Education Tools Archives - Countering WMD Disinformation https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/category/education-tools/ Countering CBRN Disinformation Fri, 29 May 2026 20:48:25 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.9.4 https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/cropped-KCL1115_GPWMD_Logo_RGB-AW-32x32.png Education Tools Archives - Countering WMD Disinformation https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/category/education-tools/ 32 32 239085621 RevCon Tactic Tracker https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/revcon-tactic-tracker/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=revcon-tactic-tracker Mon, 11 May 2026 03:28:17 +0000 https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/?page_id=6258 Games RevCon Tactic Tracker How do I play? When you detect one of these RN disinformation tactics in use, mark […]

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Games

RevCon Tactic Tracker

How do I play?

When you detect one of these RN disinformation tactics in use, mark it on the Tracker Card. The objective is to identify both the greatest variety of tactics and the highest total number of instances.

A. Appeal to Authority

Experts, officials or institutions cited to lend false legitimacy. Sources may be fabricated, quoted out of context or speaking beyond their expertise

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B. Appeal to Emotions

Fear, outrage or grief used to persuade, often through fearmongering about radiation exposure, existential threats or imminent attack.

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C. Claims of Victimisation

Criticism recast as persecution or politically motivated hostility. Used to justify military action, nuclear posture or noncompliance.

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D. Credibility Inflation

Self-portrayal as responsible, moral or uniquely credible to make claims more believable and present oneself as a responsible nuclear actor.

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E. Discrediting Opponents

Allegations of noncompliance or negligence used to undermine credibility, isolate opponents and deflect scrutiny from own conduct.

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F. Distraction & Misdirection

Attention shifted to other issues to create confusion and divert scrutiny from the originator’s activities. Can be very effective during fast-moving crises

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What is the GP Initiative?

Countering WMD Disinformation is a Global Partnership (GP) initiative designed to detect, analyse and counter state-sponsored and state-adjacent disinformation on weapons of mass destruction. The project helps safeguard non-proliferation norms by tracking disinformation narratives, identifying emerging trends, and developing tools and strategies to strengthen resilience and support proactive responses.

Disclaimer: It can be difficult to definitively determine whether the information you read or hear is disinformation. This game provides a starting point for identifying deceptive tactics when encountering potential CBRN disinformation. However, confirming a claim’s authenticity often requires further investigation and may not be possible in real time.

Tactic Matching

How do I play?

Correctly match each disinformation tactic (page one) with the narrative examples above by numbering the empty boxes. Turn this page upside down for the answers.

Answers: A=4, B=3, C=6, D=2, E=1, F=5

DISINFORMATION TACTICS

“State X possesses thousands of warheads and denies sovereign nations the right to peaceful nuclear energy. They possess a hegemonic posture and imperial ambition.”

“Our nation is home to a 5,000 year old civilisation and leads developing nations toward energy independence and prosperity through peaceful nuclear technology.”

“Over 500,000 people were evacuated and radioactive water dumped in the ocean – these are just a few of the many consequences of this historic disaster. The risks are existential and imminent – people are DYING!”

“State X has been endangering the safety of the nuclear power plant. All the top people at the UN and the IAEA, as well as in the world capitals, understand this and agree with us.”

“Why are we using this fora to discuss “irrelevant” developments when State X is attempting to acquire nuclear weapons with the help of several member states?”

“Our nation has been left with no choice but to rely on nuclear deterrence as a direct consequence of the coalition’s relentless expansion, vilification of our people and unwarranted aggression.”

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]]> 6258 Weaponization of Nuclear Power Plants https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/weaponization-of-nuclear-power-plants/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=weaponization-of-nuclear-power-plants Sat, 16 Aug 2025 14:03:29 +0000 https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/?page_id=5133 UNDERSTANDING DISINFORMATION IN UKRAINE WEAPONIZATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS BACKGROUND Disinformation targeting nuclear power plants (NPPs) has historically been employed […]

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UNDERSTANDING DISINFORMATION IN UKRAINE

WEAPONIZATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

BACKGROUND

Disinformation targeting nuclear power plants (NPPs) has historically been employed by both state and non-state actors to erode public trust in governments and nuclear energy.1 Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, physical incidents at NPPs (shelling, power loss and drone attacks) have become frequent (see timeline), fuelling these disinformation narratives while obscuring culpability and manipulating public opinion.

While ZNPP has been central to ongoing radiological and nuclear disinformation, ChNPP and KNPP have also featured in the information operation. References to ChNPP often tap into historical radiological anxieties,3 while military activities near KNPP are used to depict Ukraine as a threat to Russian nuclear security.4 Each site plays a distinct role: ZNPP as an occupied and compromised site, ChNPP as a symbol of past catastrophe, and KNPP as a vehicle for cross-border escalation narratives.

VERIFICATION CHALLENGES

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has recorded multiple safety incidents at ZNPP, including drone strikes, off-site power losses, shelling, gunfire and cooling water shortages.5 Attribution for many incidents remains disputed with both sides denying responsibility and accusing the other of staging attacks.6 These narratives amount to disinformation when they involve deliberately false claims, but broader attempts to deflect blame and influence international perception are often better understood as components of wider information operations. Rotation of IAEA staff to ZNPP has been often delayed due to military activity.7 These delays complicate timely verification of nuclear materials and risk safe operations.8 Despite ongoing military activities and incidents at ZNPP and the connected disinformation narratives, the IAEA has confirmed that there is no immediate risk of a radiological leak, with radiation levels remaining within normal parameters.9

STRATEGIC AIMS

Disinformation campaigns around NPPs, particularly ZNPP, appear to reflect a deliberate effort to exploit nuclear infrastructure for the following military, political, and psychological advantage:

 

  1. Justifying Military Presence:10 By framing control of ZNPP as a measure of nuclear risk management, occupation shifts from a violation of sovereignty to a promotion of nuclear safety.
  2. Delegitimising Ukraine’s Reputation:11 Narratives that cast Ukraine as incapable or reckless with nuclear infrastructure erode international confidence in its governance. 12
  3. Blurring Global Norms: Undermining of long-standing norms that civilian nuclear facilities should be excluded from military operations, a principle aimed at preserving their safety during conflict.

TACTIC COMPARISON

Despite differences in the narratives surrounding the ZNPP, ChNPP, and KNPP, consistent disinformation tactics are evident across all three cases. The most prominent techniques include:

Unsubstantiated Attribution

Attributing harm or negligence to deliberate adversary actions without substantiated evidence, to shape international perception.

Manipulating Content

Using altered imagery, selectively framed data, or misleading video to fabricate or distort evidence in support of false narratives.

Emotional Triggers13

Amplifying anxiety through alarmist rhetoric or exaggerated consequences to provoke panic and erode public trust in official information.

Firehose of Falsehoods14

Disseminating large volumes of misleading or contradictory information across multiple channels to confuse audiences and crowd out accurate reporting.

The presence of these disinformation tactics across three diverse examples suggests they constitute a blueprint likely to be reused in future conflicts involving NPPs. Developing a nuanced understanding of this disinformation toolkit is essential for building resilience and ensuring effective crisis response.

CONCLUSION

Disinformation during conflict can threaten nuclear safety by distorting threats, provoking risky actions, and delaying response. It disrupts the ability of institutions like the IAEA to operate effectively and reveals gaps in global mechanisms meant to protect nuclear sites during conflict. ZNPP specifically demonstrates how these dynamics heighten the risk of escalation.

 

These NPP crises not only challenge Ukraine’s legitimacy but expose vulnerabilities in global nuclear governance frameworks.15 With disinformation increasing confusion and mistrust around nuclear facilities under occupation and within active war zones, institutions must adapt by strengthening safety measures, assessing protocols and implementing crisis communication strategies.

TIMELINE

24 February 2022

Russia launches full-scale invasion, occupies ChNPP.

4 March 2022

RRussia occupies ZNPP.

31 March 2022

Russian forces withdraw from ChNPP.

5 August 2022

Initial reports of shelling damage to infrastructure at ZNPP.

25 August 2022

First loss of off-site power at ZNPP. (Off-site power is lost nine times between Aug 2022 and Jul 2025).

23 November 2022

Nationwide blackout affects all Ukrainian NPPs.

6 June 2023

Kakhovka Dam collapses, impacting ZNPP’s cooling water reserves.

3 October 2023

Reports of drone attacks near KNPP.

11 August 2024

Fire damages ZNPP cooling tower after a drone attack.

14 February 2025

Drone strike hits ChNPP’s New Safe Confinement dome.

