NPT 2026 Archives - Countering WMD Disinformation

RevCon Tactic Tracker

Erik — Mon, 11 May 2026 03:28:17 +0000

Games

RevCon Tactic Tracker

How do I play?

When you detect one of these RN disinformation tactics in use, mark it on the Tracker Card. The objective is to identify both the greatest variety of tactics and the highest total number of instances.

A. Appeal to Authority

Experts, officials or institutions cited to lend false legitimacy. Sources may be fabricated, quoted out of context or speaking beyond their expertise

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B. Appeal to Emotions

Fear, outrage or grief used to persuade, often through fearmongering about radiation exposure, existential threats or imminent attack.

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C. Claims of Victimisation

Criticism recast as persecution or politically motivated hostility. Used to justify military action, nuclear posture or noncompliance.

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D. Credibility Inflation

Self-portrayal as responsible, moral or uniquely credible to make claims more believable and present oneself as a responsible nuclear actor.

□ □ □ □ □ □

E. Discrediting Opponents

Allegations of noncompliance or negligence used to undermine credibility, isolate opponents and deflect scrutiny from own conduct.

□ □ □ □ □ □

F. Distraction & Misdirection

Attention shifted to other issues to create confusion and divert scrutiny from the originator’s activities. Can be very effective during fast-moving crises

□ □ □ □ □ □

What is the GP Initiative?

Countering WMD Disinformation is a Global Partnership (GP) initiative designed to detect, analyse and counter state-sponsored and state-adjacent disinformation on weapons of mass destruction. The project helps safeguard non-proliferation norms by tracking disinformation narratives, identifying emerging trends, and developing tools and strategies to strengthen resilience and support proactive responses.

Disclaimer: It can be difficult to definitively determine whether the information you read or hear is disinformation. This game provides a starting point for identifying deceptive tactics when encountering potential CBRN disinformation. However, confirming a claim’s authenticity often requires further investigation and may not be possible in real time.

Tactic Matching

How do I play?

Correctly match each disinformation tactic (page one) with the narrative examples above by numbering the empty boxes. Turn this page upside down for the answers.

Answers: A=4, B=3, C=6, D=2, E=1, F=5

DISINFORMATION TACTICS

“State X possesses thousands of warheads and denies sovereign nations the right to peaceful nuclear energy. They possess a hegemonic posture and imperial ambition.”

“Our nation is home to a 5,000 year old civilisation and leads developing nations toward energy independence and prosperity through peaceful nuclear technology.”

“Over 500,000 people were evacuated and radioactive water dumped in the ocean – these are just a few of the many consequences of this historic disaster. The risks are existential and imminent – people are DYING!”

“State X has been endangering the safety of the nuclear power plant. All the top people at the UN and the IAEA, as well as in the world capitals, understand this and agree with us.”

“Why are we using this fora to discuss “irrelevant” developments when State X is attempting to acquire nuclear weapons with the help of several member states?”

“Our nation has been left with no choice but to rely on nuclear deterrence as a direct consequence of the coalition’s relentless expansion, vilification of our people and unwarranted aggression.”

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2026 Review Conference of the NPT

Erik — Mon, 11 May 2026 02:09:55 +0000

Countering Radiological & Nuclear Disinformation

2026 Review Conference of the NPT

BRIEFING NOTE | April 2026

Disinformation* by State-sponsored and State-adjacent actors has been observed in international disarmament forums and will likely feature at the 2026 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This briefing note aims to prepare delegations for disinformation narratives they may encounter. For further information: www.GPWMDCounterDisinfo.com.

WHAT IS RN DISINFORMATION AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?

Radiological and nuclear (RN) disinformation refers to deliberately false or manipulated information concerning radiological or nuclear technologies, materials, weapons or their associated risks and uses. Like other WMD-related disinformation, RN narratives matter because of their negative and disruptive impact in multilateral fora. See examples of the risk below:

Complicate risk communication and response coordination during emergencies.

Put technical facts in question through selective interpretation of data, reducing the impact of impartial assessments.

Create diplomatic friction and misperceptions between Member States, making collective action harder.

Weaken norm coherence and pave the way for norm fragmentation.

Distract resources and delay effective decision-making.

