and themes associated with pro-Kremlin CBRN disinformation.

Tactic Spotlight: One commonly used tactic is “distraction and misdirection.” This tactic points to (real or falsely alleged) CBRN activity and threats, such as weapons use, attacks on facilities, or emerging dangers. It is designed to cause confusion about what may be happening on the ground, justify potential use of weapons, and/or direct attention away from potentially embarrassing events or a country’s own CBRN activities.

OVERVIEW

EXAMPLES

Misdirection on Biological Laboratories

Leading up to Russia’s enlargement of a high containment biological laboratory near Moscow, there was an increase in false rumors regarding biological laboratories in Ukraine. Historically, this mirrors disinformation campaigns promoted by the USSR to cover up its own clandestine biological weapons activities. Additionally, this effort to draw attention to biological laboratories in Ukraine and accuse Ukrainians of working on biological weapons may have been designed to justify the invasion of Ukraine and divert attention from atrocities committed by Russian forces. The graph to the right shows the volume of news items about Ukrainian biolabs in relation to events in Ukraine in spring 2022.¹

News Items Covering Ukrainian Biological Laboratories by Country, February– March 2022

Creating Confusion about Chemical Weapons

Disinformation about chemical weapons frequently creates confusion through false allegations, such as:

Use of chemical weapons by Ukrainian Armed Forces against the Russian military and Ukrainian locals
Plans for anti-Russia provocations and false flag operations featuring deployment of chemical weapons
Ukraine and allies engaging in nefarious activities, like purchasing and transporting suspicious chemicals
Ukraine and allies disregarding or violating international rules, laws, and norms
Alternative theories around the poisonings of Alexei Navalny and Sergei & Yulia Skripal

These activities reflect previous efforts to confuse the information space about chemical weapons use in Syria.²They flood and overwhelm the information space, confusing readers, and making it difficult to recognize what information is accurate or false. This distraction tactic can create an environment where malicious activity can remain undetected or difficult to discern from reality. Additionally, it can be used to divert readers from evidence of Russia’s own nefarious activities to other, emotionally evocative allegations against opponents.

Disinfo excerpt: “The simultaneous supply of American chemical weapons and means of protection against them to the Ukrainian Armed Forces indicates active preparations for the use of the biological psychotropic chemical agent Bi-Z in the Donbass.’’ (Sputnik Georgia, 2023)

Distracting from Real Events by Leveraging Fears About Radiological or Nuclear Threats

Pro-Kremlin news media outlets often prey upon fears and confusion about radiological and nuclear weapons to distract and direct attention away from real events. News media outlets, for example, falsely alleged that Ukraine attacked the Kursk nuclear power plant (NPP).³ Such false claims muddled the information space and served as a distraction from the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk.⁴

Radiological and nuclear weapons-related disinformation distracts and misdirects through false narratives about:

Attacks on nuclear power plants
Plans for anti-Russia provocations and false flag operations featuring radiological and nuclear weapons
Spikes in radiation near nuclear sites and across Europe
Evidence and graphic descriptions of explosions that are likened to the atomic bomb

Disinfo excerpt: “Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday accused Ukraine of trying to strike Russia’s Kursk nuclear power plant in an overnight attack and said Moscow had informed the U.N. nuclear safety watchdog about the situation.” (Reuters, 2024)³

IMPLICATIONS

These manipulative techniques influence the information space by directing attention in purposeful ways. Like a magician with a card trick, Russia deceives audiences by misdirecting their attention, drawing it away from its own failures or illegal acts and towards the fictitious crimes of other actors. Because they are highly feared and have strong emotive potential, CBRN threats serve as a compelling subject for Russia’s disinformation campaigns. Further, when such disinformation campaigns include allegations about the development or use of CBRN weapons, the polluted information space may lead others to perceive that multiple parties are violating international norms and regulations, weakening these systems and increasing the risk of WMD proliferation.

ACTIONS

Audiences should be made aware of how common this approach is in disinformation campaigns and try to remain aware of the larger information space in which these types of accusations are made in order to gain a better understanding of how their attention may be misdirected. Forewarning policy makers and the public can help to improve resilience to this kind of disinformation. Such warnings can include describing the historical use of disinformation to distract and manipulate audiences. Voluntary transparency exercises such as peer-review visits to laboratories⁵ or other facilities may also help build and maintain trust between states and preserve the nonproliferation norms and systems that may be undermined by such disinformation.

November 2024

REFERENCES

Sundelson AE, Trotochaud M, Huhn N, Sell TK. Russian and US News Media Coverage of Ukrainian Biological Laboratories, February–March 2022. Journal of Strategic Security. 2023 Jan 1;16(4):57-73.
U.S. Department of State Global Engagement Center. The Kremlin’s Chemical Weapons Disinformation Campaigns. May 2022. Accessed November 20, 2024.
Putin accuses Ukraine of trying to strike Russia’s Kursk nuclear power plant. Reuters. August 22, 2024. Accessed November 8, 2024.
EUvsDisinfo. The convenient distraction of false martyrdom. EUvsDisinfo. August 29, 2024. Accessed November 15, 2024.
Building Confidence through Transparency: Peer Review Transparency Visit at the Richard Lugar Center for Public Health Research of the National Center for Disease Control and Public Health in Tbilisi, Georgia. December 3, 2018. Accessed November 13, 2024.

The post Distraction and Misdirection appeared first on Countering WMD Disinformation.

Tactic Spotlights Archives - Countering WMD Disinformation

Weaponization of Nuclear Power Plants

UNDERSTANDING DISINFORMATION IN UKRAINE

WEAPONIZATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

24 February 2022

4 March 2022

31 March 2022

5 August 2022

25 August 2022

23 November 2022

6 June 2023

3 October 2023

11 August 2024

14 February 2025

READ MORE:

Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Use of Misleading “Evidence”

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

USE OF MISLEADING “EVIDENCE”

Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Master Narratives

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

MASTER NARRATIVES

Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Disregard for Rules, Laws, and Norms

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

DISREGARD FOR RULES, LAWS, AND NORMS

Developing a Taxonomy

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

DEVELOPING A TAXONOMY

Tactic Spotlight – Portraying states and organizations as puppets

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

PORTRAYING STATES AND ORGANIZATIONS AS PUPPETS

Tactic Spotlight – Russia as savior

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

FRAMING RUSSIA AS A SAVIOR

Strategy and Impacts of CW Disinformation

Chemical Weapons Disinformation in Ukraine​

STRATEGY AND IMPACTS OF CW DISINFORMATION

READ MORE:

Russia’s Dirty Bomb Disinformation in Ukraine

Russia's Dirty Bomb Disinformation in Ukraine

2015-2021

January - March 2022

23 October 2022

24 October 2022

25 October 2022

26 October 2022

27 October 2022

28 October 2022

November 2022 - Present

Distraction and Misdirection

DISINFORMATION TACTIC SPOTLIGHT

DISTRACTION AND MISDIRECTION

Chemical Weapons Disinformation in Ukraine