August 2025

READ MORE:

→ Global Partnership Tactic Spotlights

REFERENCES

  1. Helen Davidson, “State-backed Disinformation Fueling Anger in China Over Fukushima Water,” The Guardian, September 4, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/sep/04/state-backed-disinformation-fuelling-anger-in-china-over-fukushima-wastewater-japan.
  2. Laurence Peter, ‘Ukraine War: Chernobyl Scarred by Russian Troops’ Damage and Looting’, BBC, 3 June 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61685643; Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Reference to Past Crises’, GP Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative, October 2024, https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/reference-to-past-crises/; Sergey Radchenko, ‘Fearing Russia’s Futures’, Engelsberg Ideas (blog), 23 February 2024, https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/fearing-russias-futures/.
  3. ‘Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Reference to Past Crises’, GP Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative, October 2024, https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/reference-to-past-crises/; Sergey Radchenko, ‘Fearing Russia’s Futures’, Engelsberg Ideas (blog), 23 February 2024, https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/fearing-russias-futures/.
  4. Reuters, ‘Russia Intercepts Drone near Kursk, No Damage to Nuclear Plant, Governor Says’, Reuters, 3 October 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-intercepts-drone-near-kursk-no-damage-nuclear-plant-governor-says-2024-10-03/; Darya Dolzikova, ‘Kursk Nuclear Power Plant: The Newest Target for Russian Disinformation’, RUSI, 28 March 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/kursk-nuclear-power-plant-newest-target-russian-disinformation.
  5. International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘Timeline of the IAEA’s Response Activities to the Situation in Ukraine’, accessed 17 February 2025, https://www.iaea.org/interactive/timeline/169792.
  6. ‘Ukraine, Russia Blame Each Other for Shelling of Nuclear Plant’. Reuters, 11 August 2022, sec. Europe. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-energoatom-says-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-shelled-again-2022-08-11/; ‘Drone Strikes Chornobyl Nuclear Plant in Ukraine, Russia Says Not to Blame’. Al Jazeera, 14 February 2025. International Atomic Energy Agency.
  7. International Atomic Energy Agency. ‘Update 274 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine’. IAEA, 12 February 2025. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-274-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.
  8. ‘IAEA Postpones Mission Rotation to Nuclear Plant Due to Lack of Russian Guarantees, Kyiv Says’. 5 February 2025, sec. Europe. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/iaea-postpones-rotation-mission-zaporizhzhia-plant-due-lack-security-guarantees-2025-02-05/.
  9. International Atomic Energy Agency. ‘Update 295 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine’. IAEA, 5 June 2025. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-295-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.
  10. ‘Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Framing Russia as a Savior’, GP Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative, January 2025, https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/tactic-spotlight-russia-as-savior/; Iuliia Hoban and Alex Rister, ‘Nuclear Anxiety as an Instrument of War: The Use of News Media to Shape and Respond to the Disinformation Campaign Surrounding the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant’, Media, War & Conflict, 12 June 2024, 17506352241256575, https://doi.org/10.1177/17506352241256575.
  11. ‘Disinformation Tactic Spotlight: Portraying States and Organizations as Puppets’, GP Countering WMD Disinformation, January 2025, https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/tactic-spotlight-portraying-states-and-organizations-as-puppets/.
  12. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ‘Statement by the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cluster I: Nuclear Disarmament), Geneva, 25 July, 2024’.
  13. American Nuclear Society. ‘American and European Nuclear Societies Issue Joint Statement Denouncing Attacks on Ukraine’s Nuclear Facilities and Misinformation’, 6 April 2022. https://www.ans.org/news/article-3823/american-and-european-nuclear-societies-issue-joint-statement/; Mark Wolverton. ‘Radiation Risks Are Real. But No Cause for Radiophobia.’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 16 September 2019. https://thebulletin.org/2019/09/radiation-risks-are-real-but-no-cause-for-radiophobia/.
  14. Miriam Matthews, ‘The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model’, RAND, July 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html
  15. Scott Roecker, ‘Nuclear Power Plants Under Attack: The Legacy of Zaporizhzhia’, Arms Control Association, April 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-04/features/nuclear-power-plants-under-attack-legacy-zaporizhzhia#bio.

 

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]]> 5133 Allegations of Ukrainian Nuclear Rearmament https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/allegations-of-ukrainian-nuclear-rearmament/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=allegations-of-ukrainian-nuclear-rearmament Sat, 08 Feb 2025 00:12:00 +0000 https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/?page_id=4488 UNDERSTANDING DISINFORMATION IN UKRAINE ALLEGATIONS OF UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR REARMAMENT Disinformation narrative: Russia deliberately promotes existing misinformation about Ukraine’s potential nuclear […]

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UNDERSTANDING DISINFORMATION IN UKRAINE

ALLEGATIONS OF UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR REARMAMENT

Disinformation narrative: Russia deliberately promotes existing misinformation about Ukraine’s potential nuclear rearmament, creating a disinformation narrative that seeks to justify its invasion and deflect attention from its own suspension of non-proliferation initiatives. Ukraine’s contradictory statements inadvertently amplify this disinformation.

 

Implications: This targeted disinformation aims to damage Ukraine’s credibility within the international community and erode Western military support.

 

Recommendations: Ukraine should prioritise consistent and unambiguous messaging around its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); Western media and policymakers should ensure quality reporting to prevent the spread of misinformation; and governmental agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international bodies should proactively debunk false narratives to expose Russia’s tactics and reaffirm global commitments to non-proliferation.

KEY POINTS

BACKGROUND

Discussions about Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament can be traced back to 1991, when it inherited roughly 4,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons that were stationed on its territory.1 Unlike Kazakhstan and Belarus, which also acquired nuclear weapons during the Soviet Union’s collapse but agreed to give them up quickly, Ukraine underwent significant internal debate about whether to retain its stockpile.

 

Kyiv’s eventual decision to relinquish its nuclear weapons was influenced by international political pressure, Moscow’s operational control over the weapons and economic and safety issues.2 Importantly, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum affirmed that Russia, the UK, the US3 would “refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine”.4 In exchange, Kyiv agreed to transfer its nuclear arsenal to Moscow and join the NPT.5 Initially praised for preventing nuclear proliferation, the Memorandum later became a source of grievance after Russia repeatedly violated Ukraine’s sovereignty6 (see timeline).

RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION

Moscow generates disinformation by deliberately amplifying existing misinformation about Ukraine’s indigenous technical capabilities and the amount of time needed to develop a viable nuclear deterrent. This fusion of factual elements with falsehoods makes these information operations especially difficult to counter and refute.7 Moscow’s disinformation campaign highly likely serves several purposes:

 

  • Justification for military aggression: Russia rationalises its invasion by undermining Kyiv’s reputation as a responsible international.8 9
  • Fearmongering: By conflating the unrelated “dirty bomb” (see previous report) and nuclear weapons development narratives, Russia amplifies public fears that supporting Ukraine could lead to nuclear escalation.10 11
  • Distraction from own nuclear activity:12 The nuclear rearmament narrative diverts attention from Russia’s suspension of non-proliferation efforts and its nuclear threats against the West.

UKRAINIAN INTENT

Despite fuelling Russia’s disinformation narratives, Kyiv’s contradictory13 14 statements about nuclear rearmament (see timeline) might aim to achieve any combination of the following objectives:

 

  • Influence Western support: Remind allies that withdrawing or reducing military assistance could destabilise nuclear non-proliferation efforts.
  • Undermine disinformation narratives: Shift the spotlight onto the failures of the Budapest Memorandum and highlight Russia’s responsibility for destabilising non-proliferation norms.
  • Signal genuine intent: Prepare the information space for a future official policy shift from NPT adherence to nuclear rearmament.

FUTURE OUTLOOK

Calls for a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine are growing.15 16 If Kyiv is unable to secure NATO membership or receive bilateral security guarantees from the US as part of a future peace settlement, Ukraine could consider developing nuclear weapons as a deterrent against further Russian aggression.

 

While Ukraine may explore rearmament, successfully rebuilding its nuclear capabilities is highly unlikely due to significant technical and political challenges. Developing a nuclear deterrent would likely take multiple years and require currently absent indigenous capabilities.17 Any covert efforts would almost certainly be exposed, undermining diplomatic support from key allies. Disinformation around the threats posed by nuclear rearmament could also be exploited as pretext for renewed military action.