REVCON NARRATIVES

In the context of the 2026 NPT RevCon, such RN disinformation narratives can erode trust in shared facts, increase suspicions and harden negotiating positions. When false claims circulate, they can distort perceptions and narrow the space for compromise across the NPT’s pillars. This can weaken political support for collective measures on nuclear non-proliferation, safety, security and peaceful uses. Delegations should therefore pause to assess whether the claims they encounter are supported by credible evidence. The following false or misleading narratives are among those most likely to be encountered at RevCon:

Inflating or Fabricating Nuclear Threats

False Framing of Nuclear Policy

Narratives recasting doctrinal revisions or nuclear cooperation as offensive escalation or treaty breach – to erode state legitimacy in multilateral fora.

Weapons Acquisition Claims

Narratives alleging that a State is close to acquiring nuclear weapons, or is receiving covert external assistance – to create urgency and legitimise coercive or military action.

Weapons Testing Allegations

Narratives alleging concealed nuclear tests or preparations for testing – to stigmatise an adversary, heighten threat perceptions or normalise reciprocal actions.

Undermining Oversight and Legitimacy

Institutional Bias Allegations

Narratives portraying international bodies as ineffective or biased – to weaken perceptions of their impartiality, technical credibility and oversight functions.

Distorting the Nature or Control of Nuclear Assets

Mischaracterised Infrastructure

Narratives claimed dual-use nuclear infrastructure is purely civilian (or vice versa) – to deligitmise escalation or justify military intervention.

False Facility Security Claims

Narratives presenting an occupier or outside actor as the rightful ‘protector’ of a nuclear facility – to shift blame for attacks, accidents or instability onto others.

Disinformation Tactics

Within RN international forums, including the RevCon, the right of reply is a key vehicle for disinformation. These replies are reactive and not formally recorded, which enables further opportunities for the spread of false or misleading claims. By contrast, pre-prepared national statements often contain less overt disinformation, though they still advance selective or strategically framed narratives.

State actors draw on a range of tactics designed to deceive audiences, shape perceptions and legitimise political or military action. See our graphic below for examples of some of the most common disinformation tactics. Recognising and responding to these tactics will better equip RevCon participants to identify, contextualise and mitigate their potential impact.

CURRENT REALITIES

Appeal to Authority

Appeal to Emotions

Claims of Victimisation

Credibility Inflation

Discrediting Opponents

Distraction & Misdirection

Manipulation of Evidence

Entities as Puppets

Recycling Narratives

Want to Learn More?

Understanding theses common disinformation narratives and tactics will better equip delegations to pre-emptively debunk falsehoods, alert others to recurring patterns and build organisational and state resilience against the harmful effects of RN disinformation.

* Definitively identifying disinformation amid broader efforts to influence populations can be challenging as intent and attribution are often unclear. For brevity, this report adopts a broad definition of ‘disinformation’ that includes misinformation and other information operations, as all seek to mislead the public and shape perceptions.

→ Best practices for Countering Radiological and Nuclear Disinfo

→ Radiological and Nuclear Disinformation Roadmap

REFERENCES

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). ‘Safeguards Implementation Report 2023’. International Atomic Energy Agency, 7 June 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/06/20240607_sir_2024_part_ab.pdf.
IAEA. ‘Two Years of IAEA Continued Presence at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant’. International Atomic Energy Agency, 3 September 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/two-years-of-iaea-continued-presence-at-the-zaporizhzhaya-nuclear-power-plant.pdf.
‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on Its 2nd Session: Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’. United Nations, 2 August 2024. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceSecond_session_(2024)/NPT_CONF.2026_PC.II_07_-_07._ADVANCE_UNEDITED_VERSION_Master_1_FINAL_Report__Preparatory_Committee_2nd__session.pdf.
‘Summary Record (Partial) of the 18th Meeting, Held at the Vienna International Centre, Vienna, on Friday, 11 August 2023: Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1st Session’. United Nations, 7 September 2023. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/239/51/pdf/n2323951.pdf.
United Nations. ‘Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference Ends without Adopting Substantive Outcome Document Due to Opposition by One Member State’, 26 August 2022. https://press.un.org/en/2022/dc3850.doc.htm.
GP WMD Counter Disinfo. ‘Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Portraying States and Organizations as Puppets’. January 2025. https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/tactic-spotlight-portraying-states-and-organizations-as-puppets/.
Predictable patterns in how the human brain functions to simplify information processing, which frequently leads individuals to think about the world in distorted ways, Stephen Eldridge. ‘Cognitive Bias: Description & Examples’. Britannica. Accessed 11 April 2025. https://www.britannica.com/science/cognitive-bias.
Specific cues or narrative elements designed to provoke strong emotional reactions in the audience; Melissa L. Finucane et al., ‘The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits’, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 13, no. 1 (January 2000): 1–17, https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(200001/03)13:1<1::AID-BDM333>3.0.CO;2-S; Cameron Martel, Gordon Pennycook, and David G. Rand, ‘Reliance on Emotion Promotes Belief in Fake News’, Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications 5, no. 1 (7 October 2020): 47,
https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-020-00252-3.

