Analysis Archives - Countering WMD Disinformation

Ebola Disinformation Narratives

Erik — Wed, 01 Jul 2026 01:14:38 +0000

Ebola Disinformation Narratives

A new outbreak – the same old story

JUNE 2026

As Ebola spreads in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, disinformation narratives have emerged about the disease, generating suspicion about its origin and the development of bioweapons. Yet these narratives are familiar, and baseless. In fact, they are recycled from prior Ebola outbreaks, including the West Africa outbreak in 2014. Why? Because they worked. These narratives stoke fear, suspicion, and confusion, which is the objective of those who promote them. In essence, they take advantage of a topic that is grabbing attention to further a range of pre-existing strategic interests and goals. Here, we show the reuse of these narratives to help expose these tactics and increase resilience against these narratives in the future.

Inflating threat perception

Ebola disinformation narratives often work to increase perception of risk. Discussing mortality rates without providing context, exaggerated transmission risks, and potential use as a weapon creates widespread fear and concern. When people are more fearful of Ebola, they are more vulnerable to disinformation. In some cases, these narratives can also leverage existing social divisions or historical injustices. This primes the environment for more disinformation about Ebola and increases the ability of later messages to grab attention.

Recycled narrative in 2026

*The average fatality rate for Ebola is approximately 50%, and for the current outbreak is roughly 26%. In rare cases, it can reach as high as 90%. The claim above lacks important context and nuance, which may distort perceptions of risk.

Narrative attempt from 2014

Creating a cloud of suspicion

Circulating Ebola disinformation narratives have also focused on creating a cloud of suspicion about the nature of outbreaks. Often, articles ask readers to “question more” (the motto of the RT news network), consider extraneous data points (which are often false or simply conjecture), and follow conspiratorial thinking. Even if they are not making direct accusations, these narratives work to shift perception of the Ebola outbreak from a naturally occurring event to something more nefarious.

Recycled narrative in 2026

Narrative attempt from 2014

Making unfounded and direct accusations

Although some Ebola disinformation narratives stop short of direct claims, other approaches are not so subtle and directly accuse opponents of creating a biological weapon, violating existing norms and laws. This works to discredit opponents and increase suspicion across a range of other activities. Direct accusations also often focus on groups or industries around which there is pre-existing mistrust, such as “big pharma.” They leverage “colonizer” themes, ethnic tension, and references to past crises.

Recycled narrative in 2026

Narrative attempt from 2014

Framing Russia as savior

Many of these narratives also paint Russia as a savior, highlighting vaccine development, aid, and other efforts to fight the outbreak. These narratives support a strategic narrative of Russia as a responsible actor and an important player in ensuring global peace and security. These are often juxtaposed against disinformation narratives described above to increase the perception of Russia as a helpful international actor. When Russia’s assistance is described, it is framed as legitimate and is praised, while any assistance provided by the “West” is framed as suspicious, inadequate, or a form of neocolonialism.

Recycled narrative in 2026

Narrative attempt from 2014

Conclusion

The recycling of disinformation narratives from past outbreaks in today’s Ebola outbreak is not surprising. It has been done before and can be expected in the future. However, seeing the same approaches being used over and over again exposes the deceitful nature of these narratives. As the current Ebola outbreak continues, we expect to see more disinformation narratives circulate as threat actors take advantage of the situation to sow discord and fear globally. Additional expected narratives based on previous disinformation may include a focus on purported ethnic weapons, biolabs in Africa, and conspiratorial framing of peaceful research done on Ebola. By becoming more aware of these reused narratives, policymakers, communicators, and the general public can grow their awareness of potential disinformation and increase resilience to manipulation attempts.

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The Matryoshka War Report

Erik — Wed, 10 Jun 2026 00:45:54 +0000

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Russia’s January 2025 Note Verbale Debunked

Erik — Wed, 20 May 2026 02:17:30 +0000

COUNTERING Biological WEAPONS DISINFORMATION

RUSSIA’S JANUARY 2025 NOTE VERBALE DEBUNKED

Policy Brief | March 2025

Background

In January 2025, Russia circulated a note verbale to the BWC Implementation Support Unit with the request it be shared with all States Parties to the BWC. This document highlighted a briefing given by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev, Deputy Head of the Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense Forces of the Russian Federation on 24 December 2024. Similar to past efforts by Russia, this note verbale focused on falsely accusing the United States of leading illicit biological activities in violation to the BWC. However, while this note included many features, disinformation narratives, and tactics observed in the past in communications issued by Russia, this note featured a new region, Africa, as its target. While Russian accusations may be old news to many who have had to manage and endure the “firehose of falsehoods” in the past, this shift of focus may engage new audiences who are less familiar with these narratives and tactics. In this policy brief we highlight these commonly used approaches found in the latest note verbale from Russia so that readers can better understand the manipulative approaches underlying such notes.

DISINFORMATION TACTICS

The note verbale shared by Russia contains several of the common narratives they have built their disinformation campaigns around and have regularly used for years. Outlined below are the excerpts from the Note Verbale that reflect these narratives.

“Suspicious Outbreaks”

One common narrative to be aware of is fear mongering about “suspicious outbreaks.” Generally, this narrative implies that naturally occurring outbreaks are the result of US biological weapon experimentation. Often this narrative will provide descriptions of potential “clues” to alleged nefarious activity in an effort to discredit the opponent. In this narrative, the occurrence of outbreaks of disease are used to insinuate nefarious activity and the existence of work to combat disease is used as “evidence” that something suspicious is occurring.

Example 1: “First, concerns are voiced about regular outbreaks of, for example, anthrax and tularemia in one region, or foot-and-mouth disease and plague in another one. Such alarms are raised usually at the meetings of US ambassadors with representatives of local health ministries.” (Page 1, Briefing by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev)
Example 2: “There is a clear trend: pathogens that fall within the Pentagon’s area of interest subsequently become pandemic, with US pharmaceutical companies becoming beneficiaries.” (Page 5, Briefing by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev)

Human Experimentation

Another common narrative is the claim that western countries (often the US) are conducting biological experiments on human research subjects. Allegations of ethical violations (lack of informed consent, exploitation of individuals in fragile settings) evoke strong emotions in readers, including disgust and/or outage. This approach often encourages readers to make a mental shortcut that combines an accusation in a different setting and the same accusation being made closer to home.

Example: “American-funded biological projects in Nigeria are aimed at combating HIV. As volunteers, Nigerian citizens take part in the clinical evaluation of antiviral drugs from the Pentagon-affiliated company Gilead. I would like to remind you that this pharmaceutical company also tested its drugs on Ukrainian citizens.” (Page 4, Briefing by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev)

Fulfillment of “Western” goals around WMD use

Another common disinformation narrative focuses on the idea that US oversees biological activities are being disguised as peaceful or protective but are, instead, designed to serve “Western” geopolitical/military goals that may harm other nations. This type of narrative exploits divisions amongst communities that were already distrustful of certain countries such as the US.