 

Additionally, aggression against Ukraine has inadvertently highlighted the dangers of nuclear disarmament. Moscow’s actions may embolden nations such as Iran and North Korea to further pursue nuclear deterrence while avoiding denuclearisation talks, damaging non-proliferation efforts.18

CONCLUSION

To counter targeted disinformation narratives:

 

  • Ukrainian officials: should prioritise consistent and unambiguous messaging around Kyiv’s commitment to the NPT to avoid undermining international confidence in non-proliferation frameworks.
  • Western media and policymakers: should deepen their understanding of the technical and legal barriers to Ukraine restoring its nuclear weapon status – to prevent inadvertently spreading disinformation.
  • Governments, NGOs and international bodies: should take a more proactive and responsive role in debunking these narratives.

By exposing disinformation tactics and reinforcing Ukraine’s non-nuclear status, the international community can discredit these narratives while reaffirming global norms against nuclear proliferation.

TIMELINE

1994

Ukraine signs the Budapest Memorandum, giving up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurances. It also joins the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state.

2014

Russia annexes Crimea and supports pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas.


Some Ukrainian politicians begin advocating for nuclear rearmament, although this doesn’t become state policy.

February 2022

President Zelenskyy warns adherence to the Budapest Memorandum is in doubt unless the West assures Ukraine’s security.


President Putin cites Ukraine’s nuclear rhetoric as a justification for Russia’s full-scale invasion.

March 2022

Foreign Minister Lavrov declares Russia will take all necessary measures to prevent Ukraine from regaining nuclear weapons.


Russia’s disinformation shifts focus from nuclear rearmament to the “dirty bomb” narrative.

June 2024

In its annual safeguard report, the IAEA again finds no indication that Ukraine is weaponising its nuclear material for non-peaceful activities.19

October 2024

President Zelenskyy states that Ukraine will either join NATO or obtain nuclear weapons.


Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry reaffirms that Kyiv remains committed to the NPT.

November 2024

Changes in US leadership raise concerns about possible reductions in military aid to Ukraine.


Rearmament concerns are amplified by poor analysis and inaccurate mainstream media reporting which misrepresents officials’ positions and downplays the complexities of nuclear weapon development.20 21


President Putin amplifies this media reporting, reiterating that Russia will not allow Ukraine to develop nuclear weapons.

January 2025

REFERENCES

  1. ‘Nuclear Disarmament Ukraine’, The Nuclear Threat Initiative (blog), 29 October 2024, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/ukraine-nuclear-disarmament/.
  2. Barry R. Schneider, William L. Dowdy, ‘Why Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons: nonproliferation incentives and disincentives’, Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear Threats (journal), 1998.
  3. Alexander Pikayev, ‘POST-SOVIET RUSSIA AND UKRAINE: WHO CAN PUSH THE BUTTON?’, The Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1994, https://web.archive.org/web/20140808054400/http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/pikaye13.pdf.
  4. Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances, 1994 – Council on Foreign Relations’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 December 1994, https://web.archive.org/web/20170312052208/http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/budapest-memorandums-security-assurances-1994/p32484.
  5. ‘Nuclear Disarmament Ukraine’.
  6. Budjeryn, Mariana. ‘“NATO or Nukes”: Why Ukraine’s Nuclear Revival Refuses to Die’. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (blog), 1 November 2024. https://thebulletin.org/2024/11/nato-or-nukes-why-ukraines-nuclear-revival-refuses-to-die/.
  7. ГЛАВКОМ. ‘Володимир Огризко: Україні слід ставити питання про вихід з договору про нерозповсюдження ядерної зброї’, 5 March https://glavcom.ua/publications/124109-volodimir-ogrizko-ukrajini-slid-staviti-pitannja-pro-vihid-z-dogovoru-pro-nerozpovsjudzhennja-jadernoji-zbroji.html.
  8. ‘Vladimir Putin – Speech on the Donbass and the Situation in Ukraine (Transcript-Video)’, accessed 10 December 2024, https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/vladimirputindonbassandukraine.htm.
  9. Sergey Lavrov, ‘Statement by Sergey Lavrov at the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva.’, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 3 January 2022, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1802148/.
  10. ‘Disinfo: Kyiv Passed from Rejecting Nuclear Weapons to Preparing a Dirty Bomb’, EUvsDisinfo, accessed 29 November 2024, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/kyiv-passed-from-rejecting-nuclear-weapons-to-preparing-a-dirty-bomb/.
  11. ‘Russia, without Evidence, Says Ukraine Making Nuclear “Dirty Bomb”’, Reuters, 6 March 2022, sec. Europe, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-without-evidence-says-ukraine-making-nuclear-dirty-bomb-2022-03-06/.
  12. GP Countering WMD Disinformation. ‘Disinfornation Tactic Spotlight: Distraction and Misdirection’. Accessed 24 January 2025. https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/distraction-and-misdirection/.
  13. Budjeryn, ‘NATO or Nukes’.
  14. Tucker, Maxim. ‘Could Zelensky Use Nuclear Bombs? Ukraine’s Options Explained’, 14 November 2024. https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/zelensky-nuclear-weapons-bomb-0ddjrs5hw.
  15. Michael McFaul, ‘How Trump Can End the War in Ukraine: Convince Kyiv to Trade Land for NATO Membership’, 12 December 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-trump-can-end-war-ukraine.
  16. Edward Helmore, ‘Trump’s Ukraine Envoy Pick Proposed Forcing Peace Talks by Withdrawing US Weapons’, The Guardian, 28 November 2024, sec. US news, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/28/trump-keith-kellogg-russia-ukraine.
  17. The G7 Global Partnership Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative. ‘Letter to the Editor: Addressing Misleading Claims on Ukraine’s Nuclear Capabilities.’ November 2024.
  18. William J. Broad, ‘Ukraine Gave Up a Giant Nuclear Arsenal 30 Years Ago. Today There Are Regrets.’, The New York Times, 5 February 2022, sec. Science, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/05/science/ukraine-nuclear-weapons.html.
  19. IAEA, Safeguards Implementation Report 2023”, 07 June 2024, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/06/20240607_sir_2024_part_ab.pdf
  20. Helene Cooper et al., ‘Trump’s Vow to End the War Could Leave Ukraine With Few Options’, The New York Times, 21 November 2024, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/21/us/politics/trump-russia-ukraine-war.html.
  21. Tucker, ‘Could Zelensky Use Nuclear Bombs? Ukraine’s Options Explained’.
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]]> 4488 Strategy and Impacts of CW Disinformation https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/chemical-weapons-disinformation-primer/strategy-and-impacts-of-cw-disinformation/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=strategy-and-impacts-of-cw-disinformation Sun, 24 Nov 2024 14:42:28 +0000 https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/?page_id=3741 Chemical Weapons Disinformation in Ukraine​ Brief 1 UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA’S CHEMICAL WEAPONS ALLEGATIONS IN UKRAINE Brief 2 SELECTED EXAMPLES OF CW […]

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Chemical Weapons Disinformation in Ukraine​

Brief 1

UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA’S CHEMICAL WEAPONS ALLEGATIONS IN UKRAINE

Brief 2

SELECTED EXAMPLES OF CW ALLEGATIONS AND RELATED DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Brief 3

STRATEGY AND IMPACTS OF CW DISINFORMATION

STRATEGY AND IMPACTS OF CW DISINFORMATION

BRIEF 3/3 | NOVEMBER 2024

Disinformation plays a crucial role in shaping perceptions, influencing diplomatic outcomes, and diverting attention. Russian allegations against Ukraine concerning the use of chemical weapons (CW) have been a central part of this strategy. These claims are not simply reactive responses to specific events; they are part of a calculated effort to shape conflict narratives to confuse international observers and deflect attention from alleged transgressions of international law.

STRATEGIC AIMS
  1. Deflection of Blame

Russia’s allegations fit into a broader strategy which is seeking to shift the blame for chemical weapons use onto Ukraine. By accusing Ukraine of chemical warfare, Russia attempts to position itself as the victim of a false narrative, claiming to be targeted by unsubstantiated attacks. This tactic serves two purposes: it deflects attention away from Russia’s own violations of international norms, and it undermines the credibility of Ukrainian and international claims. Russian allegations are often directed with little or no evidence, but their repetition contributes to a growing atmosphere of confusion that can hamper efforts to hold Russia accountable for its actions.

 

  1. Justification for Potential Action

Another strategic aim of these allegations is to set the stage for Russia’s own potential use of chemical weapons. By framing accusations of Ukrainian chemical attacks as a pre-emptive move, Russia can lay the groundwork to justify the use of chemical weapons on the battlefield. This tactic further aligns with concerns expressed by the US, UK, and Ukraine about the possibility of “false flag” operations, in which Russia might stage chemical attacks to falsely implicate Ukraine. These pre-emptive accusations create a framework in which any future Russian use of chemical weapons can be justified as retaliation or as a defensive response to Ukrainian “provocations.”

 

  1. Discrediting Ukraine and International Allies

By accusing Ukraine of chemical weapon use, Russia seeks to frame Ukraine—and by extension, its allies—as aggressors or violators of international law. These allegations are part of a broader strategy to undermine Ukraine’s legitimacy on the world stage, presenting it as a rogue state that ignores the laws of war and the disarmament treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Furthermore, by focusing on the actions of the US and NATO, Russia attempts to discredit the support Ukraine receives from the West, portraying it as an enabler of Ukrainian violations. By continuously disseminating CW-related disinformation, Russia aims to polarise the geopolitical landscape.

IMPACTS ON CONFLICT DYNAMICS

  1. Complicating Accountability

The stream of unverified claims and manipulated evidence complicates the process of accountability for contraventions of the norms, laws and guidelines under threat during the ongoing conflict. International bodies, such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), can struggle to determine the veracity of claims when accusations are constantly reported. The volume of disinformation makes it challenging for these organisations to distinguish between genuine threats and fabricated claims.

 

  1. Erosion of Trust in International Monitoring

The effectiveness of international monitoring bodies such as the OPCW has been undermined by the ongoing disinformation campaign. When evidence regarding allegations is inconsistent or unverifiable, international organisations are left with limited options. The repeated lack and volume of clear evidence leads to a situation where organisations tasked with monitoring CW can lose credibility, as they are unable to confirm or refute the claims. This erosion of trust not only hampers the credibility of international monitoring but may also reduce the deterrent these bodies have on states considering the use of CW.

 

  1. Increased Tensions and Sanctions

The disinformation surrounding the alleged use of chemical weapons has contributed to increased diplomatic tensions. These allegations have sparked a cycle of retaliatory sanctions, as the US, EU, and their allies impose financial and economic penalties on Russian entities in response to accusations of chemical weapons use. The ongoing accusations feed into a broader narrative of escalating tensions, with each new claim prompting further punitive measures and deepening divisions.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

  1. Role of the OPCW and UN

International organisations, particularly the OPCW and the United Nations (UN), face significant challenges responding to chemical weapons allegations due to the lack of verifiable evidence and the complexity of the claims. The OPCW has struggled to verify allegations made by both Russia and Ukraine, as the limited or contradictory information available makes it difficult to establish reliable facts. This challenge is compounded by the high volume of claims, which not only raises concerns about the authenticity of specific reports but also overwhelms the OPCW’s ability to conduct thorough investigations. As a result, the OPCW’s ability to independently verify chemical weapons use has been severely hampered, preventing clear conclusions and effective responses.

 

In the absence of conclusive proof, these organisations are often forced to issue generic statements or suspend investigations, which further fuels scepticism and disinformation.  The competing narratives make it difficult for the international organisations to take decisive action with regards to accountability.

 

For example, the OPCW’s recent Technical Assistance Visit (TAV) to Ukraine in November 2024, following allegations from Ukraine of toxic chemical use near Illinka, provides a clear instance of these challenges. In response to Ukrains request for a TAV the OPCW team corroborated the chain of custody for samples provided by Ukraine, confirming the presence of the riot control agent CS in both soil and grenade samples. However, the OPCW noted that the use of riot control agents as weapons of war is prohibited under the CWC, which highlights the difficulty of managing competing allegations while ensuring compliance with international norms.

 

Despite the OPCW’s rigorous methods, including independent analysis by designated laboratories and witness testimonies, such incidents underscore the ongoing challenges of verifying chemical weapons use. These complexities are not limited to the verification of false claims, but also involve the logistical and technical hurdles of gathering consistent, reliable evidence amid ongoing conflict.

 

  1. Sanctions and Diplomatic Pressure

The United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom have imposed sanctions on Russian entities and individuals associated with the spread of false information or the alleged use of CW. These sanctions are intended to punish Russia and deter further escalation. However, they also serve as a diplomatic tool to signal disapproval of Russia’s actions and to bolster the credibility of Ukraine’s claims. In addition, the international diplomatic pressure on Russia has been amplified by the allegations, which have become a focal point for global debates on the ethics of warfare and the use of CW.

 

The increasing readiness of States Parties to call out Russian disinformation relating to chemical weapons reflects the growing concern over the implications of Russia’s disinformation campaign, which undermines efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict. As accusations of chemical weapons use continue to surface, international powers are increasingly aligning with Ukraine’s calls for greater international scrutiny and accountability, further isolating Russia from the global community.

CONCLUSION

Russia’s use of disinformation about Ukraine’s chemical weapons is a strategic tool designed to deflect blame, justify potential future actions, and discredit both Ukraine and its supporters. By complicating accountability, eroding trust in international monitoring, and prompting retaliatory sanctions, these allegations are impacting the dynamics of the conflict at the international level. The ongoing responses from international organisations such as the OPCW and the UN, have been limited by the lack of verifiable evidence, highlighting the challenges posed by disinformation amidst ongoing conflict hostilities. The international community’s response, including sanctions and diplomatic pressure, reflects the growing recognition of the dangers posed by Russia’s disinformation campaign, and the need for a unified stance against the use of chemical weapons.

READ MORE:

→ Chemical Weapons in Ukraine | Policy Brief 1/3

→ Chemical Weapons in Ukraine | Policy Brief 2/3

→ Chemical Weapons in Ukraine | Policy Brief 3/3

→ What is chemical weapons disinformation?

→ Russia’s July 2024 Note Verbale debunked

Download PDF
Policy Briefs

The post Strategy and Impacts of CW Disinformation appeared first on Countering WMD Disinformation.

]]> 3741 Selected Examples of CW Allegations and Related Disinformation Campaigns from the Russian Federation https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/chemical-weapons-disinformation-primer/selected-examples-of-cw-allegations-and-related-disinformation-campaigns-from-the-russian-federation/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=selected-examples-of-cw-allegations-and-related-disinformation-campaigns-from-the-russian-federation Sun, 24 Nov 2024 14:19:48 +0000 https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/?page_id=3729 Chemical Weapons Disinformation in Ukraine Brief 1 UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA’S CHEMICAL WEAPONS ALLEGATIONS IN UKRAINE Brief 2 SELECTED EXAMPLES OF CW […]

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Chemical Weapons Disinformation in Ukraine

Brief 1

UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA’S CHEMICAL WEAPONS ALLEGATIONS IN UKRAINE

Brief 2

SELECTED EXAMPLES OF CW ALLEGATIONS AND RELATED DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Brief 3

STRATEGY AND IMPACTS OF CW DISINFORMATION

SELECTED EXAMPLES OF CW ALLEGATIONS AND RELATED DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

BRIEF 2/3 | NOVEMBER 2024

This briefing aims to showcase a selection of specific examples of the allegations made by Russian authorities concerning the use of chemical weapons by Ukrainian forces. By analysing these cases, we can better understand the nature, consistency, and strategic patterns of the claims, which reveal key insights into Russia’s broader disinformation campaign. These examples demonstrate how unsubstantiated allegations, often lacking credible evidence, fit into a larger strategy of influencing global narratives, discrediting opponents, undermining trust in international institutions and distracting from Russia’s own alleged use of chemical weapons.

EXAMPLE 1: AMMONIUM NITRATE EXPLOSION (MAZANIVKA, MAY 2020)

In May 2022, Russia claimed that the Ukrainian Security Services were behind an explosion in Mazanivka (in the Donetsk Oblast in Ukraine) involving ammonium nitrate, creating a toxic cloud aimed at Kramatorsk. Russian authorities suggested that this explosion was a deliberate provocation, designed to falsely accuse Russia of using chemical weapons. The claim described the incident as a potential false flag operation, orchestrated to manipulate international opinion to justify further military action in Ukraine.

 

Despite the gravity of the allegation, no evidence was provided to support the claim. This reflects a common pattern in Russia’s allegations, whereby accusations are made without evidence. The lack of substantiation suggests that the primary goal of these allegations was not to inform, but rather to create confusion and deflect the attention of the international community away from their own actions. This type of unfounded accusation aligns with their broader disinformation strategy, which aims to create ambiguity around accountability and make independent verification more difficult for international observers in the event of actual contraventions of WMD laws and norms.

EXAMPLE 2: UAV-DELIVERED CHEMICAL MUNITIONS (VELYKA NOVOSILKA, FEBRUARY 2023)

In February 2023, Russian media reported that Ukrainian forces had deployed chemical munitions via unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) near Velyka Novosilka. According to Russian sources, these munitions allegedly caused chemical burns amongst Russian troops. The claim accompanied by video and photo images, which was touted as proof of the chemical attack.

Figure 1: Available evidence provided for the alleged chemical attack against Russian personnel near Urozhaine and Velyka Novosilka in Feburary 2023.

The images presented in this case lack the necessary context and clarity for independent verification. These images do not offer sufficient detail to identify the item in question; in fact, there is no evidence to confirm that it is a munition at all, as it lacks the paint and marking combinations typically used on military ordnance. Without these distinguishing features, the true nature of the object cannot be confirmed. Moreover, if the item were a chemical weapon or contained hazardous materials, standard gloves may not offer adequate protection, especially if the canister were damaged or leaking. This highlights a key tactic in Russia’s disinformation: the use of suggestive misleading or unverified media to create a false impression of credibility. These kinds of manipulated materials are difficult to verify, making them an effective tool in attempting to shape public perceptions, particularly when combined with an ongoing narrative of Ukrainian aggression.

EXAMPLE 3: ALLEGED CHLORINE USE IN KURSK (AUGUST 2024)

In August 2024, Russia accused Ukraine in the media of deploying chlorine-filled chemical shells in the Kursk region, allegedly causing respiratory poisoning among workers at a power company and local officials. The accusation was accompanied by photographs, which were presented as evidence of the chemical attack.

Figure 2: available evidence provided for the alleged deployment of chlorine in Kursk area in August, 2024


The photographs used to support these claims were quickly debunked. Fenix Insight traced the images back to a 2015 event in Iraq, where chlorine was used in a controlled explosion. This debunking highlights the extent to which Russia has been willing to manipulate or recycle old materials to support false claims. The lack of new, verifiable evidence and the reuse of dated images not only undermines the credibility of the claim but also showcases the systemic nature of the disinformation. This case demonstrates how Russia attempts to influence perceptions by weaponising old, unconnected content, further complicating the task for international bodies to assess emerging claims.

EXAMPLE 4: UAV MUNITIONS

The repeated allegations by Russia that Ukraine is using chemical weapons against its forces in a Note Verbale circulated to member states of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the eve of its Executive Council session in July 2024.

 

Russia alleged that drone UAV-sourced footage shows a Russian soldier convulsing following the dropping of munitions, again suggesting the role of a chemical agent. The GP WMD Counter Disinformation Initiative has debunked this claim, showing that the video provided is incomplete, and a longer version is available showing a munition dropped on two soldiers, with a follow-on munition dropped on the single Russian soldier flailing in the water. The first munition dropped (0:06), prior to the imagery shown in the video, is a modified F-1 grenade (or clone thereof). The F-1 is a cast iron-bodied, high-explosive fragmentation defensive hand grenade. The second munition dropped (0:19) is a modified VOG-17M. The VOG-17M is a 30 mm, high-explosive fragmentation automatic grenade launcher (AGL) round.

Figure 3: F-1 grenade dropped at 0:16.
Figure 4: Modified VOG-17M dropped at 0:19.

There is no evidence of chemical agents being used within these munitions. The F-1 grenade appears to detonate and injure the personnel with fragmentation, with one soldier flailing in the water and bleeding from the mouth. The VOG-17M is dropped a distance away from the soldier. He then struggles to keep afloat in the water (likely due to injuries, as well as the weight of his body armour and other equipment) leading to him drowning.

 

This case shows how video documentation, and other such material, can be presented to further a suggested narrative. The case combines emotive imagery of wounded combatants, in tandem with a carefully cut video segment. Without the benefit of resource-intensive technical assessments and debunking efforts, such evidence can appear credible to the non-expert observer.

CONCLUSION

Across all four examples, a clear pattern emerges. The allegations made by Russia regarding Ukrainian use of chemical weapons are consistently unverified, based on ambiguous or fabricated evidence, and often part of a broader disinformation strategy.  These allegations are repetitive in their structure: accusations are often presented with minimal or manipulated evidence, which cannot be independently corroborated. The use of dramatic claims, unsupported by verifiable evidence, serves to create confusion, shift blame, and discredit the opposing side.

 

This repetitive nature suggests that Russia is employing a strategic disinformation campaign, designed to influence the international community’s opinion of the conflict and to deflect scrutiny from Russia’s own alleged use of CW. These efforts complicate the global community’s ability to discern truth from falsehood by clouding the collective factual understanding of the conflict.

 

The constant cycle of baseless accusations, lack of evidence, and use of fabricated materials significantly undermines the credibility of Russian claims. While these disinformation tactics may not always succeed in swaying public support for Ukraine or shifting the international stance in favour of Russia, they play a critical role in undermining global norms surrounding the use of WMDs. By continuously introducing false or misleading narratives, Russia erodes trust in factual reporting and creates confusion within the international community, which hampers the ability to make objective assessments of events

READ MORE:

→ Chemical Weapons in Ukraine | Policy Brief 1/3

→ Chemical Weapons in Ukraine | Policy Brief 2/3

→ Chemical Weapons in Ukraine | Policy Brief 3/3

→ What is chemical weapons disinformation?

→ Russia’s July 2024 Note Verbale debunked

Download PDF
Policy Briefs

The post Selected Examples of CW Allegations and Related Disinformation Campaigns from the Russian Federation appeared first on Countering WMD Disinformation.

]]> 3729 Understanding Russia’s Chemical Weapons Allegations in Ukraine https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/chemical-weapons-disinformation-primer/understanding-russias-chemical-weapons-allegations-in-ukraine/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=understanding-russias-chemical-weapons-allegations-in-ukraine Sat, 23 Nov 2024 20:07:33 +0000 https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/?page_id=3717 Chemical Weapons Disinformation in Ukraine Brief 1 UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA’S CHEMICAL WEAPONS ALLEGATIONS IN UKRAINE Brief 2 SELECTED EXAMPLES OF CW […]

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Chemical Weapons Disinformation in Ukraine

Brief 1

UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA’S CHEMICAL WEAPONS ALLEGATIONS IN UKRAINE

Brief 2

SELECTED EXAMPLES OF CW ALLEGATIONS AND RELATED DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Brief 3

STRATEGY AND IMPACTS OF CW DISINFORMATION

UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA’S CHEMICAL WEAPONS ALLEGATIONS IN UKRAINE ​

BRIEF 1/3 | NOVEMBER 2024

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has repeatedly accused Ukrainian armed forces of using chemical weapons. Russia’s disinformation efforts surrounding Chemical Weapons (CW) development and use in Ukraine are a continuation of tactics that have evolved since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. These narratives appear strategically timed to coincide with military and political escalations, aiming to influence international opinion and justify Russia’s conduct.

 

This briefing paper focuses on the evolution of these allegations, highlighting Russia’s strategic use of such claims as part of a broader disinformation campaign. Historically, allegations of CW use have been a powerful tool for manipulating international opinion. For instance, in the Syrian Civil War, allegations of chemical attacks, such as the 2013 Ghouta attack, altered the politics of international involvement, leading to widespread condemnation and intervention efforts. In the current context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia appears to be employing similar tactics by making allegations against Ukraine to serve its broader political and military objectives. Unlike the Syrian case, where evidence played a central role in shaping international responses, the Russian accusations lack substantiation and seem designed to manipulate the narrative.

EVOLUTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPON DISINFORMATION

Russian allegations of Ukrainian chemical weapons have specifically cited agents such as white phosphorus, chlorine, phosgene, CS gas, chloropicrin, BZ, sulfuric acid and sodium cyanide. Twenty-one specific claims (graph 1) have been made using international treaties, platforms and mechanisms such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Note Verbales to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the remainder published via the media or social networks from February 2022 to November 2024.

The timeline of chemical weapons allegations in the Russia-Ukraine war reflects a pattern that appears closely tied to a broader pattern of disinformation and counteraccusations.  A regular cycle of mutual allegations has established itself, with Russian narratives prioritising disinformation regarding chemical incidents, and Western Powers countering with concerns relating to potential Russian cover operations. Russian allegations have been widely interpreted as an effort to pre-emptively deflect blame or justify future actions in relation to possible chemical weapon use in the conflict.