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STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL DISINFORMATION TO 2026 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

Erik — Sun, 10 May 2026 17:47:59 +0000

STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL DISINFORMATION

2026 NPT Review Conference | April 2026

Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am speaking on behalf of the Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative of the 31-member Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. This initiative is funded by Canada and Germany and is implemented by The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, King’s College London and Open Nuclear Network.

As States Parties meet over the next month to review the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, we must address a growing challenge affecting multilateral discussions in the nuclear and radiological realm: the amplification and circulation of false or unverified allegations regarding safeguards, compliance or nuclear intent.

Radiological and nuclear issues are technically complex and rely on specialised verification methodologies, established evidentiary standards and clearly defined institutional mandates. When such matters are discussed or claims made without the full context, misunderstandings and opportunities for confusion can arise and positions may harden before clarification or key details are made available.

Unverified, unfounded and false allegations related to compliance, safety or intent can shape diplomatic positions before technical clarification is available. Technical findings may be selectively presented, reframed or simplified, reducing complex issues to binary narratives. This risks distorting discussions and placing delegations – particularly those without specialised technical capacity – in difficult positions, including pressure on neutral or middle-ground states to signal alignment prematurely, narrowing space for balanced engagement and increasing polarisation.

The introduction of serious allegations in multilateral settings carries particular weight. Such claims should be carefully substantiated and, where appropriate, grounded in established reporting mechanisms. Creating space for technical clarification before drawing conclusions can support stability in deliberations.

This challenge cuts across all three pillars of the Treaty.

In the context of non-proliferation, unverified claims regarding safeguards, compliance or intent can undermine confidence in verification processes and distort assessments of risk.

In the context of disarmament, inaccurate or misleading characterisation of capabilities, doctrines or commitments can deepen mistrust and complicate dialogue.

In the context of peaceful uses, misleading narratives about safety, security or intent can undermine cooperation and erode confidence in the benefits of nuclear applications.

To support the integrity of Treaty discussions, key standards should be implemented, including:

All allegations should be grounded in well-documented and verified information.
Technical assessments should be referenced in their full context.
Established clarification mechanisms should be used where uncertainties arise.

Where these standards are not met, caution should be exercised in engaging with or amplifying such claims. Verification through competent international bodies and trusted expert networks, requests for clarification through established Treaty mechanisms and internal coordination before responding should be prioritised. Where appropriate, timely and evidence-based communication should be used to clarify the record and mitigate the spread of misleading narratives.

These principles are not intended to constrain debate. They are intended to protect it. Technical assessment and political deliberation serve complementary roles within the Treaty framework.

The NPT depends on informed engagement, mutual respect and good-faith deliberation. By exercising care in how nuclear and radiological information is presented and interpreted, States Parties can reduce the risk of avoidable polarisation and preserve the integrity of this Review Conference.

We thank you for your attention.

The GP Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative

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Countering radiological & nuclear disinformation: Narratives, tactics and motivations

Erik — Fri, 25 Apr 2025 16:09:29 +0000

Countering radiological & nuclear disinformation

Narratives, tactics and motivations

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (PREPCOM) FOR THE 2026 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

BRIEFING NOTE | APRIL 2025

Disinformation* by state-sponsored and state-adjacent actors has been observed in international disarmament forums, including the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Disinformation will likely feature at the 2025 PrepCom. The Global Partnership’s WMD Counter Disinformation Initiative (GP) has analysed past relevant disinformation tactics and identified common narratives and their characteristics. This analysis aims to prepare PrepCom delegations for disinformation narratives they may encounter. Further information can be found on www.GPWMDCounterDisinfo.com.

COMMON FALSE ALLEGATIONS

Within radiological and nuclear international forums, such as the NPT, the most common vehicle Russia uses to disseminate disinformation is the “right of reply” mechanism. In contrast, its “formal statements” within the NPT have largely refrained from employing overt disinformation.^{9, 10, 15, 17, 18} Russia has frequently spread disinformation regarding the following radiological and nuclear topics:

NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

False claims Ukraine is developing nuclear weapons.

DIRTY BOMB DETONATION

False claims Ukraine is planning to detonate a dirty bomb and blame Russia for the attack.