Example 1: “It is designed to obtain pathogens in endemic areas and natural foci, control and manage the biological situation in order to serve US interests.” (Page 1, Briefing by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev)
Example 2: “The online media outlet Geopolitics has published an article about the joint efforts of DTRA and the US non-profit organization RTI International to monitor infectious diseases in Africa, which, according to the publication, is a component of the Pentagon’s broader ‘biological espionage’; initiative.” (Page 7, Briefing by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev)

COMMON TACTICS AND MOTIVES

In addition to recycled disinformation narratives, Russia also employed recycled tactics to spread disinformation through this communication, with the common motive of discrediting its opponents and strengthening its global standing. Outlined below are the excerpts from the Note Verbale that highlight the common tactics and motives Russia regularly uses.

“Western” colonialism

This tactic leverages distrust from historical exploitation to suggest that the US furthers its interests while harming locals. It implies that US overseas biological activity is part of a neocolonial agenda. At the same time, Russia uses these messages to position itself as a friend and partner working to support states in Africa.

Example 1: “Now the focus of interest has shifted to Africa. The United States Administration views the region as an infinite natural reservoir of dangerous infectious agents and as a testing ground for experimental medical products.” (Page 1, Briefing by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev)
Example 2: “As a result, participating states involved in this system lose their national sovereignty in the field of biological safety and security and become fully dependent on the United States.” (Page 2, Briefing by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev)

Discrediting opponents

This tactic often lists military organizations, U.S. government organizations (such as the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Department of Defense), government contractors (e.g., CH2M Hill, Metabiota), and people who have worked in the region, and reframes their work in nefarious terms. By listing a large volume of organizations and associations (some trusted and some not) and, at the same time, implying their work is linked to suspicious activity, this approach diminishes each organization’s individual credibility, even if they are a part of approved and well-known global health programs that provide large amounts of local aid.

Risk increasing language

Disinformation usually uses risk increasing language, such as suggesting that common people may not even know they were exposed to biological agents, to increase attention and perception of risk. This includes listing many bio/military programs and implying they have a dual use intent. In this way, this language links the mere existence of a biological program or lab with its potential for causing widespread harm, which evokes a foreboding feeling of risk in the reader, a feeling of immanent harm, and/or that risks are not being honestly communicated to the people who would suffer them.

Disregard for rules, laws, norms

Another tactic aims to diminish the credibility of the “Western” nations by claiming that the US or allies are casually breaking rules, laws, or norms. At the same time, Russia seeks to create a contrast and establishes itself as a rule-follower in many diplomatic spaces and uses rule-breaking as a reason to admonish others.

Example: “While the stated goals are to monitor infectious diseases and assist developing countries, in practice we see a buildup of US biological military capabilities, which circumvents the BWC commitments.” (Page 5, Briefing by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev)

Current Realities

Example: “While the stated goals are to monitor infectious diseases and assist developing countries, in practice we see a buildup of US biological military capabilities, which circumvents the BWC commitments.” (Page 5, Briefing by Major General Aleksey Rtishchev)

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Debunking CBRN Ritishchev Briefing

Erik — Sun, 08 Mar 2026 16:30:39 +0000

Alexey Rtishchev’s December 2025 Briefing Debunked

On December 12, 2025, Major General Alexey Rtishchev, Deputy Chief of Russia’s Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Troops gave a briefing that contained numerous false allegations pertaining to biological, chemical, and radiological weapons. The Global Partnership’s Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative has systematically debunked a selection of allegations in the briefing while also drawing attention to the broader tactics used in such campaigns. By learning to recognize these tactics, the global nonproliferation and disarmament community can build resilience to CBRN disinformation, safeguarding vital multilateral agreements and norms.

For more information about the tactics frequently used in CBRN disinformation campaigns, view our Tactic Spotlights and Disinformation Roadmaps.

Biological Weapons Disinformation: USAID and COVID-19 Allegations

In the briefing, Rtishchev falsely claims that to disguise its nefarious biological activities, the U.S. government conducts its “illicit” research through civilian agencies such as USAID. He further claims that USAID funded Event 201, a pandemic preparedness exercise that took place before the COVID-19 pandemic. Taken together, these allegations represent a thinly veiled attempt to blame the COVID-19 pandemic on the U.S. government. The posts and photos below, which are used to support Rtishchev’s claims, contain several common disinformation tactics.

Disinformation Tactic: Appeal to Emotions

This statement, which is translated into Russian in the speech bubble below, is factually inaccurate and deliberately inflammatory. It is designed to arouse anger and disgust at the U.S. government’s purported misuse of taxpayer dollars. Such emotions can cloud rational thinking and impair judgement, making it difficult for audiences to think critically about what they are reading or hearing. There is no evidence to suggest that USAID ever funded bioweapons research.

Disinformation Tactic: Provision of “Evidence”

Event 201 was an exercise conducted by Johns Hopkins University to help governments and the private sector prepare for pandemics. Rtishchev uses the event to falsely show that there is “evidence” of USAID’s purported wrongdoing. However, the exercise was not funded by USAID and had nothing to do with biological weapons. On the contrary, the exercise scenario centered on a natural spillover event. Moreover, the fact that a coronavirus was used reflects the reality that coronaviruses have long caused natural outbreaks. The event organizers even acknowledge that it was based loosely on SARS (a disease caused by a coronavirus, but not the same coronavirus that causes COVID-19). The event does not suggest, in other words, that anyone knew about COVID-19 before it occurred.

Biological Weapons Disinformation: Allegations about Biolaboratories in Ukraine

The briefing also repeats the familiar “biolabs” disinformation narrative, claiming that the U.S. government was using Ukraine as a testing ground for dangerous and illegal biological experiments. Rtishchev claims that such activities have been confirmed by statements from U.S. government officials and scientists. The statements he references, however, are either deliberately misinterpreted or made by individuals with irrelevant or dubious qualifications. This is a common tactic designed to make false claims appear more legitimate or trustworthy.

Translation: “Ukraine has biological research facilities, which, in fact, we are now quite concerned Russian forces may be seeking to gain control of, so we are working with the Ukrainians on how they can prevent any of those research materials from falling into the hands of Russian forces”

Disinformation Tactic: Referencing Authoritative Sources

In this quote, Victoria Nuland expresses concern that Russian forces could gain control of research facilities in Ukraine – a concern that was warranted given that even peaceful research facilities contain pathogens that could be used to cause harm. In the briefing, however, her statement is deliberately misinterpreted as an admission by the U.S. government that it was conducting biological weapons research in Ukraine – an admission that Victoria Nuland never made. The underlying tactic is effective both because the quote is accurate (even though it was taken out of context) and because Victoria Nuland is considered an authoritative (i.e., trustworthy) source.

Translation: “There were something like 36 bioweapons labs in Ukraine of U.S. origin. So, why is Ukraine perfect? Ukraine’s perfect. To run a bioweapons lab, you need first-world infrastructure and third-world people to test on.”

Disinformation Tactic: Referencing Authoritative Sources

In this quote, a professor named Dave Collum makes the false claim that there were 36 biological weapons laboratories run by the US in Ukraine. While Dave Collum is a professor, his specialty is in organic chemistry. He has no relevant qualifications in biological weapons or public health, making him unqualified to comment on U.S. cooperative biological activities in Ukraine. His title as a professor, however, is being used strategically because it suggests he is an authoritative source.

Dave Collum’s false statement about the US conducting medical experiments on “third-world people” is also a strong appeal to emotions. This is another tactic that is regularly used to spread disinformation. This statement is manipulative and designed to play on fears of exploitation – a strategy that may be particularly effective among communities that have been exploited in the past.

Radiological Weapons Disinformation: Dirty Bomb Allegations

The briefing frames Ukraine’s radiation safety activities as a serious threat and alleges that Kyiv is engaging in “nuclear blackmail.” It provides no definition of the term and offers no evidence of a coercive threat linked to any concrete political demand. Instead, the allegation mirrors longstanding criticism of Russia’s own nuclear signaling since 2022, creating a false equivalence and shifting perceived responsibility through a fabricated “dirty bomb” narrative. Taken together, these claims use vague, high-impact language to discredit Ukraine and undermine international support.

Disinformation Tactic: Provision of “Evidence”

The briefing begins by accusing Ukrainian officials of covertly importing spent nuclear fuel for a “dirty bomb,” but no evidence supports the allegation.

It goes on to claim that SBU training simulates the theft of ionizing radiation sources, the construction of a “dirty bomb,” and its detonation in a crowded area. These exercises, presented alongside images of personnel in protective suits, are used as “evidence” that Ukraine intends to conduct such an attack. In practice, such scenarios are part of standard CBRN counterterrorism training used internationally to strengthen preparedness and response to recognized threats, including terrorist acquisition and use of radioactive sources. The SBU is legally mandated to conduct counterterrorism and state security preparedness, including for radiological threats. The briefing materials therefore function as pseudo-evidence by reframing legitimate security training as incriminating proof of malintent.

Disinformation Tactic: Provision of “Evidence”

Russia’s briefing asserts that Ukraine lost control of 68 ionizing radiation sources in the Kharkiv region and uses this to suggest that Kyiv could build a “dirty bomb.” The allegation relies on the selective quotation of Ukrainian documentation that describes a “loss of control.” In regulatory practice, such reporting is mandatory when sources cannot be physically verified, including due to war-related access restrictions (which is what occurred in this case due to Russia’s invasion and subsequent military operations). Ukraine’s documentation therefore reflects compliance with safety and security obligations and alignment with IAEA expectations rather than an admission of illicit activity. The materials function as pseudo-evidence by reframing mandatory incident reporting as evidence of Ukrainian malintent.

Radiological Weapons Disinformation: Radiological Contamination Allegations

The briefing also claims that Western military and financial assistance “provokes” violations of nuclear material handling norms in Ukraine, further asserting that the “degradation” of the state administration could push Ukraine and parts of Europe towards an environmental catastrophe. It offers no credible causal pathway linking external assistance to any compliance failures and provides no evidence of any concrete incident. No public IAEA finding supports these allegations.

Disinformation Tactics: Cherry Picking, Fear Mongering

The briefing asserts that a radiation accident occurring at the ZNPP would result in a Chornobyl-like fallout, with radiation spreading across Ukraine and Europe. This allegation weaponizes selective radiological modeling and historical trauma. The referenced “forecast” is cherry-picked from standard multi-scenario emergency planning, which uses dynamic tools like JRODOS or FLEXPART to simulate multiple plume trajectories depending on variable weather. Moreover, equating current risks at the ZNPP to Chornobyl is scientifically flawed: unlike the 1986 core meltdown, explosion, and high-energy graphite fire, which lofted radioactive material into the stratosphere, any localized incident at the ZNPP would lack the thermal energy necessary for long-range atmospheric transport, especially while the ZNPP is in cold shutdown. Hence, the claim relies on unsubstantiated fear mongering by invoking the collective trauma of the Chornobyl disaster.

Disinformation Tactics: Provision of “Evidence”, Fear Mongering, Discrediting Opponents

In the briefing, a uranium legacy site in Kamianske is presented as an urgent radiological threat. The briefing claims that the Prydniprovskyi Chemical Plant poses dangerous contamination risks for the Dnipro basin and the Black Sea. The plant is indeed a Soviet-era uranium processing complex with long-term remediation needs. However, these are longstanding environmental and industrial safety challenges common for Soviet legacy sites and exacerbated by Russia’s invasion. The briefing repackages these issues as “evidence” of an acute crisis. Available assessments report the issue as a manageable engineering and remediation task rather than an acute catastrophe scenario. The briefing uses fear mongering to stoke concerns about a radiological emergency, portraying Ukraine as reckless and irresponsible with radioactive material in an attempt to discredit Russia’s opponent.

Chemical Weapons Disinformation: Allegations of an Aggressive Anti-Russia Campaign in the OPCW

In the briefing, Rtishchev makes several allegations to call into question the independence and neutrality of the OPCW. In particular, the briefing falsely claims that the OPCW is engaged in an aggressive, politically motivated campaign directed against the Russian Federation. These allegations seek to portray the OCPW as a Western-directed organization rather than an independent verification body. These narratives are designed to undermine confidence in the multilateral disarmament system and weaken trust in the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Disinformation Tactic: Discrediting the OPCW

This content seeks to connect actions and decisions made in the Syrian Arab Republic to ongoing activities in Ukraine. This image displays Rtishchev’s claims that the OPCW is a puppet of the West and falsely frames investigations and decisions by the OPCW as justifications for Western military actions. Through such claims, Russia seeks to erode trust in the multilateral verification mechanisms of the OPCW, allowing Russian officials to dismiss any findings that contradict their allegations as politically motivated rather than evidence based. These narratives serve to weaken both the OPCW and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Disinformation Tactic: Portraying States and Organizations as Puppets

Rtishchev claims the Russian Federation regularly informs the OPCW about instances of chemical weapons use by Ukrainian forces and provides “evidence” for these claims. Examples include numerous Notes Verbales Russia has submitted to the OPCW, such as the one pictured in this example from July 2025. This statement is deliberately misleading, as the claims outlined in these Notes Verbales regularly include disinformation, unfounded accusations, and misleading or unsubstantiated “evidence” (another common disinformation tactic used in this briefing).

In this briefing, Rtishchev specifically claims Western states “control the OPCW,” stripping neutrality and independence from the Organization. This tactic weakens the verification mechanisms in place and suggests international organizations cannot act independently or transparently.

Chemical Weapons Disinformation: False Allegations of CW Use

The briefing included multiple claims of chemical weapons use by Ukrainian forces and its allies. One example was a claim that the Russian Ministry of Defense uncovered more than 600 instances of chemical weapons use by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including the use of riot control agents and scheduled chemicals. To support his claims, Rtishchev provides several pieces of “evidence.” This is a common tactic used throughout the briefing to support unfounded claims. While such evidence has the appearance of legitimacy and even scientific robustness, it either lacks independent third-party verification or represents a deliberate misinterpretation of information.

Disinformation Tactic: Provision of “Evidence”

In this image, a map is presented that purportedly shows cases of chemical weapons use by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Without independent investigation of each individual case, including soil sample collection, eyewitness testimony, and other critical pieces of information, the map cannot be considered a legitimate form of evidence. Below the map, images of blood samples purportedly taken from poisoned Russian military personnel are presented, along with a photo of ammunition that is said to contain cyanide. Like the map, such photos are inherently misleading, as they lack any independent analysis or verification. Additionally, no information is provided about the methods used to detect the alleged substances, which is problematic given the difficulties and nuances associated with the detection of chemical weapons. Most intact chemical warfare agents, for example, including BZ, cannot be detected in blood after certain periods because they are metabolized and/or eliminated rapidly. While methods for detecting metabolites or other markers are available, no methods are specified in the photo.

Disinformation Tactic: Provision of “Evidence”

Rtishchev also claims that deliveries to Ukraine of personal protective equipment (PPE) and antidote kits prove Ukraine’s use of (or intent to use) chemical weapons. Framing CBRN preparedness measures as evidence of malintent is a common tactic used by the Russian government to support false claims for which there is no substantive evidence. As the article included in the image suggests, such equipment was requested to protect Ukrainian forces from Russian chemical attacks.

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Red Teaming Simulation Exercise

Erik — Wed, 10 Sep 2025 02:09:44 +0000

Red teaming simulation exercise

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) seeks to understand and counter state-sponsored or state-adjacent disinformation across the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) spectrum. As part of this effort, the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (JHCHS) conducted a red teaming study to assess the impact of Russian biological weapons (BW) disinformation on global non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament norms. Findings can be used to inform efforts to safeguard these norms.

Red teaming is a methodology that involves adopting the persona of a decision maker and simulating that decision maker’s thinking and actions. Used frequently by both academics and defense analysts, red teaming is considered a rigorous methodology, one that facilitates exploration of decision making while avoiding mirror imaging bias (when researchers project their world view onto a decision maker, resulting in incorrect assumptions and conclusions). In this exercise, participants were asked to adopt the role of a county leader and simulate that leader’s decision making on issues related to BW pursuit. Findings from the exercise suggest that disinformation can have real impacts on state-level decision making regarding BW, underscoring the importance of addressing information manipulation in diplomatic settings to safeguard nonproliferation norms and cooperative threat reduction efforts. Indeed, we found evidence that disinformation has the potential to increase state actors’ interest in pursuing an offensive BW capability, along with evidence that debunking false allegations can be an effective strategy to mitigate some of the consequences associated with disinformation.

OVERVIEW

METHODOLOGY

Participant recruitment and characteristics: To assess how different levels of expertise may impact state leaders’ decision making, the following groups of participants were recruited to complete the exercise:

40 BW experts (individuals with expertise in BW-related concepts).
40 country experts (individuals with expertise in the country to which they were assigned)
20 non-expert participants

10 participants (4 BW experts, 4 country experts, and 2 non-experts) were assigned to each country. To ensure appropriate assignments and the validity of study outputs, participants were assigned to countries based on their level and area of expertise, both of which were assessed through an online questionnaire. 10 countries were included in the exercise. These countries were chosen to ensure a sample with representation from all three BWC regional groups and sufficient variation across political systems, alliances, and historical experiences with BW.

Prior to completing the exercise, participants were provided with two primers to ensure they had sufficient background knowledge to engage with exercise materials: one on biological weapons concepts, and another describing the history, domestic politics, and foreign policy of the country to which they were assigned (along with any relevant information about the country’s history of BW pursuit and official stance on BW).

Exercise scenario: The red teaming exercise, which was adapted from a previous exercise,¹ was conducted through the online survey platform Qualtrics. The exercise scenario was based on real events, namely Russia’s 2022 request for a BWC Article V Formal Consultative Meeting to discuss unfounded allegations of U.S.-funded BW development in Ukraine. Participants’ interest in pursuing an offensive BW capability and/or a biodefense capability was then measured (both quantitatively and qualitatively) at three points in time:

At the beginning of the exercise, which was set in April 2021, prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
After the introduction of the first experimental inject (inject 1*), which was based on the disinformation presented by Russia during the 2022 Formal Consultative Meeting.
After the introduction of the second experimental inject (inject 2*), which was based on the United States’ and Ukraine’s official responses to Russia at the 2022 Formal Consultative Meeting.

*Both experimental injects were shortened or edited (for clarity) versions of the original statements and documents presented at the Formal Consultative Meeting. No fictional claims or documents were added by the investigators.

Outcome measurements: The primary outcome (participants’ interest, as leaders of their assigned country, in pursuing an offensive BW capability) was measured on two different scales:

Written scale, which required participants to select one of the following written statements:
1. “I don’t think our country should pursue any activity related to biological weapons, whether for offensive or defensive purposes.” (No interest in offense or defense)
2. “We should be conducting activities to enhance our defenses against biological weapons, including research to characterize deliberate biological threats and the development of medical countermeasures. However, we should not pursue offensive activities.” (Interest in defense only)
3. “That is a good question, and while we’re not interested in pursuing an offensive biological weapons capability now, there are some circumstances in which an offensive program might theoretically be useful.” (Slight interest in an offensive capability)
4. “We should give careful thought as to whether acquiring an offensive biological weapons capability in the short to medium term is in our interest.” (Moderate interest in an offensive capability)
5. “An offensive biological weapons program is something that we ideally would like to pursue.” (Strong interest in an offensive capability)
Numeric scale, which required participants to rate their interest in pursuing an offensive BW capability on a 0-10 scale (with 0 indicating no interest and 10 indicating strong interest).

PARTICIPANTS’ RESPONSES AT EACH TIME POINT

Participants’ interest in BW-related activities at each of the three measured time points: Throughout the exercise, over half of all participants indicated that they had no interest in pursuing an offensive BW capability, with most of these participants still expressing an interest in biodefense. However, a sizeable number (>20) indicated that they had slight interest in pursuing an offensive capability. Only a small number of participants indicated moderate or strong interest in pursuing an offensive BW capability, but this number increased after participants were exposed to the first experimental inject (Russia’s allegations). Following the response from the US and Ukraine, the number of participants expressing moderate or strong interest in pursuing an offensive capability decreased, but only slightly. These findings are displayed in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Participants’ interest in pursuing activities related to BW at each of the three measured time points

CHANGE IN PARTICIPANTS’ INTEREST THROUGHOUT THE EXERCISE

Figure 1: Participants’ interest in pursuing activities related to BW at each of the three measured time points

Change in participants’ interest in pursuing an offensive BW capability throughout the exercise: To better understand how interest in pursuing an offensive BW capability varied throughout the exercise, we grouped participants according to their ratings on the numeric (0 – 10) scale. We then plotted the number of participants in each group at each of the three measured time points (at the beginning of the exercise, following inject 1, and following inject 2). These groupings—and any movement between them—are displayed in Figure 2. As can be seen in the figure:

For many participants, their interest in pursuing an offensive BW capability remained at the same level throughout the exercise.
However, for some participants, their interest in pursuing an offensive BW capability increased following the first inject, with some of those expressing low or moderate interest at the beginning of the exercise expressing moderate, high, or even very high interest after exposure to Russia’s allegations.
For other participants, particularly those expressing high or very high interest at the beginning of the exercise, their interest in pursuing an offensive BW capability decreased following the first inject.
Following the second inject, interest in pursuing an offensive BW capability decreased for many participants, though for some, these decreases were small in scale.

Figure 2: Change in participants’ interest in pursuing an offensive BW capability throughout the exercise, with participants categorized according to their ratings on the numeric (0 – 10) scale

PARTICIPANTS’ EXPLANATIONS FOR THEIR RATINGS

Participants’ explanations for their ratings: Participants were asked to provide short written statements explaining their level of interest in pursuing an offensive BW capability after each inject. Some of the more common explanations are described in the table below, alongside representative quotes.

Time point	Change in interest	Reason(s)	Representative quote
Following inject 1 (Russia's allegations)	Increased interest	Information in the inject raised concerns about a potential BW threat from the US and/or Ukraine	"Our friends in Russia have shown considerable evidence that Ukraine and the US are engaging in offensive work... It’s clear that we must now at least consider, seriously, how best to protect oursel[ves]..."
	Decreased interest	Perceived political costs of developing an offensive BW capability following Russia’s allegations	"Noting the tension between Russia and the West, my inclination is to maintain relationships with both—including on defense—and that it isn’t wise to engage in risky biological research that stands to disrupt that relationship."
	No change	Information provided in the inject did not change political priorities or commitment to nonproliferation norms and laws	"[Our country] continues to abide by the rule of law and international norms, as set by the BWC. … Although I take these claims seriously, it is crucial that we do not allow accusations [to] justify the abandonment of our principles."
Following inject 2 (response from the US and Ukraine)	Increased interest	Perception that U.S. and Ukrainian activities still have dual-use potential; perceived ability to mask an offensive program as a defensive one	"The US and Ukraine’s activities, even if framed as peaceful, reveal the dual-use potential of biological research under defense programs, which I view as a strategic threat. Their reliance on public health narratives provides a model for plausible deniability, giving me cover to advance similar efforts under a defensive pretext."
	Decreased interest	U.S./Ukrainian response perceived to be legitimate and trustworthy, alleviating concerns	"The research conducted in Ukraine does seem targeted at reducing risks rather than developing weapons. It seems likely that the Americans are telling the truth..."
	No change	Distrust of the US and its intentions	"US evidence, in my view, simply added detail … to the well-grounded accusations that Russian authorities made. American diplomats are skilled at manipulating international institutions like the UN to distort and mask [their] disdain of international norms and the lives of people who dare to live outside the imperialist orbit."

IMPLICATIONS

Disinformation has the potential to alter state-level decision making about biological weapons

Some participants’ interest in pursuing an offensive BW capability increased following exposure to Russia’s allegations, suggesting that for some state actors, disinformation may increase the perceived utility or desirability of biological weapons.
These findings suggest that disinformation can have tangible—and dangerous—impacts on global nonproliferation, underscoring the need to invest resources in counter-disinformation efforts.
In their written explanations for their ratings, participants often discussed—implicitly or explicitly—the geopolitical orientation of their assigned country, including their assigned country’s relationship to the United States, Ukraine, and Russia. Such findings suggest that the effects of disinformation may hinge, at least to some extent, on geopolitics.

Debunking can mitigate some of the consequences of disinformation but should not be the only approach taken

Many participants expressed a reduced interest in pursuing an offensive BW capability following the second inject (the response from the US and Ukraine). These findings suggest that responding to and refuting false allegations (i.e., debunking) can mitigate some of the negative consequences of disinformation campaigns.
However, for some participants, their interest in pursuing an offensive capability did not decrease back to its starting level (i.e., to what it was at the beginning of the exercise), suggesting that debunking may not always be 100% effective.
Many of these participants were assigned to countries with close ties to Russia and/or negative or strained relations with the United States, suggesting that countries may respond to both disinformation and efforts to counter it along geopolitical lines. Such responses can be described as a form of motivated reasoning, or reasoning that is driven by the desire to maintain pre-existing social or political beliefs and identities.^2-3
These findings highlight that while debunking can be an effective strategy, other approaches to countering disinformation (including more pre-emptive strategies such as prebunking) should also be considered to ensure maximum efficacy.

ACTIONS

It is imperative that countries respond to false allegations fully and promptly, particularly when such allegations rise to the level of a BWC Formal Consultative Meeting. Findings from this study suggest that debunking can be an effective way to respond to false allegations, albeit one that may not be 100% effective.
Debunking must be done carefully and in a way that does not prompt countries to reject accurate information simply because it challenges pre-existing beliefs or geopolitical orientations. While this study found evidence that the response provided by the US and Ukraine was effective in some cases, it also appeared to trigger motivated reasoning in other cases.
Message tailoring techniques, including aligning messages to audiences’ core values, may help countries avoid triggering motivated reasoning.⁴ Aligning messages to the core values outlined in the BWC, including trust, transparency, and the importance of facilitating access to materials and technology for the peaceful use of biology, may be a particularly effective strategy.
In addition to debunking, other strategies to counter disinformation, including pre-emptive refutation (i.e., prebunking) should also be utilized.

September 2025

REFERENCES

Ackerman GA, Behlendorf B, Peterson H, LaTourette J, Wetzel A, Clifford D. Investigating the Potential Strategic Implications of COVID-19 for Biological Weapons Pursuit: A New Expert Simulation. Health Secur. 2024;22(1):45-57. doi:10.1089/hs.2023.0029
Kunda Z. The case for motivated reasoning. Psychol Bull. 1990;108(3):480-498. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480
Kahan DM. Ideology, motivated reasoning, and cognitive reflection. Judgment and Decision Making. 2013;8(4):407-424. doi:10.1017/S1930297500005271
Carpenter CJ. Cognitive Dissonance, Ego-Involvement, and Motivated Reasoning. Annals of the International Communication Association. 2019;43(1):1-23. doi:10.1080/23808985.2018.1564881

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Debunking the Recent October 2024 Russian Claims of a Chemical Weapons Attack by Ukraine

Erik — Thu, 12 Dec 2024 00:44:58 +0000

DEBUNKING THE RECENT OCTOBER 2024 RUSSIAN CLAIMS OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS ATTACK BY UKRAINE

On October 12, 2024, over 290 individual channels on Telegram and accounts on X (formerly Twitter), as well as some online news websites amplified a message claiming Ukraine was attacking Russian soldiers with unidentified chemical weapons.

The channels which repeated almost identical allegations across multiple languages (Russian, French, Spanish, English and Polish), focus on a story of a Russian soldier who experienced a chemical weapons attack. The soldier (callsign ‘Cerberus’) was allegedly the only survivor of a four-day chemical attack by the Armed forces of Ukraine. The posts describe how the soldier sustained injuries from exposure to a chemical agent while rescuing another soldier from their position. The narrative reports the use of a gas without assigning a specific classification to the substance (although a video description on RuTube classifies it as Sulphur Mustard) and is often accompanied by photos or videos.

Whilst the origins of the story are unclear, it has gained traction after being published by a war correspondent and Kremlin-affiliated Telegram channels. There are two variations of media reports supporting the claims – a video of the position the soldier was allegedly located at, with either a supporting selfie of an individual who is suggested to be the soldier, or a still image of what is claimed to be the soldier’s hand damaged by the chemical agent. The video and the selfie are presented as original material. However, monitoring by GP WMD Disinformation identified the pictures to have appeared two months prior related to other contexts.

The first instance of the photo in question appeared at a local Ukrainian channel from the Kharkiv Regional Administration on September 21, which initially claimed it depicted damage caused by a Russian chemical attack. The post was later amended to say the picture was illustrative and didn’t show the results of the actual attack. It was then deleted entirely. The actual origins of the picture and its connection to exposure by a chemical agent have not been identified. However, Russian networks are actively claiming and watermarking the image as evidence of a Ukrainian chemical weapons attack.

DETAILS OF THE NARRATIVE

TIMELINE

September 2024

Photo showing alleged CW injuries of Ukrainian soldier is shared by Ukrainian channels.

These claims are later clarified and debunked, revealing the image was illustrative, with no confirmation of its origin or link to chemical attacks.

October 2024

A network of Russian channels begins sharing claims about the Armed Forces of Ukraine using chemical weapons.

The claims are amplified by Kremlin-associated media outlets like Tsargrad TV and Pravda News.

November 2024

Video posted on RU Tube detailing the chemical as sulfur mustard.

CONTEXT

This campaign has emerged during a period of high tension with Russia’s actions in the ongoing conflict with Ukraine, particularly relating to the allegations of CW use in Ukraine and the diplomatic discourse within the OPCW.

In October 2024, the Russia-Ukraine conflict entered a phase of heightened military and diplomatic activity. On the ground, Russian forces launched aggressive offensives, seizing strategic locations such as Krasnyi Yar in Donetsk and Nevske in Luhansk, while Ukraine successfully defended other critical areas, including Kurakhove. Both sides escalated their use of drone warfare, with Russia targeting Kyiv and Ukraine conducting strikes in Belgorod.

Diplomatically, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy introduced a “Victory Plan” during a NATO defence ministers’ meeting, outlining goals for increased military support, advanced weaponry, and NATO accession. Zelenskyy emphasised the urgency of robust international backing, particularly considering concerns about declining aid from key allies like the United States.

This surge in activity occurs alongside several significant developments tied to chemical weapons allegations. The Russian Federation was ousted from the OPCW Executive Council and faced Ukrainian-led efforts to block its re-entry. Additionally, the OPCW Technical Assistance Visit (TAV) to Ukraine recently released a report confirming the presence of CS gas in samples reportedly linked to a Russian drone attack.

The timing of these accusations is crucial within the broader context of the ongoing military and diplomatic tensions. It aligns with a well-documented pattern where Russian disinformation increases during periods of intense conflict. These chemical weapons allegations may serve as a strategic effort to shape international perceptions and responses. With Ukraine actively lobbying for more support, including advanced weapons and NATO membership, these allegations could be seen as a tactic to discredit Ukrainian forces and draw global attention to supposed violations of international law.

TACTICS USED

The allegations of a CW attack by Ukrainian forces on Ukraine follows a similar pattern of tactics used by Russia:

Firehose of falsehood: this tactic utilises high numbers of channels and messages and exemplifies a willingness to disseminate partial truths or outright fictions. This tactic is used through the multiple messages across multiple channels, in different languages, portraying the same story. It is important to note that this is not a story told from different perspectives but is instead identical description of events likely machine translated into different languages.
Misrepresentation of evidence: As highlighted, whilst the messages claim the images of wounds and the soldier are from mid-October, these images actually circulated in September, suggesting that the use of such images as ‘evidence’ of a recent CW attack is not genuine.
Appeal to emotions: by using highly emotive/ graphic imagery, Russian actors seek to evoke feelings of disgust, fear and outrage.

TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT: PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE

The photographs presented in this case are inconclusive in determining the nature of the alleged chemical agent. While a Russian source has suggested sulfur mustard as the agent of concern, there is no corroborative evidence to substantiate this claim, nor any documented instances of sulfur mustard use in Ukrainian territory.

The wounds depicted in the photographs are nonspecific and cannot be used to confirm the patient’s exposure to sulfur mustard. The injuries, which depict focal tissue necrosis of the 4th and 5th digits – could have resulted from localised trauma or thermal burns – importantly there is no specific wound pattern presented that is confirmatory of a chemical exposure, either inhalational or locally delivered to the anatomical site of concern.

Furthermore, the absence of evidence for sulfur mustard use in Ukraine and the fact that the photographs provided have been sourced from a prior post by Ukrainian online accounts, renders these photographs irrelevant to the present claims made by Russian actors.

SUMMARY

The chemical weapons allegations made against Ukraine in October 2024, involving a Russian soldier’s claim of being attacked with an unidentified chemical agent, appear to be part of a broader disinformation campaign. Despite widespread dissemination across multiple platforms, the narrative lacks credible evidence. Key images, which pre-date the incident in question, are misrepresented to make suggestive claims without contemporaneous evidence. The claims of sulfur mustard use are unsubstantiated, and the injuries depicted in the images are non-specific for indicating chemical weapons exposure.

This disinformation, amplified through a “firehose of falsehood” strategy, with tactics designed to garner audiences’ emotional reaction, aligns with Russia’s broader tactics to discredit Ukraine amidst a tense military and diplomatic climate. As both sides continue to intensify operations, these allegations may serve as a tool to influence international perception, particularly in the context of rising chemical weapon concerns and Ukraine’s calls for further support.

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Sergiev Posad 6

Erik — Thu, 31 Oct 2024 15:51:22 +0000

SERGIEV POSAD-6

RUSSIA’S UPGRADED MILITARY BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH FACILITY AND THE LINK TO BIOWEAPONS DISINFORMATION IN UKRAINE

INTRODUCTION

Using satellite images from 2022 to the present day, Washington Post journalists recently documented evidence of what appears to be significant upgrades to Russia’s military biological facility at Sergiev Posad-6 near Moscow, with enhancements and enlargements to its high-containment facility, used to work on dangerous pathogens, and the expansion of the linked civilian site where scientists are housed.

The construction of this facility appeared to begin in May 2022 and coincided with an increase in biological weapons-related disinformation from Russia focused on Ukraine and its Western Allies, including false narratives around legitimate public health and biological research facilities. This briefing note explores this connection in more detail.

SOVIET AND RUSSIAN BIOWEAPONS DISINFORMATION

The USSR intentionally spread biological disinformation for decades during the Cold War, in part to distract from its own clandestine biological weapons development, as well as to undermine trust in the West. Despite being a signatory to, and special custodian of, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the Soviet Union continued and accelerated its development and production of biological weapons throughout the Cold War, in direct contravention of its responsibilities under the BWC.

During this period, the USSR pursued several disinformation campaigns related to biological research and related facilities in other countries, the most well-known one being Operation Denver. A 1985 KGB telegram detailed the intentions of this malicious disinformation related to HIV-AIDS, indicating:

“The goal of these measures is to create a favorable opinion for us [the USSR] abroad that that this disease is the result of secret experiments with a new type of biological weapon by the secret services of the USA and the Pentagon that spun out of control.”

Mikhail Gorbachev, the former leader of the Soviet Union, reportedly acknowledged and apologized to US President Ronald Reagan for spreading this disinformation.

This disinformation operation was ongoing while Soviet researchers pursued weaponization programs for dozens of biological agents, including those causing smallpox, plague, anthrax, Ebola virus disease and Marburg virus disease.

In 1992, Russian president Boris Yeltsin publicly acknowledged the continued existence of an active Russian biological weapons program, with military officials in the Russian Federation having continued rather than dismantled the USSR’s biological weapons program after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Sergiev Posad-6 site (originally known as Zagorsk-6) is one of three key military biological research laboratories in Russia, known to have been involved in the USSR’s offensive bioweapons program, that international experts have never been granted access to inspect.

The United States maintains that the Russian bioweapons program continues to exist today, and on 1 May 2024, the US State Department announced it was sanctioning three Russian government entities associated with Russia’s chemical and biological weapons programs, as well as four Russian companies that have contributed to such entities. The Sergiev Posad site was among these newly sanctioned Russian government entities, falling under the Russian Ministry of Defence’s Federal State Budgetary Institution 48th Central Scientific-Research Institute (48-i Tsentralnyi nauchno-issledovatel’skii institut, abbreviated in Russian as the 48th TSNII). According to the State Department, this is the leading Russian Ministry of Defence scientific research institute responsible for military protection against infectious diseases and biological threats. The 48th TSNII incorporates biological facilities in Sergiev Posad (48 Central Scientific Research Institute Sergiev Posad), Kirov (48 Central Scientific Research Institute Kirov) and Ekaterinburg (48 Central Scientific Research Institute Ekaterinburg).

MODERN DAY BIOWEAPONS DISINFORMATION

There are stark parallels to historical disinformation campaigns in the present day. While Russia further developed its high-containment facility at the Sergiev Posad-6 military research site, it also increased its efforts to spread disinformation targeting the Ukrainian public health system and other peaceful biological research laboratories in Ukraine, including falsely accusing these facilities of developing biological weapons.

On 11 March 2022, shortly after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Mission to the United Nations requested a meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss unfounded allegations of military biological activities in Ukraine in relation to public health laboratories. Following this, Russia circulated a note verbale to Security Council members falsely accusing Ukraine of having a biological weapons program and continued to circulate statements and materials accusing the United States and Ukraine of biological weapons development. In May 2022, as evidenced by satellite imagery, the Russian military began preparing the ground to expand the high-containment military facility at Sergiev Posad. At the same time, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov continued to falsely accuse the US of developing biological weapons in Ukraine and the Russian Federation subsequently initiated the formal mechanisms of the BWC by invoking both Article V and Article VI of the convention. Of note, a vast majority of States Parties that participated in the resulting BWC Formal Consultation in September 2022 dismissed Russia’s allegations as entirely unfounded.

Ironically, the Ukrainian laboratories alleged by Russia to be engaged in bioweapons efforts had lengthy and well-documented track records of peaceful collaboration with a range of international partners. These threat reduction efforts began in the early 1990s through the US-led Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program that worked, inter alia, to demilitarize the Soviet biological weapons infrastructure and to redirect former weapons scientists into peaceful roles. The Russian Federation was initially a participant in these peaceful efforts, it played an important role in the establishment by the G8 of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (2002) and collaborated on the delivery of a wide array of WMD threat reduction programming in Russia over the next decade. However, in 2014 following its annexation of Crimea, Russia was suspended from the G8 and the Global Partnership and has subsequently initiated significant disinformation campaigns targeting some of these very same facilities. It is noteworthy that Russia’s disinformation campaign against Ukraine was denounced by the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), which declared:

“These accusations are part of the Russian government’s absurd attempt to provide a plausible rationale for its unjust and unprovoked war against Ukraine. They are blatantly false and have been discredited numerous times. Until 2015, the Russian Federation hosted the ISTC and benefitted from approximately $1.5 billion of funding from states parties to the ISTC, including the U.S and the EU, to support Russian weapons scientists—including Russian biological scientists—in their transition to peaceful research. During the two-plus decades that Russia was an ISTC Party and ISTC Governing Board member, the Russian Federation directly approved the very same ISTC biological research and infrastructure projects that Russia is now slandering”.

MOTIVATIONS FOR SPREADING BIOWEAPON DISINFORMATION

Disinformation has been regularly used by malicious actors to obfuscate or justify their own actions and undermine others. There are numerous motivations for creating and disseminating disinformation. It is important to be aware of these motivations so that effective strategies can be developed to pre-empt and counter such attacks. Some common motivations include:

Misdirection: As detailed by the Soviet example above, Russian disinformation has previously been used to accuse its adversaries of the nefarious activities that Russia itself is conducting.
Creation of Confusion: Linked to this, a flood or ‘firehose’ of disinformation may be used to overwhelm and confuse the information space, making it difficult for individuals to recognize what information is accurate and what is false. This can create an environment where malicious activity can remain undetected or difficult to discern from reality.
Justification: Russia has repeatedly used false accusations of biological weapons development in Ukraine, often by NATO allies, and the promotion of false narratives regarding broader WMD threats as justification for its illegal war on Ukraine.
Undermining Trust: Disinformation about bioweapons undermines trust in and support for Western countries and the rules-based international system, including multilateral disarmament fora.

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Russia’s July 2024 Note Verbale Debunked

Erik — Sun, 01 Sep 2024 14:52:09 +0000

RUSSIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISINFORMATION

RUSSIA’S JULY 2024 NOTE VERBALE DEBUNKED

CONTEXT

The Russian Federation (Russia) repeated allegations that Ukraine is using chemical weapons against its forces in a Note Verbale circulated to member states of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the eve of its Executive Council session in July 2024. The Global Partnership’s Counter WMD Disinformation Initiative analysed Russia’s tactics and debunked the disinformation contained in the Note Verbale.

BACKGROUND

Russia has made a series of false allegations regarding WMD, particularly in the wake of its war of aggression against Ukraine. These allegations include false assertions of biological weapons development (leading to Russia’s invocation of Articles V and VI of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention) as well as targeted narratives about chemical weapons use and accusations made against the OPCW. Russia has an established history of spreading disinformation at the OPCW on the issue of chemical weapons use. These campaigns concern CW attacks by the Assad regime in Syria, the Novichok attacks in the United Kingdom, the Novichok poisoning of Alexander Navalny, and most recently battlefield use in Ukraine. Russia was also responsible for a foiled cyber-attack against the OPCW in 2018.

In November 2023, Russia lost its seat on the Executive Council of the OPCW. Alongside its continued disinformation campaign, Russia is accused of using riot control agents as a weapon of war in Ukraine, in violation of Article I of the Chemical Weapons Convention. These allegations have led to a new round of US sanctions.

WHAT TACTICS ARE BEING USED IN THE NOTE VERBALE?

In its most recent disinformation campaign, Russia employed several tactics, including:

Flooding the information space. Overwhelming the OPCW with a large volume of materials containing false allegations. This is part of a broader tactic known as a firehose of falsehood.
False Flags. Alleging that state actors have launched, or are preparing to launch, attacks against Russia using prohibited agents, often with the support of key member states.
Misrepresentation of evidence.
- Claiming that issued patents or patent applications are evidence of nefarious activity (the issuance of a US patent does not make it legal to produce the patented device).
- Framing CBRN preparedness activities as evidence of offensive plans.
- Doctoring video evidence by sharing incomplete video footage to falsely suggest soldiers convulsing.
Appeal to emotions. Sharing graphic images, videos, or textual descriptions to evoke feelings of disgust, fear and outrage.

WHY IS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THE NOTE VERBALE NOT CREDIBLE?

Video 1: Russia alleges that a video posted online shows the commander of Magyar Birds, a Ukrainian tactical aerial reconnaissance group, filling ammunition cylinders with unspecified toxic chemicals. Russia is selectively interpreting the container markings as evidence of chemical warfare agents. The more likely explanation is that the markings refer to “Бойова частина Осколковий: Combat unit [Warhead] anti-personnel [fragmentation]”, indicating a traditional high explosive fragmentation (HE-frag) warhead.

Video 2: Russia alleges that drone UAV-sourced footage shows a Russian soldier convulsing following the dropping of munitions, again suggesting the role of a chemical agent. The video provided is incomplete, and a longer version is available showing a munition dropped on two soldiers, with a follow-on munition dropped on the single Russian soldier flailing in the water. The first munition dropped (0:06), prior to the imagery shown in the video, is a modified F-1 grenade (or clone thereof). The F-1 is a cast iron-bodied, high-explosive fragmentation defensive hand grenade. The second munition dropped (0:19) is a modified VOG-17M. The VOG-17M is a 30 mm, high-explosive fragmentation automatic grenade launcher (AGL) round.

There is no evidence of chemical agents being used within these munitions. The F-1 grenade appears to detonate and injure the personnel with fragmentation, with one soldier flailing in the water and bleeding from the mouth. The VOG-17M is dropped a distance away from the soldier. He then struggles to keep afloat in the water (likely due to injuries, as well as the weight of his body armour and other equipment) leading to him drown.

Video 3: Russia alleges that a video showing a UAV-dropped munition is releasing a non-specified chemical agent due to a white smoke cloud emanating from the drop-zone. No additional information was offered to support this speculation, and no specific agent or munition can be confirmed from this video.

Patent Document: A patent is included in the Note Verbale, US9200877B1, describing a munition designed to carry chemical and biological agents. The patent does not appear to bear any relation to the events reported throughout the evidence pack. Given that the remainder of the document pertains to UAV-dropped munitions, there is no link to small arms ammunition. Small arms rounds are not fired by, or dropped from, any known Ukrainian or Russian UAVs.

WHAT IS THE GOAL OF THIS DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN?

By spreading this false narrative, Russia has several objectives:

Undermine confidence in the OPCW and its role as an independent investigatory body.
Discredit technical assistance from OPCW delivered in July 2024 to Ukraine.
Distract attention and dilute discussion relating to allegations of Russia’s own use of chemical weapons in Ukraine.
Polarise the multilateral system by making unsubstantiated claims requiring a response and affirmation of alignments by member states.
Sow doubt regarding Western/NATO/Ukrainian intentions by creating an information environment in which it is difficult to tell fact from fiction.
Undermine support for Ukraine and justify further Russian military aggression.

CURRENT REALITIES

There is no credible evidence that Ukraine is in contravention of any of its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The evidence provided by Russia to the OPCW is incomplete, speculative and circumstantial. Key items of evidence have been misrepresented to bolster Russia’srepeated spurious allegations.

Multiple credible allegations of CW use have been levelled against Russia in Ukraine. Allegations regarding chemical attacks have been described in Ukraine’s most recent statement to the OPCW and have been supported by international partners. These allegations fit into a larger pattern of Russian chemical weapons use against Ukrainian service personnel. Russia has a track record of using, or supporting the use of, chemicals weapons, as demonstrated by its actions during the Syrian conflict and in the Novichok attacks in the United Kingdom.

The OPCW remains a vital independent multilateral institution that protects the rules based international order, which Russia has continued to flout since its illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns divert international attention away from Russia’s own violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In addition, they represent continued attempts to discredit the OPCW and associated institutions where it has deployed similar tactics, such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the United Nations Security Council.

Russia’s current allegations on chemical weapons use by Ukraine are not new and fit into a broader pattern of disinformation related to weapons of mass destruction. It is critical that the international community continues to systematically uncover and refute falsehoods, which pose a serious and present danger to the global nonproliferation and disarmament architecture.