Nuclear Meetings Archives - Countering WMD Disinformation

RevCon Tactic Tracker

Erik — Mon, 11 May 2026 03:28:17 +0000

Games

RevCon Tactic Tracker

How do I play?

When you detect one of these RN disinformation tactics in use, mark it on the Tracker Card. The objective is to identify both the greatest variety of tactics and the highest total number of instances.

A. Appeal to Authority

Experts, officials or institutions cited to lend false legitimacy. Sources may be fabricated, quoted out of context or speaking beyond their expertise

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B. Appeal to Emotions

Fear, outrage or grief used to persuade, often through fearmongering about radiation exposure, existential threats or imminent attack.

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C. Claims of Victimisation

Criticism recast as persecution or politically motivated hostility. Used to justify military action, nuclear posture or noncompliance.

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D. Credibility Inflation

Self-portrayal as responsible, moral or uniquely credible to make claims more believable and present oneself as a responsible nuclear actor.

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E. Discrediting Opponents

Allegations of noncompliance or negligence used to undermine credibility, isolate opponents and deflect scrutiny from own conduct.

□ □ □ □ □ □

F. Distraction & Misdirection

Attention shifted to other issues to create confusion and divert scrutiny from the originator’s activities. Can be very effective during fast-moving crises

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What is the GP Initiative?

Countering WMD Disinformation is a Global Partnership (GP) initiative designed to detect, analyse and counter state-sponsored and state-adjacent disinformation on weapons of mass destruction. The project helps safeguard non-proliferation norms by tracking disinformation narratives, identifying emerging trends, and developing tools and strategies to strengthen resilience and support proactive responses.

Disclaimer: It can be difficult to definitively determine whether the information you read or hear is disinformation. This game provides a starting point for identifying deceptive tactics when encountering potential CBRN disinformation. However, confirming a claim’s authenticity often requires further investigation and may not be possible in real time.

Tactic Matching

How do I play?

Correctly match each disinformation tactic (page one) with the narrative examples above by numbering the empty boxes. Turn this page upside down for the answers.

Answers: A=4, B=3, C=6, D=2, E=1, F=5

DISINFORMATION TACTICS

“State X possesses thousands of warheads and denies sovereign nations the right to peaceful nuclear energy. They possess a hegemonic posture and imperial ambition.”

“Our nation is home to a 5,000 year old civilisation and leads developing nations toward energy independence and prosperity through peaceful nuclear technology.”

“Over 500,000 people were evacuated and radioactive water dumped in the ocean – these are just a few of the many consequences of this historic disaster. The risks are existential and imminent – people are DYING!”

“State X has been endangering the safety of the nuclear power plant. All the top people at the UN and the IAEA, as well as in the world capitals, understand this and agree with us.”

“Why are we using this fora to discuss “irrelevant” developments when State X is attempting to acquire nuclear weapons with the help of several member states?”

“Our nation has been left with no choice but to rely on nuclear deterrence as a direct consequence of the coalition’s relentless expansion, vilification of our people and unwarranted aggression.”

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2026 Review Conference of the NPT

Erik — Mon, 11 May 2026 02:09:55 +0000

Countering Radiological & Nuclear Disinformation

2026 Review Conference of the NPT

BRIEFING NOTE | April 2026

Disinformation* by State-sponsored and State-adjacent actors has been observed in international disarmament forums and will likely feature at the 2026 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This briefing note aims to prepare delegations for disinformation narratives they may encounter. For further information: www.GPWMDCounterDisinfo.com.

WHAT IS RN DISINFORMATION AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?

Radiological and nuclear (RN) disinformation refers to deliberately false or manipulated information concerning radiological or nuclear technologies, materials, weapons or their associated risks and uses. Like other WMD-related disinformation, RN narratives matter because of their negative and disruptive impact in multilateral fora. See examples of the risk below:

Complicate risk communication and response coordination during emergencies.

Put technical facts in question through selective interpretation of data, reducing the impact of impartial assessments.

Create diplomatic friction and misperceptions between Member States, making collective action harder.

Weaken norm coherence and pave the way for norm fragmentation.

Distract resources and delay effective decision-making.

REVCON NARRATIVES

In the context of the 2026 NPT RevCon, such RN disinformation narratives can erode trust in shared facts, increase suspicions and harden negotiating positions. When false claims circulate, they can distort perceptions and narrow the space for compromise across the NPT’s pillars. This can weaken political support for collective measures on nuclear non-proliferation, safety, security and peaceful uses. Delegations should therefore pause to assess whether the claims they encounter are supported by credible evidence. The following false or misleading narratives are among those most likely to be encountered at RevCon:

Inflating or Fabricating Nuclear Threats

False Framing of Nuclear Policy

Narratives recasting doctrinal revisions or nuclear cooperation as offensive escalation or treaty breach – to erode state legitimacy in multilateral fora.

Weapons Acquisition Claims

Narratives alleging that a State is close to acquiring nuclear weapons, or is receiving covert external assistance – to create urgency and legitimise coercive or military action.

Weapons Testing Allegations

Narratives alleging concealed nuclear tests or preparations for testing – to stigmatise an adversary, heighten threat perceptions or normalise reciprocal actions.

Undermining Oversight and Legitimacy

Institutional Bias Allegations

Narratives portraying international bodies as ineffective or biased – to weaken perceptions of their impartiality, technical credibility and oversight functions.