ESCALATION WITH NATO

False claims Ukraine is intentionally attempting to drag NATO into a nuclear war with Russia.

In addition to the above examples, a central disinformation narrative has involved the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). The IAEA has identified 17 major incidents at the site.^{5, 6}Based on a review of previous “right of replies”,³ narratives likely to emerge during this 2025 NPT PrepCom include:

Ownership claims: Russia repeatedly asserts itself as the legal owner of ZNPP, framing its military occupation as necessary to protect the facility from Ukraine’s “reckless” attacks.^{7, 9, 10, 11, 16}
Accuse Ukraine of the ZNPP attacks: Russia denies all responsibility and shifts responsibility to Ukraine for shelling the facility and surrounding areas.^{7, 8, 11, 12, 13}
Calling out Western “hypocrisy”: In an effort to undermine Western credibility, Russia argues that Western media reporting and official statements are biased, frequently questioning why Ukraine’s alleged attacks on ZNPP receive less scrutiny than Russia’s occupation of the plant.^{8, 11}

DISINFORMATION TACTICS

State actors have employed a variety of disinformation tactics to mislead audiences, shape perceptions, and justify political or military actions. Such tactics have been observed across the CBRN disarmament spectrum, including in the radiological and nuclear sphere. Recognising and addressing these tactics will help NPT PrepCom participants mitigate their potential impact.

Based on our previous research, we have identified the following tactics which have been used in disinformation campaigns targeting Ukraine:

EXPLOIT DIVISIONS

Amplifies political issues to erode social trust and cohesion.

ABUSE TECHNICAL LANGUAGE

Exploits complex terminology to hinder debunking efforts.²

DISTRACT AND MISDIRECT

Diverts attention from political and military actions.¹

APPEAL TO AUTHORITY

Uses official-sounding sources to boost credibility.^{14, 17}

EMOTIONAL TRIGGERS

Incites public fear by exploiting emotive terminology.

FIREHOSE OF FALSEHOODS

Generates parallel narrative to overwhelm the audience.^{12, 13}

To prepare for potential radiological and nuclear disinformation at the upcoming NPT PrepCom, participants can take the following steps:

Recognise disinformation: Familiarise yourself with common narratives, tactics and motivations behind radiological and nuclear disinformation. The GP Counter WMD Disinfo Initiative has several factsheets of common tactics for diplomats to explore.
Promote a fact-based information environment: Discredit false narratives and strengthen technical nuclear understanding by actively sharing credible information, including authoritative sources like the IAEA.
Understand past radiological and nuclear disinformation narratives: The GP Counter WMD Disinfo Initiative have published several deep dive reports exploring Russian dirty bomb and Ukraine nuclear weapons disinformation.
Stay informed: Follow the GP Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative on social media to stay informed about emerging disinformation trends.