 

In the initial months of the conflict after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Russian forces faced unexpected resistance. Following this resistance, the first wave of CW allegations began to emerge. The early accusations were often vague, without reference to specific events and with little or no evidence presented. For example, in March 2022, Russian authorities claimed they had found evidence of US-funded biolabs in Ukraine conducting research on dangerous pathogens and including chemicals that could be weaponised. Despite the lack of credible evidence, these accusations were heavily amplified by Russian media and echoed by state officials, signalling an early attempt to create a narrative that positioned Ukraine as the aggressor. This early period saw Russia attempt to frame Ukraine as a violator of international norms, likely in an effort to justify its invasion and delegitimise Ukrainian resistance on the global stage.

 

As the conflict intensified, the nature of the allegations evolved. In June 2022 at the UN Security Council, Russia claimed that Ukraine was preparing a chemical false flag incident. Despite failing to provide any evidence, the accusations gained traction serving the purpose of spreading confusion and casting doubt on Ukraine’s actions whilst pre-emptively deflecting blame in the case of deliberate use of CW by Russia.

 

In July 2022, Russia provided another notable accusation to the OPCW involved claims that Ukraine planned a chemical provocation in Mykolaivka, Donetsk, by dispersing liquid chlorine at the Slovyansk thermal power plant. Similarly, no evidence was presented to substantiate these claims, and international observers were unable to verify the existence of such chemical threats. The timing of these allegations coincided with increased international military aid to Ukraine, suggesting a possible attempt by Russia to sway international opinion and deter further support.

 

From early-2023 onwards, the focus of the allegations shifted towards more specific incidents involving claims of UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) delivering chemical munitions. In February 2023, Russian media circulated footage purportedly showing Ukrainian drones dispersing unknown chemicals over Russian positions in Velyka Novosilka. However, the video was quickly flagged by Fenix Insight as likely staged or manipulated, given the lack of corroborating evidence and the similarity to previous disinformation tactics used in other conflicts.

 

Most recently, in October 2024, the Kremlin made an unfounded public statement claiming that Western-backed Ukrainian forces used toxic chemicals against Russian forces, and that Ukraine, with the support of NATO, planned to stage a chemical weapons attack.

 

In a significant development, the OPCW recently confirmed the presence of riot control agent CS gas in samples collected by Ukraine near confrontation lines in the Dnipropetrovsk region, following an alleged chemical incident in September 2024. CS gas is one of the most commonly used tear gases in the world. CS gas is used as a riot control agent, however, is banned for use in warfare due to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. While the use of CS gas is prohibited as a method of warfare under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the OPCW report underscores the need for independent verification mechanisms amidst the ongoing allegations from both sides.

 

Following the Ukrainian incursion in the Kursk region, a further spate of chemical weapons allegations have appeared, including the claim that Ukraine is clearing territory using chlorine. The evidence provided has included manipulated images which, in one case was taken in Iraq in 2015, but presented as if it relates to recent combat operations in Kursk.

CONCLUSION

The timing of these allegations appears closely linked to key points in the conflict when Russia sought to shift narratives or justify escalations. By examining the pattern of these claims, it becomes clear that they serve several strategic purposes for Russia. Firstly, they act as a tool for deflecting attention away from its own military actions, particularly those that may violate international laws. Secondly, they help to frame Ukraine as a violator of international norms, potentially weakening international support.

 

Understanding the background and timing of these chemical weapons allegations is crucial for policymakers and international observers. Recognising the strategic intent behind these claims can help mitigate their impact, counteract disinformation, and focus on obtaining credible, verifiable information in assessing the true situation on the ground.

TIMELINE

March 2022

Russian authorities claimed they had found evidence of US-funded biolabs in Ukraine.

June 2022

Russia claimed that Ukraine was preparing a chemical false flag incident.

July 2022

Russia claims Ukraine planned a chemical provocation in Mykolaivka.

Early 2023

Allegations shift towards claims of UAVs delivering chemical munitions.

February 2023

Russian media alleges chemical drone strikes targeting Russian positions.

October 2024

Russia claimed that Western-backed Ukrainian forces used toxic chemicals against Russian foes.

November 2024

OPCW confirmed the presence of riot control agent CS gas in Ukraine.

READ MORE:

→ Chemical Weapons in Ukraine | Policy Brief 1/3

→ Chemical Weapons in Ukraine | Policy Brief 2/3

→ Chemical Weapons in Ukraine | Policy Brief 3/3

→ What is chemical weapons disinformation?

→ Russia’s July 2024 Note Verbale debunked

Download PDF
Policy Briefs

The post Understanding Russia’s Chemical Weapons Allegations in Ukraine appeared first on Countering WMD Disinformation.

]]> 3717 Russia’s Dirty Bomb Disinformation in Ukraine https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/russias-dirty-bomb-disinformation-in-ukraine/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=russias-dirty-bomb-disinformation-in-ukraine Sat, 23 Nov 2024 19:22:20 +0000 https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/?page_id=3698 Russia’s Dirty Bomb Disinformation in Ukraine KEY POINTS Disinformation narrative: Moscow’s false claim that Ukraine was planning to detonate a […]

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Russia's Dirty Bomb Disinformation in Ukraine

KEY POINTS

Disinformation narrative: Moscow’s false claim that Ukraine was planning to detonate a dirty bomb on its own territory and blame Russia gained mainstream media attention following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This rhetoric began generating substantial alarm several months later in October 2022, when Western officials (Europe, the US and allied countries) believed it might serve as cover for a false-flag operation or pretext for tactical nuclear weapons use.

 

Response: The initial response from Ukraine and its allies to Russia’s dirty bomb narrative relied primarily on fact-checking to refute and debunk claims about dirty bomb manufacturing in Ukraine. After it became apparent that these claims could be used as a pretext to escalation, backchannel diplomacy and threats of retaliation were also employed to dissuade Russian escalatory action.

 

Implications: Moscow’s dirty bomb narrative underscores how false narratives can manipulate public opinion and obscure intentions. Moving forward, combating such disinformation, especially in fast-evolving crises, may need to rely more heavily on advanced technologies like AI-driven analytics and real-time verification to rapidly counter false narratives.

WHAT IS A DIRTY BOMB?

A dirty bomb (i.e. radiological dispersal device) uses conventional explosives to spread radioactive material – causing contamination, damage and possibly significant disruption.

 

Unlike nuclear weapons, which require highly enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium, the materials used in dirty bombs do not need to be specially developed for weapons use and could potentially be gathered from research, industrial, energy and medical sources. Their relatively small size allows these devices to be positioned by foot or transported by vehicle, making them more accessible to malign non-state actors.1 Dirty bombs have never been successfully used,2 however:

 

  • Their detonation would be millions of times less powerful than a nuclear weapon explosion as it does not create a nuclear fission chain reaction.3
  • The area contaminated would be dependent on the explosive yield and amount of radioactive material released – but would likely extend only a few hundred metres.
  • Radiation released would likely be insufficient to immediately cause mass fatalities, but victims could be harmed over time by the exposure to radioactive material.

The psychological effects of the detonation and subsequent decontamination efforts have led these devices to be characterised as “weapons of mass disruption” rather than “weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).”4

DISINFO

Since at least 2015, Russian actors have propagated the dirty bomb narrative to advance domestic and geopolitical interests – as part of its broader disinformation campaigns. Moscow employs a variety of tactics when spreading these narratives, such as amplifying existing societal divisions and disseminating multiple narratives concurrently to cultivate confusion and public apathy.5 These operations span all chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) domains and have found greater success in the Global South compared with Western audiences.6

OBJECTIVES

Russia’s dirty bomb narrative (see timeline) peaked sharply in intensity and outreach in October 2022, causing Western officials to became concerned that the sudden increase in messaging might serve as cover for a false-flag operation or pretext for tactical nuclear weapons use.8

At the time, Moscow was experiencing significant battlefield setbacks and Western intelligence agencies had intercepted communications from senior Russian military leaders discussing the circumstances in which Moscow might use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine.9 Considering these broader developments, Moscow was plausibly attempting to achieve one, or a combination, of the following objectives:

 

  • Prepare the information space for potential nuclear weapons use.
  • Influence the behaviour of Ukraine and its Western allies.
  • Express genuine concern about Ukraine’s intentions, due to inaccurate intelligence gathering.
  • Bolster domestic support for its ongoing mobilisation efforts.

RESPONSE

As Russia’s dirty bomb narrative and resulting public concern peaked, the West implemented several tactics to mitigate Moscow’s information operations.

 

  • Fact-checking: Officials, media platforms and research institutes10 redoubled ongoing efforts to debunk Moscow’s dirty bomb narrative, with strategies such as reverse image searching and feasibility analysis by experts. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which undertook verification activities and conducted research within Ukraine, also categorically rejecting Moscow’s claims.11
  • Backchannel diplomacy: This was conducted to encourage Russia’s partners to dissuade Moscow from employing a dirty bomb or nuclear weapon. China’s leader, Xi Jinping, likely warned President Putin against using nuclear weapons. India also issued a public statement condemning nuclear weapon use by any state.12
  • Threats of retaliation: These were privately conveyed to Russia by French, UK and US officials. Western leaders reportedly warned that a tactical nuclear weapons strike would not go unpunished and that they may respond by conventionally striking Russian forces.13

CONCLUSION

Moscow’s dirty bomb narrative highlights how false or misleading information can be used to exploit global radiological and nuclear fears, shape public opinion, obscure intentions and sow confusion.14 Western debunking efforts likely played a role in calming public anxiety and challenging Russia’s accusations. However, combating future disinformation, especially during rapidly evolving crises, may need to increasingly leverage advanced technologies such as AI-driven analytics and real-time data verification to identify and counter misleading narratives before they gain momentum.

TIMELINE

2015-2021

Sporadic appearance of dirty bomb narrative in Russian language media/social media.

January - March 2022

Russian state media reports on alleged Ukrainian dirty bomb manufacturing, possibly to help justify its invasion.

23 October 2022

Surge in Russian state media reporting about a potential dirty bomb ‘provocation’.


Russian defence officials discuss concerns with French, UK and US counterparts.

24 October 2022

France, UK and US leaders reject Russia’s dirty bomb narrative.


US officials express fears that Russia’s claims may be used as a pretext for tactical nuclear weapons use in Ukraine.


Chief of the Russian Armed Forces claims a dirty bomb is nearly complete and that the military is preparing to operate in a radioactive environment.


Russia’s UN ambassador writes to the UN Secretary General stating his concerns about dirty bomb use.

25 October 2022

President Biden warns that tactical nuclear weapons use would be a “serious mistake”.

26 October 2022

Russia’s defence minister contacts Chinese and Indian counterparts to warn them of the dirty bomb threat.


NATO’s secretary general warns of severe consequences in response to nuclear weapons use.


India’s defence minister publicly warns against nuclear weapons use.

27 October 2022

President Putin repeats dirty bomb allegations.


The US defence secretary warns of significant retaliation if Russia uses nuclear weapons.

28 October 2022

Moscow’s dirty bomb warnings abruptly end.

November 2022 - Present

Circulation of dirty bomb narrative returns to baseline frequency.

November 2024

REFERENCES

  1. András Rácz. ‘Russia Goes for Annexation and Mobilization’. German Council on Foreign Relations, 22 September 2022. https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/russia-goes-annexation-and-mobilization.
  2. Borger, Julian, and Peter Beaumont. ‘Russia Steps up Ukraine “Dirty Bomb” Claim in Letter Delivered to UN’. The Guardian, 25 October 2022, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/25/russia-to-raise-ukraine-dirty-bomb-claim-at-un-security-council.
  3. Brookes, Peter. ‘Russia’s Dirty Bomb Claim Is a Dirty Lie’. The Heritage Foundation, 4 November 2022. https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/russias-dirty-bomb-claim-dirty-lie.
  4. Delegation of the European Union to the People’s Republic of China. ‘Disinformation About Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine – Debunking Seven Myths Spread by Russia’. Delegation of the European Union to the People’s Republic of China, 18 March 2022. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/disinformation-about-russias-invasion-ukraine-debunking-seven-myths-spread-russia_en?s=166.
  5. Digital Forensic Research Lab. ‘Russian War Report: Kremlin Recycles Old Narratives to Claim Ukraine Is Constructing Dirty Bombs and Bioweapons’. Atlantic Council, 7 March 2022. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-kremlin-recycles-old-narratives-to-claim-ukraine-is-constructing-dirty-bombs-and-bioweapons/.
  6. Government of Massachusetts. ‘Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC): Fact Sheet on Dirty Bombs’. Government of Massachusetts. Accessed 8 April 2025. https://www.mass.gov/info-details/nuclear-regulatory-commission-nrc-fact-sheet-on-dirty-bombs.
  7. Heather Williams, Kelsey Hartigan, Lachlan MacKenzie, and Reja Younis. ‘Deter and Divide: Russia’s Nuclear Rhetoric & Escalation Risks in Ukraine’. Center for Strategic & International Studies. Accessed 8 April 2025. https://features.csis.org/deter-and-divide-russia-nuclear-rhetoric.
  8. Heather Williams, Kelsey Hartigan, Lachlan MacKenzie, and Reja Younis. ‘Russian Nuclear Calibration in the War in Ukraine’. Center for Strategic & International Studies, 23 February 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-nuclear-calibration-war-ukraine.
  9. Helene Cooper, Julian E. Barnes, and Eric Schmitt. ‘Russian Military Leaders Discussed Use of Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Officials Say’. The New York Times, 2 November 2022, sec. U.S. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/us/politics/russia-ukraine-nuclear-weapons.html.
  10. International Atomic Energy Agency. ‘IAEA Inspectors Complete In-Field Verification Activities at Three Ukraine Locations, No Indications of Undeclared Nuclear Activities and Materials’. Text. IAEA, 3 November 2022. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-inspectors-complete-in-field-verification-activities-at-three-ukraine-locations-no-indications-of-undeclared-nuclear-activities-and-materials.
  11. Katherine Lawlor and Kateryna Stepanenko. ‘Warning Update: Russia May Conduct a Chemical or Radiological False-Flag Attack as a Pretext for Greater Aggression against Ukraine’. Institute for the Study of War, 9 March 2022. http://dev-isw.bivings.com/.
  12. Lachlan MacKenzie. ‘Six Days in October: Russia’s Dirty Bomb Signaling and the Return of Nuclear Crises’, 3 September 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/six-days-october-russias-dirty-bomb-signaling-and-return-nuclear-crises.
  13. Max Seddon. ‘Why Vladimir Putin Toned down His Nuclear Rhetoric’. Financial Times, 1 November 2023, sec. War in Ukraine. https://www.ft.com/content/d98446ac-b56e-4f1d-bfa9-ebaed4e26884.
  14. Meyer, Samuel, Sarah Bidgood, and William C. Potter. ‘Death Dust: The Little-Known Story of U.S. and Soviet Pursuit of Radiological Weapons’. International Security 45, no. 2 (1 October 2020): 51–94. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00391.
  15. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna. ‘Russia’s Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s Comment in Connection with the Latest Failure to Rotate IAEA Secretariat Experts at the Zaporozhskaya NPP and Ukraine’s New Provocation against This Plant’, 12 February 2025.
  16. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna. ‘Statement by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov on the Agenda Item 3 of the Session of the IAEA Board of Governors «Nuclear and Radiation Safety: Nuclear Safety Review 2025»’, 3 March 2025.
  17. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations. ‘Remarks to the Press by First Deputy Permanent Representative Dmitry Polyanskiy Following Security Council’s AOB Discussion of the Possibility of Ukraine Creating a  “Dirty Bomb”’, 25 October 2022. https://russiaun.ru/en/news/stakeout_251022#!
  18. Reuters. ‘Russia, without Evidence, Says Ukraine Making Nuclear “Dirty Bomb”’. Reuters, 6 March 2022, sec. Europe. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-without-evidence-says-ukraine-making-nuclear-dirty-bomb-2022-03-06/.
  19. Russian Federation. ‘Letter Dated 24 October 2022 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council’. United Nations, 24 October 2022. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3995910.
  20. The Guardian. ‘US Dismisses “Transparently False” Russian Claims of Ukraine Plan to Use “Dirty Bomb”’. The Guardian, 24 October 2022, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/24/us-dismisses-transparently-false-russian-claims-of-ukraine-plan-to-use-dirty-bomb.
  21. ‘Summary Record (Partial) of the 18th Meeting, Held at the Vienna International Centre, Vienna, on Friday, 11 August 2023: Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1st Session’. United Nations, 7 September 2023. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/239/51/pdf/n2323951.pdf.
  22. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ‘Backgrounder on Dirty Bombs’. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 2022. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-dirty-bombs.html.
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]]> 3698 What is Nuclear Weapon and Radiological Weapon Disinformation? https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/video-explainers/what-is-nuclear-weapon-and-radiological-weapon-disinformation/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=what-is-nuclear-weapon-and-radiological-weapon-disinformation Sun, 01 Sep 2024 23:34:37 +0000 https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/?page_id=3091 What is Nuclear Weapon and Radiological Weapon Disinformation? Watch this video on YouTube. Disinformation in the nuclear and radiological security […]

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What is Nuclear Weapon and Radiological Weapon Disinformation?

Disinformation in the nuclear and radiological security realm is a rapidly growing threat, capable of creating confusion, fear, and potentially dangerous policies that can destabilize the international system and escalate crises.

 

In 2016, false reports claimed that U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were being moved from Turkey to Romania. Widely disseminated by state-affiliated media and presented as evidence of provocations, this misinformation highlights how false claims can manipulate public perception and influence policy decisions.

 

A more recent example involves Russia’s false accusations that Ukraine plans to detonate a “dirty bomb” on its own soil. Similarly, Russian officials and state media have falsely accused Ukraine of seeking to develop nuclear weapons, alleging the existence of stockpiles of uranium or plutonium, secret facilities, and Western assistance. These unfounded allegations are used to frame Ukraine as a nuclear threat, justify military actions, escalate tensions, undermine international support for Ukraine, hinder peaceful resolution efforts, and increase regional instability.

 

The rapid spread of disinformation is accelerated by social media and AI-generated content, which are particularly vulnerable due to the high volume and speed of information dissemination. Addressing this issue requires action at all levels, including public education to enhance media literacy, organizational commitment to data accuracy, and transparency.

 

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction is developing tools to counter nuclear and radiological weapons disinformation, particularly as it arises in Ukraine. These efforts are vital to creating a safer, more secure world.

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]]> 3091 BWC Article X success stories https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/bwc-article-x-success-stories/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=bwc-article-x-success-stories Sun, 01 Sep 2024 20:19:21 +0000 https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/?page_id=3029 BWC Article X success stories COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) commits states parties “to […]

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BWC Article X success stories

COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE

Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) commits states parties “to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.” The provisions of Article X recognise that in addition to the BWC’s provisions on disarmament, scientific cooperation and development assistance are essential to ensure that biological knowledge, tools and material are shared to promote the security of states parties from infectious disease threats emerging within and outside their territories. There have been multiple Article X success stories, including from Senegal, Laos, Uganda, Ghana and Thailand.

SENEGAL

The establishment in 2018 of a Public Health Emergency Operations Center in Dakar received support from the Global Health Security Agenda, the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the African Union Center for Disease Control, and the World Health Organisation. It now successfully acts as a focal point for disease analytics, diagnostic testing and information sharing across the West African region. The Public Health Emergency Operations Center has been utilised during the COVID-19 pandemic, recent Chikungunya outbreaks and following a mass casualty event involving Senegalese nationals during a Hajj stampede.

LAOS 

Nearly US $1.9 million in scientific assistance has been provided to Laos to support health security in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. A tabletop exercise in Vientiane in March 2020, sponsored by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency included representatives from across the government of Laos and its public health bodies, as well as local United Nations officials and the World Health Organisation. The exercise built on long-term scientific assistance provided to Laos to support best practices in health security and emergency management.

UGANDA

A partnership between the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the government of Uganda has resulted in a multi-year programme to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity in the country. In the context of regional instability in East Africa, the partnership has developed infrastructure to safeguard dangerous pathogens used for public health research, including physical site protections and workforce training on dual-use research of concern, and it has supported the development of laboratories and Public Health Emergency Operations Centers, including in Uganda.

GHANA

A partnership between Global Affairs Canada, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, and Ghanaian Veterinary professionals successfully established biological containment laboratories in Accra, Pong-Tamale and Takoradi. The state-of-the-art modular laboratories were initially designed to support the detection of anthrax, avian influenza and African swine fever in animal populations, but as the COVID-19 pandemic reached Ghana, they were adapted to also provide frontline diagnostics to local health authorities.

THAILAND

Diagnostic equipment provided by the US Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to the Chulalongkorn University in Thailand facilitated the first diagnosis of a case of SARS-CoV-2 outside of Wuhan, China in January 2020. Early detection and reporting of the international spread of the virus supported early response planning by international health bodies.

KEY MESSAGES

  • The successes of recent scientific cooperation underscores the crucial role of Article X in global biological security regimes.
  • Scores of programmes have shown the benefits of effective collaboration to build essential infrastructure, share best practices, and pool expert knowledge across country networks to ensure the international community’s shared protection against infectious disease threats wherever they might emerge.

READ MORE:

→ BWC/MSP/2018/WP.9 ‘International Activities of Global Partnership Member Countries related to Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,’ submitted by Canada, Denmark, European Union, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States, 4 Dec 2018.

→ BWC/MSP/2020/MX.1/WP.2 ‘What Constitutes Assistance and Cooperation under Article X?,’ submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 13 August 2021.

→ Revill, J & Maceda, MG ‘Options for Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention,’ UNDIR, Feb 2022.

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]]> 3029 Mitigating Disinformation https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/policy-briefs/mitigating-disinformation/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=mitigating-disinformation Fri, 30 Aug 2024 18:36:13 +0000 https://gpwmdcounterdisinfo.com/?page_id=2957 Mitigating Disinformation RESPONDING TO DISINFORMATION Disinformation, or the practice of spreading false information in full knowledge of its falsehood, is […]

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Mitigating Disinformation

RESPONDING TO DISINFORMATION

Disinformation, or the practice of spreading false information in full knowledge of its falsehood, is typically difficult to mitigate against. This is due to its close interplay with misinformation: successful disinformation campaigns typically draw on conspiracy theories already present and circulating within groups.

 

Given the three mental processes which dispose people to believe disinformation and misinformation—intentionality, proportionality, and confirmation bias—any concerted effort to counter disinformation with facts is only likely to entrench the beliefs of the targeted community.

 

There are four main tactics that can be used to mitigate the impact of disinformation campaigns: Gamification, active transparency, pre-bunking, and pre-informing.

GAMIFICATION

Gamification refers to the integration of game mechanisms and technicalities into a non-game (or physical) environment. In disinformation, this refers to the practice of encouraging ‘players’—the general public—to behave in a certain way to provoke a desired outcome.

 

An example of this is Snapchat. The popular app has a feature in which users can apply Augmenter Reality (AR) filters to their photos, with the outcome being that they gain more ‘likes’ and therefore cultural capital. In 2020 Snapchat launched two AR filters in collaboration with the World Health Organization. This included one which demonstrated circles around the user’s location to identify that they were adhering to social distancing measures.

 

In another example, Taiwan introduced a policy of “humour not rumour” to combat COVID-19 disinformation. This included releasing several tweets referring to the consequences of misinformation and disinformation such as hoarding toilet paper and openly mocking those who followed the practice. These were “memeified,” with the result that many people re-tweeted with photos to prove they were not hoarding toilet paper.

ACTIVE TRANSPARENCY

Active transparency refers to the active release of information with no perceivable bias or angle. Given that confirmation bias means that any release of summaries, opinion pieces or redacted documents are perceived as evidence for conspiracy, organisations should only release factual statements in full transparency. If there is a need for redactions or the inability to release documents then these should be explained ahead of time.

 

The active delegitimization of independent media and think tanks pursued by disinformation campaigns is likely to decrease trust in any publications. The release of data may mitigate this. Disinformation campaigns in the 21st century are characterised by a model of repetition involving rapid and continuous production of media and narratives. The rapid and fluid nature of these campaigns—often run by large state-sponsored organisations—make disinformation campaigns difficult to respond to individually. Releasing the data allows for a response to a variety of narratives simultaneously, while freeing the releasing organisation from accusations of disinformation on their part.

PRE-BUNKING

Prebunking refers to the practice of providing people access to videos or tools (often in a gamified manner) which inform them about critical thinking techniques that can be used when consuming media. These may help people identify their existing biases and the biases of the media they consume, identify language that could indicate disinformation or misinformation, or provide information on how to identify lack of proof and to think critically about sources.

 

Given that attempting to debunk disinformation campaigns may have the opposite effect than intended, prebunking is likely to be more successful if correctly used.

PRE-INFORMING

Pre-informing is the practice of providing clear information about an event which may or may not happen (such as a global pandemic) as soon as there are warning signs.

 

The COVID-19 pandemic showed that many populations did not have the tools to absorb the scientific literature being published and filled in their perception using their own biases or the biases of the media where the research was published. This was similar for government publications and reactions to public health measures.

 

By providing easily digestible fact-sheets explaining key terms, key facts, and key skills in interpreting scientific literature, publics can more easily engage with official and scientific literature, enabling people to identify potential disinformation and misinformation.

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