Distorting the Nature or Control of Nuclear Assets

Mischaracterised Infrastructure

Narratives claimed dual-use nuclear infrastructure is purely civilian (or vice versa) – to deligitmise escalation or justify military intervention.

False Facility Security Claims

Narratives presenting an occupier or outside actor as the rightful ‘protector’ of a nuclear facility – to shift blame for attacks, accidents or instability onto others.

Disinformation Tactics

Within RN international forums, including the RevCon, the right of reply is a key vehicle for disinformation. These replies are reactive and not formally recorded, which enables further opportunities for the spread of false or misleading claims. By contrast, pre-prepared national statements often contain less overt disinformation, though they still advance selective or strategically framed narratives.

State actors draw on a range of tactics designed to deceive audiences, shape perceptions and legitimise political or military action. See our graphic below for examples of some of the most common disinformation tactics. Recognising and responding to these tactics will better equip RevCon participants to identify, contextualise and mitigate their potential impact.

CURRENT REALITIES

Appeal to Authority

Appeal to Emotions

Claims of Victimisation

Credibility Inflation

Discrediting Opponents

Distraction & Misdirection

Manipulation of Evidence

Entities as Puppets

Recycling Narratives

Want to Learn More?

Understanding theses common disinformation narratives and tactics will better equip delegations to pre-emptively debunk falsehoods, alert others to recurring patterns and build organisational and state resilience against the harmful effects of RN disinformation.

* Definitively identifying disinformation amid broader efforts to influence populations can be challenging as intent and attribution are often unclear. For brevity, this report adopts a broad definition of ‘disinformation’ that includes misinformation and other information operations, as all seek to mislead the public and shape perceptions.

→ Best practices for Countering Radiological and Nuclear Disinfo

→ Radiological and Nuclear Disinformation Roadmap

REFERENCES

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). ‘Safeguards Implementation Report 2023’. International Atomic Energy Agency, 7 June 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/06/20240607_sir_2024_part_ab.pdf.
IAEA. ‘Two Years of IAEA Continued Presence at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant’. International Atomic Energy Agency, 3 September 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/two-years-of-iaea-continued-presence-at-the-zaporizhzhaya-nuclear-power-plant.pdf.
‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on Its 2nd Session: Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’. United Nations, 2 August 2024. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceSecond_session_(2024)/NPT_CONF.2026_PC.II_07_-_07._ADVANCE_UNEDITED_VERSION_Master_1_FINAL_Report__Preparatory_Committee_2nd__session.pdf.
‘Summary Record (Partial) of the 18th Meeting, Held at the Vienna International Centre, Vienna, on Friday, 11 August 2023: Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1st Session’. United Nations, 7 September 2023. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/239/51/pdf/n2323951.pdf.
United Nations. ‘Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference Ends without Adopting Substantive Outcome Document Due to Opposition by One Member State’, 26 August 2022. https://press.un.org/en/2022/dc3850.doc.htm.
GP WMD Counter Disinfo. ‘Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Portraying States and Organizations as Puppets’. January 2025. https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/tactic-spotlight-portraying-states-and-organizations-as-puppets/.
Predictable patterns in how the human brain functions to simplify information processing, which frequently leads individuals to think about the world in distorted ways, Stephen Eldridge. ‘Cognitive Bias: Description & Examples’. Britannica. Accessed 11 April 2025. https://www.britannica.com/science/cognitive-bias.
Specific cues or narrative elements designed to provoke strong emotional reactions in the audience; Melissa L. Finucane et al., ‘The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits’, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 13, no. 1 (January 2000): 1–17, https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(200001/03)13:1<1::AID-BDM333>3.0.CO;2-S; Cameron Martel, Gordon Pennycook, and David G. Rand, ‘Reliance on Emotion Promotes Belief in Fake News’, Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications 5, no. 1 (7 October 2020): 47,
https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-020-00252-3.

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Statement on Nuclear and Radiological Disinformation 2024

Erik — Sun, 10 May 2026 18:22:16 +0000

Statement on Nuclear and Radiological Disinformation

On behalf of the Global Partnership Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative

2024 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting

Geneva, Switzerland

July 2024

Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am speaking on behalf of the Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative, a project of the 31-member Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership). This initiative is funded by Global Affairs Canada and implemented by The Atlantic Council Digital Forensic Research Lab, The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, King’s College London and Open Nuclear Network. The project is endorsed by the G7-led Global Partership and the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism. [Additional endorsements to be confirmed this week.]

Today, we would like to address a critical and growing threat that jeopardises global security: the spread of disinformation in the nuclear and radiological security realm, which poses a significant and growing threat to the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to the supporting cooperative threat reduction activities of the Global partnership community. This statement aims to highlight the detrimental effects of such disinformation on the three pillars of the NPT – disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear technology – and suggest ways to address this growing threat.

Disarmament

It is now largely accepted that disarmament, a cornerstone of the NPT, is likely to rely heavily on trust and verification. Disinformation campaigns spreading false information about the intentions and actions of states could erode this trust. For instance, the incident in 2016, when false reports claimed US tactical nuclear weapons were being moved from Turkey to Romania, created panic and confusion. Such disinformation can manipulate public perception and influence policy decisions, hindering disarmament efforts.

Disinformation can also influence countries’ threat perceptions, potentially hindering disarmament efforts or fuelling an arms race. When nations are led to believe in exaggerated threats, they may respond by increasing their own arsenals, thus undermining global disarmament objectives.

Non-proliferation

The objective of non-proliferation is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. However, disinformation can erode trust in international safeguards and verification mechanisms, which are essential for ensuring compliance with non-proliferation obligations.

Unfounded allegations, such as those about plans to explode a “dirty bomb” on Ukrainian soil, exemplify broader disinformation campaigns that may justify military escalations and destabilise regions. These tactics undermine international support for affected nations and destabilise entire regions, hindering peaceful resolution efforts and increasing regional instability. Disinformation campaigns can also falsely accuse states of non-compliance or secret nuclear activities, potentially jeopardising regional and global security.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

The peaceful use of nuclear technology, a vital right under the NPT, is critical for sustainable development and energy security. Disinformation can generate unwarranted fear and opposition to nuclear energy and other beneficial applications, significantly hindering their development and implementation. By misrepresenting the safety and environmental impacts of nuclear technology, disinformation campaigns can distort public perception, causing delays or cancellations of projects that could offer substantial benefits to health, energy and industry.

Moreover, disinformation undermines public confidence in regulatory bodies and international organisations responsible for overseeing nuclear safety and security. When these institutions are portrayed as ineffective or biased, public trust erodes and support for nuclear projects diminishes.

The rapid spread of disinformation is facilitated by social media and AI-generated content, platforms that are particularly vulnerable due to the high volume and speed of information dissemination. This false information can even undermine technical analyses, leading to flawed understandings that affect international treaties and policies.

Call to Action

To address these challenges, we propose a series of steps:

Strengthen International Cooperation: Establish a dedicated task force within the NPT framework to monitor, identify and counter nuclear and radiological disinformation.
Enhance Verification Mechanisms: Improve existing verification and transparency measures to build trust among states.
Promote Public Education: Launch comprehensive educational campaigns to inform the public about the realities of nuclear energy and disarmament. Transparent and fact-based communication can help dispel myths and counteract disinformation.
Leverage Technology: Utilise advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence and big data analytics, to detect and analyse disinformation patterns. By understanding the origins and dissemination channels of disinformation, we can develop targeted strategies to mitigate its impact.
Engage Civil Society and Academia: Engagement by civil society and non-governmental organisations can broaden the scope of efforts to combat disinformation, leveraging diverse perspectives and expertise. Academic and policy research on the impacts of disinformation can provide valuable insights and inform strategies. Investing in research specifically focused on nuclear and radiological disinformation can lead to more effective countermeasures and a deeper understanding of these threats.
Promote Media Literacy: Initiatives to enhance media literacy and public awareness can empower individuals and the general public to recognise and reject false information, thereby reducing the effectiveness of disinformation campaigns.

We are pleased to report that some measures towards addressing this threat have already commenced. The GP Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative is a coordinated and multi-disciplinary effort to mitigate the threat of disinformation across Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) security. This project, which is being delivered in collaboration with the G7’s Rapid Response Mechanism and other counter-disinformation initiatives, aims to provide a solid evidence base to: identify, understand and develop mitigation strategies; raise awareness; and ultimately reduce the impact of hostile CBRN disinformation.

By taking these comprehensive steps, State Parties, international organisations and civil society can protect the treaty’s integrity and ensure global nuclear security. Through coordinated efforts at all levels, we can mitigate the impact of disinformation in the nuclear and radiological security realm and ensure a safer, more secure future for all.

We thank you for your attention.

The GP Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative

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Statement on Nuclear and Radiological Disinformation

Erik — Sun, 10 May 2026 18:09:01 +0000

Statement on Nuclear and Radiological Disinformation

On behalf of the Global Partnership Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative

2025 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting

New York, United States of America

April 2025

Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am speaking on behalf of the Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative, a dedicated effort of the G7-led Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership). This initiative is funded by Global Affairs Canada and implemented by The Atlantic Council Digital Forensic Research Lab, The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, King’s College London and Open Nuclear Network. Our efforts are undertaken on behalf of all 31 Global Partnership members and are coordinated with other counter-disinformation initiatives, including the G7’s Rapid Response Mechanism.

As States gather to reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), we must acknowledge a growing challenge that threatens the treaty’s integrity: the spread of disinformation in the nuclear and radiological realm. Disinformation is increasingly used to manipulate perceptions, distort facts, and undermine trust across the entire WMD spectrum. In the NPT context, disinformation threatens the effective implementation of the treaty’s three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear technologies.

While disinformation in nuclear fora is not new, recent trends suggest a rise in deliberate and sophisticated efforts to mislead the international community. These efforts target verification mechanisms and multilateral forums, fuel distrust among states, and erode public confidence in nuclear governance and non-proliferation efforts. This statement will illustrate how disinformation threatens the NPT’s objectives and propose concrete measures to counter its spread while preserving the integrity of diplomatic discourse.

Disarmament

For disarmament to be effective, states must have assurance that other countries are implementing their commitments in good faith. However, disinformation is increasingly being used to cast doubt on compliance, create false perceptions of treaty violations, and justify arms buildups. Fabricated claims about nuclear intentions or capabilities are used to portray states as non-compliant, while manipulated public narratives can erode support for arms control agreements. Additionally, independent verification bodies are sometimes undermined through allegations of bias or incompetence. If left unchecked, these tactics will further degrade trust, impede diplomatic progress, and increase the risk of arms racing based on exaggerated or false security concerns.

Non-Proliferation

The non-proliferation pillar of the NPT relies on the credibility of its verification mechanisms, yet disinformation poses a growing challenge to its effectiveness. False accusations of states developing nuclear weapons capabilities in violation of their obligations undermine trust in the treaty, while efforts to cast doubt on the neutrality of verification bodies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), further weaken confidence in compliance processes. Additionally, misleading claims are sometimes used to justify unilateral actions under the pretext of preventing proliferation. Past disinformation campaigns have falsely alleged the existence of clandestine nuclear programs or imminent radiological threats, leading to heightened geopolitical tensions and calls for pre-emptive action despite a lack of credible evidence. Such tactics not only destabilize international security but also divert attention from legitimate proliferation concerns that require collective engagement and fact-based diplomacy.

The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Applications

The right to develop and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is a fundamental principle of the NPT. However, disinformation campaigns seek to delegitimize civilian nuclear programs, sometimes by falsely linking them to weapons development or storage to justify restrictions on technology transfer and international cooperation. Exaggerated claims about safety risks contribute to public opposition to nuclear energy projects, while efforts to undermine trust in nuclear regulators by portraying them as ineffective or politically biased further erode confidence in the sector. These challenges are particularly concerning as the world faces growing energy needs and climate change pressures, both of which require a fact-based discussion on the role of nuclear energy in sustainable development.

Recommendations for Action

Platforms like the GP Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative, together with credible partners from civil society, can provide valuable support to Member States in addressing these challenges. Dedicated counter-disinformation initiatives, independent research institutions, media organizations, and NGOs can provide evidence and materials that fact-check nuclear-related claims, debunk disinformation, and contribute to public awareness efforts. Fostering partnerships between governments, international organizations, and civil society will help build a resilient information environment, protect the treaty’s integrity and ensure global nuclear security. Through coordinated efforts at all levels, we can mitigate the impact of disinformation in the nuclear and radiological security realm and ensure a safer, more secure future for all.

We thank you for your attention.

The GP Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative

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STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL DISINFORMATION TO 2026 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

Erik — Sun, 10 May 2026 17:47:59 +0000

STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL DISINFORMATION

2026 NPT Review Conference | April 2026

Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am speaking on behalf of the Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative of the 31-member Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. This initiative is funded by Canada and Germany and is implemented by The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, King’s College London and Open Nuclear Network.

As States Parties meet over the next month to review the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, we must address a growing challenge affecting multilateral discussions in the nuclear and radiological realm: the amplification and circulation of false or unverified allegations regarding safeguards, compliance or nuclear intent.

Radiological and nuclear issues are technically complex and rely on specialised verification methodologies, established evidentiary standards and clearly defined institutional mandates. When such matters are discussed or claims made without the full context, misunderstandings and opportunities for confusion can arise and positions may harden before clarification or key details are made available.

Unverified, unfounded and false allegations related to compliance, safety or intent can shape diplomatic positions before technical clarification is available. Technical findings may be selectively presented, reframed or simplified, reducing complex issues to binary narratives. This risks distorting discussions and placing delegations – particularly those without specialised technical capacity – in difficult positions, including pressure on neutral or middle-ground states to signal alignment prematurely, narrowing space for balanced engagement and increasing polarisation.

The introduction of serious allegations in multilateral settings carries particular weight. Such claims should be carefully substantiated and, where appropriate, grounded in established reporting mechanisms. Creating space for technical clarification before drawing conclusions can support stability in deliberations.

This challenge cuts across all three pillars of the Treaty.

In the context of non-proliferation, unverified claims regarding safeguards, compliance or intent can undermine confidence in verification processes and distort assessments of risk.

In the context of disarmament, inaccurate or misleading characterisation of capabilities, doctrines or commitments can deepen mistrust and complicate dialogue.

In the context of peaceful uses, misleading narratives about safety, security or intent can undermine cooperation and erode confidence in the benefits of nuclear applications.

To support the integrity of Treaty discussions, key standards should be implemented, including:

All allegations should be grounded in well-documented and verified information.
Technical assessments should be referenced in their full context.
Established clarification mechanisms should be used where uncertainties arise.

Where these standards are not met, caution should be exercised in engaging with or amplifying such claims. Verification through competent international bodies and trusted expert networks, requests for clarification through established Treaty mechanisms and internal coordination before responding should be prioritised. Where appropriate, timely and evidence-based communication should be used to clarify the record and mitigate the spread of misleading narratives.

These principles are not intended to constrain debate. They are intended to protect it. Technical assessment and political deliberation serve complementary roles within the Treaty framework.

The NPT depends on informed engagement, mutual respect and good-faith deliberation. By exercising care in how nuclear and radiological information is presented and interpreted, States Parties can reduce the risk of avoidable polarisation and preserve the integrity of this Review Conference.

We thank you for your attention.

The GP Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative

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Countering Radiological and Nuclear Disinformation

Erik — Sun, 08 Mar 2026 18:34:52 +0000

COUNTERING RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (RN) DISINFORMATION:

AN INTRODUCTORY BEST PRACTICE GUIDE FOR STATE DELEGATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL FORA

RN disinformation is the deliberate spread of false or misleading information aboutnuclear weapons, peaceful nuclear applications or radiological materials. The GP WMD Counter Disinfo Initiative has analysed relevant past disinformation tactics aimed at preparing delegations for disinformation narratives they may encounter.

WHY IT MATTERS

State delegations articulate national positions, engage in dialogue and shape outcomes through norm-setting and decision-making. Their visibility makes them prime targets for reputational attacks, narrative manipulation and emotionally charged RN disinformation, which is increasingly used as a tool of hybrid warfare.¹ Such disinformation poses a growing risk not only to the perceived credibility of delegations but also to the coherence of diplomatic processes and broader institutional trust.

HOW IT WORKS

RN disinformation strategically undermines state delegations’ ability to perform core diplomatic functions by seeking to erode their credibility and trustworthiness. Delegations may be portrayed as deceptive or irresponsible (e.g. their state secretly developing or intending to develop nuclear weapons or concealing treaty violations);² as provoking escalation (e.g. intentionally escalating tensions by attempting to provoke a nuclear war or drag alliances into direct confrontation);³ or acting as proxies for external agendas (e.g. adversaries can use polarising, degrading or vilifying language to present delegations as “puppets of foreign interests”).⁴ These tactics seek to weaken delegations’ reputations, impede coalition-building and reduce delegations’ influence in negotiations, ultimately disrupting their capacity to shape diplomatic outcomes.

ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN DELEGATIONS’ RESILIENCE AGAINST RN DISINFORMATION

This foundational best practice guidance is informed by interviews, practitioner engagement and a review of relevant policy and academic literature. It brings together sectoral insights from disciplines focusing on information perception and resulting behaviour, as well as analysis of RN disinformation dynamics in international fora, including stakeholder-specific advantages, constraints and identified practitioner needs.

Anticipate narrative risks: through scenario planning and foresight exercises (e.g. alleged treaty non-compliance, clandestine nuclear activities, safeguards manipulation, nuclear accidents, contamination risks, escalation and deterrence framing).

Establish internal thresholds: define what level of visibility, credibility and risk merits a response.

Monitor consistently and discreetly: track formal and informal channels for disinformation indicators before and during events; disinformation often exploits radiophobia, nuclear catastrophe imagery or escalation anxiety.

Log and archive: keep track of emerging narratives, including media files, before they mutate or disappear.

Verify: use IAEA, CTBT, OSINT and trusted expert materials and networks to validate emerging narratives.

Coordinate internally: clarify counter-disinfo roles across the delegation in advance of events.

Use the right channel for audience: use bilateral or informal settings to clarify low-level falsehoods; use formal tools when institutional credibility is at risk.

Maintain a professional tone but allow for emotional resonance: stick to facts and avoid speculation, but make speeches resonate emotionally.

Debrief and adapt: reflect on what worked, what did not and update procedures accordingly.

✘ Don't

✘

Respond reflexively: a hasty or defensive response can unintentionally validate false claims, politicise safeguards and verification processes, reinforce catastrophic framing or escalate deterrence narratives.

✘

Overestimate fringe content: not all disinformation warrants a response, which may inadvertently amplify the narrative.

✘

Act outside your mandate: avoid public statements or clarifications without internal alignment.

✘

Assume silence equals failure: strategic silence, combined with informal coordination, can be more effective than public rebuttal, especially where verification is ongoing, confidential or delayed by design.

✘

Isolate yourself: engage peer delegations and institutional actors early.

✘

Break message consistency across channels.

✘

Ignore emotional resonance: purely technical corrections are insufficient where RN disinformation exploits radiophobia, nuclear catastrophe imagery or escalation anxiety.

✘

Forget institutional memory: failing to document cases can lead to repetition of errors and loss of learning during staff turnover.

RN DISINFORMATION DECISION TREE: STEP-BY-STEP GUIDANCE

Step 1: Detect

A suspected RN disinformation narrative emerges in a multilateral forum through statements, procedural interventions, agenda items, draft language negotiations, technical questions or requests for clarification. Does the narrative target your delegation directly or indirectly?

Monitor silently and document. Discuss internally whether further assessment or response may be warranted.

Yes

Step 2: Assess

Is the narrative spreading beyond fringe sources? Indicators: Cited by media, mentioned by other delegations, referenced in negotiations or draft language or gaining engagement online.

Log, archive and monitor for changes.

Yes

Is the narrative being perceived as credible? Indicators: framed using technical and verification-related language, not openly questioned, cited by peers or repeated in official statements.

Consider informal prebunking, debunking or strategic silence.

Yes

Could the narrative cause institutional harm or diplomatic risk? Indicators: Undermines trust, weakens coalitions or disrupts negotiation outcomes, including by raising compliance, escalation or safety concerns in RN contexts.

Consider informal prebunking, debunking or ignoring strategically.

Yes

Can the claim be credibly and quickly verified or clarified? Consider whether this can be done within the delegation's mandate and time constraints.

Escalate internally, seek support from capital, consult IAEA, CTBT, OSINT and trusted expert materials and networks or peer coordination.

Yes

Step 3: Respond

Would a public response amplify the narrative?

Yes

Assess internally: Is a formal response warranted, or would a discreet conversation with select delegations be more effective, considering inadvertent amplification risks?

Respond formally and visibly. Options include right of reply in a multilateral forum, joint statement with other delegations or institutional actors, pre-cleared public language (press line, talking points) and supplementary materials (e.g. factsheet, technical note).

Step 4: Follow-Up

Log the case internally: include narrative summary, sources, screenshots, timeline, actions taken and outcomes.
Conduct internal debrief: review effectiveness of response, note gaps in response coordination or technical access.
Update Standard Operating Procedures or decision thresholds.
Share lessons learned with trusted partners through secure channels.
Add case to transition brief for future delegation rotations.

REFERENCES

A set of military, diplomatic, economic and informational actions that are deployed to achieve strategic objectives. See: Yevhen Mahda, Russia’s Hybrid Aggression: Lessons for the World (2018).
TACC, ‘Путин заявил, что угроза Украины создать собственное ядерное оружие не пустая бравада [Putin says Ukraine’s Threat to Develop its Own Nuclear Weapons Is Not Empty Bravado]’, 21 February 2021, .
MIKRU, ‘Экс-дипломат объяснил желание Зеленского втянуть НАТО в горячий конфликт с Россией [Former diplomat explains Zelensky’s desire to drag NATO into a heated conflict with Russia]’, 5 August 2024; Delegation of the Russian Federation, ‘Statement by the Representative of the Delegation of the Russian Federation in Exercise of the Right of Reply’, 2 August 2022.
GP WMD Counter Disinfo, ‘Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Portraying States and Organizations as Puppets’, January 2025.

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IAEA General Conference Nuclear & Radiological Disinformation Primer

Erik — Thu, 11 Sep 2025 23:19:00 +0000

COUNTERING Radiological & nuclear DISINFORMATION

RAISING AWARENESS & BUILDING RESILIENCE

GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY (IAEA GC)

BRIEFING NOTE | SEPTEMBER 2025

Disinformation by state-sponsored and state-adjacent actors has been observed in multilateral chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) forums, including the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Disinformation will likely feature at the IAEA GC. To help prepare delegations for disinformation narratives they may encounter, the GP WMD Counter Disinfo Initiative has analysed past disinformation cases and identified common narratives and their characteristics. Further information can be found at www.GPWMDCounterDisinfo.com.

WHAT IS RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (RN) DISINFORMATION

It is the deliberate spread of false or misleading information about nuclear weapons, peaceful nuclear applications (such as nuclear energy), or radiological materials. Disinformation is differentiated from misinformation by its intent to mislead, although this intent is often difficult to establish with certainty.

WHY IT MATTERS

RN disinformation can directly undermine the IAEA’s ability to deliver on its mandate by delegitimising the sources of its authority: impartiality, technical expertise and international credibility. When the IAEA is portrayed as biased or ineffective, trust is eroded, which can lead to reduced political support and financial contributions by Member States. Constraining IAEA capacity could destabilise the institution’s key roles in deterring proliferation and ensuring nuclear safety, security and peaceful cooperation.

HOW RN DISINFORMATION WORKS

RN disinformation taps into powerful psychological drivers. Radiation is widely perceived as a uniquely alarming threat, making audiences highly sensitive to distressing claims. Complex technical issues provide a high barrier to understanding and are often simplified into good-versus-evil narratives. Allegations linked to nationality, alliances or ideology also resonate strongly and deepen polarisation. Follow the link to learn more about CBRN disinformation tactics.

HOW DISINFORMATION CAN ERODE THE IAEA’S CREDIBILITY

Actors exploit: The IAEA’s obligation to remain impartial and base conclusions only on verifiable evidence.

Disinformation approach: Neutrality is reframed as political alignment with dominant powers or selective blindness to violations.

Actors exploit: The time required for IAEA inspectors, verification and technical assessment.

Disinformation approach: Slow, deliberate processes and probabilistic language are presented as deliberate concealment or collusion.

Actors exploit: The IAEA’s lack of authority to attribute blame for incidents and its requirement to use precise, consensus-driven communication.

Disinformation approach: Scope limitations are portrayed as unwillingness to act, lack of relevance or institutional weakness.

PREVIOUSLY OBSERVED DISINFORMATION VEHICLES

Plenary statements and notes verbale: insertion of misleading claims into official records.
Working papers: technical distortions in draft documents and non-papers.
Bilateral meetings: direct advocacy with skewed or falsified information.
Corridor diplomacy: informal rumours among delegations and staff.

WHAT DELEGATES CAN DO TO MINIMISE DISINFORMATION IMPACTS

Spot & Check

Watch for potentially false narratives and quietly verify with trusted technical experts and sources (e.g. safeguards implementation reports).

Escalate & Cordinate

If deemed significant, coordinate with your capital, the IAEA Secretariat’s Communications Office and trusted third parties, including experts.

Select Response

Assess whether the narrative is strategically significant and spreading widely enough to warrant a response (engagement could amplify the falsehood).

Debunk

If the decision to respond is made, use factual language to reassert the IAEA’s mandate and support individuals (inspectors, officials) if personally targeted.

LONG-TERM INSTITUTIONAL COUNTERMEASURES

Awareness

Encourage topical training on rad/nuke content for delegations and staff, and support scenario-based exercises to enhance analytic rigor.

Monitoring

Build monitoring capacity to track disinformation trends and ensure staff have access to relevant OSINT and digital analysis tools.

Assessment

Define clear response thresholds that establish when and how action should be taken, ensuring rapid and credible debunking.

Response

Prepare adaptable, pre-approved messaging templates that combine verified facts with accessible language for diverse audiences.

→ Russia’s Dirty Bomb Disinformation in Ukraine

→ Allegations of Ukrainian nuclear rearmament

→ Weaponization of nuclear power plants

The post IAEA General Conference Nuclear & Radiological Disinformation Primer appeared first on Countering WMD Disinformation.

Countering radiological & nuclear disinformation: Narratives, tactics and motivations

Erik — Fri, 25 Apr 2025 16:09:29 +0000

Countering radiological & nuclear disinformation

Narratives, tactics and motivations

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (PREPCOM) FOR THE 2026 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

BRIEFING NOTE | APRIL 2025

Disinformation* by state-sponsored and state-adjacent actors has been observed in international disarmament forums, including the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Disinformation will likely feature at the 2025 PrepCom. The Global Partnership’s WMD Counter Disinformation Initiative (GP) has analysed past relevant disinformation tactics and identified common narratives and their characteristics. This analysis aims to prepare PrepCom delegations for disinformation narratives they may encounter. Further information can be found on www.GPWMDCounterDisinfo.com.

COMMON FALSE ALLEGATIONS

Within radiological and nuclear international forums, such as the NPT, the most common vehicle Russia uses to disseminate disinformation is the “right of reply” mechanism. In contrast, its “formal statements” within the NPT have largely refrained from employing overt disinformation.^{9, 10, 15, 17, 18} Russia has frequently spread disinformation regarding the following radiological and nuclear topics:

NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

False claims Ukraine is developing nuclear weapons.

DIRTY BOMB DETONATION

False claims Ukraine is planning to detonate a dirty bomb and blame Russia for the attack.

ESCALATION WITH NATO

False claims Ukraine is intentionally attempting to drag NATO into a nuclear war with Russia.

In addition to the above examples, a central disinformation narrative has involved the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). The IAEA has identified 17 major incidents at the site.^{5, 6}Based on a review of previous “right of replies”,³ narratives likely to emerge during this 2025 NPT PrepCom include:

Ownership claims: Russia repeatedly asserts itself as the legal owner of ZNPP, framing its military occupation as necessary to protect the facility from Ukraine’s “reckless” attacks.^{7, 9, 10, 11, 16}
Accuse Ukraine of the ZNPP attacks: Russia denies all responsibility and shifts responsibility to Ukraine for shelling the facility and surrounding areas.^{7, 8, 11, 12, 13}
Calling out Western “hypocrisy”: In an effort to undermine Western credibility, Russia argues that Western media reporting and official statements are biased, frequently questioning why Ukraine’s alleged attacks on ZNPP receive less scrutiny than Russia’s occupation of the plant.^{8, 11}

DISINFORMATION TACTICS

State actors have employed a variety of disinformation tactics to mislead audiences, shape perceptions, and justify political or military actions. Such tactics have been observed across the CBRN disarmament spectrum, including in the radiological and nuclear sphere. Recognising and addressing these tactics will help NPT PrepCom participants mitigate their potential impact.

Based on our previous research, we have identified the following tactics which have been used in disinformation campaigns targeting Ukraine:

EXPLOIT DIVISIONS

Amplifies political issues to erode social trust and cohesion.

ABUSE TECHNICAL LANGUAGE

Exploits complex terminology to hinder debunking efforts.²

DISTRACT AND MISDIRECT

Diverts attention from political and military actions.¹

APPEAL TO AUTHORITY

Uses official-sounding sources to boost credibility.^{14, 17}

EMOTIONAL TRIGGERS

Incites public fear by exploiting emotive terminology.

FIREHOSE OF FALSEHOODS

Generates parallel narrative to overwhelm the audience.^{12, 13}

To prepare for potential radiological and nuclear disinformation at the upcoming NPT PrepCom, participants can take the following steps:

Recognise disinformation: Familiarise yourself with common narratives, tactics and motivations behind radiological and nuclear disinformation. The GP Counter WMD Disinfo Initiative has several factsheets of common tactics for diplomats to explore.
Promote a fact-based information environment: Discredit false narratives and strengthen technical nuclear understanding by actively sharing credible information, including authoritative sources like the IAEA.
Understand past radiological and nuclear disinformation narratives: The GP Counter WMD Disinfo Initiative have published several deep dive reports exploring Russian dirty bomb and Ukraine nuclear weapons disinformation.
Stay informed: Follow the GP Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative on social media to stay informed about emerging disinformation trends.

COUNTERING RADIOLOGICAL & NUCLEAR DISINFORMATION

→ GP Tactic Spotlights

→ Allegations of Ukrainian Nuclear Rearmament

→ Allegations of Ukrainian dirty bomb development

REFERENCES

1. András Rácz. ‘Russia Goes for Annexation and Mobilization | DGAP’. German Council on Foreign Relations, 22 September 2022. https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/russia-goes-annexation-and-mobilization.
2. Borger, Julian, and Peter Beaumont. ‘Russia Steps up Ukraine “Dirty Bomb” Claim in Letter Delivered to UN’. The Guardian, 25 October 2022, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/25/russia-to-raise-ukraine-dirty-bomb-claim-at-un-security-council.
3. Delegation of the Russian Federation at the 10th NPT Review Conference. ‘Statement by the Representative of the Delegation of the Russian Federation in Exercise of the Right of Reply’. Reaching Critical Will, 2 August 2022. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2022/statements/2Aug_Russia_RoR.pdf.
4. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). ‘Safeguards Implementation Report 2023’. International Atomic Energy Agency, 7 June 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/06/20240607_sir_2024_part_ab.pdf.
5. ‘Timeline of the IAEA’s Response Activities to the Situation in Ukraine’. Accessed 6 March 2025. https://www.iaea.org/interactive/timeline/169792.
6. ‘Two Years of IAEA Continued Presence at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant’. International Atomic Energy Agency, 3 September 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/two-years-of-iaea-continued-presence-at-the-zaporizhzhaya-nuclear-power-plant.pdf.
7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on the Kiev Regime’s Recurrent Terrorist Attacks on Energodar – The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation’, 22 June 2024. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1958650/.
8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s Comment on the UN General Assembly Adopting Ukrainian Draft Resolution “Safety and Security of Nuclear Facilities of Ukraine, Including the Zaporozhskaya Nuclear Power Plant“ – The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation’, 12 July 2024. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1961688/.
9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cluster 1: Nuclear Disarmament), Vienna, August 3, 2023’, 3 August 2023. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1900234/.
10. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Statement by the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cluster I: Nuclear Disarmament), Geneva, 25 July, 2024’, 25 July 2024. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1963583/.
11. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Выступление Управляющего От Российской Федерации, Постоянного Представителя РФ При Международных Организациях в Вене М.И.Ульянова По Пункту 8 Повестки Дня Сессии Совета Управляющих МАГАТЭ, Вена, 6 Марта 2025 Года (Statement by the Governor of the Russian Federation, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna M.I. Ulyanov on Agenda Item 8 of the IAEA Board of Governors, Vienna, March 6, 2025)’. Accessed 7 March 2025. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2001818/.
12. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna. ‘Russia’s Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s Comment in Connection with the Latest Failure to Rotate IAEA Secretariat Experts at the Zaporozhskaya NPP and Ukraine’s New Provocation against This Plant’, 12 February 2025. https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/russia_s_foreign_ministry_spokeswoman_maria_zakharova_s_comment_in_connection_with_the_latest_failur/.
13. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna. ‘Statement by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov on the Agenda Item 3 of the Session of the IAEA Board of Governors «Nuclear and Radiation Safety: Nuclear Safety Review 2025»’, 3 March 2025. https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/statement_by_permanent_representative_of_the_russian_federation_to_the_international_organizations_i_03032025/.
14. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations. ‘Remarks to the Press by First Deputy Permanent Representative Dmitry Polyanskiy Following Security Council’s AOB Discussion of the Possibility of Ukraine Creating a “Dirty Bomb”’, 25 October 2022. https://russiaun.ru/en/news/stakeout_251022#!
15. ‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on Its 2nd Session: Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’. United Nations, 2 August 2024. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceSecond_session_(2024)/NPT_CONF.2026_PC.II_07_-_07._ADVANCE_UNEDITED_VERSION_Master_1_FINAL_Report__Preparatory_Committee_2nd__session.pdf.
16. Russian Mission Vienna. ‘Выступление Постоянного Представителя Российской Федерации При Международных Организациях в Вене М.И.Ульянова По Пункту 9 Повестки Дня Сессии Совета Управляющих МАГАТЭ «Ядерная Безопасность, Физическая Ядерная Безопасность и Гарантии На Украине» (Statement by Mikhail Ulyanov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organisations in Vienna, on Agenda Item 9 of the IAEA Board of Governors “Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine”)’. Telegraph, 11 September 2024. https://telegra.ph/Vystuplenie-Postoyannogo-predstavitelya-Rossijskoj-Federacii-pri-mezhdunarodnyh-organizaciyah-v-Vene-MIUlyanova-po-punktu-9-pove-09-11.
17. ‘Summary Record (Partial) of the 18th Meeting, Held at the Vienna International Centre, Vienna, on Friday, 11 August 2023: Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1st Session’. United Nations, 7 September 2023. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/239/51/pdf/n2323951.pdf.
18. United Nations. ‘Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference Ends without Adopting Substantive Outcome Document Due to Opposition by One Member State’, 26 August 2022. https://press.un.org/en/2022/dc3850.doc.htm.

The post Countering radiological & nuclear disinformation: Narratives, tactics and motivations appeared first on Countering WMD Disinformation.

Nuclear Meetings Archives - Countering WMD Disinformation

RevCon Tactic Tracker

Games

RevCon Tactic Tracker

How do I play?

A. Appeal to Authority

B. Appeal to Emotions

C. Claims of Victimisation

D. Credibility Inflation

E. Discrediting Opponents

F. Distraction & Misdirection

Tactic Matching

How do I play?

2026 Review Conference of the NPT

Countering Radiological & Nuclear Disinformation

2026 Review Conference of the NPT

False Framing of Nuclear Policy

Weapons Acquisition Claims

Weapons Testing Allegations

Institutional Bias Allegations

Mischaracterised Infrastructure

False Facility Security Claims

Appeal to Authority

Appeal to Emotions

Claims of Victimisation

Credibility Inflation

Discrediting Opponents

Distraction & Misdirection

Manipulation of Evidence

Entities as Puppets

Recycling Narratives

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STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL DISINFORMATION

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AN INTRODUCTORY BEST PRACTICE GUIDE FOR STATE DELEGATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL FORA

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Countering radiological & nuclear disinformation: Narratives, tactics and motivations

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Narratives, tactics and motivations

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