COUNTERING RADIOLOGICAL & NUCLEAR DISINFORMATION

→ GP Tactic Spotlights

→ Allegations of Ukrainian Nuclear Rearmament

→ Allegations of Ukrainian dirty bomb development

REFERENCES

1. András Rácz. ‘Russia Goes for Annexation and Mobilization | DGAP’. German Council on Foreign Relations, 22 September 2022. https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/russia-goes-annexation-and-mobilization.
2. Borger, Julian, and Peter Beaumont. ‘Russia Steps up Ukraine “Dirty Bomb” Claim in Letter Delivered to UN’. The Guardian, 25 October 2022, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/25/russia-to-raise-ukraine-dirty-bomb-claim-at-un-security-council.
3. Delegation of the Russian Federation at the 10th NPT Review Conference. ‘Statement by the Representative of the Delegation of the Russian Federation in Exercise of the Right of Reply’. Reaching Critical Will, 2 August 2022. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2022/statements/2Aug_Russia_RoR.pdf.
4. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). ‘Safeguards Implementation Report 2023’. International Atomic Energy Agency, 7 June 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/06/20240607_sir_2024_part_ab.pdf.
5. ‘Timeline of the IAEA’s Response Activities to the Situation in Ukraine’. Accessed 6 March 2025. https://www.iaea.org/interactive/timeline/169792.
6. ‘Two Years of IAEA Continued Presence at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant’. International Atomic Energy Agency, 3 September 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/two-years-of-iaea-continued-presence-at-the-zaporizhzhaya-nuclear-power-plant.pdf.
7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on the Kiev Regime’s Recurrent Terrorist Attacks on Energodar – The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation’, 22 June 2024. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1958650/.
8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s Comment on the UN General Assembly Adopting Ukrainian Draft Resolution “Safety and Security of Nuclear Facilities of Ukraine, Including the Zaporozhskaya Nuclear Power Plant“ – The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation’, 12 July 2024. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1961688/.
9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cluster 1: Nuclear Disarmament), Vienna, August 3, 2023’, 3 August 2023. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1900234/.
10. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Statement by the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cluster I: Nuclear Disarmament), Geneva, 25 July, 2024’, 25 July 2024. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1963583/.
11. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Выступление Управляющего От Российской Федерации, Постоянного Представителя РФ При Международных Организациях в Вене М.И.Ульянова По Пункту 8 Повестки Дня Сессии Совета Управляющих МАГАТЭ, Вена, 6 Марта 2025 Года (Statement by the Governor of the Russian Federation, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna M.I. Ulyanov on Agenda Item 8 of the IAEA Board of Governors, Vienna, March 6, 2025)’. Accessed 7 March 2025. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2001818/.
12. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna. ‘Russia’s Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s Comment in Connection with the Latest Failure to Rotate IAEA Secretariat Experts at the Zaporozhskaya NPP and Ukraine’s New Provocation against This Plant’, 12 February 2025. https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/russia_s_foreign_ministry_spokeswoman_maria_zakharova_s_comment_in_connection_with_the_latest_failur/.
13. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna. ‘Statement by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov on the Agenda Item 3 of the Session of the IAEA Board of Governors «Nuclear and Radiation Safety: Nuclear Safety Review 2025»’, 3 March 2025. https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/statement_by_permanent_representative_of_the_russian_federation_to_the_international_organizations_i_03032025/.
14. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations. ‘Remarks to the Press by First Deputy Permanent Representative Dmitry Polyanskiy Following Security Council’s AOB Discussion of the Possibility of Ukraine Creating a “Dirty Bomb”’, 25 October 2022. https://russiaun.ru/en/news/stakeout_251022#!
15. ‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on Its 2nd Session: Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’. United Nations, 2 August 2024. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceSecond_session_(2024)/NPT_CONF.2026_PC.II_07_-_07._ADVANCE_UNEDITED_VERSION_Master_1_FINAL_Report__Preparatory_Committee_2nd__session.pdf.
16. Russian Mission Vienna. ‘Выступление Постоянного Представителя Российской Федерации При Международных Организациях в Вене М.И.Ульянова По Пункту 9 Повестки Дня Сессии Совета Управляющих МАГАТЭ «Ядерная Безопасность, Физическая Ядерная Безопасность и Гарантии На Украине» (Statement by Mikhail Ulyanov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organisations in Vienna, on Agenda Item 9 of the IAEA Board of Governors “Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine”)’. Telegraph, 11 September 2024. https://telegra.ph/Vystuplenie-Postoyannogo-predstavitelya-Rossijskoj-Federacii-pri-mezhdunarodnyh-organizaciyah-v-Vene-MIUlyanova-po-punktu-9-pove-09-11.
17. ‘Summary Record (Partial) of the 18th Meeting, Held at the Vienna International Centre, Vienna, on Friday, 11 August 2023: Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1st Session’. United Nations, 7 September 2023. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/239/51/pdf/n2323951.pdf.
18. United Nations. ‘Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference Ends without Adopting Substantive Outcome Document Due to Opposition by One Member State’, 26 August 2022. https://press.un.org/en/2022/dc3850.doc.htm.

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NPT 2026 Archives - Countering WMD Disinformation

RevCon Tactic Tracker

Games

RevCon Tactic Tracker

How do I play?

A. Appeal to Authority

B. Appeal to Emotions

C. Claims of Victimisation

D. Credibility Inflation

E. Discrediting Opponents

F. Distraction & Misdirection

Tactic Matching

How do I play?

2026 Review Conference of the NPT

Countering Radiological & Nuclear Disinformation

2026 Review Conference of the NPT

False Framing of Nuclear Policy

Weapons Acquisition Claims

Weapons Testing Allegations

Institutional Bias Allegations

Mischaracterised Infrastructure

False Facility Security Claims

Appeal to Authority

Appeal to Emotions

Claims of Victimisation

Credibility Inflation

Discrediting Opponents

Distraction & Misdirection

Manipulation of Evidence

Entities as Puppets

Recycling Narratives

Read More:

STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL DISINFORMATION TO 2026 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL DISINFORMATION

Countering radiological & nuclear disinformation: Narratives, tactics and motivations

Countering radiological & nuclear disinformation

Narratives, tactics and motivations

READ MORE: